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
HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

BY GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,

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A NEW EDITION.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.—VOL. III.

WITH PORTRAIT, MAPS, AND PLANS.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1862.

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LONDON : PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHANCERY CROSS.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

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CHAPTER XXV.

ILLYRIANS, MACEDONIANS, PÆONIANS.

NORTHWARD of the tribes called Epirotic lay those more numerous and widely extended tribes who bore the general name of Illyrians, bounded on the west by the Adriatic, on the east by the mountain-range of Skardus, the northern continuation of Pindus, and thus covering what is now called Middle and Upper Albania, together with the more northerly mountains of Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Bosnia. Their limits to the north and north-east cannot be assigned. But the Dardani and Autariatæ must have reached to the north-east of Skardus and even east of the Servian plain of Kossovo; while along the Adriatic coast, Skylax extends the race so far northward as to include Dalmatia, treating the Liburnians and Istrians beyond them as not Illyrian: yet Appian and others consider the Liburnians and Istrians as Illyrian, and Herodotus even includes under that name the Eneti or Veneti at the extremity of the Adriatic Gulf.¹ The

¹ Herodot. i. 196; Skylax, c. 19-27; Appian, Illyric. c. 2, 4, 8.

The geography of the countries occupied in ancient times by the Illyrians, Macedonians, Pæonians, Thracians, &c., and now possessed by a great diversity of races, among whom the Turks and Albanians retain the primitive barbarism without mitigation, is still very imperfectly understood; though the researches of Colonel Leake, of Boué, of Grisebach, and others (especially the

valuable travels of the latter), have of late thrown much light upon it. How much our knowledge is extended in this direction, may be seen by comparing the map prefixed to Mannert's *Geographie*, or to O. Müller's *Dissertation on the Macedonians*, with that in Boué's *Travels*; but the extreme deficiency of the maps, even as they now stand, is emphatically noticed by Boué himself (see his *Critique des Cartes de la Turquie* in the fourth volume of his

Bulini, according to Skylax, were the northernmost Illyrian tribe : the Amantini, immediately northward of the Epirotic Chaonians,

Voyage)—by Paul Joseph Schaffarik, the learned historian of the Slavonic race, in the preface attached by him to Dr. Joseph Müller's Topographical Account of Albania—and by Grisebach, who in his surveys taken from the summits of the mountains Peristeri and Ljubatrin, found the map differing at every step from the bearings which presented themselves to his eye. It is only since Boué and Grisebach that the idea has been completely dismissed, derived originally from Strabo, of a straight line of mountains (*εὐθεία γραμμή*, Strabo, lib. vii. Fragm. 3) running across from the Adriatic to the Euxine, and sending forth other lateral chains in a direction nearly southerly. The mountains of Turkey in Europe, when examined with the stock of geological science which M. Viquesnel (the companion of Boué) and Dr. Grisebach bring to the task, are found to belong to systems very different, and to present evidences of conditions of formation often quite independent of each other.

The thirteenth chapter of Grisebach's Travels presents the best account which has yet been given of the chain of Skardus and Pindus: he has been the first to prove clearly, that the Ljubatrin, which immediately overhangs the plain of Kossovo at the southern border of Servia and Bosnia, is the north-eastern extremity of a chain of mountains reaching southward to the frontiers of Ætolia, in a direction not very wide of N-S.—with the single interruption (first brought to view by Colonel Leake) of the Klissoura of Devol—a complete gap, where the river Devol, rising on the eastern side, crosses the chain and joins the Apsus or Beratino on the western—(it is remarkable that both in the map of Boué and in that annexed to Dr. Joseph Müller's Topographical Description of Albania, the river Devol is made to join the Genussus or Skoumi, considerably north of the Apsus, though Colonel Leake's map gives the correct course). In Grisebach's nomenclature Skardus is made to reach from the Ljubatrin as its north-eastern extremity, south-westward and southward as far as the Klissoura of Devol: south of that point Pindus commences, in a continuation however of the same axis.

In reference to the seats of the

ancient Illyrians and Macedonians, Grisebach has made another observation of great importance (vol. ii. p. 121). Between the north-eastern extremity, Mount Ljubatrin, and the Klissoura of Devol, there are in the mighty and continuous chain of Skardus (above 7000 feet high) only two passes fit for an army to cross: one near the northern extremity of the chain, over which Grisebach himself crossed, from Kalkandele to Prisdren, a very high col, not less than 5000 feet above the level of the sea; the other, considerably to the southward, and lower as well as easier, nearly in the latitude of Lychnidus or Ochrida. It was over this last pass that the Roman Via Egnatia travelled, and that the modern road from Scutari and Durazzo to Bitolia now travels. With the exception of these two partial depressions, the long mountain ridge maintains itself undiminished in height, admitting indeed paths by which a small company either of travellers, or of Albanian robbers from the Dibren, may cross (there is a path of this kind which connects Struga with Ueskioub, mentioned by Dr. Joseph Müller, p. 70, and some others by Boué, vol. iv. p. 546), but nowhere admitting the passage of an army.

To attack the Macedonians, therefore, an Illyrian army would have to go through one or other of these passes, or else to go round the north-eastern pass of Katschanik, beyond the extremity of Ljubatrin. And we shall find that, in point of fact, the military operations recorded between the two nations, carry us usually in one or other of these directions. The military proceedings of Brasidas (Thucyd. iv. 124)—of Philip the son of Amyntas king of Macedon (Diodor. xvi. 8)—of Alexander the Great in the first year of his reign (Arrian, i. 5), all bring us to the pass near Lychnidus (compare Livy, xxxii. 9; Plutarch, Flaminin. c. 4); while the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ border upon Pæonia, to the north of Pelagonia, and threaten Macedonia from the north-east of the mountain-chain of Skardus. The Autariatæ are not far removed from the Pæonian Agrianes, who dwelt near the sources of the Strymon, and both Autariatæ and Dardani threatened the return march of Alexander from the Danube into Macedonia, after his suc-

were the southernmost. Among the southern Illyrian tribes are to be numbered the Taulantii—originally the possessors, afterwards the immediate neighbours, of the territory on which Epidamnus was founded. The ancient geographer Hekataeus¹ (about 500 B.C.) is sufficiently well acquainted with them to specify their town Sesarêthus. He names the Chelidonii as their northern, the Encheleis as their southern, neighbours; and the Abri also as a tribe nearly adjoining. We hear of the Illyrian Parthini, nearly in the same regions—of the Dassaretii,² near Lake Lychnidus—of the Penestæ, with a fortified town Uscana, north of the Dassaretii—of the Ardiaeans, the Autariatæ, and the Dardanians, throughout Upper Albania eastward as far as Upper Moesia, including the range of Skardus itself; so that there were some Illyrian tribes conterminous on the east, with Macedonians, and on the south with Macedonians as well as with Pæonians. Strabo even extends some of the Illyrian tribes much farther northward, nearly to the Julian Alps.³

With the exception of some portions of what is now called Middle Albania, the territory of these tribes consisted principally of mountain pastures with a certain proportion of fertile valley, but rarely expanding into a plain. The Autariatæ had the reputation of being unwarlike, but the Illyrians generally were poor, rapacious,

successful campaign against the Getæ, low down in the course of that great river (Arrian, i. 5). Without being able to determine the precise line of Alexander's march on this occasion, we may see that these two Illyrian tribes must have come down to attack him from Upper Moesia, and on the eastern side of the Axios. This, and the fact that the Dardani were the immediate neighbours of the Pæonians, shows us that their seats could not have been far removed from Upper Moesia (Livy, xlv. 29): the fauces Pelagoniæ (Livy, xxxi. 34) are the pass by which they entered Macedonia from the north. Ptolemy even places the Dardani at Skopie (Ueskioub) (iii. 9); his information about these countries seems better than that of Strabo.

The important topographical instruction contained in Grisebach's work was deprived of much of its value from the want of a map annexed. This deficiency has now been supplied (1853) in the new map of Turkey in Europe, published by Kiepert of Berlin; wherein the data of Grisebach, Boué, Viquesnel, Joseph Müller, and several others, are

for the first time combined and turned to account. Kiepert's map is a material addition to our knowledge of the countries south of the Danube. The "Erläuterungen" annexed to it, while they set forth the best evidences on which a cartographer of Turkey in the present day can proceed, proclaim however the deplorable paucity of scientific or accurate observations.

¹ Hekataei Fragm. ed. Klausen, Fr. 66-70; Thucyd. i. 26.

Skylax places the Encheleis north of Epidamnus and of the Taulantii. It may be remarked that Hekataeus seems to have communicated much information respecting the Adriatic: he noticed the city of Adria at the extremity of the Gulf, and the fertility and abundance of the territory around it (Fr. 58: compare Skymnus Chius, 384).

² Livy, xliii. 9-18. Mannert (Geograph. der Griech. und Römer, part vii. ch. 9. p. 386 *seq.*) collects the points and shows how little can be ascertained respecting the localities of these Illyrian tribes.

³ Strabo, iv. p. 206.

fierce and formidable in battle. They shared with the remote Thracian tribes the custom of tattowing¹ their bodies and of offering human sacrifices: moreover, they were always ready to sell their military service for hire, like the modern Albanian Schkipetars, in whom probably their blood yet flows, though with considerable admixture from subsequent immigrations. Of the Illyrian kingdom on the Adriatic coast, with Skodra (Scutari) for its capital city, which became formidable by its reckless piracies in the third century B.C., we hear nothing in the flourishing period of Grecian history. The description of Skylax notices in his day, all along the northern Adriatic, a considerable and standing traffic between the coast and the interior, carried on by Liburnians, Istrians, and the small Grecian insular settlements of Pharos and Issa. But he does not name Skodra, and probably this strong post (together with the Greek town Lissus, founded by Dionysius of Syracuse) was occupied after his time by conquerors from the interior,² the predecessors of Agrôn and Gentius, just as the coast-land of the Thermaic Gulf was conquered by inland Macedonians.

Once during the Peloponnesian war, a detachment of hired Illyrians, marching into Macedonia Lynkêstis (seemingly over the pass of Skardus a little east of Lychnidus or Ochrida), tried the valour of the Spartan Brasidas.

On that occasion (as in the expedition above alluded to of the Epirots against Akarnania) we shall notice the marked superiority of the Grecian character, even in the case of an armament chiefly composed of helots newly enfranchised, over both Macedonians and Illyrians. We shall see the contrast between brave men acting in concert and obedience to a common authority, and an assailing host of warriors, not less brave individually, but in which every man is his own master,³ and fights as he pleases. The rapid and impetuous rush of the Illyrians, if the first shock

¹ Strabo, vii. p. 315; Arrian, i. 5, 4-11. So impracticable is the territory, and so narrow the means of the inhabitants, in the region called Upper Albania, that most of its resident tribes even now are considered as free, and pay no tribute to the Turkish government: the Pachas cannot extort it without greater expense and difficulty than the sum gained would repay. The same was the case in Epirus or Lower Albania, previous to the time of Ali Pacha: in Middle Albania, the country does not present the like difficulties, and no such exemptions are allowed (Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. iii. p. 192).

These free Albanian tribes are in the same condition with regard to the Sultan as the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor with regard to the king of Persia in ancient times (Xenophon, Anab. iii. 2, 23).

² Diodor. xv. 13; Polyb. ii. 4.

³ See the description in Thucydides (iv. 124-128); especially the exhortation which he puts into the mouth of Brasidas—*αὐτοκράτωρ μάχῃ*, contrasted with the orderly array of Greeks.

"Illyriorum velocitas ad excursiones et impetus subitos."—Livy, xxxi. 35.

failed of its effect, was succeeded by an equally rapid retreat or flight. We hear nothing afterwards respecting these barbarians until the time of Philip of Macedon, whose vigour and military energy first repressed their incursions, and afterwards partially conquered them. It seems to have been about this period (400-350 B.C.) that the great movement of the Gauls from west to east took place, which brought the Gallic Skordiski and other tribes into the regions between the Danube and the Adriatic Sea, and which probably dislodged some of the northern Illyrians so as to drive them upon new enterprises and fresh abodes.

What is now called Middle Albania, the Illyrian territory immediately north of Epirus, is much superior to the latter in productiveness.¹ Though mountainous, it possesses more both of low hill and valley, and ampler as well as more fertile cultivable spaces. Epidamnus and Apollonia formed the seaports of this territory. To them commerce with the southern Illyrians, less barbarous than the northern, was one of the sources² of great prosperity during the first century of their existence—a prosperity interrupted in the case of the Epidamnians by internal dissensions, which impaired their ascendancy over their Illyrian neighbours, and ultimately placed them at variance with their mother-city Korkyra. The commerce between these Greek seaports and the interior tribes, when once the Greeks became strong enough to render violent attack from the latter hopeless, was reciprocally beneficial to both of them. Grecian oil and wine were introduced among these barbarians, whose chiefs at the same time learnt to appreciate the woven fabrics,³ the polished and carved metallic work, the tempered weapons, and the pottery, which issued from Grecian artisans. Moreover, the importation sometimes of salt-fish, and always that of salt itself, was of the greatest importance to these inland residents, especially for such localities as possessed lakes abounding in fish like that of Lychnidus. We hear of wars between the Autariatæ and the Ardiaei, respecting salt-springs near their boundaries, and also of other tribes whom the privation of salt reduced to the necessity of submitting to the Romans.⁴ On the other hand these tribes pos-

Epidamnus
and Apol-
lonia in rela-
tion to the
Illyrians.

¹ See Pouqueville, *Voyage en Grèce*, vol. i. ch. 23 and 24; Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa*, vol. ii. p. 138, 139; Boné, *La Turquie en Europe*, *Géographie Générale*, vol. i. p. 60-65.

² *Skymnus Chius*, v. 418-425.

³ Thucydides mentions the *ύφαντὰ*

καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, which the Greek settlements on the Thracian coast sent up to king Seuthês (ii. 98): similar to the *ύφασμαθ' ἱερὰ*, and to the *χειρᾶν τεκτόνων δαίδαλα*, offered as presents to the Delphian god (Eurip. *Ion*, 1141; Pindar, *Pyth.* v. 46).

⁴ Strabo, vii. p. 317; Appian, *Illyric*.

sessed two articles of exchange so precious in the eyes of the Greeks, that Polybius reckons them as absolutely indispensable¹—cattle and slaves; which latter were doubtless procured from Illyria, often in exchange for salt, as they were from Thrace and from the Euxine, and from Aquileia in the Adriatic, through the internal wars of one tribe with another. Silver-mines were worked at Damastium in Illyria. Wax and honey were probably also articles of export, and it is a proof that the natural products of Illyria were carefully sought out, when we find a species of iris peculiar to the country collected and sent to Corinth, where its

17; Aristot. *Mirab. Ausc.* c. 138. For the extreme importance of the trade in salt, as a bond of connexion, see the regulations of the Romans when they divided Macedonia into four provinces, with the distinct view of cutting off all connexion between one and the other. All *commercium* and *connubium* were forbidden between them. The fourth region, whose capital was Pelagonia (and which included all the primitive or Upper Macedonia, east of the range of Pindus and Skardus), was altogether inland, and it was expressly forbidden to draw its salt from the third region, or the country between the Lower Axios and the Peneius; while on the other hand the Illyrian Dardani (situated northward of Upper Macedonia) received express permission to draw *their* salt from this third or maritime region of Macedonia: the salt was to be conveyed from the Thermaic Gulf along the road of the Axios to Stobi in Pæonia, and was there to be sold at a fixed price.

The inner or fourth region of Macedonia, which included the modern Bitoglia and Lake Castoria, could easily obtain its salt from the Adriatic, by the communication afterwards so well known as the Roman Egnatian way; but the communication of the Dardani with the Adriatic led through a country of the greatest possible difficulty, and it was probably a great convenience to them to receive their supply from the Gulf of Therma by the road along the Vardar (Axios) (*Livy*, xlv. 29). Compare the route of Grisebach from Salonichi to Scutari, in his *Reise durch Rumelien*, vol. ii.

¹ About the cattle in Illyria, Aristotle, *De Mirab. Ausc.* c. 128. There is a remarkable passage in Polybius, wherein he treats the importation of slaves as a matter of necessity to Greece (iv. 37). The purchasing of the Thra-

cian slaves in exchange for salt is noticed by Menander—*Θράξ εὐγενὴς εἰ, πρὸς ἄλλας ἡγορασμένος*: see Proverb. Zenob. ii. 12, and Diogenian, i. 100.

The same trade was carried on in antiquity with the nations on and near Caucasus, from the seaport of Dioskurias at the eastern extremity of the Euxine (*Strabo*, xi. p. 506): so little have those tribes changed, that the Circassians now carry on much the same trade. Dr. Clarke's statement carries us back to the ancient world:—"The Circassians frequently sell their children to strangers, particularly to the Persians and Turks, and their princes supply the Turkish seraglios with the most beautiful of the prisoners of both sexes whom they take in war. In their commerce with the Tchernomorski Cossacks (north of the river Kuban), the Circassians bring considerable quantities of wood, and the delicious honey of the mountains, sewed up in goats' hides, with the hair on the outside. These articles they exchange for salt, a commodity found in the neighbouring lakes, of a very excellent quality. Salt is more precious than any other kind of wealth to the Circassians, and it constitutes the most acceptable present which can be offered to them. They weave mats of very great beauty, which find a ready market both in Turkey and Russia. They are also ingenious in the art of working silver and other metals, and in the fabrication of guns, pistols and sabres. Some, which they offered us for sale, we suspected had been procured in Turkey in exchange for slaves. Their bows and arrows are made with inimitable skill, and the arrows being tipped with iron, and otherwise exquisitely wrought, are considered by the Cossacks and Russians as inflicting incurable wounds." (*Clarke's Travels*, vol. i. ch. xvi. p. 378.)

root was employed to give the special flavour to a celebrated kind of aromatic unguent.¹

The intercourse between the Hellenic ports and the Illyrians inland, was not exclusively commercial. Grecian exiles also found their way into Illyria, and Grecian mythes became localised there, as may be seen by the tale of Kadmus and Harmonia, from whom the chiefs of the Illyrian Encheleis professed to trace their descent.²

The Macedonians of the fourth century B.C. acquired, from the ability and enterprise of two successive kings, a great perfection in Greek military organization without any of the loftier Hellenic qualities. Their career in Greece is purely destructive, extinguishing the free movement of the separate cities, and disarming the citizen-soldier to make room for the foreign mercenary whose sword was unhallowed by any feelings of patriotism—yet totally incompetent to substitute any good system of central or pacific administration. But the Macedonians of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. are an aggregate only of rude inland tribes, subdivided into distinct petty principalities, and separated from the Greeks by a wider ethnical difference even than the Epirots; since Herodotus, who considers the Epirotic Molossians and Thesprotians as children of Hellen, decidedly thinks the contrary respecting the Macedonians.³ In the main, however, they seem at this early period analogous to the Epirots in character and civilization. They had some few towns, but they were chiefly village residents, extremely brave and pugnacious: the customs of some of their tribes enjoined that the man who had not yet slain an enemy should be distinguished on some occasions by a badge of discredit.⁴

The original seats of the Macedonians were in the regions east of the chain of Skardus (the northerly continuation of Pindus)—north of the chain called the Cambunian mountains, which connects Olympus with Pindus, and which forms the

Early Macedonians.

Their original seats.

¹ Theophrast. Hist. Plant. iv. 5, 2; ix. 7, 4; Pliny, H. N. xiii. 2; xxi. 19; Strabo, vii. p. 326. Coins of Epidamnus and Apollonia are found not only in Macedonia, but in Thrace and in Italy: the trade of these two cities probably extended across from sea to sea, even before the construction of the Egnatian way; and the Inscription 2056 in the Corpus of Boëckh proclaims the gratitude of Odëssus (Varna) in the Euxine Sea towards a citizen of Epidamnus (Barth, Corinthiorum Mercatur.

Hist. p. 49; Aristot. Mirab. Auscult. c. 104).

² Herodot. v. 61; viii. 137; Strabo, vii. p. 326. Skylax places the *Λίθοι* of Kadmus and Harmonia among the Illyrian Manii, north of the Encheleis (Diodor. xix. 53; Pausan. ix. 5, 3).

³ Herodot. v. 22.

⁴ Aristot. Polit. vii. 2, 6. That the Macedonians were chiefly village residents, appears from Thucyd. ii. 100, iv. 124, though this does not exclude some towns.

north-western boundary of Thessaly; but they did not reach so far eastward as the Thermaic Gulf; apparently not farther eastward than Mount Bermius, or about the longitude of Edessa and Berrhoia. They thus covered the upper portions of the course of the rivers Haliakmôn and Erigôn, before the junction of the latter with the Axios; while the upper course of the Axios, higher than this point of junction, appears to have belonged to Pæonia, though the boundaries of Macedonia and Pæonia cannot be distinctly marked out at any time.

The large space of country included between the above-mentioned boundaries is in great part mountainous, occupied by lateral ridges or elevations which connect themselves with the main line of Skardus. But it also comprises three wide alluvial basins or plains, which are of great extent and well-adapted to cultivation—the plain of Tettovo or Kalkandele (northernmost of the three), which contains the sources and early course of the Axios or Vardar—that of Bitolia, coinciding to a great degree with the ancient Pelagonia, wherein the Erigôn flows towards the Axios—and the larger and more undulating basin of Greveno and Anaselitzas, containing the Upper Haliakmôn with its confluent streams: this latter region is separated from the basin of Thessaly by a mountainous line of considerable length, but presenting numerous easy passes.¹ Reckoning the basin of Thessaly as a fourth, here are four distinct enclosed plains on the east side of this long range of Skardus and Pindus—each generally bounded by mountains which rise precipitously to an alpine height, and each leaving only one cleft for drainage by a single river—the Axios, the Erigôn, the Haliakmôn and the Peneius respectively. All four, moreover, though of high level above the sea, are yet for the most part of distinguished fertility, especially the plains of Tettovo, of Bitolia, and Thessaly. The fat rich land to the east of Pindus and Skardus is described as forming a marked contrast with the light calcareous soil of the Albanian plains and valleys on the western side. The basins of Bitolia and of the Haliakmôn, with the mountains around and adjoining, were possessed by the original Macedonians; that of Tettovo, on the north, by a portion of the Pæonians. Among the four, Thessaly is the most spacious; yet the two comprised in the primitive seats of the Macedonians, both of them very con-

¹ Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. i. p. 199: “un bon nombre de cols dirigés du nord au sud, comme pour inviter les habitants de passer d’une de ces provinces dans l’autre.”

siderable in magnitude, formed a territory better calculated to nourish and to generate a considerable population than the less favoured home, and smaller breadth of valley and plain, occupied by Epirots or Illyrians. Abundance of corn easily raised, of pasture for cattle, and of new fertile land open to cultivation, would suffice to increase the numbers of hardy villagers, indifferent to luxury as well as to accumulation, and exempt from that oppressive extortion of rulers which now harasses the same fine regions.¹

The inhabitants of this primitive Macedonia doubtless differed much in ancient times, as they do now, according as they dwelt on mountain or plain, and in soil and climate more or less kind. But all acknowledged a common ethnical name and nationality, and the tribes were in many cases distinguished from each other, not by having substantive names of their own, but merely by local epithets of Grecian origin. Thus we find Elymiotæ Macedonians or Macedonians of Elymeia—Lynkêstæ Macedonians or Macedonians of Lynkus, &c. Orestæ is doubtless an adjunct name of the same character. The inhabitants of the more northerly tracts, called Pelagonia and Deu-

Distribution
and tribes
of the Mace-
donians.

¹ For the general physical character of the region, both east and west of Skardus, continued by Pindus, see the valuable chapter of Grisebach's Travels above referred to (Reisen, vol. ii. ch. xiii. p. 125–130; c. xiv. p. 175; c. xvi. p. 214–216; c. xvii. p. 244, 245).

Respecting the plains comprised in the ancient Pelagonia, see also the Journal of the younger Pouqueville, in his progress from Travnik in Bosnia to Janina. He remarks, in the two days' march from Prelepe (Prilip) through Bitolia to Florina, "Dans cette route on parcourt des plaines luxuriantes couvertes de moissons, de vastes prairies remplies de trèfle, des plateaux abondans en pâturages inépuisables, où paissent d'innombrables troupeaux de bœufs, de chèvres, et de menu bétail Le blé, le maïs, et les autres grains sont toujours à très bas prix, à cause de la difficulté des débouchés, d'où l'on exporte une grande quantité de laines, de cotons, de peaux d'agneaux, de buffles, et de chevaux, qui passent par le moyen des caravanes en Hongrie." (Pouqueville, Voyage dans la Grèce, tom. ii. ch. 62. p. 495.) So also Grisebach, describing his journey from Bitolia to Prilip, mentions—"spacious fields, of immeasurable extent, covered with wheat, barley, and maize, together with rich meadows and pas-

ture-grounds bordering the water" (p. 214).

Again, M. Boué remarks upon this same plain, in his Critique des Cartes de la Turquie, Voyage, vol. iv. p. 483, "La plaine immense de Prilip, de Bitolia, et de Florina, n'est pas représentée (sur les cartes) de manière à ce qu'on ait une idée de son étendue, et surtout de sa largeur La plaine de Sarigoul est changée en vallée," &c. The basin of the Haliakmôn he remarks to be represented equally imperfectly on the maps: compare also his Voyage, i. pp. 211, 299, 300.

I notice the more particularly the large proportion of fertile plain and valley in the ancient Macedonia, because it is often represented (and even by O. Müller, in his Dissertation on the ancient Macedonians, attached to his History of the Dorians) as a cold and rugged land, pursuant to the statement of Livy (xlv. 29), who says, respecting the fourth region of Macedonia as distributed by the Romans, "Frigida hæc omnis, duraque cultu, et aspera plaga est: cultorum quoque ingenia terræ similia habet: ferociores eos et accolæ barbari faciunt, nunc bello exercentes, nunc in pace miscentes ritus suos."

This is probably true of the mountaineers included in the region, but it is too much generalised.

riopus, were also portions of the Macedonian aggregate, though neighbours of the Pæonians, to whom they bore much affinity: whether the Eordi and Almopians were of Macedonian race, it is more difficult to say. The Macedonian language was different from Illyrian,¹ from Thracian, and seemingly also from Pæonian; it was also different from Greek, yet apparently not more widely distinct than that of the Epirots; so that the acquisition of Greek was comparatively easy to the chiefs and people, though there were always some Greek letters which they were incapable of pronouncing. And when we follow their history, we shall find in them more of the regular warrior conquering in order to maintain dominion and tribute, and less of the armed plunderer—than the Illyrians, Thracians, or Epirots, by whom it was their misfortune to be surrounded. They approach nearer to the Thessalians,² and to the other ungifted members of the Hellenic family.

The large and comparatively productive region covered by the various sections of Macedonians, helps to explain that increase of ascendancy which they successively acquired over all their neighbours. It was not however until a late period that they became united under one government. At first, each section—how many we do not know—had its own prince or chief. The Elymiots or inhabitants of Elymeia, the southernmost portion of Macedonia, were thus originally distinct and independent; also the Orestæ, in mountain seats somewhat north-west of the Elymiots—the Lynkêstæ and Eordi, who occupied portions of territory on the track of the subsequent Egnatian way, between Lychnidus (Ochrida) and Edessa—the Pelagonians,³ with a town of the same name, in the fertile plain of Bitolia—and the more northerly Deuriopians. And the early political union was usually so loose, that each of these denominations probably includes many petty independencies, small towns, and villages. The section of the Macedonian name

Macedonians round Edessa—the leading portion of the nation. who afterwards swallowed up all the rest and became known as *The Macedonians*, had their original centre at Ægæ or Edessa—the lofty, commanding and picturesque

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 8, 9. This is the most distinct testimony which we possess, and it appears to me to contradict the opinion both of Mannert (Geogr. der Gr. und Röm. vol. vii. p. 492) and of O. Müller (On the Macedonians, sect. 28–36), that the native Macedonians were of Illyrian descent.

² The Macedonian military array seems to have been very like that of the Thessalians—horsemen well-mounted

and armed and maintaining good order (Thucyd. ii. 201): of their infantry, before the time of Philip son of Amyntas, we do not hear much.

“Macedoniam, quæ tantis barbarorum gentibus attingitur, ut semper Macedonicis imperatoribus iidem fines imperii fuerint qui gladiatorum atque pilorum.” (Cicero, in Pison. c. xvi.)

³ Strabo, lib. vii. Fragm. 20, ed. Tafel.

site of the modern Vodhena. And though the residence of the kings was in later times transferred to the marshy Pella, in the maritime plain beneath, yet Edessa was always retained as the regal burial-place, and as the hearth to which the religious continuity of the nation (so much revered in ancient times) was attached. This ancient town, which lay on the Roman Egnatian way from Lychnidus to Pella and Thessalonika, formed the pass over the mountain-ridge called Bermius, or that prolongation to the northward of Mount Olympus, through which the Haliakmôn makes its way out into the maritime plain at Verria, by a cleft more precipitous and impracticable than that of the Peneius in the defile of Tempê.

This mountain-chain called Bermius, extending from Olympus considerably to the north of Edessa, formed the original eastern boundary of the Macedonian tribes; who seem at first not to have reached the valley of the Axios in any part of its course, and who certainly did not reach at first to the Thermaic Gulf. Between the last-mentioned gulf and the eastern counterforts of Olympus and Bermius there exists a narrow strip of plain land or low hill which reaches from the mouth of the Peneius to the head of the Thermaic Gulf; it there widens into the spacious and fertile plain of Salonichi, comprising the mouths of the Haliakmôn, the Axios, and the Echeidôrus. The river Ludias, which flows from Edessa into the marshes surrounding Pella, and which in antiquity joined the Haliakmôn, near its mouth, has now altered its course so as to join the Axios. This narrow strip, between the mouths of the Peneius and the Haliakmôn, was the original abode of the Pierian Thracians, who dwelt close to the foot of Olympus, and among whom the worship of the Muses seems to have been a primitive characteristic; Grecian poetry teems with local allusions and epithets which appear traceable to this early fact, though we are unable to follow it in detail. North of the Pierians, from the mouth of the Haliakmôn to that of the Axios, dwelt the Bottiæans.¹

Pierians and Bottiæans—originally placed on the Thermaic Gulf, between the Macedonians and the sea.

¹ I have followed Herodotus in stating the original series of occupants on the Thermaic Gulf, anterior to the Macedonian conquests. Thucydides introduces the Pæonians between Bottiæans and Mygdonians: he says that the Pæonians possessed "a narrow strip of land on the side of the Axios, down to Pella and the sea" (ii. 96). If this were true, it would leave hardly any room for the Bottiæans, whom never-

theless Thucydides recognizes on the coast; for the whole space between the mouths of the two rivers, Axios and Haliakmôn, is inconsiderable; moreover, I cannot but suspect that Thucydides has been led to believe, by finding in the Iliad that the Pæonian allies of Troy came from the Axios, that there must have been old Pæonian settlements at the mouth of that river, and that he has advanced the inference as if it were

Beyond the river Axios, at the lower part of its course, began the tribes of the great Thracian race—Mygdonians, Krestônians, Edônians, Bisaltæ, Sithonians: the Mygdonians seem to have been originally the most powerful, since the country still continued to be called by their name, Mygdonia, even after the Macedonian conquest. These, and various other Thracian tribes, originally occupied most part of the country between the mouth of the Axios and that of the Strymon; together with that memorable three-pronged peninsula which derived from the Grecian colonies its name of Chalkidikê. It will thus appear, if we consider the Bottiæans as well as the Pierians to be Thracians, that the Thracian race extended originally southward as far as the mouth of the Peneius: the Bottiæans professed indeed a Kretan origin, but this pretension is not noticed by either Herodotus or Thucydides. In the time of Skylax,¹ seemingly during the early reign of Philip the son of Amyntas, Macedonia and Thrace were separated by the Strymon.

We have yet to mention the Pæonians, a numerous and much-divided race, seemingly neither Thracian nor Macedonian nor Illyrian, but professing to be descended from the Teukri of Troy. These Pæonians occupied both banks of the Strymon, from the neighbourhood of Mount Skomius, in which that river rises,² down to the lake near its mouth: some of their

a certified fact. The case is analogous to what he says about the Bœotians in his preface (upon which O. Müller has already commented); he stated the immigration of the Bœotians into Bœotia as having taken place *after* the Trojan war, but saves the historical credit of the Homeric catalogue by adding that there had been a *fraction* of them in Bœotia *before*, from whom the contingent which went to Troy was furnished (*ἀποδασµὸς*, Thucyd. i. 12).

On this occasion, therefore, having to choose between Herodotus and Thucydides, I prefer the former. O. Müller (On the Macedonians, sect. 11) would strike out just so much of the assertion of Thucydides as positively contradicts Herodotus, and retain the rest; he thinks that the Pæonians came down *very near* to the mouth of the river, but *not quite*. I confess that this does not satisfy me; the more so as the passage from Livy by which he would support his view will appear, on examination, to refer to Pæonia high up the Axios—not to a supposed portion of Pæonia near the mouth (Livy, xlv. 29).

Again, I would remark that the original residence of the Pierians between the Peneius and the Haliakmôn rests chiefly upon the authority of Thucydides: Herodotus knows the Pierians in their seats between Mount Pangæus and the sea, but he gives no intimation that they had before dwelt south of the Haliakmôn; the tract between the Haliakmôn and the Peneius is by him conceived as Lower Macedonia or Macedonis, reaching to the borders of Thessaly (vii. 127–173). I make this remark in reference to sect. 7–17 of O. Müller's Dissertation, wherein the conception of Herodotus appears incorrectly apprehended, and some erroneous inferences founded upon it. That this tract was the original Pieria, there is sufficient reason for believing (compare Strabo, vii. Frag. 22, with Tafel's note, and ix. p. 410; Livy, xlv. 9); but Herodotus notices it only as Macedonia.

¹ Skylax, c. 67. The conquests of Philip extended the boundary beyond the Strymon to the Nestus (Strabo, lib. vii. Fragm. 33, ed. Tafel).

² Mount Skomius seems to be the

tribes possessed the fertile plain of Siris (now Seres)—the land immediately north of Mount Pangæus—and even a portion of the space through which Xerxês marched on his route from Akanthus to Therma. Besides this, it appears that the upper parts of the valley of the Axios were also occupied by Pæonian tribes; how far down the river they extended, we are unable to say. We are not to suppose that the whole territory between Axios and Strymon was continuously peopled by them. Continuous population is not the character of the ancient world, and it seems moreover that while the land immediately bordering on both rivers is in very many places of the richest quality, the spaces between the two are either mountain or barren low hill—forming a marked contrast with the rich alluvial basin of the Macedonian river Erigôn.¹ The Pæonians in their north-western tribes thus bordered upon the Macedonian Pelagonia—in their northern tribes, upon the Illyrian Dardani and Autariatæ—in their eastern, southern and south-eastern tribes, upon the Thracians and Pierians;² that is, upon the second seats occupied by the expelled Pierians under Mount Pangæus.

Such was, as far as we can make it out, the position of the Macedonians and their immediate neighbours, in the seventh century B.C. It was first altered by the enterprise and ability of a family of exiled Greeks, who conducted a section of the Macedonian people to those conquests which their descendants, Philip and Alexander the Great, afterwards so marvellously multiplied.

Respecting the primitive ancestry of these two princes, there were different stories, but all concurred in tracing the origin of the family to the Herakleid or Temenid race of Argos. According to one story (which apparently cannot be traced higher than Theopompus), Karanus,

Argæan
Greeks who
established
the dynasty
of Edessa—
Perdikkas.

mountain now called Vitoshka, between Kadomir and Sophia, near the south-eastern frontier of Servia (Thucyd. ii. 96; Grisebach, vol. ii. ch. x. p. 29).

¹ See this contrast noticed in Grisebach, especially in reference to the wide but barren region called the plain of Mustapha, no great distance from the left bank of the Axios (Grisebach, Reisen, v. ii. p. 225; Boué, Voyage, vol. i. p. 168).

For the description of the banks of the Axios (Vardar) and the Strymon, see Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. p. 201, and Boué, Voyage en Turquie, vol. i. p. 196–199. “La plaine

ovale de Seres est un des diamans de la couronne de Byzance,” &c. He remarks how incorrectly the course of the Strymon is depicted on the maps (vol. iv. p. 482).

² The expression of Strabo or his Epitomator—*τὴν Παιονίαν μέχρι Πελαγονίας καὶ Πιερίας ἐκτετάσθαι*—seems quite exact, though Tafel finds a difficulty in it. See his Note on the Vatican Fragments of the seventh Book of Strabo, Fr. 37. The Fragment 40 is expressed much more loosely. Compare Herodot. v. 13–16, vii. 124; Thucyd. ii. 96; Diodor. xx. 19.

brother of the despot Pheidon, had migrated from Argos to Macedonia, and established himself as conqueror at Edessa. According to another tale, which we find in Herodotus, there were three exiles of the Temenid race, Gauanês, Aëropus, and Perdikkas, who fled from Argos to Illyria, from whence they passed into Upper Macedonia, in such poverty as to be compelled to serve the petty king of the town Lebæa in the capacity of shepherds. A remarkable prodigy happening to Perdikkas foreshadows the future eminence of his family, and leads to his dismissal by the king of Lebæa—from whom he makes his escape with difficulty. He is preserved by the sudden rise of a river, immediately after he had crossed it, so as to become impassable by the horsemen who pursued him; to this river, as to the saviour of the family, solemn sacrifices were still offered by the kings of Macedonia in the time of Herodotus. Perdikkas with his two brothers having thus escaped, established himself near the spot called the Garden of Midas on Mount Bermius. From the loins of this hardy young shepherd sprang the dynasty of Edessa.¹ This tale bears much more the marks of a genuine local tradition than that of Theopompus; and the origin of the Macedonian family, or Argeadæ, from Argos, appears to have been universally recognised by Grecian inquirers,² so that Alexander the son of Amyntas, the contemporary of the Persian invasion, was admitted by the Hellanodikæ to contend at the Olympic games as a genuine Greek, though his competitors sought to exclude him as a Macedonian.

The talent for command was so much more the attribute of the Greek mind than of any of the neighbouring barbarians, that we easily conceive a courageous Argeian adventurer acquiring to himself great ascendancy in the local disputes of the Macedonian tribes, and transmitting the chieftainship of one of those tribes to his offspring. The influence acquired by Miltiadês among the Thracians of the Chersonese, and by Phormio among the Akarnanians (who specially requested that after his death his son or some one of his kindred might be sent from Athens to command them³), was very much of this character. We may add the case of Sertorius among the native Iberians. In like manner, the kings of the Macedonian Lynkêstæ

¹ Herodot. viii. 137, 138.

² Herodot. v. 22. Argeadæ, Strabo, lib. vii. Fragm. 20, ed. Tafel, which may probably have been erroneously

changed into Ægeadæ (Justin, vii. 1).

³ Thucyd. iii. 7; Herodot. vi. 34–37: compare the story of Zalmoxis among the Thracians (iv. 94).

professed to be descended from the Bacchiadæ¹ of Corinth; and the neighbourhood of Epidamnus and Apollonia, in both of which doubtless members of that great gens were domiciliated, renders this tale even more plausible than that of an emigration from Argos. The kings of the Epirotic Molossi pretended also to a descent from the heroic Æakid race of Greece. In fact, our means of knowledge do not enable us to discriminate the cases in which these reigning families were originally Greeks, from those in which they were Hellenised natives pretending to Grecian blood.

After the foundation-legend of the Macedonian kingdom, we have nothing but a long blank until the reign of king Amyntas (about 520-500 B.C.), and his son Alexander (about 480 B.C.). Herodotus gives us five successive kings between the founder Perdikkas and Amyntas—Perdikkas, Argæus, Philippos, Aëropus, Alketas, Amyntas, and Alexander—the contemporary and to a certain extent the ally of Xerxes.² Though we have no means of establishing any dates in this early series, either of names or of facts, yet we see that the Temenid kings, beginning from a humble origin, extended their dominions successively on all sides. They conquered the Briges,³ originally their neighbours on Mount Bermius—the Eordi, bordering on Edessa to the westward, who were either destroyed or expelled from the country (a small remnant of them still existed in the time of Thucydidês at Physka between Strymon and Axios)—the Almopians, an inland tribe of unknown site—and many of the interior Macedonian tribes who had been at first autonomous. Besides these inland conquests, they had made the still more important acquisition of Pieria (the territory which lay between Mount Bermius and the sea), from whence they expelled the original Pierians, who found new seats on the eastern bank of the Strymon between Mount Pangæus and the sea. Amyntas king of Macedon was thus master of a very considerable territory, comprising the coast of the Thermaic Gulf as far north as the mouth of the Haliakmôn, and also some other territory on the same gulf from which the Bottiæans had been expelled; but not comprising the coast between the mouths of the Axios and the Haliakmôn, nor even Pella the subsequent capital, which were still

Aggrandisement of the dynasty of Edessa—conquests as far as the Thermaic Gulf, as well as over the interior Macedonians.

¹ Strabo, vii. p. 326.

² Herodot. viii. 139. Thucydidês agrees in the number of kings, but does not give the names (ii. 100).

For the divergent lists of the early Macedonian kings, see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, vol. ii. p. 221.

³ This may be gathered, I think, from Herodot. vii. 73 and viii. 138. The alleged migration of the Briges into Asia, and the change of their name to Phryges, is a statement which I do not venture to repeat as credible.

in the hands of the Bottiæans at the period when Xerxês passed through.¹ He possessed also Anthemûs, a town and territory in the peninsula of Chalkidikê, and some parts of Mygdonia, the territory east of the mouth of the Axios; but how much, we do not know. We shall find the Macedonians hereafter extending their dominion still farther, during the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian war.

We hear of king Amyntas in friendly connexion with the Peisistratid princes at Athens, whose dominion was in part sustained by mercenaries from the Strymon; and this amicable sentiment was continued between his son Alexander and the emancipated Athenians.² It is only in the reigns of these two princes that Macedonia begins to be implicated in Grecian affairs. The regal dynasty had become so completely Macedonised, and had so far renounced its Hellenic brotherhood, that the claim of Alexander to run at the Olympic games was contested by his competitors, who compelled him to prove his lineage before the Hellanodikæ.

¹ Herodot. vii. 123. Herodotus recognises both Bottiæans between the Axios and the Haliakmôn—and Bottiæans at Olynthus, whom the Macedonians had expelled from the Thermaic Gulf—at the time when Xerxês passed (viii. 127). These two statements seem to me compatible, and both admissible:

the former Bottiæans were expelled by the Macedonians subsequently, anterior to the Peloponnesian war.

My view of these facts therefore differs somewhat from that of O. Müller (Macedonians, sect. 16).

² Herodot. i. 59; v. 94; viii. 136.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THRACIANS AND GREEK COLONIES IN THRACE.

THAT vast space comprised between the rivers, Strymon and Danube, and bounded to the west by the easternmost Illyrian tribes, northward of the Strymon, was occupied by the innumerable subdivisions of the race called Thracians or Threĩcians. They were the most numerous and most terrible race known to Herodotus: could they by possibility act in unison or under one dominion (he says) they would be irresistible. A conjunction thus formidable once seemed impending, during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, under the reign of Sitalkês king of the Odrysæ, who reigned from Abdêra at the mouth of the Nestus to the Euxine, and compressed under his sceptre a large proportion of these ferocious but warlike plunderers; so that the Greeks even down to Thermopylæ trembled at his expected approach. But the abilities of that prince were not found adequate to bring the whole force of Thrace into effective co-operation and aggression against others.

Thracians—their numbers and abode.

Numerous as the tribes of Thracians were, their customs and character (according to Herodotus) were marked by great uniformity: of the Getæ, the Trausi, and others, he tells us a few particularities. And the large tract over which the race were spread, comprising as it did the whole chain of Mount Hæmus and the still loftier chain of Rhodopê,¹ together with a portion of the mountains Orbêlus and Skomius, was yet partly occupied by level and fertile surface—such as the great plain of Adrianople, and the land towards the lower course of the rivers Nestus and Hebrus. The Thracians of the plain, though not less warlike, were at least more home-keeping, and less

Many distinct tribes, yet little diversity of character.

¹ This territory of ancient Rhodopê—the inland space between the Strymon, the Hebrus, and the Ægean Sea—has been less visited by modern travellers, and is at present more thoroughly unknown, than any part of European Turkey. M. Viquesnel visited it in 1847, and the topographical data collected by

him (embodied in a report made to the French Government) have been employed by Kiepert in the preparation of his new map of European Turkey, just published (1853). But Viquesnel's own map of the region of Rhodopê has not yet appeared (see Kiepert's *Erläuterungen*, annexed to his *Map*, p. 5).

greedy of foreign plunder, than those of the mountains. But the general character of the race presents an aggregate of repulsive features, unredced by the presence of even the commonest domestic affections.¹ The Thracian chief deduced his pedigree from a god called by the Greeks Hermês, to whom he offered up worship apart from the rest of his tribe, sometimes with the acceptable present of a human victim. He tattooed his body,² and that of the women belonging to him, as a privilege of honourable descent: he bought his wives from their parents, and sold his children for exportation to the foreign merchant: he held it disgraceful to cultivate the earth, and felt honoured only by the acquisitions of war and robbery. The Thracian tribes worshipped deities whom the Greeks assimilate to Arês, Dionysus, and Artemis. The great sanctuary and oracle of their god Dionysus was in one of the loftiest summits of Rhodopê, amidst dense and foggy thickets—the residence of the fierce and unassailable Satræ. To illustrate the Thracian character, we may turn to a deed perpetrated by the king of the Bisaltæ—perhaps one out of several chiefs of that extensive Thracian tribe—whose territory, between Strymon and Axius, lay in the direct march of Xerxês into Greece, and who, to escape the ignominy of being dragged along amidst the compulsory auxiliaries of the Persian invasion, fled to the heights of Rhodopê, forbidding his six sons to take any part in it. From recklessness, or curiosity, the sons disobeyed his commands, and accompanied Xerxês into Greece. They returned unhurt by the Greek spear, but the incensed father, when they again came into his presence, caused the eyes of all of them to be put out. Exultation of success manifested itself in the Thracians by increased alacrity in shedding blood; but as warriors, the only occupation which they esteemed, they were not less brave than patient of hardship; maintaining a good front, under their own peculiar array, against forces much superior in all military efficacy.³ It appears that the Thynians and Bithynians,⁴ on the Asiatic side

Their cruelty, rapacity, and military efficiency.

¹ Mannert assimilates the civilization of the Thracians to that of the Gauls when Julius Cæsar invaded them—a great injustice to the latter, in my judgement (*Geograph. Gr. und Röm.* vol. vii. p. 23).

² Cicero, *De Officiis*, ii. 7. “Barbarum compunctum notis Threiciis.” Plutarch (*De Serâ Numin. Vindict.* c. 13. p. 558) speaks as if the women only were tattooed, in Thrace: he puts a singular interpretation upon it, as a

continuous punishment on the sex for having slain Orpheus.

³ For the Thracians generally, see Herodot. v. 3–9, vii. 110, viii. 116, ix. 119; Thucyd. ii. 100, vii. 29, 30; Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 2, 38, and the seventh book of the *Anabasis* generally, which describes the relations of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand Greeks with Seuthês the Thracian prince.

⁴ Xenoph. *Anab.* vi. 2, 17; Herodot. vii. 75.

of the Bosphorus, perhaps also the Mysians, were members of this great Thracian race, which was more remotely connected also with the Phrygians. And the whole race may be said to present a character more Asiatic than European; especially in those ecstatic and maddening religious rites, which prevailed not less among the Edonian Thracians than in the mountains of Ida and Dindymon of Asia, though with some important differences. The Thracians served to furnish the Greeks with mercenary troops and slaves, and the number of Grecian colonies planted on the coast had the effect of partially softening the tribes in the immediate vicinity, between whose chiefs and the Greek leaders intermarriages were not unfrequent. But the tribes in the interior seem to have retained their savage habits with little mitigation; so that the language in which Tacitus¹ describes them is an apt continuation to that of Herodotus, though coming more than five centuries after.

Thracian
worship and
character
Asiatic.

To note the situation of each one among these many different tribes, in the large territory of Thrace, which is even now imperfectly known and badly mapped, would be unnecessary and indeed impracticable. I shall proceed to mention the principal Grecian colonies which were formed in the country, noticing occasionally the particular Thracian tribes with which they came in contact.

The Grecian colonies established on the Thermaic Gulf, as well as in the peninsula of Chalkidikê—emanating principally from Chalkis and Eretria, though we do not know their precise epoch—appear to have been of early date, and probably preceded the time when the Macedonians of Edessa extended their conquest to the sea. At that early period, they would find the Pierians still between the Peneius and Haliakmôn—also a number of petty Thracian tribes throughout the broad part of the Chalkidic peninsula; they would find Pydna a Pierian town, and Therma, Anthemus, Chalastra, &c., Mygdonian.

Early date
of the Chal-
kidic colonies
in Thrace.

The most ancient Grecian colony in these regions seems to have been Methônê, founded by the Eretrians in Pieria; nearly at the same time (if we may trust a statement of rather suspicious character, though the date itself is no way improbable) as Korkyra was settled by the Corinthians (about 730-720 B.C.²). It was a little to the north of the Pierian town of Pydna, and separated by about ten miles from the Bottiæan town of Alôrus, which lay north of the Haliakmôn.³ We know

Methônê
the earliest
—about
720 B.C.

¹ Tacit. Annal. ii. 66; iv. 46.

² Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. p. 293.

³ Skylax, c. 67.

very little about Methônê, except that it preserved its autonomy and its Hellenism until the time of Philip of Macedon, who took and destroyed it. But though, when once established, it was strong enough to maintain itself in spite of conquests made all around by the Macedonians of Edessa, we may fairly presume that it could not have been originally planted on Macedonian territory. Nor in point of fact was the situation peculiarly advantageous for Grecian colonists, inasmuch as there were other maritime towns, not Grecian, in its neighbourhood—Pydna, Alôrus, Therma, Chalastra; whereas the point of advantage for a Grecian colony was, to become the exclusive seaport for inland indigenous people.

The colonies, founded by Chalkis and Eretria on all the three
Several other small settlements on the Chalkidic peninsula and its three projecting headlands. projections of the Chalkidic peninsula, were numerous, though for a long time inconsiderable. We do not know how far these projecting headlands were occupied before the arrival of the settlers from Eubœa. Such arrival we may probably place at some period earlier than 600 B.C. For after that period Chalkis and Eretria seem rather on the decline; and it appears too, that the Chalkidian colonists in Thrace aided their mother-city Chalkis in her war against Eretria, which cannot be much later than 600 B.C., though it may be considerably earlier.

The range of mountains which crosses from the Thermaic to the Strymonic Gulf and forms the northern limit of the Chalkidic peninsula, slopes down towards the southern extremity, so as to leave a considerable tract of fertile land between the Torônaic and the Thermaic Gulfs, including the fertile headland called Pallênê—the westernmost of those three prongs of Chalkidikê which run out into the Ægean. Of the other two prongs or projections, the easternmost is terminated by the sublime
Chalkidic peninsula—Mount Athos. Mount Athos, which rises out of the sea as a precipitous rock 6400 feet in height, connected with the mainland by a ridge not more than half the height of the mountain itself, yet still high, rugged and woody from sea to sea, leaving only little occasional spaces fit to be occupied or cultivated. The intermediate or Sithonian headland is also hilly and woody, though in a less degree—both less inviting and less productive than Pallênê.¹

¹ For the description of Chalkidikê, see Grisebach's *Reisen*, vol. ii. ch. 10. pp. 6–16, and Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. 24. p. 152.

If we read attentively the description

of Chalkidikê as given by Skylax (c. 67), we shall see that he did not conceive it as three-pronged, but as terminating only in the peninsula of Pallênê, with Potidæa at its isthmus.

Æneia, near that cape which marks the entrance of the inner Thermaic Gulf—and Potidæa, at the narrow isthmus of Pallênê—were both founded by Corinth. Between these two towns lay the fertile territory called Krusis or Krossæa, forming in aftertimes a part of the domain of Olynthus, but in the sixth century B.C. occupied by petty Thracian townships.¹ Within Pallênê were the towns of Mendê, a colony from Eretria—Skiônê, which, having no legitimate mother-city, traced its origin to Pellenian warriors returning from Troy—Aphytis, Neapolis, Ægê, Therambôs, and Sanê,² either wholly or partly colonies from Eretria. In the Sithonian peninsula were Assa, Pilôrus, Singus, Sartê, Torônê, Galêpsus, Sermylê, and Mekyberna: all or most of these seem to have been of Chalkidic origin. But at the head of the Toronaic Gulf (which lies between Sithonia and Pallênê) was placed Olynthus, surrounded by an extensive and fertile plain. Originally a Bottiæan town, Olynthus will be seen at the time of the Persian invasion to pass into the hands of the Chalkidian Greeks,³ and gradually to incorporate with itself several of the petty neighbouring establishments belonging to that race; whereby the Chalkidians acquired that marked preponderance in the peninsula which they retained, even against the efforts of Athens, until the days of Philip of Macedon.

Colonies in Pallênê, or the westernmost of the three headlands.

In Sithonia, or the middle headland.

On the scanty spaces, admitted by the mountainous promontory or ridge ending in Athos, were planted some Thracian and some Pelasgic settlements of the same inhabitants as those who occupied Lemnos and Imbros; a few Chalkidic citizens being domiciliated with them, and the people speaking both Pelasgic and Hellenic. But near the narrow isthmus which joins this promontory to Thrace, and along the north-western coast of the Strymonic Gulf, were Grecian towns of considerable importance—Sanê, Akanthus, Stageira, and Argilus, all colonies from Andros, which had itself been colonised from Eretria.⁴ Akanthus and Stageira are said to have been founded in 654 B.C.

In the headland of Athos—Akanthus, Stageira, &c.

Following the southern coast of Thrace, from the mouth of the river Strymôn towards the east, we may doubt whether, in the year 560 B.C., any considerable independent colo-

Greek settlements east of the Strymôn in Thrace.

¹ Herodot. vii. 123; Skymnus Chius, v. 627.

² Strabo, x. p. 447; Thucyd. iv. 120–123; Pompon. Mela, ii. 2; Herodot. vii. 123.

³ Herodot. vii. 122; viii. 127. Stophanus Byz. (v. Παλλήνη) gives us some

idea of the mythes of the lost Greek writers, Hêgesippus and Theagenês, about Pallênê.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 84, 103, 109. See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 654 B.C.

nies of Greeks had yet been formed upon it. The Ionic colony of Abdêra, eastward of the mouth of the river Nestus, formed from Teôs in Ionia, is of more recent date, though the Klazomenians¹ had begun an unsuccessful settlement there as early as the year 651 B.C.; while Dikæa—the Chian settlement of Marôneia—and the Lesbian settlement of Ænus at the mouth of the Hebrus—are of unknown date.² The important and valuable territory near the mouth of the Strymôn, where, after many ruinous failures,³ the Athenian colony of Amphipolis afterwards maintained itself, was at the date here mentioned possessed by Edonian Thracians and Pierians. The various Thracian tribes—Satræ, Edonians, Dersæans, Sapæans, Bistones, Kikones, Pætians, &c.—were in force on the principal part of the tract between Strymôn and Hebrus, even to the sea-coast. It is to be remarked however that the island of Thasus, and that of Samothrace, each possessed what in Greek was called a Peræa⁴—a strip of the adjoining mainland cultivated and defended by means of fortified posts or small towns. Probably these occupations are of very ancient date, since they seem almost indispensable as a means of support to the islands. For the barren Thasus, especially, merits even at this day the uninviting description applied to it by the poet Archilochus, in the seventh century B.C.—“an ass’s backbone, overspread with wild wood :”⁵ so wholly is it composed of mountain naked or wooded, and so scanty are the patches of cultivable soil left in it, nearly all close to the sea-shore.

This island was originally occupied by the Phenicians, who worked the gold-mines in its mountains with a degree of industry, which, even in its remains, excited the admiration of Herodotus. How and when it was evacuated by them, we do not know. But the poet Archilochus⁶ formed one of a body of Parian colonists

¹ Solinus, x. 10.

² Herodot. i. 168; vii. 58–59, 109; Skymnus Chius, v. 675.

³ Thucyd. i. 100, iv. 102; Herodot. v. 11. Large quantities of corn are now exported from this territory to Constantinople (Leake, North. Gr. vol. iii. ch. 25. p. 172).

⁴ Herodot. vii. 108–109; Thucyd. i. 101.

⁵ἦδε δ' ὥστ' ὄνου ῥάχης

Ἔστηκεν, ὕλης ἀγρίας ἐπιστεφής.

Archiloch. Fragm. 17–18, ed. Schneide-
win.

The striking propriety of this description, even after the lapse of 2500 years, may be seen in the Travels of Grisebach,

vol. i. ch. 7. p. 210–218, and in Prokesch, Denkwürdigkeiten des Orients, Th. 3. p. 612. The view of Thasus from the sea justifies the title Ἠερίη (CEnomaus ap. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. vii. p. 256; Steph. Byz. Θάσσος).

Thasus (now Tasso) contains at present a population of about 6000 Greeks, dispersed in twelve small villages; it exports some good ship-timber, principally fir, of which there is abundance on the island, together with some olive oil and wax; but it cannot grow corn enough even for this small population. No mines either are now, or have been for a long time, in work.

⁶ Archiloch. Fragm. 5, ed. Schneide-
win; Aristophan. Pac. 1298, with the

who planted themselves on it in the seventh century B.C., and carried on war, not always successful, against the Thracian tribe called Saians: on one occasion, Archilochus found himself compelled to throw away his shield. By their mines and their possessions on the mainland (which contained even richer mines, at Skaptê Hylê, and elsewhere, than those in the island), the Thasian Greeks rose to considerable power and population. And as they seem to have been the only Greeks, until the settlement of the Milesian Histiaëus on the Strymôn about 510 B.C., who actively concerned themselves in the mining districts of Thrace opposite to their island, we cannot be surprised to hear that their clear surplus revenue before the Persian conquest, about 493 B.C., after defraying the charges of their government without any taxation, amounted to the large sum of 200 talents, sometimes even to 300 talents, in each year (£46,000–66,000).

On the long peninsula called the Thracian Chersonese there may probably have been small Grecian settlements at an early ^{Thracian} date, though we do not know at what time either the ^{Chersonesus.} Milesian settlement of Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula, near the Ægean Sea—or the Æolic colony of Sestus on the Hellespont—were founded. The Athenian ascendancy in the peninsula begins only with the migration of the first Miltiadês, during the reign of Peisistratus at Athens. The Samian colony of Perinthus, on the northern coast of ^{Perinthus,} the Propontis,^{Selymbria,}^{and Byzantium.}¹ is spoken of as ancient in date, and the Megarian colonies, Selymbria and Byzantium, belong to the seventh century B.C.: the latter of these two is assigned to the 30th Olympiad (657 B.C.), and its neighbour Chalkêdôn, on the opposite coast, was a few years earlier. The site of Byzantium in the narrow strait of the Bosphorus, with its abundant thunny-fishery,² which both employed and nourished a large proportion of the poorer freemen, was alike convenient either for maritime traffic or for levying contributions on the numerous corn ships which passed from the Euxine into the Ægean. We are even told that it held a considerable number of the neighbouring Bithynian Thracians as tributary Pericœki. Such dominion, though probably maintained during the more vigorous period of Grecian city life, became in later times impracticable, and we even find the Byzantines not always competent to the defence of their own small

Scholia; Strabo, x. p. 487, xii. p. 549; Thucyd. iv. 104.

¹ Skymnus Chius, 699–715; Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 57. See M. Raoul Ro-

chette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, ch. xi.–xiv. vol. iii. p. 273–298.

² Aristot. Polit. iv. 4, 1.

surrounding territory. The place, however, will be found to possess considerable importance during all the period of this history.¹

Grecian settlements on the Euxine, south of the Danube. The Grecian settlements on the inhospitable south-western coast of the Euxine, south of the Danube, appear never to have attained any consideration: the principal traffic of Greek ships in that sea tended to more northerly ports, on the banks of the Borysthenês and in the Tauric Chersonese. Istria was founded by the Milesians near the southern embouchure of the Danube—Apollonia and Odêssus on the same coast more to the south—all probably between 600-560 B.C. The Megarian or Byzantine colony of Mesambria seems to have been later than the Ionic revolt: of Kallatis the age is not known. Tomi, north of Kallatis and south of Istria, is renowned as the place of Ovid's banishment.² The picture which he gives of that uninviting spot, which enjoyed but little truce from the neighbourhood of the murderous Getæ, explains to us sufficiently why these towns acquired little or no importance.

Lemnos and Imbros. The islands of Lemnos and Imbros, in the Ægean, were at this early period occupied by Tyrrhenian Pelasgi. They were conquered by the Persians about 508 B.C., and seem to have passed into the power of the Athenians, at the time when Ionia revolted from the Persians. If the mythical or poetical stories respecting these Tyrrhenian Pelasgi contain any basis of truth, they must have been a race of buccaneers not less rapacious than cruel. At one time, these Pelasgi seem also to have possessed Samothrace, but how or when they were supplanted by Greeks, we find no trustworthy account: the population of Samothrace at the time of the Persian war was Ionic.³

¹ Polyb. iv. 39; Phylarch. Fragm. 10, ed. Didot.

² Skymnus Chius, 720-740; Herodot. ii. 33, vi. 33; Strabo, vii. p. 319; Skylax, c. 68; Mannert, Geograph. Gr. Röm. vol. vii. ch. 8. p. 126-140.

An inscription in Boëckh's Collection proves the existence of a pentapolis or union of five Grecian cities on this

coast. Tomi, Kallatis, Mesambria, and Apôllonia, are presumed by Blaramberg to have belonged to this union. See Inscript. No. 2056 c.

Syncellus however (p. 213) places the foundation of Istria considerably earlier, in 651 B.C.

³ Herodot. viii. 90.

CHAPTER XXVII.

KYRENE AND BARKA.—HESPERIDES.

It has been already mentioned in a former chapter, that Psammetichus king of Egypt, about the middle of the seventh century B.C., first removed those prohibitions which had excluded Grecian commerce from the country. In his reign, Grecian mercenaries were first established in Egypt, and Grecian traders admitted, under certain regulations, into the Nile. The opening of this new market emboldened them to traverse the direct sea which separates Krête from Egypt—a dangerous voyage with vessels which rarely ventured to lose sight of land—and seems to have first made them acquainted with the neighbouring coast of Libya, between the Nile and the gulf called the Great Syrtis. Hence arose the foundation of the important colony called Kyrênê.

First voyages
of the
Greeks to
Libya.

As in the case of most other Grecian colonies, so in that of Kyrênê, both the foundation and the early history are very imperfectly known. The date of the event, as far as can be made out amidst much contradiction of statement, was about 630 B.C.¹ Thêra was the mother-city, herself a colony from Lacedæmon; and the settlements formed in Libya became no inconsiderable ornaments to the Dorian name in Hellas.

According to the account of a lost historian, Meneklês²—political dissension among the inhabitants of Thêra led to that emigration which founded Kyrênê. The more ample legendary details which Herodotus collected, partly from Theraean, partly from Kyrenæan informants, are not positively inconsistent with this statement, though they indicate more particularly bad seasons, distress, and over-population. But both of them dwell emphatically on the Delphian oracle as the instigator as well as the director of the first emigrants, whose apprehensions of a dangerous voyage and an unknown country were very difficult to overcome. Both of them affirmed that the original ækist

Foundation
of Kyrênê.

¹ See the discussion of the æra of Kyrênê in Thrige, *Historia Cyrênês*, ch. 22, 23, 24, where the different state-

ments are noticed and compared.

² Schol. ad Pindar. *Pyth.* iv.

Battus was selected and consecrated to the work by the divine command: both called Battus the son of Polymnêstus, of the mythical breed called Minyæ. But on other points there was complete divergence between the two stories, and the Kyrenæans themselves, whose town was partly peopled by emigrants from Krête, described the mother of Battus as daughter of Etearchus, prince of the Kretan town of Axus.¹ Battus had an impediment in his speech, and it was on his entreating from the Delphian oracle a cure for this infirmity that he received directions to go as “a cattle-breeding œkist to Libya.” The suffering Theræans were directed to assist him. But neither he nor they knew where Libya was, nor could they find any resident in Krête who had ever visited it. Such was the limited reach of Grecian navigation to the south of the Ægean Sea, even a century after the foundation of Syracuse. At length, by prolonged inquiry, they discovered a man employed in catching the purple shellfish, named Korôbius, who said that he had been once forced by stress of weather to the island of Platea, close on the shores of Libya, and on the side not far removed from the western limit of Egypt. Some Theræans being sent along with Korôbius to inspect this island, left him there with a stock of provisions, and returned to Thêra to conduct the emigrants. From the seven districts into which Thêra was divided, emigrants were drafted for the colony, one brother being singled out from the different numerous families by lot. But so long was their return to Platea deferred, that the provisions of Korôbius were exhausted, and he was only saved from starvation by the accidental arrival of a Samian ship, driven by contrary winds out of her course on the voyage to Egypt. Kôlæus, the master of this ship (whose immense profits made by the first voyage to Tartêssus have been noticed in a former chapter), supplied him with provisions for a year—an act of kindness, which is said to have laid the first foundation of the alliance and good feeling afterwards prevalent between Thêra, Kyrênê, and Samos. At length the expected emigrants reached the island, having found the voyage so perilous and difficult, that they once returned in despair to Thêra, where they were only prevented by force from re-landing. The band which accompanied Battus was all conveyed in two pentekonters—armed ships with fifty rowers each. Thus humble was the start of the mighty Kyrênê, which, in the days of Herodotus, covered a city-area equal to the entire island of Platea.²

Founded by
Battus from
the island of
Thêra.

¹ Herodot. iv. 150–154.

² Herodot. iv. 155.

That island, however, though near to Libya, and supposed by the colonists to be Libya, was not so in reality : the commands of the oracle had not been literally fulfilled. Accordingly the settlement carried with it nothing but hardship for the space of two years ; and Battus returned with his companions to Delphi, to complain that the promised land had proved a bitter disappointment. The god, through his priestess, returned for answer, “If you, who have never visited the cattle-breeding Libya, know it better than I who *have*, I greatly admire your cleverness.” Again the inexorable mandate forced them to return. This time they planted themselves on the actual continent of Libya, nearly over against the island of Platea, in a district called Aziris, surrounded on both sides by fine woods, and with a running stream adjoining. After six years of residence in this spot, they were persuaded by some of the indigenous Libyans to abandon it, under the promise that they should be conducted to a better situation. Their guides now brought them to the actual site of Kyrênê, saying, “Here, men of Hellas, is the place for you to dwell, for here the sky is perforated.”¹ The road through which they passed had led through the tempting region of Irasa with its fountain Thestê, and their guides took the precaution to carry them through it by night, in order that they might remain ignorant of its beauties.

Such were the preliminary steps, divine and human, which brought Battus and his colonists to Kyrênê. In the time of Herodotus, Irasa was an outlying portion of the eastern territory of this powerful city. But we trace in the story just related an opinion prevalent among his Kyrenæan informants, that Irasa with its fountain Thestê was a more inviting position than Kyrênê with its fountain of Apollo, and ought in prudence to have been originally chosen : out of which opinion, according to the general habit of the Greek mind, an anecdote is engendered and accredited, explaining how the supposed mistake was committed. What may have been the recommendations of Irasa, we are not permitted to know ; but descriptions of modern travellers, no less than the subsequent history of Kyrênê, go far to justify the choice actually made. The city was placed at the distance of about ten miles from the sea, having a sheltered port called Apollonia, itself afterwards a considerable town—it was about twenty miles from

Colony first settled in the island of Platea—afterwards removed to Kyrênê.

Situation of Kyrênê.

¹ Herodot. iv. 158. ἐνθαῦτα γὰρ ὁ οὐρανὸς τέτρηται. Compare the jest ascribed to the Byzantine envoys on occasion of the vaunts of Lysimachus (Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alexandr. Magn. c. 3. p. 338).

the promontory Phykus, which forms the northernmost projection of the African coast, nearly in the longitude of the Peloponnesian Cape Tænarus (Matapan). Kyrênê was situated about 1800 feet above the level of the Mediterranean, of which it commanded a fine view, and from which it was conspicuously visible, on the edge of a range of hills which slope by successive terraces down to the port. The soil immediately around, partly calcareous, partly sandy, is described by Captain Beechey to present a vigorous vegetation and remarkable fertility; though the ancients considered it inferior in this respect both to Barka¹ and Hesperides, and still more inferior to the more westerly region near Kinyps. But the abundant periodical rains, attracted by the lofty heights around, and justifying the expression of the "perforated sky," were even of greater importance under an African sun than extraordinary richness of soil.² The maritime regions near Kyrênê and Barka, and Hesperides, produced oil and wine as well as corn, while the extensive district between these towns, composed of alternate mountain,

¹ Herodot. iv. 198.

² See, about the productive powers of Kyrênê and its surrounding region, Herodot. iv. 199; Kallimachus (himself a Kyrenæan), Hymn. ad Apoll. 65, with the note of Spanheim; Pindar, Pyth. iv., with the Scholia *passim*; Diodor. iii. 49; Arrian, Indica, xliii. 13. Strabo (xvii. p. 837) saw Kyrênê from the sea in sailing by, and was struck with the view: he does not appear to have landed.

The results of modern observation in that country are given in the *Viaggio di Della Cella* and in the exploring expedition of Captain Beechey: see an interesting summary in the *History of the Barbary States*, by Dr. Russell (Edinburgh, 1835), ch. v. p. 160-171. The chapter on this subject (c. 6) in Thrige's *Historia Cyrênês* is defective, as the author seems never to have seen the careful and valuable observations of Captain Beechey, and proceeds chiefly on the statements of Della Cella.

I refer briefly to a few among the many interesting notices of Captain Beechey. For the site of the ancient Hesperides (Bengazi), and the "beautiful fertile plain near it, extending to the foot of a long chain of mountains about fourteen miles distant to the south-eastward,"—see Beechey, *Expedition*, ch. xi. p. 287-315; "a great many date-palm trees in the neighbourhood" (ch. xii. p. 340-345).

The distance between Bengazi (Hespe-

rides) and Ptolemeta (Ptolemais, the port of Barka) is fifty-seven geographical miles, along a fertile and beautiful plain, stretching from the mountains to the sea. Between these two was situated the ancient Teucheira (*ib.* ch. xii. p. 347), about thirty-eight miles from Hesperides (p. 349), in a country highly productive wherever it is cultivated (p. 350-355). Exuberant vegetation exists near the deserted Ptolemeta (or Ptolemais) after the winter rains (p. 364). The circuit of Ptolemais, as measured by the ruins of its walls, was about three and a half English miles (p. 380).

An extensive, fertile, and well-watered mountain-plain of Mergê, constituted the territory of the ancient Barka (*ib.* ch. xiii. p. 395-401): the bricks, which the Arabic geographers state to have been exported from Barka to Egypt (p. 399), are noticed by Stephan. Byzant. (v. *Βάρκη*) as constituting the material of the houses at Barka.

The road from Barka to Kyrênê presents continued marks of ancient chariot-wheels (ch. xiv. p. 406); after passing the plain of Mergê, it becomes hilly and woody, "but on approaching Grenna (Kyrênê) it becomes more clear of wood; the valleys produce fine crops of barley, and the hills excellent pasturage for cattle" (p. 409). Luxuriant vegetation comes after the winter rains in the vicinity of Kyrênê (ch. xv. p. 465).

wood and plain, was eminently suited for pasture and cattle-breeding. The ports were secure, presenting conveniences for the intercourse of the Greek trader with Northern Africa, such as were not to be found along all the coast of the Great Syrtis westward of Hesperides. Abundance of applicable land—great diversity both of climate and of productive season, between the sea-side, the low hill, and the upper mountain, ^{Fertility, produce, and prosperity.} within a small space, so that harvest was continually going on, and fresh produce coming in from the earth, during eight months of the year—together with the monopoly of the valuable plant called the Silphium, which grew nowhere except in the Kyrenaic region, and the juice of which was extensively demanded throughout Greece and Italy—led to the rapid growth of Kyrênê, in spite of serious and renewed political troubles. And even now, the immense remains which still mark its desolate site, the evidences of past labour and solicitude at the Fountain of Apollo and elsewhere, together with the profusion of excavated and ornamented tombs, attest sufficiently what the grandeur of the place must have been in the days of Herodotus and Pindar. So much did the Kyrenæans pride themselves on the Silphium, found wild in their back country from the island of Platea on the east to the inner recess of the Great Syrtis westward—the leaves of which were highly salubrious for cattle and the stalk for man, while the root furnished the peculiar juice for export—that they maintained it to have first appeared seven years prior to the arrival of the first Grecian colonists in their city.¹

But it was not only the properties of the soil which promoted the prosperity of Kyrênê. Isokratês² praises the well-chosen site of that colony, because it was planted in the midst of indigenous natives apt for subjection, and far distant from any formidable enemies. That the native Libyan tribes were made conducive in an eminent degree to the growth of the Greco-^{Libyan tribes near Kyrênê.} Libyan cities, admits of no doubt; and in reviewing the history of these cities, we must bear in mind that their population was not pure Greek, but more or less mixed, like that of the colonies in Italy, Sicily, or Ionia. Though our information is very imperfect, we see enough to prove that the small force brought over by Battus the Stammerer was enabled first to fraternise with the indigenous Libyans—next, reinforced by additional colonists and avail-

¹ Theophrast. Hist. Pl. vi. 3, 3; ix. 1, 7; Skylax. c. 107.

² Isokratês, Or. v. ad Philipp. p. 84 (p. 107 ed. Bek.). Thêra being a colony

of Lacedæmon, and Kyrênê of Thêra, Isokratês speaks of Kyrênê as a colony of Lacedæmon.

ing themselves of the power of native chiefs, to overawe and subjugate them. Kyrênê—combined with Barka and Hesperides, both of them having sprung from her root¹—exercised over the Libyan tribes between the borders of Egypt and the inner recess of the Great Syrtis, for a space of three degrees of longitude, an ascendancy similar to that which Carthage possessed over the more westerly Libyans near the Lesser Syrtis. Within these Kyrenæan limits, and farther westward along the shores of the Great Syrtis, the Libyan tribes were of pastoral habits; westward, beyond the Lake Tritônis and the Lesser Syrtis,² they began to be agricultural. Immediately westward of Egypt were the Adyrmachidæ, bordering upon Apis and Marea, the Egyptian frontier towns;³ they were subject to the Egyptians, and had adopted some of the minute ritual and religious observances which characterised the region of the Nile. Proceeding westward from the Adyrmachidæ were found the Giligammæ, the Asbystæ, the Auschisæ, the Kabales, and the Nasamônes—the latter of whom occupied the south-eastern corner of the Great Syrtis—next, the Makæ, Gindânes, Lotophagi, Machlyes, as far as a certain river and lake called Tritôn and Tritônis, which seems to have been near the Lesser Syrtis. These last-mentioned tribes were not dependent either on Kyrênê or on Carthage, at the time of Herodotus, nor probably during the proper period of free Grecian history (600-300 B.C.). But in the third century B.C., the Ptolemaic governors of Kyrênê extended their dominion westward, while Carthage pushed her colonies and castles eastward, so that the two powers embraced between them the whole line of coast between the Greater and Lesser Syrtis, meeting at the spot called the Altars of the Brothers Philæni—celebrated for its commemorative legend.⁴ Moreover, even in the

Extensive
dominion of
Kyrênê and
Barka over
the Libyans.

¹ Pindar, *Pyth.* iv. 26. *Κυρήνην—ἀστέων δίξαν*. In the time of Herodotus these three cities may possibly have been spoken of as a Tripolis; but no one before Alexander the Great would have understood the expression Pentapolis, used under the Romans to denote Kyrênê, Apollonia, Ptolemais, Teucheira, and Berenikê or Hesperides.

Ptolemais, originally the port of Barka, had become autonomous and of greater importance than the latter.

² The accounts respecting the lake called in ancient times Tritônis are however very uncertain: see Dr. Shaw's *Travels in Barbary*, p. 127. Strabo mentions a lake so called near Hesperides

(xvii. p. 836); Pherekydês talks of it as near Irasa (*Pherekyd. Fragm.* 33 d. ed. Didot).

³ Eratosthenês, born at Kyrênê and resident at Alexandria, estimated the land-journey between the two at 525 Roman miles (*Pliny, H. N.* v. 6).

⁴ Sallust, *Bell. Jugurth.* c. 75; Valerius Maximus, v. 6. Thrige (*Histor. Cyr.* c. 49) places this division of the Syrtis between Kyrênê and Carthage at some period between 400-330 B.C., anterior to the loss of the independence of Kyrênê; but I cannot think that it was earlier than the Ptolemies: compare Strabo, xvii. p. 836.

sixth century B.C., Carthage was jealous of the extension of Grecian colonies along this coast, and aided the Libyan Makæ (about 510 B.C.) to expel the Spartan prince Dorieus from his settlement near the river Kinyps; near that spot was afterwards planted, by Phenician or Carthaginian exiles, the town of Leptis Magna¹ (now Lebida), which does not seem to have existed in the time of Herodotus. Nor does the latter historian notice the Marmaridæ, who appear as the principal Libyan tribe near the west of Egypt between the age of Skylax and the third century of the Christian æra. Some migration or revolution subsequent to the time of Herodotus must have brought this name into predominance.²

The interior country stretching westward from Egypt (along the thirtieth and thirty-first parallel of latitude) to the Great Syrtis, and then along the southern shore of that gulf, is to a great degree low and sandy, and quite destitute of trees; yet affording in many parts water, herbage, and a fertile soil.³ But the maritime region

¹ The Carthaginian establishment Neapolis is mentioned by Skylax (c. 109), and Strabo states that Leptis was another name for the same place (xvii. p. 835).

² Skylax, c. 107; Vopiscus, Vit. Prob. c. 9; Strabo, xvii. p. 838; Pliny, H. N. v. 5. From the Libyan tribe Marmaridæ was derived the name Marmarika applied to that region.

³ *ταπεινὴ τε καὶ ψαμμόδης* (Herodot. iv. 191); Sallust, Bell. Jugurthin. c. 17.

Captain Beechey points out the mistaken conceptions which have been entertained of this region:—

“It is not only in the works of early writers that we find the nature of the Syrtis misunderstood; for the whole of the space between Mesurata (i. e. the cape which forms the western extremity of the Great Syrtis) and Alexandria is described by Leo Africanus, under the title of Barca, as a wild and desert country, where there is neither water nor land capable of cultivation. He tells us that the most powerful among the Mahometan invaders possessed themselves of the fertile parts of the coast, leaving the others only the desert for their abode, exposed to all the miseries and privations attendant upon it; for this desert (he continues) is far removed from any habitations, and nothing is produced there whatever. So that if these poor people would have a supply of grain, or of any other articles necessary to their existence, they

are obliged to pledge their children to the Sicilians who visit the coast; who, on providing them with these things, carry off the children they have received

“It appears to be chiefly from Leo Africanus that modern historians have derived their idea of what they term the district and desert of Barca. Yet the whole of the Cyrenaica is comprehended within the limits which they assign to it; and the authority of Herodotus, without citing any other, would be amply sufficient to prove that this tract of country not only was no desert, but was at all times remarkable for its fertility The impression left upon our minds, after reading the account of Herodotus, would be much more consistent with the appearance and peculiarities of both, in their actual state, than that which would result from the description of any succeeding writer The district of Barca, including all the country between Mesurata and Alexandria, neither is, nor ever was, so destitute and barren as has been represented; the part of it which constitutes the Cyrenaica is capable of the highest degree of cultivation, and many parts of the Syrtis afford excellent pasturage, while some of it is not only adapted to cultivation, but does actually produce good crops of barley and dhurra.” (Captain Beechey, Expedition to Northern Coast of Africa, ch. x. pp. 263, 265, 267, 269: comp. ch. xi. p. 321.)

north of this, constituting the projecting bosom of the African coast from the island of Platea (Gulf of Bomba) on the east to Hesperides (Bengazi) on the west, is of a totally different character; covered with mountains of considerable elevation, which reach their highest point near Kyrênê, interspersed with productive plain and valley, broken by frequent ravines which carry off the winter torrents into the sea, and never at any time of the year destitute of water. It is this latter advantage that causes them to be now visited every summer by the Bedouin Arabs, who flock to the inexhaustible Fountain of Apollo and to other parts of the mountainous region from Kyrênê to Hesperides, when their supply of water and herbage fails in the interior;¹ and the same circumstance must have operated in ancient times to hold the Nomadic Libyans in a sort of dependence on Kyrênê and Barka. Kyrênê appropriated the maritime portion of the territory of the Libyan Asbystæ:² the Auschisæ occupied the region south of Barka, touching the sea near Hesperides: the Kabales dwelt near Teucheira in the territory of Barka. Over the interior spaces these Libyan Nomads, with their cattle and twisted tents, wandered unrestrained, amply fed upon meat and

¹ Justin, xiii. 7. "amœnitatem loci et fontium ubertatem." Captain Beechey notices this annual migration of the Bedouin Arabs:—

"Teucheira (on the coast between Hesperides and Barka) abounds in wells of excellent water, which are reserved by the Arabs for their summer consumption, and only resorted to when the more inland supplies are exhausted: at other times it is uninhabited. Many of the excavated tombs are occupied as dwelling-houses by the Arabs during their summer visits to that part of the coast." (Beechey, Exp. to North. Afric. ch. xii. p. 354.)

And about the wide mountain plain, or table-land of Mergô, the site of the ancient Barka, "The water from the mountains enclosing the plain settles in pools and lakes in different parts of this spacious valley; and affords a constant supply, during the summer months, to the Arabs who frequent it" (ch. xiii. p. 390). The red earth which Captain Beechey observed in this plain is noticed by Herodotus in regard to Libya (ii. 12). Stephan. Byz. also mentions the bricks used in building (v. Βάρκη). Derna, too, to the eastward of Cyrene on the sea-coast, is amply provided with water (ch. xvi. p. 471).

Respecting Kyrênê itself, Captain Beechey states:—"During the time, about a fortnight, of our absence from Cyrene, the changes which had taken place in the appearance of the country about it were remarkable. We found the hills on our return covered with Arabs, their camels, flocks, and herds; the scarcity of water in the interior at this time having driven the Bedouins to the mountains, and particularly to Cyrene, where the springs afford at all times an abundant supply. The corn was all cut, and the high grass and luxuriant vegetation, which we had found it so difficult to wade through on former occasions, had been eaten down to the roots by the cattle" (ch. xviii. pp. 517, 520).

The winter rains are also abundant, between January and March, at Bengazi (the ancient Hesperides): sweet springs of water are found near the town (ch. xi. pp. 282, 315, 327). About Ptolemeta, or Ptolemais, the port of the ancient Barka, *ib.* ch. xii. p. 363.

² Herodot. iv. 170–171. παραλία σφόδρα εὐδαίμων. Strabo, ii. p. 131. πολυμήλου καὶ πολυκαρποτάτας χθονός, Pindar, Pyth. ix. 7.

milk,¹ clothed in goat skins, and enjoying better health than any people known to Herodotus. Their breed of horses was excellent, and their chariots or waggons with four horses could perform feats admired even by Greeks. It was to these horses that the princes² and magnates of Kyrênê and Barka owed the frequent successes of their chariots in the games of Greece. The Libyan Nasamônes, leaving their cattle near the sea, were ^{Manners of the Libyan Nomads.} in the habit of making an annual journey up the country to the Oasis of Augila for the purpose of gathering the date-harvest,³ or of purchasing dates; and the Bedouin Arabs from Bengazi still make this same journey annually, carrying up their wheat and barley, for the same purpose. Each of the Libyan tribes was distinguished by a distinct mode of cutting the hair, and by some peculiarities of religious worship, though generally all worshipped the Sun and the Moon.⁴ But in the neighbourhood of the Lake Tritônis (seemingly the western extremity of Grecian coasting trade in the time of Herodotus, who knows little beyond, except from Carthaginian authorities), the Grecian deities Poseidôn and Athênê, together with the legend of Jason and the Argonauts, had been localised. There were moreover current prophecies announcing that one hundred Hellenic cities were destined one day to be founded round the lake—and that one city in the island Phla, surrounded by the lake, was to be planted by the Lacedæmonians.⁵ These indeed were among the many unfulfilled prophecies which from every side cheated the Grecian ear, proceeding probably from Kyrenæan or Theræan traders, who thought the spot advantageous for settlement, and circulated their own hopes under the form of divine assurances. It was about the year 510 B.C.⁶ that some of the Theræans conducted the Spartan prince Dorieus to found a colony in the fertile region of Kinyps, belonging to the Libyan Makæ. But Carthage, interested in preventing the extension of Greek settlements westward, aided the Libyans in driving him out.

The Libyans in the immediate neighbourhood of Kyrênê were

¹ Herodot. iv. 186, 187, 189, 190. *Νομάδες κρεοφάγοι καὶ γαλακτοπόται.* Pindar, Pyth. ix. 127, *ἵππευται Νομάδες.* Pompon. Mela, i. 8.

² See the fourth, fifth and ninth Pythian Odes of Pindar. In the description given by Sophoklês (Electra, 695) of the Pythian contest, in which pretence is made that Orestês has perished, ten contending chariots are supposed, of which two are Libyan from

Barka: of the remaining eight, one only comes from each place named.

³ Herodot. iv. 172–182. Compare Hornemann's Travels in Africa, p. 48, and Heeren, Verkehr und Handel der Alten Welt, Th. ii. Abth. 1. Abschnitt vi. p. 226.

⁴ Herodot. iv. 175–188.

⁵ Herodot. iv. 178, 179, 195, 196.

⁶ Herodot. iv. 42.

materially changed by the establishment of that town. They constituted a large part—at first probably far the largest part—of its constituent population. Not possessing that fierce tenacity of habits which the Mahomedan religion has impressed upon the Arabs of the present day, they were open to the mingled influence of constraint and seduction applied by Grecian settlers; and in the time of Herodotus, the Kabales and the Asbystæ of the interior had come to copy Kyrenæan tastes and customs.¹ The Theræan colonists, having obtained not merely the consent, but even the guidance, of the natives to their occupation of Kyrênê, constituted themselves like privileged Spartan citizens in the midst of Libyan Pericæki.² They seem to have married Libyan wives, so that Herodotus describes the women of Kyrênê and Barka as following, even in his time, religious observances indigenous and not Hellenic.³ Even the descendants of the primitive œkist Battus were semi-Libyan, for Herodotus gives us the curious information that Battus was the Libyan word for a king, and deduces from it the just inference that the name Battus was not originally personal to the œkist, but acquired in Libya first as a title;⁴ though it afterwards passed to his descendants as a proper name. For eight generations the reigning princes were called Battus and Arkesilaus, the Libyan denomination alternating with the Greek, until the family was finally deprived of its power. Moreover we find the chief of Barka, kinsman of Arkesilaus of Kyrênê, bearing the name of Alazir; a name certainly not Hellenic, and probably Libyan.⁵ We are therefore to conceive the first Theræan colonists as established in their lofty fortified post Kyrênê, in the centre of Libyan Pericæki, till then strangers to walls, to arts, and perhaps even to cultivated land. Probably these Pericæki were always subject and tributary, in a greater or less degree, though they continued for half a century to retain their own king.

To these rude men the Theræans communicated the elements of Hellenism and civilization, not without receiving themselves much that was non-Hellenic in return; and perhaps the reactionary influence of the Libyan element

Dynasty of Battus at Kyrênê—fresh colonists from Greece.

¹ Herodot. iv. 170. νόμους δὲ τοὺς πλείστους μιμέεσθαι ἐπιτηδεύουσι τοὺς Κυρηναίων.

² Herodot. iv. 161. Θηραίων καὶ τῶν περιόκων, &c.

³ Herodot. iv. 186–189. Compare also the story in Pindar, Pyth. ix. 109–126, about Alexidamus, the ancestor of

Telesikratês the Kyrenæan; how the former won, by his swiftness in running, a Libyan maiden, daughter of Antæus of Irasa—and Kallimachus, Hymn. Apoll. 86.

⁴ Herodot. iv. 155.

⁵ Herodot. iv. 164.

against the Hellenic might have proved the stronger of the two, had they not been reinforced by new-comers from Greece. After forty years of Battus the Œkist (about 630-590 B.C.) and sixteen years of his son Arkesilaus (about 590-574 B.C.), a second Battus¹ succeeded, called Battus the Prosperous, to mark the extraordinary increase of Kyrênê during his presidency. The Kyrenæans under him took pains to invite new settlers from all parts of Greece without distinction—a circumstance deserving notice in Grecian colonization, which usually manifested a preference for certain races, if it did not positively exclude the rest. To every new-comer was promised a lot of land, and the Delphian priestess strenuously seconded the wishes of the Kyrenæans, proclaiming that “whosoever should reach the place too late for the land-division, would have reason to repent it.” Such promise of new land, as well as the sanction of the oracle, were doubtless made public at all the games and meetings of Greeks. A large number of new colonists embarked for Kyrênê: the exact number is not mentioned, but we must conceive it to have been very great, when we are told that during the succeeding generation, not less than 7000 Grecian hoplites of Kyrênê perished by the hands of the revolted Libyans—yet leaving both the city itself and its neighbour Barka still powerful. The loss of so great a number as 7000 Grecian hoplites has very few parallels throughout the whole history of Greece. In fact, this second migration, during the government of Battus the Prosperous, which must have taken place between 574-554 B.C., ought to be looked upon as the moment of real and effective colonization for Kyrênê. It was on this occasion probably that the port of Apollonia, which afterwards came to equal the city itself in importance, was first occupied and fortified—for the second swarm of immigrants came by sea direct, while the original colonists had reached Kyrênê by land from the island of Platea through Irasa. The fresh immigrants came from Peloponnesus, Krête, and some other islands of the Ægean.

To furnish so many new lots of land, it was either necessary, or it was found expedient, to dispossess many of the Libyan ^{Disputes with the native Libyans.} Pericæki; who found their situation, in other respects also, greatly changed for the worse. The Libyan king Adikran, himself among the sufferers, implored aid from Apriês king of Egypt, then in the height of his power; sending to declare himself and his people Egyptian subjects, like their neighbours the

¹ Respecting the chronology of the Pattiad princes, see Böckh, ad Pindar. | Pyth. iv. p. 265, and Thrige, *Histor. Cyrenes*, p. 127, *seq.*

Adyrmachidæ. The Egyptian prince, accepting the offer, despatched a large military force of the native soldier-caste, who were constantly in station at the western frontier-town Marea, by the route along shore to attack Kyrênê. They were met at Irasa by the Greeks of Kyrênê, and being totally ignorant of Grecian arms and tactics, experienced a defeat so complete that few of them reached home.¹ The consequences of this disaster in Egypt, where it caused the transfer of the throne from Apriês to Amasis, have been noticed in a former chapter.

Of course the Libyan Periœki were put down, and the redivision of lands near Kyrênê among the Greek settlers accomplished, to the great increase of the power of the city. And the reign of Battus the Prosperous marks a flourishing æra in the town, with a large acquisition of land-dominion, antecedent to years of dissension and distress. The Kyrenæans came into intimate alliance with Amasis king of Egypt, who encouraged Grecian connexion in every way, and who even took to wife Ladikê, a woman of the Battiad family at Kyrênê; so that the Libyan Periœki lost all chance of Egyptian aid against the Greeks.²

New prospects, however, were opened to them during the reign of Arkesilaus the Second, son of Battus the Prosperous (about 554-544 B.C.). The behaviour of this prince incensed and alienated his own brothers, who raised a revolt against him, seceded with a portion of the citizens, and induced a number of the Libyan Periœki to take part with them. They founded the Greco-Libyan city of Barka, in the territory of the Libyan Auschisæ, about twelve miles from the coast, distant from Kyrênê by sea about seventy miles to the westward. The space between the two, and even beyond Barka as far as the more westerly Grecian colony called Hesperides, was in the days of Skylax provided with commodious ports for refuge or landing.³ At what time Hesperides was founded we do not know, but it existed about 510 B.C.⁴ Whether Arkesilaus obstructed the foundation of Barka is not certain; but he marched the Kyrenæan forces against those revolted Libyans who had joined it. Unable to resist, the latter fled for refuge to their more easterly brethren near the borders of Egypt, and Arkesilaus pursued them. At length, in a district called Leukôn, the fugitives found an opportunity of attacking him at such prodigious advan-

Arkesilaus
the Second
prince of
Kyrênê—
misfortunes
of the city—
foundation
of Barka.

¹ Herodot. iv. 159.

² Herodot. ii. 180-181.

³ Herodot. iv. 160; Skylax, c. 107;

Hekataeus, Fragm. 300, ed. Klausen.

⁴ Herodot. iv. 204.

tage, that they almost destroyed the Kyrenæan army; 7000 hoplites (as has been before intimated) being left dead on the field. Arkesilaus did not long survive this disaster. He was strangled during sickness by his brother Learchus, who aspired to the throne; but Eryxô, widow of the deceased prince,¹ avenged the crime by causing Learchus to be assassinated.

That the credit of the Battiad princes was impaired by such a series of disasters and enormities, we can readily believe. But it received a still greater shock from the circumstance, that Battus the Third, son and successor of Arkesilaus, was lame and deformed in his feet. To be governed by a man thus personally disabled, was in the minds of the Kyrenæans an indignity not to be borne, as well as an excuse for pre-existing discontents. The resolution was taken to send to the Delphian oracle for advice. They were directed by the priestess to invite from Mantinea a moderator, empowered to close discussions and provide a scheme of government. The Mantineans selected Demônax, one of the wisest of their citizens, to solve the same problem which had been committed to Solon at Athens. By his arrangement, the regal prerogative of the Battiad line was terminated, and a republican government established, seemingly about 543 B.C.; the dispossessed prince retaining both the landed domains² and the various sacerdotal functions which had belonged to his predecessors. Respecting the government, as newly framed, however, Herodotus unfortunately gives us hardly any particulars. Demônax classified the inhabitants of Kyrênê into three tribes; composed of—1. Theræans with their Libyan Perioeki; 2. Greeks who had come from Peloponnesus and Krête; 3. such Greeks as

Battus the Third—a lame man—reform by Demônax.

¹ Herodot. iv. 160. Plutarch (*De Virtutibus Mulier.* p. 261) and Polyænus (viii. 41) give various details of this stratagem on the part of Eryxô; Learchus being in love with her. Plutarch also states that Learchus maintained himself as despot for some time by the aid of Egyptian troops from Amasia, and committed great cruelties. His story has too much the air of a romance to be transcribed into the text, nor do I know from what authority it is taken.

² Herodot. iv. 161. Τῷ βασιλεῖ Βάττῳ τεμένεια ἐξελών καὶ ἱρωσύνας, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ πρότερον εἶχον οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐς μέσον τῷ δήμῳ ἔθηκε.

I construe the word τεμένεια as meaning all the domains, doubtless large, which had belonged to the Battiad princes; contrary to Thrige (*Historia*

Cyrênês, ch. 38. p. 150), who restricts the expression to revenues derived from sacred property. The reference of Wesseling to Hesych.—Βάττου σίλφιον—is of no avail for illustrating this passage.

The supposition of O. Müller, that the preceding king had made himself despotic by means of Egyptian soldiers, appears to me not probable and not admissible upon the simple authority of Plutarch's romantic story, when we take into consideration the silence of Herodotus. Nor is he correct in affirming that Demônax "restored the supremacy of the community:" that legislator superseded the old kingly political privileges, and framed a new constitution (see O. Müller, *History of Dorians*, h. iii. ch. 9. s. 13).

had come from all other islands in the Ægean. It appears too that a senate was constituted, taken doubtless from these three tribes, and, we may presume, in equal proportion. It seems probable that there had been before no constitutional classification, nor political privilege, except what was vested in the Theræans—that these latter, the descendants of the original colonists, were the only persons hitherto *known to the constitution*—and that the remaining Greeks, though free landed proprietors and hoplites, were not permitted to act as an integral part of the body politic, nor distributed in tribes at all.¹ The whole powers of government—up to this time vested in the Battiad princes, subject only to such check, how effective we know not, which the citizens of Theræan origin might be able to interpose—were now transferred from the prince to the people, that is, to certain individuals or assemblies chosen somehow from among all the citizens. There existed at Kyrênê, as at Thêra and Sparta, a board of Ephors, and a band of three hundred armed police,² analogous to those who were called the Hippeis or Horsemen at Sparta. Whether these were instituted by Demônax we do not know, nor does the identity of titular office, in different states, afford safe ground for inferring identity of power. This is particularly to be remarked with regard to the Perioeki at Kyrênê, who were perhaps more analogous to the Helots than to the Perioeki of Sparta. The fact that the Perioeki were considered in the new constitution as belonging specially to the Theræan branch of citizens, shows that these latter still continued a privileged order, like the Patricians with their Clients at Rome in relation to the Plebs.

That the re-arrangement introduced by Demônax was wise, consonant to the general current of Greek feeling, and calculated to work well, there is good reason to believe. No discontent within would have subverted it without the aid of extraneous force. Battus the Lamæ acquiesced in

New Immi-
gration—
restoration
of the Bat-
tiad Arke-
silas the
Third.

¹ Both O. Müller (Dor. b. iii. 4, 5) and Thirge (Hist. Cyren. c. 38. p. 148) speak of Demônax as having abolished the old tribes and created new ones. I do not conceive the change in this manner. Demônax did not *abolish* any tribes, but distributed for the first time the inhabitants into tribes. It is possible indeed that before his time the Theræans of Kyrênê may have been divided among themselves into distinct tribes; but the other inhabitants, having immigrated from a great number of different places, had never before been

thrown into tribes at all. Some formal enactment or regulation was necessary for this purpose, to define and sanction that religious, social, and political communion which went to make up the idea of the Tribe. It is not to be assumed, as a matter of course, that there must necessarily have been tribes anterior to Demônax, among a population so miscellaneous in its origin.

² Hesychius, *Τριακᾶριοι*; Eustath. ad Hom. Odyss. p. 303; Herakleidês Pontic. De Polit. c. 4.

it peaceably during his life ; but his widow and his son, Pheretimê and Arkesilaus, raised a revolt after his death and tried to regain by force the kingly privileges of the family. They were worsted and obliged to flee—the mother to Cyprus, the son to Samos—where both employed themselves in procuring foreign arms to invade and conquer Kyrênê. Though Pheretimê could obtain no effective aid from Euelthôn prince of Salamis in Cyprus, her son was more successful in Samos, by inviting new Greek settlers to Kyrênê, under promise of a redistribution of the land. A large body of emigrants joined him on this proclamation; the period seemingly being favourable to it, since the Ionian cities had not long before become subject to Persia, and were discontented with the yoke. But before he conducted this numerous band against his native city, he thought proper to ask the advice of the Delphian oracle. Success in the undertaking was promised to him, but moderation and mercy after success were emphatically enjoined, on pain of losing his life ; and the Battiad race was declared by the god to be destined to rule at Kyrênê for eight generations, but no longer—as far as four princes named Battus and four named Arkesilaus.¹ “More than such eight generations (said the Pythia), Apollo forbids the Battiads even to aim at.” This oracle was doubtless told to Herodotus by Kyrenæan informants when he visited their city after the final deposition of the Battiad princes, which took place in the person of the fourth Arkesilaus, between 460-450 B.C. ; the invasion of Kyrênê by Arkesilaus the Third, sixth prince of the Battiad race, to which the oracle professed to refer, having occurred about 530 B.C. The words placed in the mouth of the priestess doubtless date from the later of these two periods, and afford a specimen of the way in which pretended prophecies are not only made up by ante-dating after-knowledge, but are also so contrived as to serve a present purpose ; for the distinct prohibition of the god “not even to aim at a longer lineage than eight Battiad princes,” seems plainly intended to deter the partisans of the dethroned family from endeavouring to reinstate them.

Arkesilaus the Third, to whom this prophecy purports to have been addressed, returned with his mother Pheretimê and his army of new colonists to Kyrênê. He was strong enough to carry all before him—to expel some of his chief opponents and seize upon others, whom he sent to Cyprus to

Oracle
limiting the
duration of
the Battiad
dynasty.

Violences
at Kyrênê
under Arke-
silaus the
Third.

¹ Herodot. iv. 163. Ἐπὶ μὲν τέσσερας Βάττους, καὶ Ἀρκεσιλῶς τέσσερας, δίδοι ὑμῖν Λοξίης βασιλεύειν Κυρήνης. πλεον μέντοι τούτου οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι παραινέει.

be destroyed ; though the vessels were driven out of their course by storms to the peninsula of Knidus, where the inhabitants rescued the prisoners and sent them to Thêra. Other Kyrenæans, opposed to the Battiads, took refuge in a lofty private tower, the property of Aglômachus, wherein Arkesilaus caused them all to be burnt, heaping wood around and setting it on fire. But after this career of triumph and revenge, he became conscious that he had departed from the mildness enjoined to him by the oracle, and sought to avoid the punishment which it had threatened by retiring from Kyrênê. At any rate he departed from Kyrênê to Barka, to the residence of the Barkæan prince his kinsman Alazir, whose daughter he had married. But he found in Barka some of the unfortunate men who had fled from Kyrênê to escape him. These exiles, aided by a few Barkæans, watched for a suitable moment to assail him in the market-place, and slew him together with his kinsman the prince Alazir.¹

The victory of Arkesilaus at Kyrênê, and his assassination at Barka, are doubtless real facts. But they seem to have been compressed together and incorrectly coloured, in order to give to the death of the Kyrenæan prince the appearance of a divine judgement. For the reign of Arkesilaus cannot have been very short, since events of the utmost importance occurred within it. The Persians under Kambyssês conquered Egypt, and both the Kyrenæan and the Barkæan prince sent to Memphis to make their submission to the conqueror—offering presents and imposing upon themselves an annual tribute. These presents of the Kyrenæans, 500 minæ of silver, were considered by Kambyssês so contemptibly small, that he took hold of them at once and threw them among his soldiers. And at the moment when Arkesilaus died, Aryandes, the Persian satrap after the death of Kambyssês, is found established in Egypt.²

During the absence of Arkesilaus at Barka, his mother Phere-
B.C. 517-513. timê had acted as regent, taking her place at the dis-
Persian ex-
pedition from
Egypt
against
Barka—
Pheretimê
mother of
Arkesilaus. cussions in the senate. But when his death took place, and the feeling against the Battiads manifested itself strongly at Barka, she did not feel powerful enough to put it down, and went to Egypt to solicit aid from Aryandes. The satrap, being made to believe that Arkesilaus had met his death in consequence of steady devotion to the Persians, sent a herald to Barka to demand the men who had slain him. The Barkæans assumed the collective responsibility of

¹ Herodot. iv. 163-164.

² Herodot. iii. 13; iv. 165-166.

the act, saying that he had done them injuries both numerous and severe—a farther proof that his reign cannot have been very short. On receiving this reply, the satrap immediately despatched a powerful Persian armament, land-force as well as sea-force, in fulfilment of the designs of Pheretimê against Barka. They besieged the town for nine months, trying to storm, to batter, and to undermine the walls;¹ but their efforts were vain, and it was taken at last only by an act of the grossest perfidy. Pretending to relinquish the attempt in despair, the Persian general concluded a treaty with the Barkæans, wherein it was stipulated that the latter should continue to pay tribute to the Great King, but that the army should retire without farther hostilities: “I swear it (said the Persian general), and my oath shall hold good, as long as this earth shall keep its place.” But the spot on which the oaths were exchanged had been fraudulently prepared: a ditch had been excavated and covered with hurdles, upon which again a surface of earth had been laid. The Barkæans, confiding in the oath, and overjoyed at their liberation, immediately opened their gates and relaxed their guard; while the Persians, breaking down the hurdles and letting fall the superimposed earth, so that they might comply with the letter of their oath, assaulted the city and took it without difficulty.

Miserable was the fate which Pheretimê had in reserve for these entrapped prisoners. She crucified the chief opponents of herself and her late son around the walls, on which were also affixed the breasts of their wives: then, with the exception of such of the inhabitants as were Battiads and no-way concerned in the death of Arkesilaus, she consigned the rest to slavery in Persia. They were carried away captive into the Persian empire, where Darius assigned to them a village in Baktria as their place of abode, which still bore the name of Barka, even in the days of Herodotus.

During the course of this expedition, it appears, the Persian army advanced as far as Hesperides, and reduced many of the Libyan tribes to subjection. These, together with Kyrênê and Barka, figure afterwards among the tributaries and auxiliaries of Xerxês in his expedition against Greece. And when the army returned to Egypt, by order of Ariandês, they were half inclined to seize Kyrênê itself in their way, though the opportunity was missed and the purpose left unaccomplished.²

¹ Polyænus (Strateg. vii. 28) gives a narrative in many respects different from ² Herodot. iv. 203, 204.

Capture of
Barka by
perfidy—
cruelty of
Pheretimê.

Pheretimê accompanied the retreating army to Egypt, where she died shortly of a loathsome disease, consumed by worms; thus showing (says Herodotus¹) that “excessive cruelty in revenge brings down upon men the displeasure of the gods.” It will be recollected that in the veins of this savage woman the Libyan blood was intermixed with the Grecian. In Greece Proper, political enmity kills—but seldom, if ever, mutilates—or sheds the blood of women.

We thus leave Kyrênê and Barka again subject to Battiad princes, at the same time that they are tributaries of Persia. Another Battus and another Arkesilaus have to intervene before the glass of this worthless dynasty is run out, between 460-450 B.C. I shall not at present carry the reader's attention to this last Arkesilaus, who stands honoured by two chariot victories in Greece, and two fine odes of Pindar.

Battus the Fourth and Arkesilaus the Fourth—final extinction of the dynasty about 460-450 B.C.

The victory of the third Arkesilaus, and the restoration of the Battiads, broke up the equitable constitution established by Demônax. His triple classification into tribes must have been completely remodelled, though we do not know how; for the number of new colonists whom Arkesilaus introduced must have necessitated a fresh distribution of land, and it is extremely doubtful whether the relation of the Theræan class of citizens with their Pericæki, as established by Demônax, still continued to subsist. It is necessary to notice this fact, because the arrangements of Demônax are spoken of by some authors as if they formed the permanent constitution of Kyrênê; whereas they cannot have outlived the restoration of the Battiads, nor can they even have been revived after that dynasty was finally expelled, since the number of new citizens and the large change of property, introduced by Arkesilaus the Third, would render them inapplicable to the subsequent city.

Constitution of Demônax not durable.

¹ Herodot. iv. 205.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAN-HELLENIC FESTIVALS—OLYMPIC, PYTHIAN, NEMEAN,
AND ISTHMIAN.

IN the preceding chapters I have been under the necessity of presenting to the reader a picture altogether incoherent and destitute of central effect. I have specified briefly each of the two or three hundred towns which agreed in bearing the Hellenic name, and recounted its birth and early life, as far as our evidence goes—but without being able to point out any action and reaction, exploits or sufferings, prosperity or misfortune, glory or disgrace, common to all. To a great degree, this is a characteristic inseparable from the history of Greece from its beginning to its end; for the only political unity which it ever receives, is the melancholy unity of subjection under all-conquering Rome. Nothing short of force will efface in the mind of a free Greek the idea of his city as an autonomous and separate organization. The village is a fraction, but the city is an unit,—and the highest of all political units, not admitting of being consolidated with others into a ten or a hundred, to the sacrifice of its own separate and individual mark. Such is the character of the race, both in their primitive country and in their colonial settlements—in their early as well as in their late history—splitting by natural fracture into a multitude of self-administering, indivisible, cities. But that which marks the early historical period before Peisistratus, and which impresses upon it an incoherence at once so fatiguing and so irremediable, is, that as yet no causes have arisen to counteract this political isolation. Each city, whether progressive or stationary, prudent or adventurous, turbulent or tranquil, follows out its own thread of existence, having no partnership or common purposes with the rest, nor being yet constrained into any active communion with them by extraneous forces. In like manner, the races which on every side surround the Hellenic world appear distinct and unconnected, not yet taken up into any co-operating mass or system.

Want of
grouping and
unity in the
early period
of Grecian
history.

Contemporaneously with the accession of Peisistratus, this state of things becomes altered both in and out of Hellas—the former

as a consequence of the latter. For at that time begins the formation of the great Persian empire, which absorbs into itself not only Upper Asia and Asia Minor, but also Phenicia, Egypt, Thrace, Macedonia, and a considerable number of the Grecian cities themselves; while the common danger, from this vast aggregate, threatening the greater states of Greece Proper, drives them, in spite of great reluctance and jealousy, into active union. Hence

New causes
tending to
favour union
begin after
560 B.C.—no
general war
between 776
and 560 B.C.
known to
Thucydides.

arises a new impulse, counterworking the natural tendency to political isolation in the Hellenic cities, and centralising their proceedings to a certain extent for the two centuries succeeding 560 B.C.; Athens and Sparta both availing themselves of the centralising tendencies which had grown out of the Persian war. But during the interval between 776-560 B.C., no such tendency can be traced even in commencement, nor any constraining force calculated to bring it about. Even Thucydides, as we may see by his excellent preface, knew of nothing during these two centuries except separate city-politics and occasional wars between neighbours. The only event, according to him, in which any considerable number of Grecian cities were jointly concerned, was the war between Chalkis and Eretria, the date of which we do not know. In that war, several cities took part as allies; Samos, among others, with Eretria—Milêtus with Chalkis:¹ how far the alliances of either may have extended, we have no evidence to inform us, but the presumption is that no great number of Grecian cities was comprehended in them. Such as it was, however, this war between Chalkis and Eretria was the nearest approach, and the only approach, to a Pan-Hellenic proceeding, which Thucydides indicates between the Trojan and the Persian wars. Both he and Herodotus present this early period only by way of preface and contrast to that which follows—when the Pan-Hellenic spirit and tendencies, though never at any time predominant, yet counted for a powerful element in history, and sensibly modified the universal instinct of city-isolation. They tell us little about it, either because they could find no trustworthy informants, or because there was nothing in it to captivate the imagination in the same manner as the Persian or the Peloponnesian wars. From whatever cause their silence arises, it is deeply to be regretted, since the phænomena of the two centuries from 776-560 B.C., though not susceptible of any central grouping, must have presented the most instructive matter for study, had they been preserved. In no period of history have there ever been

¹ Thucyd. i. 15.

formed a greater number of new political communities, under much variety of circumstances, personal as well as local. A few chronicles, however destitute of philosophy, reporting the exact march of some of these colonies from their commencement—amidst all the difficulties attendant on amalgamation with strange natives, as well as on a fresh distribution of land—would have added greatly to our knowledge both of Greek character and Greek social existence.

Taking the two centuries now under review, then, it will appear that there is not only no growing political unity among the Grecian states, but a tendency even to the contrary—to dissemination and mutual estrangement. Not so, however, in regard to the other feelings of unity capable of subsisting between men who acknowledge no common political authority—sympathies founded on common religion, language, belief of race, legends, tastes and customs, intellectual appetencies, sense of proportion and artistic excellence, recreative enjoyments, &c. On all these points, the manifestations of Hellenic unity become more and more pronounced and comprehensive, in spite of increased political dissemination, throughout the same period. The breadth of common sentiment and sympathy between Greek and Greek, together with the conception of multitudinous periodical meetings as an indispensable portion of existence, appears decidedly greater in 560 B.C. than it had been a century before. It was fostered by the increased conviction of the superiority of Greeks as compared with foreigners—a conviction gradually more and more justified as Grecian art and intellect improved, and as the survey of foreign countries became extended—as well as by the many new efforts of men of genius in the field of music, poetry, statuary, and architecture; each of whom touched chords of feeling, belonging to other Greeks hardly less than to his own peculiar city. At the same time, the life of each peculiar city continues distinct, and even gathers to itself a greater abundance of facts and internal interests; so that during the two centuries now under review there was in the mind of every Greek an increase both of the city-feeling and of the Pan-Hellenic feeling, but on the other hand a decline of the old sentiment of separate race—Doric, Ionic, Æolic.

I have already, in my former volume, touched upon the many-sided character of the Grecian religion, entering as it did into all the enjoyments and sufferings, the hopes and fears, the affections and antipathies of the people—not simply imposing restraints and obligations, but protecting,

Increasing
disposition
to religious,
intellectual
and social
union.

Reciprocal
admission
of cities to
the religious
festivals of
each other.

multiplying and diversifying all the social pleasures and all the decorations of existence. Each city and even each village had its peculiar religious festivals, wherein the sacrifices to the gods were usually followed by public recreations of one kind or other—by feasting on the victims, processional marches, singing and dancing, or competition in strong and active exercises. The festival was originally local, but friendship or communion of race was shown by inviting others, non-residents, to partake in its attractions. In the case of a colony and its metropolis, it was a frequent practice that citizens of the metropolis were honoured with a privileged seat at the festivals of the colony, or that one of their number was presented with the first taste of the sacrificial victim.¹ Reciprocal frequentation of religious festivals was thus the standing evidence of friendship and fraternity among cities not politically united. That it must have existed to a certain degree from the earliest days, there can be no reasonable doubt; though in Homer and Hesiod we find only the celebration of funeral games, by a chief at his own private expense, in honour of his deceased father or friend—with all the accompanying recreations, however, of a public festival, and with strangers not only present, but also contending for valuable prizes.² Passing to historical Greece during the seventh century B.C., we find evidence of two festivals, even then very considerable, and frequented by Greeks from many different cities and districts—the festival at Delos, in honour of Apollo, the great place of meeting for Ionians throughout the Ægean—and the Olympic games.

The Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, which must be placed earlier than 600 B.C., dwells with emphasis on the splendour of the Delian festival, unrivalled throughout Greece, as it would appear, during all the first period of this history, for wealth, finery of attire, and variety of exhibitions as well in poetical genius as in bodily activity³—equalling probably at that time, if not surpassing, the Olympic games. The complete and undiminished grandeur of this Delian Pan-Ionic festival is one of our chief marks of the first period of Grecian history, before the comparative prostration of the Ionic Greeks through the rise of

¹ Thucyd. i. 26. See the tale in Pausanias (v. 25, 1) of the ancient chorus sent annually from Messênê in Sicily across the strait to Rhegium, to a local festival of the Rhegians—thirty-five boys with a chorus-master and a flute-player: on one unfortunate occasion, all of them perished in crossing. For the Théory (or solemn religious

deputation) periodically sent by the Athenians to Delos, see Plutarch, Nicias, c. 3; Plato, Phædon, c. 1. p. 58. Compare also Strabo, ix. p. 419, on the general subject.

² Homer, Iliad, xi. 879. xxiii. 679; Hesiod, Opp. Di. 651.

³ Homer. Hymn. Apoll. 150; Thucyd. iii. 104.

Persia. It was celebrated periodically in every fourth year, to the honour of Apollo and Artemis. Moreover it was distinguished from the Olympic games by two circumstances both deserving of notice—first, by including solemn matches not only of gymnastic, but also of musical and poetical excellence, whereas the latter had no place at Olympia; secondly, by the admission of men, women and children indiscriminately as spectators, whereas women were formally excluded from the Olympic ceremony.¹ Such exclusion may have depended in part on the inland situation of Olympia, less easily approachable by females than the island of Delos; but even making allowance for this circumstance, both the one distinction and the other mark the rougher character of the Ætolo-Dorians in Peloponnesus. The Delian festival, which greatly dwindled away during the subjection of the Asiatic and insular Greeks to Persia, was revived afterwards by Athens during the period of her empire, when she was seeking in every way to strengthen her central ascendancy in the Ægean. But though it continued to be ostentatiously celebrated under her management, it never regained that commanding sanctity and crowded frequentation which we find attested in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo for its earlier period.

Very different was the fate of the Olympic festival—on the banks of the Alpheius² in Peloponnesus, near the old oracular temple of the Olympian Zeus—which not only grew up uninterruptedly from small beginnings to the maximum of Pan-Hellenic importance, but even preserved its crowds of visitors and its celebrity for many centuries after the extinction of Greek freedom, and only received its final abolition, after more than 1100 years of continuance, from the decree of the Christian emperor Theodosius in 394 A.D. I have already recounted in the preceding volume of this History, the attempt made by Pheidon, despot of Argos, to restore to the Pisatans, or to acquire for himself, the administration of this festival—an event which proves the importance of the festival in Peloponnesus, even so early as 740 B.C. At that time, and for some years afterwards, it seems to have been frequented chiefly, if not exclusively, by the neighbouring inhabitants of Central and Western Peloponnesus—Spartans, Messenians, Arkadians, Triphylians, Pisatans, Eleians, and Achæans³—and it forms an important link connecting the

Olympic
games—
their cele-
brity and
long con-
tinuance.

¹ Pausan. v. 6, 5; Ælian, N. H. x. 1; Thucyd. iii. 104. When Ephesus, and the festival called Ephesia, had become the great place of Ionic meeting, the presence of women was still continued (Dionys. Hal. A. R. iv. 25).

² Strabo, viii. p. 353; Pindar, Olymp. viii. 2; Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 2; iii. 2, 22.

³ See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats-Alterthümer, sect. 10.

Ætolo-Eleians, and their privileges as Agonothets, to solemnise and preside over it, with Sparta. From the year 720 B.C., we trace positive evidences of the gradual presence of more distant Greeks—Corinthians, Megarians, Bœotians, Athenians, and even Smyrnæans from Asia. We observe also other proofs of growing importance, in the increased number and variety of matches exhibited to the spectators, and in the substitution of the simple crown of olive, an honorary reward, in place of the more substantial present which the Olympic festival and all other Grecian festivals began by conferring upon the victor. The humble constitution of the Olympic games presented originally nothing more than a match of runners in the measured course called the Stadium. A continuous series of the victorious runners was formally inscribed and preserved by the Eleians, beginning with Korœbus in 776 B.C., and was made to serve by chronological inquirers from the third century B.C. downwards, as a means of measuring the chronological sequence of Grecian events. It was on the occasion of the seventh Olympiad after Korœbus that Daiklês the Messenian first received for his victory in the stadium no farther recompense than a wreath from the sacred olive-tree near Olympia:¹ the honour of being proclaimed victor was found sufficient, without any pecuniary addition. But until the fourteenth Olympiad (724 B.C.) there was no other match for the spectators to witness besides that of simple runners in the stadium. On that occasion a second race was first introduced, of runners in the double stadium, or up and down the course. In the next or fifteenth Olympiad (720 B.C.) a third match, the long course for runners, or several times up and down the stadium. There were thus three races—the simple Stadium, the double Stadium or Diaulos, and the long course or Dolichos, all for runners—which continued without addition until the eighteenth Olympiad, when the wrestling-match and the complicated Pentathlon (including jumping, running, the quoit, the javelin, and wrestling) were both added. A farther novelty appears in the twenty-third Olympiad (688 B.C.), the boxing-match; and another still more important in the twenty-fifth (680 B.C.), the chariot with four full-grown horses. This last-mentioned addition is deserving of special notice, not merely as it diversified the scene by the introduction of horses, but also as

Their gradual increase—new matches introduced.

¹ Dionys. Halikarn. Ant. Rom. i. 71; Phlegon, De Olympiad. p. 140. For an illustration of the stress laid by the Greeks on the purely honorary rewards of Olympia, and on the credit which

they took to themselves as competitors, not for money, but for glory, see Herodot. viii. 26. Compare the Scholia on Pindar, Nem. and Isthm. Argument, p. 425–514, ed. Boëckh.

it brought in a totally new class of competitors—rich men and women, who possessed the finest horses and could hire the most skilful drivers, without any personal superiority or power of bodily display in themselves.¹ The prodigious exhibition of wealth in which the chariot proprietors indulged, is not only an evidence of growing importance in the Olympic games, but also served materially to increase that importance and to heighten the interest of spectators. Two farther matches were added in the thirty-third Olympiad (648 B.C.)—the Pankration, or boxing and wrestling conjoined,² with the hand unarmed or divested of that hard leather cestus³ worn by the pugilist, which rendered the blow of the latter more terrible, but at the same time prevented him from grasping or keeping hold of his adversary—and the single race-horse. Many other novelties were introduced one after the other, which it is unnecessary fully to enumerate—the race between men clothed in full panoply and bearing each his shield—the different matches between boys, analogous to those between full-grown men, and between colts of the same nature as between full-grown horses. At the maximum of its attraction the Olympic solemnity occupied five days, but until the seventy-seventh Olympiad, all the various matches had been compressed into one—beginning at day-break and not always closing before dark.⁴ The seventy-seventh Olympiad follows immediately after the successful expulsion of the Persian invaders from Greece, when the Pan-Hellenic feeling had been keenly stimulated by resistance to a common enemy; and we

¹ See the sentiment of Agesilaus, somewhat contemptuous, respecting the chariot-race, as described by Xenophon (Agesilaus, ix. 6): the general feeling of Greece, however, is more in conformity with what Thucydides (vi. 16) puts into the mouth of Alkibiades, and Xenophon into that of Simonides (Xenophon, Hiero, xi. 5). The great respect attached to a family which had gained chariot victories is amply attested: see Herodot. vi. 35, 36, 103, 126 — οἰκίη τεθριππότροφος—and vi. 70, about Demaratus king of Sparta.

² Antholog. Palatin. ix. 588; vol. ii. p. 299, Jacobs.

³ The original Greek word for this covering (which surrounded the middle hand and upper portion of the fingers, leaving both the ends of the fingers and the thumb exposed) was *ιμάς*, the word for a thong, strap, or whip, of leather: the special word *μύρμηξ* seems to have been afterwards introduced

(Hesychius, v. 'Ιμάς): see Homer, Iliad, xxiii. 686. Cestus, or Cæstus, is the Latin word (Virg. Æn. v. 404): the Greek word *κεστός* is an adjective annexed to *ιμάς*—*κεστόν ιμάντα*—*πολύκεστος ιμάς* (Iliad, xiv. 214. iii. 371). See Pausan. viii. 40, 3, for the description of the incident which caused an alteration in this hand-covering at the Nemean games: ultimately it was still farther hardened by the addition of iron.

⁴ 'Αέθλων πεμπαμέρους ἀμίλλας—Pindar, Olymp. v. 6: compare Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. iii. 33.

See the facts respecting the Olympic Agôn collected by Corsini (Dissertationes Agonisticæ, Dissert. i. sect. 8, 9, 10), and still more amply set forth, with a valuable commentary, by Krause (Olympia, oder Darstellung der grossen Olympischen Spiele, Wien 1838, sect. 8–11 especially).

may easily conceive that this was a suitable moment for imparting additional dignity to the chief national festival.

We are thus enabled partially to trace the steps whereby, during the two centuries succeeding 776 B.C., the festival of the Olympic Zeus in the Pisatid gradually passed from a local to a national character, and acquired an attractive force capable of bringing together into temporary union the dispersed fragments of Hellas, from Marseilles to Trebizond. In this important function it did not long stand alone. During the sixth century B.C., three other festivals, at first local, became successively nationalised—the Pythia near Delphi, the Isthmia near Corinth, the Nemea near Kleônæ, between Sikyôn and Argos.

In regard to the Pythian festival, we find a short notice of the particular incidents and individuals by whom its reconstitution and enlargement were brought about—a notice the more interesting, inasmuch as these very incidents are themselves a manifestation of something like Pan-Hellenic patriotism, standing almost alone in an age which presents little else in operation except distinct city-interests. At the time when the Homeric Hymn to the Delphinian Apollo was composed (probably in the seventh century B.C.), the Pythian festival had as yet acquired little eminence. The rich and holy temple of Apollo was then purely oracular, established for the purpose of communicating to pious inquirers “the counsels of the Immortals.” Multitudes of visitors came to consult it, as well as to sacrifice victims and to deposit costly offerings; but while the god delighted in the sound of the harp as an accompaniment to the singing of Pæans, he was by no means anxious to encourage horse-races and chariot-races in the neighbourhood. Nay, this psalmist considers that the noise of horses would be “a nuisance,”—the drinking of mules a desecration to the sacred fountains—and the ostentation of fine-built chariots objectionable,¹ as tending to divert the attention of spectators away from the great temple and its wealth. From such inconveniences the god was protected by placing his sanctuary “in the rocky Pytho”—a rugged and uneven recess, of no great dimensions, embosomed in the southern

¹ Hom. Hymn. Apoll. 262.

Πημανέει σ' αἰεὶ κτυπὸς ἵππων ὠκειάων,
 Ἀρδόμενοι τ' οὐρῆες ἐμῶν ἱερῶν ἀπὸ πηγέων.
 Ἐνθα τις ἀνθρώπων βουλήσεται εἰσοράασθαι
 Ἀρματὰ τ' εὐποίητα καὶ ὠκυπόδων κτυπὸν ἵππων,
 Ἡ νηὸν τε μέγαν καὶ κτήματα πολλὰ ἐνέοντα.

Also v. 288–394. γυάλων ὑπὸ Παρνήσοιο —484. ὑπὸ πτυχί Παρνήσοιο—Pindar, Pyth. viii. 90. Πυθῶνος ἐν γυάλοις—Strabo, ix. p. 418. πετρωδὲς χάριον καὶ θεατροειδὲς—Heliodorus, Æthiop. ii. 26: compare Will. Götte, Das Delphische Orakel (Leipzig 1839), p. 39–42.

declivity of Parnassus, and about 2000 feet above the level of the sea, while the topmost Parnassian summits reach a height of near 8000 feet. The situation was extremely imposing, but unsuited by nature for the congregation of any considerable number of spectators—altogether impracticable for chariot-races—and only rendered practicable by later art and outlay for the theatre as well as for the stadium; the original stadium, when first established, was placed in the plain beneath. Such a site furnished little means of subsistence, but the sacrifices and presents of visitors enabled the ministers of the temple to live in abundance,¹ and gathered together by degrees a village around it.

Near the sanctuary of Pytho, and about the same altitude, was situated the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, on a projecting spur of Parnassus—overhung above by the line ^{Phokian town of Krissa.} of rocky precipice called the Phædriades, and itself overhanging below the deep ravine through which flows the river Pleistus. On the other side of this river rises the steep mountain Kirphis, which projects southward into the Corinthian Gulf—the river reaching that gulf through the broad Krissæan, or Kirrhæan, plain, which stretches westward nearly to the Lokrian town of Amphissa; a plain for the most part fertile and productive, though least so in its eastern part immediately under the Kirphis, where the seaport Kirrha was placed.² The temple, the oracle, and the

¹ Βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἰφερβόν, οὐπιάν τ' ἀελ ζέρος, says Ion (in Euripidēs, Ion, 334) the slave of Apollo, and the verger of his Delphian temple, who waters it from the Kastalian spring, sweeps it with laurel boughs, and keeps off with his bow and arrows the obtrusive birds (Ion, 105, 143, 154). Whoever reads the description of Professor Ulrichs (Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, ch. 7. p. 110) will see that the birds—eagles, vultures, and crows—are quite numerous enough to have been exceedingly troublesome. The whole play of Ion conveys a lively idea of the Delphian temple and its scenery, with which Euripidēs was doubtless familiar.

² There is considerable perplexity respecting Krissa and Kirrha, and it still remains a question among scholars whether the two names denote the same place, or different places; the former is the opinion of O. Müller (Orchomenos, p. 495). Strabo distinguishes the two, Pausanias identifies them, conceiving no other town to have

ever existed except the seaport (x. 37, 4). Mannert (Geogr. Gr. Röm. viii. p. 148) follows Strabo, and represents them as different.

I consider the latter to be the correct opinion; upon the grounds, and partly also on the careful topographical examination, of Professor Ulrichs, who gives an excellent account of the whole scenery of Delphi (Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, Bremen 1840, chapters 1, 2, 3). The ruins described by him on the high ground near Kastri, called the Forty Saints, may fairly be considered as the ruins of Krissa; the ruins of Kirrha are on the sea-shore near the mouth of the Pleistus. The plain beneath might without impropriety be called either the Krissæan or the Kirrhæan plain (Herodot. viii. 32; Strabo, ix. p. 419). Though Strabo was right in distinguishing Krissa from Kirrha, and right also in the position of the latter under Kirphis, he conceived incorrectly the situation of Krissa; and his representation that there were two wars—in the first of

wealth of Pytho, belong to the very earliest periods of Grecian antiquity. But the octennial solemnity in honour of the god included at first no other competition except that of bards, who sang each a pæan with the harp. It has been already mentioned, in my preceding volume, that the Amphiktyonic assembly held one of its half-yearly meetings near the temple of Pytho, the other at Thermopylæ.

In those early times when the Homeric Hymn to Apollo was composed, the town of Krissa appears to have been great and powerful, possessing all the broad plain between Parnassus, Kirphis, and the gulf, to which latter it gave its name—and possessing also, what was a property not less valuable, the adjoining sanctuary of Pytho itself, which the Hymn identifies with Krissa, not indicating Delphi as a separate place. The Krissæans doubtless derived great profits from the number of visitors who came to visit Delphi, both by land and by sea, and Kirrha was originally only the name for their seaport. Gradually, however, the port appears to have grown in importance at the expense of the town, just as Apollonia and Ptolemais came to equal Kyrênê and Barka, and as Plymouth Dock has swelled into Devonport; while at the same time the sanctuary of Pytho with its administrators expanded into the town of Delphi, and came to claim an independent existence of its own. The original relations between Krissa, Kirrha, and Delphi, were in this manner at length subverted, the first declining and the two latter rising. The Krissæans found themselves dispossessed of the management of the temple, which passed to the Delphians; as well as of the profits arising from the visitors, whose disbursements went to enrich the inhabitants of Kirrha. Krissa was a primitive city of the Phokian name, and could boast of a place as such in the Homeric Catalogue, so that her loss of importance was not likely to be quietly endured. Moreover, in addition to the above facts, already sufficient in themselves as seeds of quarrel, we are told that the Kirrhæans abused their position as masters of the avenue to the temple by sea, and levied

which, Kirrha was destroyed by the Krissæans, while in the second, Krissa itself was conquered by the Amphiktyons—is not confirmed by any other authority.

The mere circumstance that Pindar gives us in three separate passages, *Κρίσα*, *Κρισάιον*, *Κρισάλοισ* (Isth. ii. 26; Pyth. v. 49, vi. 18), and in five other

passages, *Κίρρα*, *Κίρρας*, *Κίρραθεν* (Pyth. iii. 33, vii. 14, viii. 26, x. 24, xi. 20), renders it almost certain that the two names belong to different places, and are not merely two different names for the same place; the poet could not in this case have any metrical reason for varying the denomination, as the metre of the two words is similar.

exorbitant tolls on the visitors who landed there—a number constantly increasing from the multiplication of the transmarine colonies, and from the prosperity of those in Italy and Sicily. Besides such offence against the general Grecian public, they had also incurred the enmity of their Phokian neighbours by outrages upon women, Phokian as well as Argeian, who were returning from the temple.¹

Thus stood the case, apparently, about 595 B.C., when the Amphiktyonic meeting interfered—either prompted by the Phokians, or perhaps on their own spontaneous impulse, out of regard to the temple—to punish the Kirrhæans. After a war of ten years, the first Sacred War in Greece, this object was completely accomplished, by a joint force of Thessalians under Eurylochos, Sikyonians under Kleisthenês, and Athenians under Alkmæon; the Athenian Solon being the person who originated and enforced in the Amphiktyonic council the proposition of interference. Kirrha appears to have made a strenuous resistance, until its supplies from the sea were intercepted by the naval force of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês. Even after the town was taken, its inhabitants defended themselves for some time on the heights of Kirphis.² At length, however, they were thoroughly subdued. Their town was destroyed, or left to subsist merely as a landing-place; while the whole adjoining plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, whose domains thus touched the sea. Under this sentence, pronounced by the religious feeling of Greece, and sanctified by a solemn oath publicly sworn and inscribed at Delphi, the land was condemned to remain untilled and unplanted, without any species of human care, and serving only for the pasturage of cattle. The latter circumstance was convenient to the temple, inasmuch as it furnished abundance of victims for the pilgrims who landed and came to sacrifice—for without preliminary sacrifice no man could consult the oracle;³ while the entire prohibition of tillage was the only means of obviating the growth of another troublesome neighbour on the sea-

Insolence
of the
Kirrhæans
punished by
the Amphiktyons.

¹ Athenæus, xiii. p. 560; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. c. 36. p. 406; Strabo, ix. p. 418. Of the Akragallidæ, or Kraugallidæ, whom Æschinês mentions along with the Kirrhæans as another impious race who dwelt in the neighbourhood of the god—and who were overthrown along with the Kirrhæans—we have no farther information. O. Müller's conjecture would identify them with the Dryopes (Dorians, i. 2. 5, and

his Orchomenos, p. 496); Harpokration, v. Κραυγαλλίδαι.

² Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. Introduct.; Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. ix. 2; Plutarch, Solon, c. 11; Pausan. ii. 9, 6. Pausanias (x. 37, 4) and Polyænus (Strateg. iii. 6) relate a stratagem of Solon, or of Eurylochos, to poison the water of the Kirrhæans with hellebore.

³ Eurip. Ion, 230.

board. The ruin of Kirrha in this war is certain: though the necessity of a harbour for visitors arriving by sea, led to the gradual revival of the town, upon a humbler scale of pretension. But the fate of Krissa is not so clear, nor do we know whether it was destroyed, or left subsisting in a position of inferiority with regard to Delphi. From this time forward, however, the Delphian community appear as substantive and 'autonomous, exercising in their own right the management of the temple; though we shall find, on more than one occasion, that the Phokians contest this right, and lay claim to the management of it for themselves¹—a remnant of that early period when the oracle stood in the domain of the Phokian Krissa. There seems moreover to have been a standing antipathy between the Delphians and the Phokians.

The Sacred War just mentioned—emanating from a solemn
First Sacred War, in 595 B.C.
 Amphiktyonic decree, carried on jointly by troops of different states whom we do not know to have ever before co-operated, and directed exclusively towards an object of common interest—is in itself a fact of high importance as manifesting a decided growth of Pan-Hellenic feeling. Sparta is not named as interfering—a circumstance which seems remarkable when we consider both her power, even as it then stood, and her intimate connexion with the Delphian oracle—while the Athenians appear as the chief movers, through the greatest and best of their citizens. The credit of a large-minded patriotism rests prominently upon them.

But if this Sacred War itself is a proof that the Pan-Hellenic
Destruction of Kirrha.—Pythian games founded by the Amphiktyons.
 spirit was growing stronger, the positive result in which it ended reinforced that spirit still farther. The spoils of Kirrha were employed by the victorious allies in founding the Pythian games. The octennial festival hitherto celebrated at Delphi in honour of the god, including no other competition except in the harp and the pæan, was expanded into comprehensive games on the model of the Olympic, with matches not only of music, but also of gymnastics and chariots—celebrated, not at Delphi itself, but on the maritime plain near the ruined Kirrha—and under the direct superintendence of the Amphiktyons themselves. I have already mentioned that Solon provided large rewards for such Athenians as gained victories in the Olympic and Isthmian games, thereby indicating his sense of the great value of the national games as a means of promoting Hellenic inter-communion. It was the same feeling which instigated the founda-

¹ Thucyd. i. 112.

tion of the new games on the Kirrhæan plain, in commemoration of the vindicated honour of Apollo, and in the territory newly made over to him. They were celebrated in the autumn, or first half of every third Olympic year; the Amphiktyons being the ostensible Agonothets or administrators, and appointing persons to discharge the duty in their names.¹ At the first Pythian ceremony (in 586 B.C.), valuable rewards were given to the different victors; at the second (582 B.C.), nothing was conferred but wreaths of laurel—the rapidly attained celebrity of the games being such as to render any farther recompence superfluous. The Sikyonian despot Kleisthenês himself, one of the leaders in the conquest of Kirrha, gained the prize at the chariot-race of the second Pythia. We find other great personages in Greece frequently mentioned as competitors, and the games long maintained a dignity second only to the Olympic, over which indeed they had some advantages; first, that they were not abused for the purpose of promoting petty jealousies and antipathies of any administering state, as the Olympic games were perverted by the Eleians, on more than one occasion; next, that they comprised music and poetry as well as bodily display. From the circumstances attending their foundation, the Pythian games deserved, even more than the Olympic, the title bestowed on them by Demosthenês—"the common Agôn of the Greeks."²

The Olympic and Pythian games continued always to be the most venerated solemnities in Greece. Yet the Nemea and Isthmia acquired a celebrity not much inferior; the Olympic prize counting for the highest of all.³ Both the Nemea and the Isthmia were distinguished from the other two festivals by occurring, not once in four years, but once in two years; the

¹ Mr. Clinton thinks that the Pythian games were celebrated in the autumn: M. Boëckh refers the celebration to the spring: Krause agrees with Boëckh (Clinton, *Fast. Hell.* vol. ii. p. 200, Appendix; Boëckh, *ad Corp. Inscr.* No. 1688. p. 813; Krause, *Die Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien*, vol. ii. p. 29–35).

Mr. Clinton's opinion appears to me the right one. Boëckh admits that, with the exception of Thucydides (v. 1–19), the other authorities go to sustain it; but he relies on Thucydides to outweigh them. Now the passage of Thucydides, properly understood, seems to me as much in favour of Clinton's view as the rest, if not more.

I may remark, as a certain additional

reason in favour of Mr. Clinton's view, that the Isthmia appear to have been celebrated in the third year of each Olympiad, and in the spring (Krause, p. 187). It seems improbable that these two great festivals should have come one immediately after the other, which nevertheless must be supposed, if we adopt the opinion of Boëckh and Krause.

Though the Pythian games belong to late summer or early autumn, the exact month is not easy to determine: see the references in K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen*, ch. 49. not. 12.

² Demosthen. *Philipp.* iii. p. 119.

³ Pindar, *Nem.* x. 28–33.

former in the second and fourth years of each Olympiad, the latter in the first and third years. To both is assigned, according to Greek custom, an origin connected with the interesting persons and circumstances of legendary antiquity; but our historical knowledge of both begins with the sixth century B.C. The first historical Nemead is presented as belonging to Olympiad 52 or 53 (572-568 B.C.), a few years subsequent to the Sacred War above-mentioned and to the origin of the Pythia. The festival was celebrated in honour of the Nemean Zeus, in the valley of Nemea between Phlius and Kleônæ. The Kleônæans themselves were originally its presidents, until, at some period after 460 B.C., the Argeians deprived them of that honour and assumed the honours of administration to themselves.¹ The Nemean games had their Hellanodikæ² to superintend, to keep order, and to distribute the prizes, as well as the Olympic.

Respecting the Isthmian festival, our first historical information is a little earlier, for it has already been stated that Solon conferred a premium upon every Athenian citizen who gained a prize at that festival as well as at the Olympian—in or after 594 B.C. It was celebrated by the Corinthians at their isthmus, in honour of Poseidôn; and if we may draw any inference from the legends respecting its foundation, which is ascribed sometimes to Theseus, the Athenians appear to have identified it with the antiquities of their own state.³

¹ Strabo, viii. p. 377; Plutarch, Arat. c. 28; Mannert, Geogr. Gr. Röm. pt. viii. p. 650. Compare the second chapter in Krause, Die Pythien, Nemeen und Isthmien, vol. ii. p. 108 *seqq.*

That the Kleônæans continued without interruption to administer the Nemean festival down to Olympiad 80 (460 B.C.), or thereabouts, is the rational inference from Pindar, Nem. x. 42: compare Nem. iv. 17. Eusebius indeed states that the Argeians seized the administration for themselves in Olympiad 53. In order to reconcile this statement with the above passage in Pindar, critics have concluded that the Argeians lost it again, and that the Kleônæans resumed it a little before Olympiad 80. I take a different view, and am disposed to reject the statement of Eusebius altogether; the more so as Pindar's tenth Nemean ode is addressed to an Argeian citizen named Theiæus; and if there had been at that time a standing dispute between Argos and Kleônæ on the subject of the ad-

ministration of the Nemea, the poet would hardly have introduced the mention of the Nemean prizes gained by the ancestors of Theiæus, under the untoward designation of "prizes received from Kleônæan men."

² See Boëckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 1126.

³ K. F. Hermann, in his *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer* (ch. 32. not. 7, and ch. 65. not. 3), and again in his more recent work (*Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen*, part iii. ch. 49, also not. 6), both highly valuable publications, maintains,—1. That the exaltation of the Isthmian and Nemean games into Pan-Hellenic importance arose directly after and out of the fall of the despots of Corinth and Sikyon. 2. That it was brought about by the paramount influence of the Dorians, especially by Sparta. 3. That the Spartans put down the despots of both these two cities.

The last of these three propositions appears to me untrue in respect to Si-

We thus perceive that the interval between 600-560 B.C. exhibits the first historical manifestation of the Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea—the first expansion of all the three from local into Pan-Hellenic festivals. To the Olympic games, for some time the only great centre of union among all the widely dispersed Greeks, are now added three other sacred Agônes of the like public, open, national character; constituting visible marks as well as tutelary bonds, of collective Hellenism, and ensuring to every Greek who went to compete in the matches, a safe and inviolate transit even through hostile Hellenic states.¹ These four, all in or near Peloponnesus, and one of which occurred in each year, formed the Period, or cycle of sacred games, and those who had gained prizes at all the four received the enviable designation of Periodonikes.² The honours paid to Olympic victors on their return to their native city, were prodigious even in the sixth century B.C., and became even more extravagant afterwards. We may remark, that in the Olympic games alone, the oldest as well as the most illustrious of

Pan-Hellenic character acquired by all the four festivals—Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian.

kyon—improbable in respect to Corinth: my reasons for thinking so have been given in a former chapter. And if this be so, the reason for presuming Spartan intervention as to the Isthmian and Nemean games falls to the ground; for there is no other proof of it, nor does Sparta appear to have interested herself in any of the four national festivals except the Olympic, with which she was from an early period peculiarly connected.

Nor can I think that the first of Hermann's three propositions is at all tenable. No connexion whatever can be shown between Sikyon and the Nemean games; and it is the more improbable in this case that the Sikyonians should have been active, inasmuch as they had under Kleisthenês a little before contributed to nationalize the Pythian games: a second interference for a similar purpose ought not to be presumed without some evidence. To prove his point about the Isthmia, Hermann cites only a passage of Solinus (vii. 14), "Hoc spectaculum, per Cypselum tyrannum intermissum, Corinthii Olymp. 49 solemnitati pristinae reddiderunt." To render this passage at all credible, we must read *Cypselidas* instead of *Cypselum*, which deducts from the value of a witness whose testimony can never under any circumstances be rated high. But granting the alteration, there are two

reasons against the assertion of Solinus. One, a positive reason, that Solon offered a large reward to Athenian victors at the Isthmian games: his legislation falls in 594 B.C., ten years before the time when the Isthmia are said by Solinus to have been renewed after a long intermission. The other reason (negative, though to my mind also powerful) is the silence of Herodotus in that long invective which he puts into the mouth of Sosiklês against the Kypselids (v. 92). If Kypselus had really been guilty of so great an insult to the feelings of the people as to suppress their most solemn festival, the fact would hardly have been omitted in the indictment which Sosiklês is made to urge against him. Aristotle indeed, representing Kypselus as a mild and popular despot, introduces a contrary view of his character, which, if we admitted it, would of itself suffice to negative the supposition that he had suppressed the Isthmia.

¹ Plutarch, Arat. c. 28. καὶ συνεχύθη τότε πρῶτον (by order of Aratus) ἡ δεδομένη τοῖς ἀγωνισταῖς ἀσυλία καὶ ἀσφάλεια, a deadly stain on the character of Aratus.

² Festus, v. Perihodos, p. 217, ed. Müller. See the animated protest of the philosopher Xenophanês against the great rewards given to Olympic victors (540-520 B.C.), Xenophan. Fragment. 2. p. 357, ed. Bergk.

the four, the musical and intellectual element was wanting. All the three more recent Agônes included crowns for exercises of music and poetry, along with gymnastics, chariots, and horses.

It was not only in the distinguishing national stamp set upon these four great festivals, that the gradual increase of Hellenic family-feeling exhibited itself, during the course of this earliest period of Grecian history. Pursuant to the same tendencies, religious festivals in all the considerable towns gradually became more and more open and accessible, attracting guests as well as competitors from beyond the border. The comparative dignity of the city, as well as the honour rendered to the presiding god, were measured by the numbers, admiration, and envy, of the frequenting visitors.¹ There is no positive evidence indeed of such expansion in the Attic festivals earlier than the reign of Peisistratus, who first added the quadrennial or greater Panathenæa to the ancient annual or lesser Panathenæa. Nor can we trace the steps of progress in regard to Thebes, Orchomenus, Thespiaë, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Ægina, Argos, &c., but we find full reason for believing that such was the general reality. Of the Olympic or Isthmian victors whom Pindar and Simonidês celebrated, many derived a portion of their renown from previous victories acquired at several of these local contests²—victories sometimes so numerous, as to prove how wide-spread the habit of reciprocal frequentation had become:³ though we find, even in the third century B.C., treaties of alliance between different cities, in which it is thought necessary to confer such mutual right by express stipulation. Temptation was offered, to the distinguished gymnastic or musical competitors, by prizes of great value. Timæus even asserted, as a proof of the overweening pride of Kroton and Sybaris, that these cities tried to supplant the pre-eminence of the Olympic games, by instituting games of their own

¹ Thucyd. vi. 16. Alkibiadês says, *καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῃ τῇ λαμπρύνονται, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται, φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ αὐτῇ ἰσχυρὸς φαίνεται.*

The greater Panathenæa are ascribed to Peisistratus by the Scholiast on Aristeidês, vol. iii. p. 323, ed. Dindorf: judging by what immediately precedes, the statement seems to come from Aristotle.

² Simonidês, Fragm. 154-158, ed. Bergk; Pindar, Nem. x. 45; Olymp. xiii. 107.

The distinguished athlete Theagenês is affirmed to have gained 1200 prizes

in these various agônes: according to some, 1400 prizes (Pausan. vi. 11, 2; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip. Ger. c. 15. p. 811).

An athlete named Apollonius arrived too late for the Olympic games, having staid away too long from his anxiety to get money at various agônes in Ionia (Pausan. v. 21, 5).

³ See, particularly, the treaty between the inhabitants of Latus and those of Olûs in Krête, in Boëckh's Corp. Inscr. No. 2554, wherein this reciprocity is expressly stipulated. Boëckh places this Inscription in the third century B.C.

with the richest prizes to be celebrated at the same time¹—a statement in itself not worthy of credit, yet nevertheless illustrating the animated rivalry known to prevail among the Grecian cities, in procuring for themselves splendid and crowded games. At the time when the Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr was composed, the worship of that goddess seems to have been purely local at Eleusis. But before the Persian war, the festival celebrated by the Athenians every year, in honour of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, admitted Greeks of all cities to be initiated, and was attended by vast crowds of them.²

It was thus that the simplicity and strict local application of the primitive religious festival, among the greater states in Greece, gradually expanded, on certain great occasions periodically recurring, into an elaborate and regulated series of exhibitions—not merely admitting, but soliciting, the fraternal presence of all Hellenic spectators. In this respect Sparta seems to have formed an exception to the remaining states. Her festivals were for herself alone, and her general rudeness towards other Greeks was not materially softened even at the Karneia³ and Hyakinthia, or Gymnopædiæ. On the other hand, the Attic Dionysia were gradually exalted, from their original rude spontaneous outburst of village feeling in thankfulness to the god, followed by song, dance, and revelry of various kinds—into costly and diversified performances, first by a trained chorus, next by actors superadded to it.⁴ And the dramatic compositions thus produced, as they embodied the perfection of Grecian art, so they were eminently calculated to invite a Pan-Hellenic audience and to encourage the sentiment of Hellenic unity. The dramatic

All other
Greek cities,
except
Sparta,
encouraged
such visits.

¹ Timæus, Fragm. 82, ed. Didot. The Krotoniates furnished a great number of victors both to the Olympic and to the Pythian games (Herodot. viii. 47; Pausan. x. 5, 5—x. 7, 3; Krause, *Gymnastik und Agonistik der Hellenen*, vol. ii. sect. 29. p. 752).

² Herodot. viii. 65. *καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ βουλόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων μυσεῖται.*

The exclusion of all competitors natives of Lampsakus, from the games celebrated in the Chersonesus to the honour of the ækist Miltiadês, is mentioned by Herodotus as something special (Herodot. vi. 38).

³ See the remarks, upon the Lacedæmonian discouragement of stranger-visitors at their public festivals, put by Thucydides into the mouth of Periklês (Thucyd. ii. 39).

Lichas the Spartan gained great re-

nown by treating hospitably the strangers who came to the Gymnopædiæ at Sparta (Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 61; Plutarch, *Kimôn*, c. 10)—a story which proves that *some* strangers came to the Spartan festivals, but which also proves that they were not many in number, and that to show them hospitality was a striking distinction from the general character of Spartans.

⁴ Aristot. *Poetic.* c. 3 and 4; Maximus Tyrius, *Diss.* xxi. p. 215; Plutarch, *De Cupidine Divitiarum*, c. 8. p. 527: compare the treatise, "*Quod non potest suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*," c. 16. p. 1098. The old oracles quoted by Demosthenês, cont. *Meidiam* (c. 15, p. 531, and cont. *Makartat.* p. 1072: see also Buttman's note on the former passage), convey the idea of the ancient simple Athenian festival.

literature of Athens however belongs properly to a later period. Previous to the year 560 B.C., we see only those commencements of innovation which drew upon Thespis¹ the rebuke of Solon; who however himself contributed to impart to the Panathenaic festival a more solemn and attractive character, by checking the licence of the rhapsodes and ensuring to those present a full orderly recital of the Iliad.

The sacred games and festivals, here alluded to as a class, took hold of the Greek mind by so great a variety of feelings,² as to counterbalance in a high degree the political dis-severance; and to keep alive among their wide-spread cities, in the midst of constant jealousy and frequent quarrel, a feeling of brotherhood and congenial sentiment such as must otherwise have died away. The Theôrs, or sacred envoys who came to Olympia or Delphi from so many different points, all sacrificed to the same god and at the same altar, witnessed the same sports, and contributed by their donatives to enrich or adorn one respected scene. Moreover the festival afforded opportunity for a sort of fair, including much traffic amid so large a mass of spectators;³ and besides the exhibitions of the games themselves, there were recitations and lectures in a spacious council-room for those who chose to listen to them, by poets, rhapsodes, philosophers and historians—among which last the history of Herodotus is said to have been publicly read by its author.⁴ Of the wealthy and

¹ Plutarch, Solon, c. 29: see above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p. 195.

² The orator Lysias, in a fragment of his lost Panegyric Oration, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (vol. v. p. 520 R.), describes the influence of the games with great force and simplicity. Hêraklêś, the founder of them, ἀγῶνα μὲν σωμάτων ἐποίησε, φιλοτιμίαν δὲ πλούτῳ, γνώμης δ' ἐπίδειξιν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ἵνα τούτων ἀπάντων ἕνεκα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωμεν, τὰ μὲν ὀψόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἀκουσόμενοι. Ἠγήσατο γὰρ τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἑλλησι τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίας.

³ Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. v. 3. "Mercatum eum, qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Græciæ celebritate: nam ut illic alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronæ peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quæstu et lucro ducerentur," &c.

Both Velleius Paterculus also (i. 8) and Justin (xiii. 5) call the Olympic festival by the name *mercatus*.

There were booths all round the Altis, or sacred precinct of Zeus (Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xi. 55), during the time of the games.

Strabo observes with justice, respecting the multitudinous festivals generally—Ἡ πανήγυρις, ἐμπορικὸν τι πρᾶγμα (x. p. 486), especially in reference to Delos: see Cicero pro Lege Maniliâ, c. 18: compare Pausanias, x. 32, 9, about the Panegyris and fair at Tithorea in Phokis, and Becker, Chariklêś, vol. i. p. 283.

At the Attic festival of the Herakleia, celebrated by the communion called Mesogei, or a certain number of the demes constituting Mesogæa, a regular market-duty or ἀγοραστικὸν was levied upon those who brought goods to sell (Inscriptiones Atticæ nuper repertæ 12, by E. Curtius, p. 3-7).

⁴ Pausan. vi. 23, 5; Diodor. xiv. 109, xv. 7; Lucian, Quomodo Historia sit conscribenda, c. 42. See Krause, Olympia, sect. 29, p. 183-186.

great men in the various cities, many contended simply for the chariot-victories and horse-victories. But there were others whose ambition was of a character more strictly personal, and who stripped naked as runners, wrestlers, boxers, or pankratiasts; having gone through the extreme fatigue of a complete previous training. Kylon, whose unfortunate attempt to usurp the sceptre at Athens has been recounted, had gained the prize in the Olympic stadium: Alexander son of Amyntas, the prince of Macedon, had run for it:¹ the great family of the Diagoridæ at Rhodes, who furnished magistrates and generals to their native city, supplied a still greater number of successful boxers and pankratiasts at Olympia, while other instances also occur of generals named by various cities from the list of successful Olympic gymnasts; and the odes of Pindar, always dearly purchased, attest how many of the great and wealthy were found in that list.² The perfect popularity, and equality of persons, at these great games, is a feature not less remarkable than the exact adherence to pre-determined rule, and the self-imposed submission of the immense crowd to a handful of servants armed with sticks,³ who executed the orders of the Eleian Hellanodikæ. The ground upon which the ceremony took place, and even the territory of the administering state, was protected by a "Truce of God" during the month of the festival, the commencement of which was formally announced by heralds sent round to the different states. Treaties of peace between different cities were often formally commemorated by pillars there erected, and the general impression of the scene

¹ Thucyd. i. 120; Herodot. v. 22-71. Eurybatês of Argos (Herodot. vi. 92); Philippus and Phayllus of Kroton (v. 47; viii. 47); Eualkidês of Eretria (v. 102); Hermolykus of Athens (ix. 105).

Pindar (Nem. iv. and vi.) gives the numerous victories of the Bassidæ and Theandridæ at Ægina: also Melissus the pankratiast and his ancestors the Kleonymidæ of Thebes—*τιμωρτες ἀρχαῖον πρόξενον τ' ἐπιχωρίων* (Isthm. iii. 25).

Respecting the extreme celebrity of Diagoras and his sons, of the Rhodian gens Eratidæ, Damagêtus, Akusilaus, and Dorieus, see Pindar, Olymp. vii. 16-145, with the Scholia; Thucyd. iii. 11; Pausan. vi. 7, 1, 2; Xenophon, Hellenic. i. 5, 19: compare Strabo, xiv. p. 655.

² The Latin writers remark it as a peculiarity of Grecian feeling, as distinguished from Roman, that men of great

station accounted it an honour to contend in the games: see, as a specimen, Tacitus, *Dialogus de Orator.* c. 9. "Ac si in Græciâ natus esses, ubi ludicras quoque artes exercere honestum est, ac tibi Nicostrati robur Dii dedissent, non paterer immanes illos et ad pugnam natos lacertos levitate jaculi vanescere." Again, Cicero, *pro Flacco*, c. 13, in his sarcastic style—"Quid si etiam occisus est a piratis Adramyttenus, homo nobilis, cujus est fere nobis omnibus nomen auditum, Atinas pugil, Olympionices? hoc est apud Græcos (quoniam de eorum *gravitate* dicimus) prope majus et gloriosius, quam Romæ triumphasse."

³ Lichas, one of the chief men of Sparta, and moreover a chariot-victor, received actual chastisement on the ground, from these staff-bearers, for an infringement of the regulations (Thucyd. v. 50).

suggested nothing but ideas of peace and brotherhood among Greeks.¹ And I may remark that the impression of the games as belonging to all Greeks, and to none but Greeks, was stronger and clearer during the interval between 600-300 B.C., than it came to be afterwards. For the Macedonian conquests had the effect of diluting and corrupting Hellenism, by spreading an exterior varnish of Hellenic tastes and manners over a wide area of incongruous foreigners, who were incapable of the real elevation of the Hellenic character; so that although in later times the games continued undiminished both in attraction and in number of visitors, the spirit of Pan-Hellenic communion which had once animated the scene was gone for ever.

¹ Thucyd. v. 18-47, and the curious ancient Inscription in Boëckh's *Corpus Inscr.* No. 11. p. 28, recording the convention between the Eleians and the inhabitants of the Arcadian town of Heræa.

The comparison of various passages referring to the Olympia, Isthmia, and Nemea (Thucydides, iii. 11, viii. 9, 10, v. 49-51, and Xenophon, *Hellenic.* iv.

7, 2; v. 1, 29) shows that serious political business was often discussed at these games—that diplomatists made use of the intercourse for the purpose of detecting the secret designs of states whom they suspected—and that the administering state often practised manœuvres in respect to the obligations of truce for the Hieromenia or Holy Season.

CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY.—THE SEVEN WISE MEN.

THE interval between 776-560 B.C. presents to us a remarkable expansion of Grecian genius in the creation of their elegiac, iambic, lyric, choric, and gnomic poetry, which was diversified in a great many ways and improved by many separate masters. The creators of all these different styles—from Kallinus and Archilochus down to Stesichorus—fall within the two centuries here included; though Pindar and Simonidês, “the proud and high-crested bards,”¹ who carried lyric and choric poetry to the maximum of elaboration consistent with full poetical effect, lived in the succeeding century, and were contemporary with the tragedian Æschylus. The Grecian drama, comic as well as tragic, of the fifth century B.C., combined the lyric and choric song with the living action of iambic dialogue—thus constituting the last ascending movement in the poetical genius of the race. Reserving this for a future time, and for the history of Athens, to which it more particularly belongs, I now propose to speak only of the poetical movement of the two earlier centuries, wherein Athens had little or no part. So scanty are the remnants, unfortunately, of these earlier poets, that we can offer little except criticisms borrowed at second-hand, and a few general considerations on their workings and tendency.²

Archilochus and Kallinus both appear to fall about the middle of the seventh century B.C., and it is with them that the innovations in Grecian poetry commence. Before them, we are told, there existed nothing but the Epos, or Daktylic Hexameter poetry, of which much has been said in my former volume—being legendary stories or adventures narrated, together with

Age and duration of the Greek lyric poetry.

Epical age preceding the lyrical.

¹ Himerius, Orat. iii. p. 426, Wernsdorf—ἀγέτωχοι καὶ ὑψαυχεῖς.

² For the whole subject of this chapter, the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of O. Müller's History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, wherein the lyric poets are handled with greater length than con-

sists with the limits of this work, will be found highly valuable—chapters abounding in erudition and ingenuity, but not always within the limits of the evidence.

The learned work of Ulrici (Geschichte der Griechischen Poesie—Lyrik) is still more open to the same remark.

addresses or hymns to the gods. We must recollect, too, that this was not only the whole poetry, but the whole literature of the age. Prose composition was altogether unknown. Writing, if beginning to be employed as an aid to a few superior men, was at any rate generally unused, and found no reading public. The voice was the only communicant, and the ear the only recipient, of all those ideas and feelings which productive minds in the community found themselves impelled to pour out; and both voice and ear were accustomed to a musical recitation or chant, apparently something between song and speech, with simple rhythm and a still simpler occasional accompaniment from the primitive four-stringed harp. Such habits and requirements of the voice and ear were, at that time, inseparably associated with the success and popularity of the poet, and contributed doubtless to restrict the range of subjects with which he could deal. The type was to a certain extent consecrated, like the primitive statues of the gods, from which men only ventured to deviate by gradual and almost unconscious innovations. Moreover, in the first half of the seventh century B.C., that genius which had once created an *Iliad* and an *Odyssey* was no longer to be found. The work of hexameter narrative had come to be prosecuted by less gifted persons—by those Cyclic poets of whom I have spoken in the preceding volumes.

Such, as far as we can make it out amidst very uncertain evidence, was the state of the Greek mind immediately before elegiac and lyric poets appeared; while at the same time its experience was enlarging by the formation of new colonies, and the communion among various states tending to increase by the freer reciprocity of religious games and festivals. There arose a demand for turning the literature of the age (I use this word as synonymous with the poetry) to new feelings and purposes, and for applying the rich, plastic, and musical language of the old epic, to present passion and circumstance, social as well as individual. Such a tendency had become obvious in Hesiod, even within the range of hexameter verse. Now the same causes which led to an enlargement of the subjects of poetry inclined men also to vary the metre. In regard to this latter point, there is reason to believe that the expansion of Greek music was the immediate determining cause. For it has been already stated that the musical scale and instruments of the Greeks, originally very narrow, were materially enlarged by borrowing from Phrygia and Lydia, and these acquisitions seem to have been first realized about the beginning of the seventh century

Wider range
of subjects
for poetry—
new metres
—enlarged
musical scale.

B.C., through the Lesbian harper Terpander—the Phrygian (or Greco-Phrygian) flute-player Olympus—and the Arkadian or Bœotian flute-player Klonas. Terpander made the important advance of exchanging the original four-stringed harp for one of seven strings, embracing the compass of one octave or two Greek tetrachords; while Olympus as well as Klonas taught many new nomes or tunes on the flute, to which the Greeks had before been strangers—probably also the use of a flute of more varied musical compass. Terpander is said to have gained the prize at the first recorded celebration of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Karneia, in 676 B.C. This is one of the best-ascertained points among the obscure chronology of the seventh century; and there seem grounds for assigning Olympus and Klonas to nearly the same period, a little before Archilochus and Kallinus.¹ To Terpander, Olympus, and Klonas, are ascribed the formation of the earliest musical nomes known to the inquiring Greeks of later times; to the first, nomes on the harp; to the two latter, on the flute—every nome being the general scheme or basis of which the airs actually performed constituted so many variations, within certain defined limits.² Terpander em-

Improve-
ment of the
harp by Ter-
pander—of
the flute by
Olympus
and others.

¹ These early innovators in Grecian music, rhythm, metre and poetry, belonging to the seventh century B.C., were very imperfectly known even to those contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, who tried to get together facts for a consecutive history of music. The treatise of Plutarch, *De Musicâ*, shows what contradictory statements he found. He quotes from four different authors—Herakleidês, Glaukus, Alexander, and Aristoxenus, who by no means agreed in their series of names and facts. The first three of them blend together mythe and history. The Anagraphê or inscription at Sikyon, which professed to give a continuous list of such poets and musicians as had contended at the Sikyonian games, began with a large stock of mythical names—Amphion, Linus, Pierius, &c. (Plutarch, *Music*, p. 1132). Some authors, according to Plutarch (p. 1133), made the great chronological mistake of placing Terpander as contemporary with Hippônax; a proof how little of chronological evidence was then accessible.

That Terpander was victor at the Spartan festival of the Karneia in 676 B.C., may have been learnt by Hellanikus from the Spartan registers: the name of the Lesbian harper Perikleitas

as having gained the same prize at some subsequent period (Plutarch, *De Mus.* p. 1133) probably rests on the same authority. That Archilochus was rather later than Terpander, and Thalêtas rather later than Archilochus, was the statement of Glaukus (Plutarch, *De Mus.* p. 1134). Klonas and Polymnêstus are placed later than Terpander; Archilochus later than Klonas: Alkman is said to have mentioned Polymnêstus in one of his songs (p. 1133–1135). It can hardly be true that Terpander gained four Pythian prizes, if the festival was octennial prior to its reconstitution by the Amphiktyons (p. 1132). Sakadas gained three Pythian prizes *after* that period, when the festival was quadrennial (p. 1134).

Compare the confused indications in Pollux, iv. 65, 66, 78, 79. The abstract given by Photius of certain parts of the *Chrestomathia* of Proclus (published in Gaisford's edition of Hephæstion, p. 375–389), is extremely valuable, in spite of its brevity and obscurity, about the lyric and choric poetry of Greece.

² The difference between *Nómos* and *Mélos* appears in Plutarch, *De Musicâ*, p. 1132—*Καὶ τὸν Τέρπανδρον, κιθαροδικῶν ποιητὴν ὄντα νόμων, κατὰ νόμον ἕκαστον τοῖς ἑπεσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς*

ployed his enlarged instrumental power as a new accompaniment to the Homeric poems, as well as to certain epic proemia or hymns to the gods of his own composition. But he does not seem to have departed from the Hexameter verse and the Daktylic rhythm, to which the new accompaniment was probably not quite suitable; and the idea may thus have been suggested of combining the words also according to new rhythmical and metrical laws.

It is certain, at least, that the age (670-600) immediately succeeding Terpander—comprising Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus and Alkman, whose relations of time one to another we have no certain means of determining,¹ though Alkman seems to have been the latest—presents a remarkable variety both of new metres and of new rhythms, superinduced upon the previous Daktylic Hexameter. The first departure from this latter is found in the elegiac verse, employed seemingly more or less by all the four above-mentioned poets, but chiefly by the first two, and even ascribed by some to the invention of Kallinus. Tyrtæus in his military march-songs employed the Anapæstic metre, while in Archilochus as well as in Alkman we find traces of a much larger range of metrical variety—Iambic, Trochaic, Anapæstic, Ionic, &c.—sometimes even asynartetic or compound metres, Anapæstic or Daktylic blended with Trochaic or Iambic. What we have remaining from Mimnermus, who comes shortly after the preceding four, is elegiac. His contemporaries Alkæus and Sappho, besides employing most of those metres

Ὁμήρου μέλη περιτιθέντα, ᾄδειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι· ἀποφῆναι δὲ τοῦτον λέγει ὀνόματα πρῶτον τοῖς κιθαρωδικοῖς νόμοις.

The nomes were not many in number; they went by special names; and there was disagreement of opinion as to the persons who had composed them (Plutarch, Music. p. 1133). They were monodic, not choric—intended to be sung by one person (Aristot. Problem. xix. 15). Herodot. i. 23, about Arion and the Nomus Orthius.

¹ Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. ad ann. 671, 665, 644) appears to me noway satisfactory in his chronological arrangement of the poets of this century. I agree with O. Müller (Hist. of Literat. of Ancient Greece, ch. xii. 9) in thinking that he makes Terpander too recent, and Thalêtas too ancient; I also believe both Kallinus and Alkman to have been more recent than the place which Mr. Clinton assigns to them; the epoch of

Tyrtæus will depend upon the date which we assign to the second Messenian war.

How very imperfectly the chronology of the poetical names even of the sixth century B.C.—Sappho, Anakreon, Hippônax—was known to writers of the beginning of the Ptolemaic age (or shortly after 300 B.C.), we may see by the mistakes noted in Athenæus, xiii. p. 599. Hermesianax of Kolophon, the elegiac poet, represented Anakreon as the lover of Sappho; this might perhaps be not absolutely impossible, if we supposed in Sappho an old age like that of Ninon de l'Enclos; but others (even earlier than Hermesianax, since they are quoted by Chamæleon) represented Anakreon, when in old age, as addressing verses to Sappho still young. Again, the comic writer Diphilus introduced both Archilochus and Hippônax as the lovers of Sappho.

which they found existing, invented each a peculiar stanza, which is familiarly known under a name derived from each. In Solon, the younger contemporary of Mimnermus, we have the elegiac, iambic, and trochaic: in Theognis, yet later, the elegiac only. Arion and Stesichorus appear to have been innovators in this department, the former by his improvement in the dithyrambic chorus or circular song and dance in honour of Dionysus—the latter by his more elaborate choric compositions, containing not only a strophê and antistrophê, but also a third division or epode succeeding them, pronounced by the chorus standing still. Both Anakreon and Ibykus likewise added to the stock of existing metrical varieties. We thus see that within the century and a half succeeding Terpander, Greek poetry (or Greek literature, which was then the same thing) became greatly enriched in matter as well as diversified in form.

To a certain extent there seems to have been a real connexion between the two. New forms were essential for the expression of new wants and feelings—though the assertion that elegiac metre is especially adapted for one set of feelings,¹ trochaic for a second, and iambic for a third, if true at all, can only be admitted with great latitude of exception, when we find so many of them employed by the poets for very different subjects—gay or melancholy, bitter or complaining, earnest or sprightly—seemingly with little discrimination. But the adoption of some new metre, different from the perpetual series of hexameters, was required when the poet desired to do something more than recount a long story or fragment of heroic legend—when he sought to bring himself, his friends, his enemies, his city, his hopes and fears with regard to matters recent or impending, all before the notice of the hearer, and that too at once with brevity and animation. The Greek hexameter, like our blank verse, has all its limiting conditions bearing upon each

New metres
superadded
to the Hexa-
meter—
Elegiac, Iam-
bic, Trochaic.

¹ The Latin poets and the Alexandrine critics seem to have both insisted on the natural mournfulness of the elegiac metre (Ovid. *Heroid.* xv. 7; *Horat. Art. Poet.* 75): see also the fanciful explanation given by Didymus in the *Ety-mologicon Magnum*, v. Ἑλεγος.

We learn from Hephæstion (c. viii. p. 45, *Gaisf.*) that the Anapestic march-metre of Tyrtaeus was employed by the comic writers also, for a totally different vein of feeling. See the *Dissertation of Franck, Callinus*, p. 37–48 (*Leips. 1816*).

Of the remarks made by O. Müller respecting the metres of these early poets (*History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, ch. xi. s. 8–12, &c.; ch. xii. s. 1, 2, &c.), many appear to me uncertified and disputable.

For some good remarks on the fallibility of men's impressions respecting the natural and inherent *ἦθος* of particular metres, see Adam Smith (*Theory of Moral Sentiment*, Part v. ch. i. p. 329), in the edition of his works by Dugald Stewart.

separate line, and presents to the hearer no predetermined resting-place or natural pause beyond.¹ In reference to any long composition, either epic or dramatic, such unrestrained licence is found convenient, and the case was similar for Greek epos and drama—the single-lined Iambic Trimeter being generally used for the dialogue of tragedy and comedy, just as the Daktylic Hexameter had been used for the epic. The metrical changes introduced by Archilochus and his contemporaries may be compared to a change from our blank verse to the rhymed couplet and quatrain. The verse was thrown into little systems of two, three, or four lines, with a pause at the end of each; and the halt thus assured to, as well as expected and relished by, the ear, was generally coincident with a close, entire or partial, in the sense which thus came to be distributed with greater point and effect.

The elegiac verse, or common Hexameter and Pentameter (this second line being an hexameter with the third and sixth thesis,² or the last half of the third and sixth foot suppressed, and a pause left in place of it), as well as the Epode (or Iambic Trimeter followed by an Iambic Dimeter) and some other binary combi-

nations of verse which we trace among the fragments of Archilochus, are conceived with a view to such increase of effect both on the ear and the mind, not less than to the direct pleasures of novelty and variety. The Iambic metre, built upon the primitive Iambus or coarse and licentious jesting³ which

¹ See the observations in Aristotle (Rhetor. iii. 9) on the λέξις εἰρομένη as compared with λέξις κατεστραμμένη—λέξις εἰρομένη, ἥ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ λεγόμενον τελειώθῃ—κατεστραμμένη δὲ, ἥ ἐν περιόδοις λέγω δὲ περίοδον, λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύννοπον.

² I employ, however unwillingly, the word *thesis* here (arsis and thesis) in the sense in which it is used by G. Hermann ("Illud tempus, in quo ictus est, arsin; ea tempora, quæ carent ictu, thesin vocamus," Element. Doctr. Metr. sect. 15), and followed by Boëckh, in his Dissertation on the Metres of Pindar (i. 4), though I agree with Dr. Barham (in the valuable Preface to his edition of Hephæstion, Cambridge, 1843, pp. 5-8) that the opposite sense of the words would be the preferable one, just as it was the original sense in which they were used by the best Greek musical writers: Dr. Barham's Preface is very instructive on the difficult subject

of ancient rhythm generally.

³ Homer, Hymn. ad Cererem, 202; Hesychius, v. Γεφυρίς; Herodot. v. 83; Diodor. v. 4. There were various gods at whose festivals scurrility (τῶθασμός) was a consecrated practice, seemingly different festivals in different places (Aristot. Politic. vii. 15, 8).

The reader will understand better what this consecrated scurrility means by comparing the description of a modern traveller in the kingdom of Naples (Tour through the Southern Provinces of the Kingdom of Naples, by Mr. Keppel Craven, London, 1821, ch. xv. p. 287):—

"I returned to Gerace (the site of the ancient Epizephyrian Lokri) by one of those moonlights which are known only in these latitudes, and which no pen or pencil can portray. My path lay along some corn-fields, in which the natives were employed in the last labours of the harvest, and I was not a little surprised to find myself saluted with a volley of opprobrious epithets

formed a part of some Grecian festivals (especially of the festivals of Dêmêtêr as well in Attica as in Paros, the native country of the poet), is only one amongst many new paths struck out by this inventive genius. His exuberance astonishes us, when we consider that he takes his start from little more than the simple Hexameter,¹ in which too he was a distinguished composer—for even of the elegiac verse he is as likely to have been the inventor as Callinus, just as he was the earliest popular and successful composer of table-songs or Skolia, though Terpander may have originated some such before him. The entire loss of his poems, excepting some few fragments, enables us to recognise little more than one characteristic—the intense personality which pervaded them, as well as that coarse, direct, and outspoken license, which afterwards lent such terrible effect to the old comedy at Athens. His lampoons are said to have driven Lykambês, the father of Neobulê, to hang himself. Neobulê had been promised to Archilochus in marriage, but that promise was broken, and the poet assailed both father and daughter with every species of calumny.² In addition to this disappointment, he was poor, the son of a slave-mother, and an exile from his country Paros to the unpromising colony of Thasos. The desultory notices respecting him betray a state of suffering combined with loose conduct which vented itself sometimes in complaint, sometimes in libellous assault. He was at last slain by some whom his muse had thus exasperated. His extraordinary poetical genius finds but one voice of encomium throughout antiquity. His triumphal song to Hêraklês was still popularly sung by the victors at Olympia, near two centuries after his death, in the days of Pindar; but

and abusive language, uttered in the most threatening voice, and accompanied with the most insulting gestures. This extraordinary custom is of the most remote antiquity, and is observed towards all strangers during the harvest and vintage seasons; those who are apprised of it will keep their temper as well as their presence of mind, as the loss of either would only serve as a signal for still louder invectives, and prolong a contest in which success would be as hopeless as undesirable.”

¹ The chief evidence for the rhythmical and metrical changes introduced by Archilochus is to be found in the 28th chapter of Plutarch, *De Musica*, p. 1140–1141, in words very difficult to understand completely. See Ulrici, *Geschichte der Hellenisch. Poesie*, vol.

ii. p. 381.

The epigram ascribed to Theokritus (No. 18 in Gaisford's *Poetæ Minores*) shows that the poet had before him Hexameter compositions of Archilochus, as well as lyric—

ὥς ἐμμελής τ' ἔγεντο κάπιδέξιος
ἐπεὰ τε ποιεῖν, πρὸς λύραν τ' αἰεῖν.

See the article on Archilochus in Welcker's *Kleine Schriften*, p. 71–82, which has the merit of showing that iambic bitterness is far from being the only marked feature in his character and genius.

² See Meleager, *Epigram.* cxix. 3, Horat. *Epist.* 19, 23, and *Epod.* vi. 13, with the Scholiast; *Ælian*, V. H. x. 13.

that majestic and complimentary poet at once denounces the malignity, and attests the retributive suffering, of the great Parian iambist.¹

Amidst the multifarious veins in which Archilochus displayed his genius, moralising or gnomic poetry is not wanting; while his contemporary Simonidês of Amorgos devotes the Iambic metre especially to this destination, afterwards followed out by Solon and Theognis. Kallinus, the earliest celebrated elegiac poet, so far as we can judge from his few fragments, employed the elegiac metre for exhortations of warlike patriotism; and the more ample remains which we possess of Tyrtæus are sermons in the same strain, preaching to the Spartans bravery against the foe, and unanimity as well as obedience to the law at home. They are patriotic effusions, called forth by the circumstances of the time, and sung by single voice, with accompaniment of the flute,² to those in whose bosoms the flame of courage was to be kindled. For though what we peruse is in verse, we are still in the tide of real and present life, and we must suppose ourselves rather listening to an orator addressing the citizens when danger or dissension is actually impending. It is only in the hands of Mimnermus that elegiac verse comes to be devoted to soft and amatory subjects. His few fragments present a vein of passive and tender sentiment, illustrated by appropriate matter of legend, such as would be cast into poetry in all ages, and quite different from the rhetoric of Kallinus and Tyrtæus.

The poetical career of Alkman is again distinct from that of any of his above-mentioned contemporaries. Their compositions, besides hymns to the gods, were principally expressions of feeling intended to be sung by individuals, though sometimes also suited for the Kômus or band of festive volunteers, assembled on some occasion of common interest: those of Alkman were principally choric, intended for the song and accompanying dance of the chorus. He was a native of Sardis in Lydia, or at least his family were so: and he appears to have come in early life to Sparta, though his genius and mastery of the Greek language discountenance the story that he was brought over to Sparta as a slave. The most ancient arrangement of music at Sparta, generally ascribed to Terpander,³

¹ Pindar, Pyth. ii. 55; Olymp. ix. 1, with the Scholia; Euripid. Hercul. Furens, 583-683. The eighteenth epigram of Theokritus (above alluded to) conveys a striking tribute of admiration to

Archilochus: compare Quintilian, x. 1, and Liebel, ad Archilochi Fragmenta, sect. 5, 6, 7.

² Athenæus, xiv. p. 630.

³ Plutarch, De Musica, pp. 1134,

underwent considerable alteration, not only through the elegiac and anapæstic measures of Tyrtaeus, but also through the Kretan Thalêtas and the Lydian Alkman. The harp, the instrument of Terpander, was rivalled and in part superseded by the flute or pipe, which had been recently rendered more effective in the hands of Olympus, Klonas, and Polymnêstus, and which gradually became, for compositions intended to raise strong emotion, the favourite instrument of the two—being employed as accompaniment both to the elegies of Tyrtaeus, and to the hyporchemata (songs or hymns combined with dancing) of Thalêtas; also, as the stimulus and regulator to the Spartan military march.¹ These elegies (as has been just remarked) were sung by one person in the midst of an assembly of listeners, and there were doubtless other compositions intended for the individual voice. But in general such was not the character of music and poetry at Sparta; everything done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective, so that the chorus and its performances received extraordinary development.

It has been already stated, that the chorus, with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of divine service throughout all Greece. It was originally a public manifestation of the citizens generally—a large proportion of them being actively engaged in it,² and receiving some training for the purpose as an ordinary branch of education. Neither the song nor the dance under such conditions could be otherwise than extremely simple. But in process of time, the performance at the chief festivals tended to become more elaborate and to fall into the hands of persons expressly and professionally trained—the mass of the citizens gradually ceasing to take active part, and

1135; Aristotle, *De Lacedæmon. Republicâ*, *Fragm.* xi. p. 132, ed. Neumann; Plutarch, *De Serâ Numin. Vindict.* c. 13. p. 558.

¹ Thucyd. v. 69-70, with the Scholia—*μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων . . . Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστῶτων, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοιν, καὶ μὴ διασπασθεῖη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις.*

Cicero, *Tuscul. Qu.* ii. 16. "*Spartiarum quorum procedit Mora ad tibiam, neque adhibetur ulla sine anapæstis pedibus hortatio.*"

The flute was also the instrument appropriated to Kômos, or the excited movement of half-intoxicated revellers (Hesiod, *Scut. Hercul.* 280; Athenæ.

xiv. p. 617-618).

² Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 803. *θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχουμένον, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἰλέως αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατόν εἶναι, &c.*; compare p. 799; Maximus Tyr. *Diss.* xxxvii. 4; Aristophan. *Ran.* 950-975; Athenæus, xiv. p. 626; Polyb. iv. 30; Lucian, *De Saltatione*, c. 10, 11, 16, 31.

Compare Aristotle (*Problem* xix. 15) about the primitive character and subsequent change of the chorus; and the last chapter of the eighth book of his *Politica*: also a striking passage in Plutarch (*De Cupidine Divitiarum*, c. 8. p. 527) about the transformation of the Dionysiac festival at Chæroneia from simplicity to costliness.

being present merely as spectators. Such was the practice which grew up in most parts of Greece, and especially at Athens, where the dramatic chorus acquired its highest perfection. But the drama never found admission at Sparta, and the peculiarity of Spartan life tended much to keep up the popular chorus on its ancient footing. It formed in fact one element in that never-ceasing drill to which the Spartans were subject from their boyhood, and it served a purpose analogous to their military training, in accustoming them to simultaneous and regulated movement—insomuch that the comparison between the chorus, especially in its Pyrrhic or war-dances, and the military enômoty, seems to have been often dwelt upon.¹ In the singing of the solemn pæan in honour of Apollo, at the festival of the Hyakinthia, king Agesilaus was under the orders of the chorus-master, and sang in the place allotted to him;² while the whole body of Spartans without exception—the old, the middle-aged, and the youth, the matrons and the virgins—were distributed in various choric companies,³ and trained to harmony both of voice and motion, which was publicly exhibited at the solemnities of the Gymnopædia. The word *dancing* must be understood in a larger sense than that in which it is now employed, and as comprising every variety of rhythmical, accentuated, conspiring movements, or gesticulations, or postures of the body, from the slowest to the quickest;⁴ cheironomy, or the decorous and expressive movement of the hands, being especially practised.

We see thus that both at Sparta and in Krête (which approached in respect to publicity of individual life most nearly to Sparta) the choric aptitudes and manifestations occupied a larger space than in any other Grecian city. And as a certain degree of

¹ Athenæus, xiv. p. 628; Suidas, vol. iii. p. 715, ed. Kuster; Plutarch, *Instituta Laconica*, c. 32—*κωμῳδίας καὶ τραγῳδίας οὐκ ἠκρόωντο, ὅπως μήτε ἐν σπουδῇ, μήτε ἐν παιδίᾳ, ἀκούωσι τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων τοῖς νόμοις*—which exactly corresponds with the ethical view implied in the alleged conversation between Solon and Thespis (Plutarch, Solon, c. 29: see above, ch. xi. vol. ii. p. 195), and with Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 817.

² Xenophon, *Agesilaus*, ii. 17. *οἵκαδε ἀπελθὼν εἰς τὰ Ῥακίνθια, ὅπου ἐτάχθη ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροποιοῦ, τὸν παιᾶνα τῷ θεῷ συνεπετέλει.*

³ Plutarch, *Lycurg.* c. 14, 16, 21; Athenæus, xiv. p. 631–632, xv. p. 678; Xenophon, *Hellen.* vi. 4, 15; *De Republic.* Lacedæm. ix. 5; Pindar, *Hypor-*

chemata, *Fragm.* 78, ed. Bergk.

Δάκαινα μὲν παρθένων ἀγέλα.

Also Alkman, *Fragm.* 13, ed. Bergk; Antigon. *Caryst. Hist. Mirab.* c. 27.

⁴ How extensively pantomimic the ancient orchêsis was, may be seen by the example in Xenophon, *Symposion* vii. 5, ix. 3–6, and Plutarch, *Symposion*, ix. 15, 2: see K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen*, ch. 29.

“Sane ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est: quod nullam majores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret religionem: nam cantus ad animum, saltatio ad mobilitatem corporis pertinet.” (Servius ad Virgil. *Eclog.* v. 73.)

musical and rhythmical variety was essential to meet this want,¹ while music was never taught to Spartan citizens individually, we farther understand how strangers like Terpander, Polymnêstus, Thalêtas, Tyrtæus, Alkman, &c., were not only received, but acquired great influence at Sparta, in spite of the preponderant spirit of jealous seclusion in the Spartan character. All these masters appear to have been effective in their own special vocation—the training of the chorus—to which they imparted new rhythmical action, and for which they composed new music. But Alkman did this, and something more. He possessed the genius of a poet, and his compositions were read afterwards with pleasure by those who could not hear them sung or see them danced. In the little of his poems which remains we recognise that variety of rhythm and metre for which he was celebrated. In this respect he (together with the Kretan Thalêtas, who is said to have introduced a more vehement style both of music and dance, with the Kretic and Pæonic rhythm, into Sparta²) surpassed Archilochus, preparing the way for the complicated choric movements of Stesichorus and Pindar. Some of his fragments, too, manifest that fresh outpouring of individual sentiment and emotion which constitutes so much of the charm of popular poetry. Besides his touching address in old age to the Spartan virgins, over whose song and dance he had been accustomed to preside, he is not afraid to speak of his hearty appetite, satisfied with simple food and relishing a bowl of warm broth at the winter tropic.³ He has attached to the spring an epithet, which comes home to the real feelings of a poor country more than those captivating pictures which abound in verse,

¹ Aristot. Politic. viii. 4, 6. Οἱ Ἀδωνες—οὐ μανθάνοντες δμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῶν μέλων.

² Homer, Hymn. Apoll. 340. Οἱοί τε Κρητῶν παιήνες, &c.: see Boëckh, De Metris Pindari, ii. 7. p. 143; Ephorus ap. Strabo. x. p. 480; Plutarch, De Musica, p. 1142.

Respecting Thalêtas, and the gradual alterations in the character of music at Sparta, Hoëckh has given much instructive matter (Kreta, vol. iii. p. 340–377). Respecting Nymphæus of Kydonia, whom Ælian (V. H. xii. 50) puts in juxtaposition with Thalêtas and Terpander, nothing is known.

After what is called the second fashion of music (κατάστασις) had thus been introduced by Thalêtas and his contemporaries—the first fashion being that of

Terpander—no farther innovations were allowed. The ephors employed violent means to prohibit the intended innovations of Phrynis and Timotheus, after the Persian war: see Plutarch, Agis, c. 10.

³ Alkman, Fragm. 13–17, ed. Bergk, ὁ πᾶμφαγος Ἀλκμάν: compare Fr. 63. Aristides calls him ὁ τῶν παρθένων ἐπαινήτης καὶ σύμβουλος (Or. xlv. vol. ii. p. 40, Dindorf).

Of the Partheneia of Alkman (songs, hymns, and dances, composed for a chorus of maidens) there were at least two books (Stephanus Byzant. v. Ἐρυσίχη). He was the earliest poet who acquired renown in this species of composition, afterwards much pursued by Pindar, Bacchylidês, and Simonidês of Keôs: see Welcker, Alkman. Fragment. p. 10

ancient as well as modern. He calls it "the season of short fare"—the crop of the previous year being then nearly consumed, the husbandman is compelled to pinch himself until his new harvest comes in.¹ Those who recollect that in earlier periods of our history, and in all countries where there is little accumulated stock, an exorbitant difference is often experienced in the price of corn before and after the harvest, will feel the justice of Alkman's description.

Judging from these and from a few other fragments of this poet, Alkman appears to have combined the life and exciting vigour of Archilochus in the song properly so called, sung by himself individually—with a larger knowledge of musical and rhythmical effect in regard to the choric performance. He composed in the Laconian dialect—a variety of the Doric with some intermixture of Æolisms. And it was from him, jointly with those other composers who figured at Sparta during the century after Terpander, as well as from the simultaneous development of the choric muse² in Argos, Sikyon, Arcadia, and other parts of Peloponnesus, that the Doric dialect acquired permanent footing in Greece, as the only proper dialect for choric compositions. Continued by Stesichorus and Pindar, this habit passed even to the Attic dramatists, whose choric songs are thus in a great measure Doric, while their dialogue is Attic. At Sparta, as well as in other parts of Peloponnesus,³ the musical and rhythmical style appears to have been fixed by Alkman and his contemporaries, and to have been tenaciously maintained, for two or three centuries, with little or no innovation; the more so, as the flute-players at Sparta formed an hereditary profession, who followed the routine of their fathers.⁴

Alkman was the last poet who addressed himself to the popular chorus. Both Arion and Stesichorus composed for a body of trained men, with a degree of variety and involution such as could

¹ Alkman, Frag. 64, ed. Bergk.

Ὅρας δ' ἐσῆκε τρεῖς, θέρος
καὶ χειμα κ' ὠπώραν τρίταν·
καὶ τέτρατον τὸ ἦρ, ὅκα
Σάλλει μὲν, ἐσθίειν δ' ἄδαν
οὐκ ἐστί.

² Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 9. p. 1134. About the dialect of Alkman, see Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicâ, sect. 2, 4; about his different metres, Welcker, Alkman. Fragm. p. 10–12.

³ Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 32. p. 1142, c. 37. p. 1144; Athenæus, xiv. p. 632. In Krête also, the popularity of the primitive musical composers was maintained, though along with the innovator Timotheus: see Inscription No. 3053, ap. Boëckh, Corp. Ins.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 60. They were probably a γένος with an heroic progenitor, like the heralds, to whom the historian compares them.

not be attained by a mere fraction of the people. The primitive Dithyrambus was a round choric dance and song in honour of Dionysus,¹ common to Naxos, Thebes, and seemingly to many other places, at the Dionysiac festival—a spontaneous effusion of drunken men in the hour of revelry, wherein the poet Archilochus, “with the thunder of wine full upon his mind,” had often taken the chief part.² Its exciting character approached to the worship of the Great Mother in Asia, and stood in contrast with the solemn and stately pæan addressed to Apollo. Arion introduced into it an alteration such as Archilochus had himself brought about in the scurrilous Iambus. He converted it into an elaborate composition in honour of the god, sung and danced by a chorus of fifty persons, not only sober, but trained with great strictness; though its rhythm and movements, and its equipment in the character of satyrs, presented more or less an imitation of the primitive licence. Born at Methymna in Lesbos, Arion appears as a harper, singer, and composer, much favoured by Periander at Corinth, in which city he first “composed, denominated, and taught the Dithyramb,” earlier than any one known to Herodotus.³ He did not, however, remain permanently there, but travelled from city to city exhibiting at the festivals for money,—especially to Sicilian and Italian Greece, where he acquired large gains. We may here again remark how the poets as well as the festivals served to promote a sentiment of unity among the dispersed Greeks. Such transfer of the Dithyramb, from the field of spontaneous nature into the garden of art,⁴ constitutes the first stage in the refinement of Dionysiac worship; which will hereafter be found still farther exalted in the form of the Attic drama.

The date of Arion seems about 600 B.C., shortly after Alkman: that of Stesichorus is a few years later. To the latter the Greek chorus owed a high degree of improvement, and in particular the final distribution of its performance into the Strophê, the Antistrophê, and the Epôdus: the turn, the return, and the rest.

¹ Pindar, Fragm. 44, ed. Bergk; Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 25; Proclus, Chrestomathia, c. 12-14, ad calc. Hephæst. Gaisf. p. 382; compare W. M. Schmidt, In Dithyrambum Poetarumque Dithyrambicorum Reliquias, pp. 171-183 (Berlin 1845).

² Archiloch. Fragm. 72, ed. Bergk.

³ Ὅς Διονύσου ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος Οἶδα διθύραμβον, οἶνον ξυγκεραυνωθείς φρένας.

The old oracle quoted in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, about the Dionysia at Athens, enjoins—Διονύσῳ δημοτελῇ ἱερὰ τελεῖν, καὶ κρατῆρα κερᾶσαι, καὶ χοροὺς ἰστάναι.

⁴ Herodot. i. 23; Suidas, v. Ἀρίων; Pindar, Olymp. xiii. 25.

⁵ Aristot. Poetic. c. 6. ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων: again, to the same effect, *ibid.* c. 9.

The rhythm and metre of the song during each strophê corresponded with that during the antistrophê, but was varied during the epôdus, and again varied during the following strophês. Until this time the song had been monostrophic, consisting of nothing more than one uniform stanza, repeated from the beginning to the end of the composition;¹ so that we may easily see how vast was the new complication and difficulty introduced by Stesichorus—not less for the performers than for the composer, himself at that time the teacher and trainer of performers. Both this poet, and his contemporary the flute-player Sakadas of Argos,—who gained the prize at the first three Pythian games founded after the Sacred War,—seem to have surpassed their predecessors in the breadth of subject which they embraced, borrowing from the inexhaustible province of ancient legend, and expanding the choric song into a well-sustained epical narrative.² Indeed these Pythian games opened a new career to musical composers just at the time when Sparta began to be closed against musical novelties.

Alkæus and Sappho, both natives of Lesbos, appear about contemporaries with Arion B.C. 610-580. Of their once celebrated lyric compositions, scarcely anything remains. But the criticisms which are preserved on both of them place them in strong contrast with Alkman, who lived and composed under the more restrictive atmosphere of Sparta—and in considerable analogy with the turbulent vehemence of Archilochus,³ though without his intense private malignity. Both Alkæus and Sappho composed for their own local audience, and in their own Lesbian Æolic dialect; not because there was any peculiar fitness in that dialect to express their vein of sentiment, but because it was

¹ Alkman slightly departed from this rule: in one of his compositions of fourteen strophês, the last seven were in a different metre from the first seven (Hephæstion, c. xv. p. 134 Gaisf.; Hermann, *Elementa Doctrin. Metricæ*, c. xvii. sect. 595). Ἀλκμανικὴ καινοτομία καὶ Στησιχόρειος (Plutarch, *De Musicâ*, p. 1135).

² Pausanias, vi. 14, 4; x. 7, 3. Sakadas, as well as Stesichorus, composed an ἱάλον πέρις (Athenæus, xiii. p. 609).

“Stesichorum (observes Quintilian, x. 1) quam sit ingenio validus, materiæ quoque ostendunt, maxima bella et clarissimos canentem duces, et epici carminis onera lyrâ sustinentem. Reddit enim personis in agendo simul loquendoque debitam dignitatem: ac si tenu-

isset modum, videtur æmulari proximus Homerum potuisse: sed redundat, atque effunditur: quod, ut est reprehendum, ita copiæ vitium est.”

Simonidês of Keôs (Frag. 19, ed. Bergk) puts Homer and Stesichorus together: see the epigram of Antipater in the *Anthologia*, t. i. p. 328, ed. Jacobs, and Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 55. vol. ii. p. 284, Reisk. Compare Kleine, *Stesichori Fragment.* p. 30-34 (Berlin 1828), and O. Müller, *History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, ch. xiv. sect. 5.

The musical composers of Argos are affirmed by Herodotus to have been the most renowned in Greece, half a century after Sakadas (Her. iii. 131).

³ Horat. *Epistol.* i. 19, 23.

more familiar to their hearers. Sappho herself boasts of the pre-eminence of the Lesbian bards;¹ and the celebrity of Terpander, Perikleitas, and Arion, permits us to suppose that there may have been before her other popular bards in the island who did not attain to a wide Hellenic celebrity. Alkæus included in his songs the fiercest bursts of political feeling, the stirring alternations of war and exile, and all the ardent relish of a susceptible man for wine and love.² The love-song seems to have formed the principal theme of Sappho, who, however, also composed odes or songs³ on a great variety of other subjects, serious as well as satirical, and is said farther to have first employed the Myxolydian mode in music. It displays the tendency of the age to metrical and rhythmical novelty, that Alkæus and Sappho are said to have each invented the peculiar stanza, well-known under their respective names—combinations of the dactyl, trochee and iambus, analogous to the asynartetic verses of Archilochus. They by no means confined themselves however to Alkaic and Sapphic metre. Both the one and the other composed hymns to the gods; indeed this is a theme common to all the lyric and choric poets, whatever may be their peculiarities in other ways. Most of their compositions were songs for the single voice, not for the chorus. The poetry of Alkæus is the more worthy of note, as it is the earliest instance of the employment of the Muse in actual political warfare, and shows the increased hold which that motive was acquiring on the Grecian mind.

¹ Sappho, *Fragm.* 93, ed. Bergk. See also Plehn, *Lesbiaca*, pp. 145-165. Respecting the poetesses, two or three of whom were noted, contemporary with Sappho, see Ulrici, *Gesch. der Hellen. Poesie*, vol. ii. p. 370.

² Dionys. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* v. 82; Horat. *Od.* i. 32, ii. 13; Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* i. 28; the striking passage in Plutarch, *Symposion* iii. 1, 3, ap. Bergk. *Fragm.* 42. In the view of Dionysius, the Æolic dialect of Alkæus and Sappho diminished the value of their compositions: the Æolic accent, analogous to the Latin, and acknowledging scarcely any oxyton words, must have rendered them much less agreeable in recitation or song.

³ See Plutarch, *De Music.* p. 1136; Dionys. Hal. *de Comp. Verb.* c. 23. p. 173, Reisk, and some striking passages of Himerius, in respect to Sappho (i. 4, 16, 19; Maximus Tyrius, *Dissert.* xxiv. 7-9), and the encomium of the critical

Dionysius (*De Compos. Verborum*, c. 23, p. 173).

The author of the Parian marble adopts as one of his chronological epochs (Epoch 37) the flight of Sappho, or exile, from Mitylênê to Sicily, somewhere between 604-596 B.C. There probably was something remarkable which induced him to single out this event; but we do not know what, nor can we trust the hints suggested by Ovid (*Heroid.* xv. 51).

Nine books of Sappho's songs were collected by the later literary Greeks, arranged chiefly according to the metres (C. F. Neue, *Sapphonis Fragment.* p. 11, Berlin 1827). There were ten books of the songs of Alkæus (*Athenæus*, xi. p. 481), and both Aristophanês (*Grammaticus*) and Aristarchus published editions of them (*Hephæstion*, c. xv. p. 134, Gaisf.). Dikæarchus wrote a commentary upon his songs (*Athenæus*, xi. p. 461).

The gnostic poets, or moralists in verse, approach by the tone of their sentiments more to the nature of prose. They begin with Simonidês of Amorgos or of Samos, the contemporary of Archilochus. Indeed Archilochus himself devoted some compositions to the illustrative fable, which had not been unknown even to Hesiod. In the remains of Simonidês of Amorgos we trace nothing relative to the man personally, though he too, like Archilochus, is said to have had an individual enemy, Orodœkidês, whose character was aspersed by his Muse.¹ His only considerable poem extant is devoted to a survey of the characters of women, in iambic verse, and by way of comparison with various animals—the mare, the ass, the bee, &c. This poem follows out the Hesiodic vein respecting the social and economical mischief usually caused by women, with some few honourable exceptions. But the poet shows a much larger range of observation and illustration, if we compare him with his predecessor Hesiod; moreover his illustrations come fresh from life and reality. We find in this early iambist the same sympathy with industry and its due rewards, which is observable in Hesiod, together with a still more melancholy sense of the uncertainty of human events.

Of Solon and Theognis I have spoken in former chapters. They reproduce in part the moralising vein of Simonidês, though with a strong admixture of personal feeling and a direct application to passing events. The mixture of political with social morality, which we find in both, marks their more advanced age: Solon bears in this respect the same relation to Simonidês, as his contemporary Alkæus bears to Archilochus. His poems, as far as we can judge by the fragments remaining, appear to have been short occasional effusions, with the exception of the epic poem respecting the submerged island of Atlantis; which he began towards the close of his life, but never finished. They are elegiac, trimeter iambic, and trochaic tetrameter: in his hands certainly neither of these metres can be said to have any special or separate character. If the poems of Solon are short, those of Theognis are much shorter, and are indeed so much broken (as they stand in our present collection), as to read like separate epigrams or bursts of feeling, which the poet had not taken the trouble to incorporate in any definite scheme or series. They form a singular mixture of maxim and passion—of general precept with personal affection towards the youth

¹ Welcker, *Simonidis Amorgini Iambi qui supersunt*, p. 9.

Kyrnus—which surprises us if tried by the standard of literary composition, but which seems a very genuine manifestation of an impoverished exile's complaints and restlessness. What remains to us of Phokylidês, another of the gnomic poets nearly contemporary with Solon, is nothing more than a few maxims in verse—couplets with the name of the author in several cases embodied in them.

Amidst all the variety of rhythmical and metrical innovations which have been enumerated, the ancient epic continued to be recited by the rhapsodes as before. Some new epical compositions were added to the existing stock: Eugammon of Kyrênê, about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.), appears to be the last of the series. At Athens, especially, both Solon and Peisistratus manifested great solicitude as well for the recitation as for the correct preservation of the *Iliad*. Perhaps its popularity may have been diminished by the competition of so much lyric and choric poetry, more showy and striking in its accompaniments, as well as more changeful in its rhythmical character. Whatever secondary effect, however, this newer species of poetry may have derived from such helps, its primary effect was produced by real intellectual or poetical excellence—by the thoughts, sentiment and expression, not by the accompaniment. For a long time the musical composer and the poet continued generally to be one and the same person; and besides those who have acquired sufficient distinction to reach posterity, we cannot doubt that there were many known only to their own contemporaries. But with all of them the instrument and the melody constituted only the inferior part of that which was known by the name of *music*—altogether subordinate to the “thoughts that breathe and words that burn.”¹ Exactness and variety of rhythmical pronunciation gave to the words their full effect upon a delicate ear; but such pleasure of the ear was ancillary to the emotion of mind arising out of the sense conveyed. Complaints are made by the poets, even so early as 500 B.C., that the accompaniment was becoming too prominent. But it was not until the age of the comic poet Aristophanes, towards the end of the fifth century B.C., that the primitive relation between the instrumental accompaniment and the words was really reversed—and loud were the complaints to which it gave rise.² The per-

Subordina-
tion of
musical and
orchestrical
accompani-
ment to the
words and
meaning.

¹ Aristophan. *Nubes*, 536.

ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καὶ τοῖς ἐπεσιν πιστεύουσ' ἐλέλυνθεν.

² See Pratinas ap. *Athenæum*, xiv. p.

617, also p. 636, and the striking fragment of the lost comic poet Pherekratês, in *Plutarch*, *De Musica*, p. 1141, containing the bitter remonstrance of *Musis*

formance of the flute or harp then became more elaborate, showy, and overpowering, while the words were so put together as to show off the player's execution. I notice briefly this subsequent revolution for the purpose of setting forth, by contrast, the truly intellectual character of the original lyric and choric poetry of Greece; and of showing how much the vague sentiment arising from mere musical sound was lost in the more definite emotion, and in the more lasting and reproductive combinations, generated by poetical meaning.

The name and poetry of Solon, and the short maxims or sayings of Phokylidês, conduct us to the mention of the Seven Wise Men. Seven Wise men of Greece. Solon was himself one of the seven, and most, if not all, of them were poets or composers in verse.¹ To most of them is ascribed also an abundance of pithy repartees, together with one short saying or maxim peculiar to each, serving as a sort of distinctive motto.² Indeed the test of an accomplished man about this time was his talent for singing or reciting poetry, and for making smart and ready answers. Respecting this constellation of Wise Men—who in the next century of Grecian history, when philosophy came to be a matter of discussion and argumentation, were spoken of with great eulogy—all the statements are confused, in part even contradictory. Neither the number, nor the names, are given by all authors alike. Dikæarchus numbered ten, Hermippus seventeen: the names of Solon the Athenian, Thalês the Milesian, Pittakus the Mitylenean, and Bias the Prienean, were comprised in all the lists—and the remaining names as given by Plato³ were, Kleo-

(Μουσική) against the wrong which she had suffered from the dithyrambist Melanippidês: compare also Aristophanês, *Nubes*, 951-972; Athenæus, xiv. p. 617; Horat. *Art. Poetic.* 205; and W. M. Schmidt, *Diatribê in Dithyrambum*, ch. viii. p. 250-265.

Τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ περιττὸν—the character of the newer music (Plutarch, *Agis*, c. 10)—as contrasted with τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀπρεπὲς of the old music (Plutarch, *De Musica*, *ut sup.*): ostentation and affected display, against seriousness and simplicity. It is by no means certain that these reproaches against the more recent music of the Greeks were well-founded; we may well be rendered mistrustful of their accuracy when we hear similar remarks and contrasts advanced with regard to the music of the last three centuries. The character of Greek poetry certainly tended to degenerate

after Euripidês.

¹ Bias of Priênê composed a poem of 2000 verses on the condition of Ionia (Diogen. Laërt. i. 85), from which perhaps Herodotus may have derived (either directly or indirectly) the judicious advice which he ascribes to that philosopher on the occasion of the first Persian conquest of Ionia (Herod. i. 170).

Not merely Xenophanês the philosopher (Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36, ix. 20), but long after him Parmenidês and Empedoklês, composed in verse.

² See the account given by Herodotus (vi. 128-129) of the way in which Kleisthenês of Sikyon tested the comparative education (παίδευσις) of the various suitors who came to woo his daughter—οἱ δὲ μνηστήρες ἔριν εἶχον ἀμφὶ τε μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς τὸ μέσον.

³ Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 28. p. 343.

bulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Myson of Chênæ, and Cheilon of Sparta. We cannot certainly distribute among them the sayings or mottos, upon which in later days the Amphiktyons conferred the honour of inscription in the Delphian temple—Know thyself—Nothing too much—Know thy opportunity—Suretyship is the precursor of ruin. Bias is praised as an excellent judge: while Myson was declared by the Delphian oracle to be the most discreet man among the Greeks, according to the testimony of the satirical poet Hippônax—this is the oldest testimony (540 B.C.) which can be produced in favour of any of the Seven. But Kleobulus of Lindus, far from being universally extolled, is pronounced by the poet Simonidês to be a fool.¹

Dikæarchus, however, justly observed, that these Seven or Ten persons were not Wise Men or Philosophers, in the sense which those words bore in his day, but persons of practical discernment in reference to man and society²—of the same turn of mind as their contemporary the fabulist Æsop, though not employing the same mode of illustration. Their appearance forms an epoch in Grecian history, inasmuch as they are the first persons who ever acquired an Hellenic reputation grounded on mental competency apart from poetical genius or effect—a proof that political and social prudence was beginning to be appreciated and admired on its own account. Solon, Pittakus, Bias, and Thalês, were all men of influence—the first two even men of ascendancy³—in their respective cities. Kleobulus was despot of Lindus, and Periander (by some numbered among the seven) of Corinth. Thalês stands distinguished as the earliest name in physical philosophy, with which the other contemporary Wise Men are not said to have meddled. Their celebrity rests upon moral, social, and political wisdom exclusively, which came into greater honour as the ethical feeling of the Greeks improved and as their experience became enlarged.

They were the first men who acquired an Hellenic reputation, without poetical genius.

¹ Hippônax, Fragm. 77, 34, ed. Bergk—καὶ δικάσασθαι Βίαντος τοῦ Πριηνέος κρείττων.

.....Καὶ Μύσων, ὃν ὡς πολλῶν
Ἄρειπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων.

Simonidês, Fr. 6, ed. Bergk—μωροῦ φαρδὸς ἔδε βουλά. Diogen. Laërt. i. 6. 2.

Simonidês treats Pittakus with more respect, though questioning an opinion delivered by him (Fragm. 8, ed. Bergk; Plato, Protagoras, c. 26. p. 339).

² Dikæarchus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 40. συνετοὺς καὶ νομοθετικοὺς δεινότητα πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 2.

About the story of the tripod, which is said to have gone the round of these seven wise men, see Menage ad Diogen. Laërt. i. 28. p. 17.

³ Cicero, De Republ. i. 7; Plutarch, in Delph. p. 385; Bernhardt, Grundriss der Griechischen Litteratur, vol. i. sect. 66. not. 3.

In these celebrated names we have social philosophy in its early and infantine state—in the shape of homely sayings or admonitions, either supposed to be self-evident, or to rest upon some great authority divine or human, but neither accompanied by reasons nor recognising any appeal to inquiry and discussion as the proper test of their rectitude. From such incurious acquiescence, the sentiment to which these admonitions owe their force, we are partially liberated even in the poet Simonidês of Keôs, who (as before alluded to) severely criticises the song of Kleobulus as well as its author. The half-century which followed the age of Simonidês (the interval between about 480-430 B.C.) broke down that sentiment more and more, by familiarising the public with argumentative controversy in the public assembly, the popular judicature, and even on the dramatic stage. And the increased self-working of the Grecian mind, thus created, manifested itself in Sokratês, who laid open all ethical and social doctrines to the scrutiny of reason, and who first awakened among his countrymen that love of dialectics which never left them—an analytical interest in the mental process of inquiring out, verifying, proving and expounding truth. To this capital item of human progress, secured through the Greeks—and through them only—to mankind generally, our attention will be called at a later period of the history. At present it is only mentioned in contrast with the naked, dogmatical, laconism of the Seven Wise Men, and with the simple enforcement of the early poets—a state in which morality has a certain place in the feelings, but no root, even among the superior minds, in the conscious exercise of reason.

The interval between Archilochus and Solon (660-580 B.C.) seems, as has been remarked in my former volume, to be the period in which writing first came to be applied to Greek poems—to the Homeric poems among the number; and shortly after the end of that period, commences the æra of compositions without metre or prose. The philosopher Pherekydês of Syros, about 550 B.C., is called by some the earliest prose-writer. But no prose-writer for a considerable time afterwards acquired any celebrity—seemingly none earlier than Hekataëus of Milêtus,¹ about 510-490 B.C.—prose being a subordinate and ineffective species of composition, not always even perspicuous, and requiring no small practice before

Early manifestation of philosophy—in the form of maxims.

Subsequent growth of dialectics and discussion.

Increase of the habit of writing—commencement of prose compositions.

¹ Pliny, H. N. vii. 57. Suidas v. 'Εκαταῖος.

the power was acquired of rendering it interesting.¹ Down to the generation preceding Sokratês, the poets continued to be the grand leaders of the Greek mind. Until then, nothing was taught to youth except to read, to remember, to recite musically and rhythmically, and to comprehend, poetical composition. The comments of preceptors addressed to their pupils may probably have become fuller and more instructive, but the text still continued to be epic or lyric poetry. These were the best masters for acquiring a full command of the complicated accent and rhythm of the Greek language, so essential to an educated man in ancient times, and so sure to be detected if not properly acquired. Not to mention the Choliambist Hippônax, who seems to have been possessed with the devil of Archilochus, and in part also with his genius—Anakreon, Ibykus, Pindar, Bacchylidês, Simonidês, and the dramatists of Athens, continue the line of eminent poets without intermission. After the Persian war, the requirements of public speaking created a class of rhetorical teachers, while the gradual spread of physical philosophy widened the range of instruction; so that prose composition, for speech or for writing, occupied a larger and larger share of the attention of men, and was gradually wrought up to high perfection, such as we see for the first time in Herodotus. But before it became thus improved, and acquired that style which was the condition of wide-spread popularity, we may be sure that it had been silently used as a means of recording information, and that neither the large mass of geographical matter contained in the *Periegêsis* of Hekataeus, nor the map first prepared by his contemporary Anaximander, could have been presented to the world, without the previous labours of unpretending prose writers, who set down the mere results of their own experience. The acquisition of prose-writing, commencing as it does about the age of Peisistratus, is not less remarkable as an evidence of past, than as a means of future, progress.

Of that splendid genius in sculpture and architecture, which shone forth in Greece after the Persian invasion, the first lineaments only are discoverable between 600-560 First beginnings of Grecian art. B.C., in Corinth, Ægina, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, &c.—enough however to give evidence of improvement and progress. Glaukus of Chios is said to have discovered the art of welding iron, and

¹ H. Ritter (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, ch. vi. p. 243) has some good remarks on the difficulty and obscurity of the early Greek prose-writers, in re-
ference to the darkness of expression and meaning universally charged upon the philosopher Herakleitus.

Rhoekus or his son Theodôrus of Samos the art of casting copper or brass in a mould. Both these discoveries, as far as can be made out, appear to date a little before 600 B.C.¹ The primitive memorial erected in honour of a god did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing more than a pillar, a board, a shapeless stone, a post, &c., fixed so as to mark and consecrate the locality, and receiving from the neighbourhood respectful care and decoration as well as worship. Sometimes there was a real statue, though of the rudest character, carved in wood; and the families of carvers—who from father to son, exercised this profession, represented in Attica by the name of Dædalus and in Ægina by the name of Smilis—adhered long with strict exactness to the consecrated type of each particular god. Gradually the wish grew up to change the material, as well as to correct the rudeness, of such primitive idols. Sometimes the original wood was retained as the material, but covered in part with ivory or gold—in other cases marble or metal was substituted. Dipœnus and Skyllis of Krête acquired renown as workers in marble about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.). From them downwards, a series of names may be traced, more or less distinguished; moreover it seems about the same period that the earliest temple-offerings, in works of art properly so called, commence—the golden statue of Zeus, and the large carved chest, dedicated by the Kypselids of Corinth at Olympia.² The pious associations, however, connected with the

Restricted character of early art, from religious associations.

¹ See O. Müller, *Archäologie der Kunst*, sect. 61; Sillig, *Catalogus Artificum*—under Theodôrus and Teleklês.

Thiersch (*Epochen der Bildenden Kunst*, p. 182–190, 2nd edit.) places Rhoekus near the beginning of the recorded Olympiads; and supposes two artists named Theodôrus, one the grandson of the other; but this seems to me not sustained by any adequate authority (for the loose chronology of Pliny about the Samian school of artists is not more trustworthy than about the Chian school—compare xxxv. 12. and xxxvi. 3), and moreover intrinsically improbable. Herodotus (i. 51) speaks of “the Samian Theodorus,” and seems to have known only one person so called; Diodôrus (i. 98) and Pausanias (x. 38, 3) give different accounts of Theodôrus, but the positive evidence does not enable us to verify the genealogies either of Thiersch or O. Müller. Herodotus (iv. 152) mentions the Ἡραίων at Samos in

connexion with events near Olymp. 37; but this does not prove that the great temple which he himself saw, a century and a half later, had been begun before Olymp. 37, as Thiersch would infer. The statement of O. Müller, that this temple was begun in Olymp. 35, is not authenticated (*Arch. der Kunst*, sect. 53).

² Pausanias tells us distinctly that this chest was dedicated at Olympia by the Kypselids, descendants of Kypselus; and this seems credible enough. But he also tells us that this was the identical chest in which the infant Kypselus had been concealed, believing this story as told in Herodotus (v. 92). In this latter belief I cannot go along with him, nor do I think that there is any evidence for believing the chest to have been of more ancient date than the persons who dedicated it—in spite of the opinions of O. Müller and Thiersch to the contrary (O. Müller, *Archäol. der*

old type were so strong, that the hand of the artist was greatly restrained in dealing with statues of the gods. It was in statues of men, especially in those of the victors at Olympia and other sacred games, that genuine ideas of beauty were first aimed at and in part attained, from whence they passed afterwards to the statues of the gods. Such statues of the athletes seem to commence somewhere between Olympiad 53-58 (568-548 B.C.).

It is not until the same interval of time (between 600-550 B.C.) that we find any traces of these architectural monuments, by which the more important cities in Greece afterwards attracted to themselves so much renown. The two greatest temples in Greece known to Herodotus were, the Artemision at Ephesus, and the Heræon at Samos. Of these the former seems to have been commenced, by the Samian Theodorus, about 600 B.C.—the latter, begun by the Samian Rhœkus, can hardly be traced to any higher antiquity. The first attempts to decorate Athens by such additions proceeded from Peisistratus and his sons, near the same time. As far as we can judge, too, in the absence of all direct evidence, the temples of Pæstum in Italy and Selinus in Sicily seem to fall in this same century. Of painting during these early centuries, nothing can be affirmed. It never at any time reached the same perfection as sculpture, and we may presume that its years of infancy were at least equally rude.

Monumental ornaments in the cities—begin in the sixth century B.C.

The immense development of Grecian art subsequently, and the great perfection of Grecian artists, are facts of great importance in the history of the human race; while in regard to the Greeks themselves, these facts not only acted powerfully on the taste of the people, but were also valuable indirectly as the common boast of Hellenism, and as supplying one bond of fraternal sympathy as well as of mutual pride, among its widely-dispersed sections. It is the paucity and weakness of such bonds which renders the history of Greece, prior to 560 B.C., little better than a series of parallel, but isolated threads, each attached to a separate city. The increased range of joint Hellenic feeling and action, upon which we shall presently enter, though arising doubtless in great measure from new and common dangers threatening many cities at once — also springs in part from those other causes which have been enumerated in this chapter, as acting on the Grecian mind. It proceeds

Importance of Grecian art as a means of Hellenic union.

from the stimulus applied to all the common feelings in religion, art, and recreation—from the gradual formation of national festivals, appealing in various ways to such tastes and sentiments as animated every Hellenic bosom—from the inspirations of men of genius, poets, musicians, sculptors, architects, who supplied more or less in every Grecian city, education for the youth, training for the chorus, and ornament for the locality—from the gradual expansion of science, philosophy, and rhetoric, during the coming period of this history, which rendered one city the intellectual capital of Greece, and brought to Isokratês and Plato pupils from the most distant parts of the Grecian world. It was this fund of common tastes, tendencies, and aptitudes, which caused the social atoms of Hellas to gravitate towards each other, and which enabled the Greeks to become something better and greater than an aggregate of petty disunited communities like the Thracians or Phrygians. And the creation of such common, extra-political, Hellenism, is the most interesting phænomenon which the historian has to point out in the early period now under our notice. He is called upon to dwell upon it the more forcibly because the modern reader has generally no idea of national union without political union—an association foreign to the Greek mind. Strange as it may seem to find a song-writer put forward as an active instrument of union among his fellow-Hellens, it is not the less true, that those poets, whom we have briefly passed in review, by enriching the common language and by circulating from town to town either in person or in their compositions, contributed to fan the flame of Pan-Hellenic patriotism at a time when there were few circumstances to co-operate with them, and when the causes tending to perpetuate isolation seemed in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF
PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT ATHENS.

WE now arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of Cræsus in Lydia.

It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot of Athens in 560 B.C. He died in 527 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B.C., thus making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of the father and the final expulsion of the son. These chronological points are settled on good evidence. But the thirty-three years covered by the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods of exile, one of them lasting not less than ten years, the other, five years; and the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the conjectures of chronologers.¹ Partly from this half-known chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the history of the half-century now before us can only be given very imperfectly. Nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterwards, statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the Peisistratids were in circulation, as Thucydides distinctly, and somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the Solonian constitution, whereby the annual Senate of Four Hundred had been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its action as well as aided and regulated by this senate) invested with a power of exacting responsibility from the magistrates after their year of office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown, and no doubt the administration of the archons had been

Peisistratus
and his sons
at Athens—
B.C. 560-510
—uncertain
chronology
as to Peisi-
stratus.

State of
feeling in
Attica at the
accession of
Peisistratus.

¹ Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. vol. ii. Appendix, c. 2. p. 201) has stated and discussed the different opinions on the chronology of Peisistratus and his sons.

practically softened by it. Yet nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment had yet been created. A hundred years hence, we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with “that angry, waspish, intractable little old man, Dêmus of Pnyx” —so Aristophanês¹ calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that he at least counted on their good temper. But between 560-510 B.C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire, and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains and cross-changes between two or three powerful men,² at the head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal quarrels, and draw the sword at their command. It was this ancient constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which the Macedonian Antipater professed to restore in 322 B.C., when he caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether from the political franchise.³

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter,⁴ Peisistratus had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed to acquire forcible possession of the acropolis. He thus became master of the administration; but he employed his power honourably and well, not disturbing the existing forms farther than was necessary to ensure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless we may see by the verses of Solon⁵ (the only contemporary evidence which we possess), that the prevalent sentiment was by no means favourable to his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently mani-

Retirement
of Peisistratus,
and
stratagem
whereby he
is reinstated.

¹ Ἀγροΐκος ὄργην, κυανοτῶξ, ἀκράχολος
Δῆμος Πευκίτης, δύσκολον γεροντίον.—
Aristoph. Equit. 41.

I need hardly mention that the Pnyx was the place in which the Athenian public assemblies were held.

² Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. c. 15. p. 858) is angry with Herodotus for imparting so petty and personal a character to the dissensions between the Alkmæonids and Peisistratus: his severe remarks in that treatise, however, tend almost always to strengthen rather than to weaken the credibility of the historian.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, c. 27. ἀπεκρί-

νατο φίλιαν ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ
ξυμμαχίαν, ἐκδοῦσι μὲν τοὺς περὶ Δημο-
σθένη καὶ Ὑπερίδην, πολιτευομένοις δὲ τὴν
πάτριον ἀπὸ τιμήματος πολιτείαν, δε-
ξαμένοις δὲ φρουρὰν εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν,
ἔτι δὲ χρήματα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ ζημίαν
προσεκτίσασιν. Compare Diodor. xviii.
18.

Twelve thousand of the poorer citizens were disfranchised by this change (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 28).

⁴ See the preceding volume, ch. xi. p. 207.

⁵ Solon, Fragm. 10. ed. Bergk.—

Εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ δι' ὑμετέρεην κακότητα,
Μήτι θεοῖς τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε, &c.

fested itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals—Megaklês at the head of the Parali or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the head of those in the neighbouring plain. As the conjunction of the two formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism. But the time came (how soon we cannot tell) when the two rivals who had expelled him quarrelled. Megaklês made propositions to Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his own aid, and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter. The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem—since the simulated wounds and pretence of personal danger were not likely to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phyê, in the panoply and costume of Athênê—surrounded her with the processional accompaniments belonging to the goddess—and placed her in a chariot with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the exiled despot and his adherents approached the city and drove up to the acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people,—“Athenians, receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athênê has honoured above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own acropolis.” The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons the report quickly spread that Athênê had appeared in person to restore Peisistratus; who thus found himself, without even a show of resistance, in possession of the acropolis and of the government. His own party, united with that of Megaklês, were powerful enough to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession. And probably all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only after Peisistratus and Megaklês had quarrelled.¹

¹ Herodot. i. 60. *καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄσπεϊ πειθόμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν, προσεύχοντό τε τὴν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐδέκοντο τὸν Πεισίστρατον.* A statement (Athenæus, xiii. p. 609) represents Phyê to have become afterwards the wife of Hipparchus.

Of this remarkable story, not the least remarkable part is the criticism with which Herodotus himself accompanies it. He treats it as a proceeding infinitely silly (*πρῆγμα εὐηθέστατον, ὥς ἐγὼ*

εὐρίσκω, μακρῷ); he cannot conceive how Greeks, so much superior to barbarians—and even Athenians, the cleverest of all the Greeks—could have fallen into such a trap. To him the story was told as a deception from the beginning, and he did not perhaps take pains to put himself into the state of feeling of those original spectators who saw the chariot approach, without any warning or preconceived suspicion. But even allowing for this, his criticism

The daughter of Megaklês, according to agreement, quickly became the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children. It became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all the Alkmæônid family, did not intend that she should become a mother.¹ Megaklês was so incensed at this behaviour, that he not only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his peace with the third party, the adherents of Lykurgus — and assumed so menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica. He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained

Quarrel of
Peisistratus
with the
Alkmæônids
—his second
retirement.

brings to our view the alteration and enlargement which had taken place in the Greek mind during the century between Peisistratus and Periklês. Doubtless neither the latter nor any of his contemporaries could have succeeded in a similar trick.

The fact, and the criticism upon it, now before us, are remarkably illustrated by an analogous case recounted in a previous chapter (vol. ii. chap. viii.). Nearly at the same period as this stratagem of Peisistratus, the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians agreed to decide, by a combat of three hundred select champions, the dispute between them as to the territory of Kynuria. The combat actually took place, and the heroism of Othryades, sole Spartan survivor, has been already recounted. In the eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war (shortly after or near upon the period when we may conceive the history of Herodotus to have been finished) the Argeians, concluding a treaty with Lacedæmon, introduced as a clause into it the liberty of reviving their pretensions to Kynuria, and of again deciding the dispute by a combat of select champions. To the Lacedæmonians of that time this appeared extreme folly — the very proceeding which had been actually resorted to a century before. Here is another case, in which the change in the point of view, and the increased positive tendencies in the Greek mind, are brought to our notice not less forcibly than by the criticism of Herodotus upon Phylê-Athênê.

Istrus (one of the Atthido-graphers of the third century B.C.) and Antiklês published books respecting the personal manifestations or epiphanies of the gods — Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιφανείαι: see Istri Frag-

ment. 33–37, ed. Didot. If Peisistratus and Megaklês had never quarrelled, their joint stratagem might have continued to pass for a genuine epiphany, and might have been included as such in the work of Istrus. I will add, that the real presence of the gods, at the festivals celebrated in their honour, was an idea continually brought before the minds of the Greeks.

The Athenians fully believed the epiphany of the god Pan to Pheidippidês the courier on his march to Sparta a little before the battle of Marathôn (Herodot. vi. 105. *καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι πιστεύσαντες εἶναι ἀληθέα*), and even Herodotus himself does not controvert it, though he relaxes the positive character of history so far as to add — “as Pheidippidês himself said and recounted publicly to the Athenians.” His informants in this case were doubtless sincere believers; whereas in the case of Phylê, the story was told to him at first as a fabrication.

At Gela in Sicily, seemingly not long before this restoration of Peisistratus, Têlinês (ancestor of the despot Gelon) had brought back some exiles to Gela, “without any armed force, but merely through the sacred ceremonies and apurtenances of the subterranean goddesses” — *ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ’ ἰρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν — τούτοις δ’ ὦν πίσυνος ἔων, κατήγαγε* (Herodot. vii. 153). Herodotus does not tell us the details which he had heard of the manner in which this restoration at Gela was brought about; but his general language intimates that they were remarkable details, and they might have illustrated the story of Phylê-Athênê.

¹ Herodot. i. 61. Peisistratus — *ἐμίχθη οἱ οὐ κατὰ νόμον*.

no less than ten years, employed in making preparations for a forcible return, and exercising, even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of a private man. He not only lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos¹ in constituting himself despot of that island, but possessed, we know not how, the means of rendering important service to different cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions of money to aid in his re-establishment: mercenaries were hired from Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself both with money and with troops. Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his ten years' absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans both from the city and from the country. It was not until he broke up from Marathon and had reached Pallênê on his way to Athens, that they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found means to attack them unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact, the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal. For the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third time ruler.²

His second
and final
restoration.

On this third successful entry, he took vigorous precautions for rendering his seat permanent. The Alkmæônidæ and their immediate partisans retired into exile: but he seized the children of those who remained and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for the behaviour of their parents, and placed them in Naxos under the care of Lygdamis. Moreover he provided himself with a powerful body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the people:³ and he was careful to conciliate the favour of the gods by a purification of the sacred island of Delos. All the dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo, were exhumed and reinterred farther off. At this time the Delian festival—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and with which

His strong
government
—mercena-
ries—puri-
fication of
Delos.

¹ About Lygdamis, see Athenæus, viii. p. 348, and his citation from the lost work of Aristotle on the Grecian Πολιτεῖαι; also Aristot. Politic. v. 5. 1.

² Herodot. i. 63.

³ Herodot. i. 64. ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρώμονος ποτάμου προσιόντων.

Athens was of course peculiarly connected—must have been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the despot Polykratês, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin of the smaller Ionic islands. Partly from the same feelings which led to the purification of Delos—partly as an act of party revenge—Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæônids to be levelled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country.¹

This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several years, until his death in 527 B.C. It is said to have been so mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be cited for trial before the senate of Areopagus; yet as we know that he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium comparatively rather than positively. Thucydidês Mild despotism of Peisistratus. affirms that both he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying from the people only an income-tax of five per cent.² This is high praise coming from

¹ Isokratês, Or. xvi. De Bigis, c. 351.

² For the statement of Boëckh, Dr. Arnold, and Dr. Thirlwall, that Peisistratus had levied a tythe or tax of ten per cent., and that his sons reduced it to the half, I find no sufficient warrant: certainly the spurious letter of Peisistratus to Solon in Diogenes Laërtius (i. 53) ought not to be considered as proving anything. Boëckh, Public Economy of Athens, B. iii. c. 6 (i. 351 German); Dr. Arnold ad Thucyd. vi. 34; Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. of Gr. ch. xi. p. 72–74. Idomeneus (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 533) considers the sons of Peisistratus to have indulged in pleasures to an extent more costly and oppressive to the people than their father.

Herodotus (i. 64) tells us that Peisistratus brought mercenary soldiers from the Strymon, but that he levied the money to pay them in Attica—*ἐρρίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπικούροισι τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ συνιόντων*. On this passage, apparently, Dr. Thirlwall has founded a statement (p. 68), for which in my first edition I did not perceive his authority—“He (Peisistratus) possessed lands on the Strymon in Thrace, which yielded

a large revenue.” The words of Herodotus undoubtedly justify Dr. Thirlwall’s construction: but they are also consistent with a different construction, which appears to me in this case the truer one; referring *τῶν μὲν* to *χρημάτων*, and *τῶν δὲ* to *ἐπικούροισι*. “Peisistratus collected the mercenary soldiers from the Strymon, and the money at home.” If he wanted mercenaries, the bank of the Strymon, with the Thracian population adjoining, was the natural place to seek them. But I think it highly improbable that “he possessed lands on the Strymon which yielded him a large revenue.” If this is to be admitted, we must suppose him to have founded, or to have taken a leading part in founding, a city at the mouth of the Strymon: for large private landed property, possessed by a man in the territory of a foreign city, was at that time a thing rare indeed, if not altogether unknown. But if Peisistratus had established any settlement at the mouth of the Strymon, we must surely have heard more of it afterwards. It would have been retained by Hippias when expelled from Athens; and Herodotus (v. 65–94) would surely have told us something about it on that

such an authority, though it seems that we ought to make some allowance for the circumstance of Thucydidês being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family.¹ The judgement of Herodotus is also very favourable respecting Peisistratus; that of Aristotle favourable, yet qualified, since he includes these despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun by Peisistratus—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenôn or the temple of Athênê Polias; both of which, nevertheless, were erected in later times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger² and her disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover, Peisistratus introduced the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward called the Lesser, was still continued.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems, as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival,—a proceeding, for which we owe him much gratitude, but which has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He probably also collected the works of other poets—called by Aulus Gellius,³ in language not well-suited to the sixth century B.C., a library thrown open to the public. The

occasion. Moreover, the mouth of the Strymon was a capital position, more coveted than almost any other by enterprising Greeks, and stoutly maintained by the Edonian Thracians. Had there been any settlement established there by Peisistratus, we must have found some mention of it either from Herodotus or Thucydidês, when they advert to the proceedings of Histiaëus, Aristagoras, and the Athenians, connected with the subsequent settlement of the locality, and ending at last in the foundation of Amphipolis (Herodot. v. 11, 23, 94; Thucyd. iv. 102).

¹ Hermippus (ap. Marcellin. Vit. Thucyd. p. ix.), and the Scholiast on Thucyd. i. 20, affirm that Thucydidês was connected by relationship with the Peisistratidæ. His manner of speaking of them certainly lends countenance to the assertion; not merely as he twice notices

their history, once briefly (i. 20) and again at considerable length (vi. 54–59), though it does not lie within the direct compass of his period—but also as he so emphatically announces his own personal knowledge of their family relations—*Ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὢν Ἰππίας ἤρξεν, εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι* (vi. 55).

Aristotle (Politic. v. 9, 21) mentions it as a report (*φασί*) that Peisistratus obeyed the summons to appear before the Areopagus; Plutarch adds that the person who had summoned him did not appear to bring the cause to trial (Vit. Solon. 31), which is not at all surprising: compare Thucyd. vi. 56, 57.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 9, 4; Dikæarchus, Vita Græciæ, pp. 140–166, ed. Fuhr; Pausan. i. 18, 8.

³ Aul. Gell. N. A. vi. 17.

service which he thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent poets of the day¹—Simonidês, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who though not pretending to the gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The Peisistratids, well-versed in these prophecies, set great value upon them, and guarded their integrity so carefully, that Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion in the act of interpolating them, was banished by Hipparchus in consequence.² The statues of Hermês, erected by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of Attica,³ and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled by the author of the Platonic dialogue called Hipparchus, with an exaggeration which approaches to irony. It is certain, however, that both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in fulfilling the religious obligations of the state, and ornamented the city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhoê. They are said to have maintained the pre-existing forms of law and justice, merely taking care always to keep themselves and their adherents in the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power. They were moreover modest and popular in their personal demeanour, and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of unscrupulous enmity, in their murder of Kimôn by night through the agency of hired assassins.⁴ There is good reason, however, for believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, after which event the surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his last four years. Hence the harshness of this concluding period left upon the Athenian mind⁵ that profound and imperishable hatred, against the dynasty generally, which Thucydidês reluctantly admits: labouring to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first by Hippias.

¹ Herodot. vii. 6; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparchus, p. 229.

² Herodot. v. 93; vii. 6. Ὀνομάκριτον, χρησμολόγον καὶ διαθέτην τῶν χρησμῶν τῶν Μουσαίου. See Pausan. i. 22, 7. Compare, about the literary tendencies of the Peisistratids, Nitzsch, De Historiâ

Homeri, ch. 30. p. 168.

³ Philochor. Frag. 69, ed. Didot; Plato, Hipparch. p. 230.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 38–103; Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 533.

⁵ Thucyd. vi. 53; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparch. p. 230; Pausan. i. 23, 1.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus. The general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thucydidês was, that Hipparchus ^{His sons Hippias and Hipparchus.} was the eldest of the three and had succeeded him. Yet the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies upon his own responsibility that Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief—the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version; but we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato,¹ about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thucydidês recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn.

Of these two Athenian citizens,² both belonging to the ancient gens called Gephyræi, the former was a beautiful youth, ^{Harmodius and Aristogeitôn.} attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy which Grecian manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogeitôn, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots,³ and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this

¹ Thucyd. i. 20, about the general belief of the Athenian public in his time—'Αθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος οἶονται ὑφ' Ἀρμόδιου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος Ἰππάρχου τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἰππίας πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου παιδῶν, &c.

The Pseudo-Plato in the dialogue called Hipparchus adopts this belief, and the real Plato in his Symposium (c. 9. p. 182) seems to countenance it.

² Herodot. v. 55–58. Harmodius is

affirmed by Plutarch to have been of the deme Aphidnæ (Plutarch, Symposiacon, i. 10. p. 628).

It is to be recollected that he died before the introduction of the Ten Tribes, and before the recognition of the demes as political elements in the commonwealth.

³ For the terrible effects produced by this fear of ὕβρις εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, see Plutarch, Kimon, 1; Aristot. Polit. v. 9, 17.

young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the Kanêphoræ or basket-carriers, according to the practice usual at Athens. But when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed.¹

An insult thus publicly offered filled Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the feelings of Aristogeitôn. Both of them resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the acropolis; this being the only day on which an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and Aristogeitôn undertook with their own hands to kill the two Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign body-guard around him, was marshalling the armed citizens for procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when Harmodius and Aristogeitôn approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of their own fellow-

They conspire and kill Hippias, B.C. 514.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 56. Τὸν δ' οὖν Ἀρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν πείρυσιν, ὥσπερ διανοεῖτο, προσηλάκισεν· ἀδελφὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ, κόρην, ἐπαγγείλαντες ἦκειν κανοῦν οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινι, ἀπήλασαν, λέγοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἀρχὴν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι.

Dr. Arnold, in his note, supposes that this exclusion of the sister of Harmodius by the Peisistratids may have been founded on the circumstance that she belonged to the gens Gephyræi (Herodot. v. 57); her foreign blood, and her being in certain respects ἄτιμος, disqualified her (he thinks) from ministering to the worship of the gods of Athens.

There is no positive reason to support the conjecture of Dr. Arnold, which seems moreover virtually discounte-

nanced by the narrative of Thucydides, who plainly describes the treatment of this young woman as a deliberate, preconcerted insult. Had there existed any assignable ground of exclusion, such as that which Dr. Arnold supposes, leading to the inference that the Peisistratids could not admit her without violating religious custom, Thucydides would hardly have neglected to allude to it, for it would have lightened the insult; and indeed on that supposition, the sending of the original summons might have been made to appear as an accidental mistake. I will add, that Thucydides, though no way forfeiting his obligations to historical truth, is evidently not disposed to omit any thing which can be truly said in favour of the Peisistratids.

conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man. They immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus; whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called the Leôkorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot; while Aristogeitôn, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was afterwards taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.¹

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced towards them,—directing them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed; upon which he ordered his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. Being now undisputed master, he seized the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted—especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydides.² To possess great power—to be above legal restraint—to inspire extraordinary fear—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by Hipparchus—of designs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance—was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B.C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias, which lasted four years longer, until 510 B.C. These last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many persons made the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years alto-

Strong and lasting sentiment, coupled with great historical mistake, in the Athenian public.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 58. *οὐ βῆδ' ὅπως διετέθη*: compare Polyæn. i. 22; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. x. p. 62, vol. iv. ed. Wess.; Justin, ii. 9. See also a good note of Dr. Thirlwall on the passage, *Hist. of Gr.* vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 77. 2nd ed. I agree with him, that we may fairly construe the indis-

ting phrase of Thucydides by the more precise statements of later authors, who mention the torture.

² Thucyd. i. 20; vi. 54–59; Herodot. v. 55, 56; vi. 123; Aristot. *Polit.* v. 8, 9.

gether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn had deposed the Peisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens—"they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws."¹ So inestimable a present was alone sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it. Moreover we must recollect that the intimate connexion between the two, though repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy,—so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeitôn were afterwards commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honour shortly after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favour of this respected lineage.² And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family—the eldest son and successor of Peisistratus—the reigning despot—to the comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished many other anecdotes,³ not the less eagerly believed because they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

Whatever may have been the previous moderation of Hippias, indignation at the death of his brother, and fear for his own

¹ See the words of the Song—

*Ὅτι τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην
Ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθήνας ἐποίησάτην—*

ap. Athenæum, xv. p. 691.

The epigram of the Keian Simonidês (Fragm. 132, ed. Bergk—ap. Hephæstion. c. 14. p. 26, ed. Gaisf.) implies a similar belief: also the passages in Plato, Symposium, p. 182, in Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 21, and Arrian, Exped. Alex. iv. 10, 3.

² Herodot. vi. 109; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 27. p. 495; cont. Meidiam, c. 47. p. 569; and the oath prescribed in

the Psephism of Demophantus—Andokidês, De Mysteriis, p. 13; Pliny. H. N. xxxiv. 4–8; Pausan. i. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 27.

The statues were carried away from Athens by Xerxês, and restored to the Athenians by Alexander after his conquest of Persia (Arrian, Ex. Al. iii. 16, 14; Pliny, H. N. xxxiv. 4–8).

³ One of these stories may be seen in Justin, ii. 9—who gives the name of Dioklês to Hipparchus—"Diocles, alter ex filiis, per vim stupratâ virgine, a fratre puellæ interficitur."

safety,¹ now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydidês and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement noway improbable in itself and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible—that he caused Lcæna, the mistress of Aristogeitôn, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter.² But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens. With this view he sought to connect himself with Darius king of Persia—a connexion full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Æantidês, son of Hippoklus the despot of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favour of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Arche-dikê in marriage; no small honour to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of Thucydidês.³ To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Peisistratids.

Hippias de-
spot alone
—514–510
B.C.—his
cruelty and
conscious in-
security.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mityleneans; so that their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of Peisistratus. Owing probably to this circumstance, an application was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian Thracians, inhabitants of the Chersonese on the opposite side of the Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbours the Absinthian tribe of Thracians. Opportunity was thus offered for sending out a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus willingly entered into the scheme, while Miltiadês son of Kypselus, a noble Athenian living impatiently under his

Connexion
of Athens
with the
Thracian
Chersonesus
and the
Asiatic coast
of the Helles-
pont.

¹ Ἡ γὰρ δειλία φονικώτατόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν—observes Plutarch (*Ar-taxerxês*, c. 25).

² Pausan. i. 23, 2; Plutarch, *De Gar-rulitate*, p. 897; Polyæn. viii. 45; Athenæus, xiii. p. 596.

³ We can hardly be mistaken in putting this interpretation on the words of Thucydidês—Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, Λαμψακηνῶ ἔδωκε (vi. 59).

Some financial tricks and frauds are

ascribed to Hippias by the author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian second book of the *Œconomica* (ii. 4). I place little reliance on the statements in this treatise respecting persons of early date, such as Kypselus or Hippias: in respect to facts of the subsequent period of Greece, between 450–300 B.C., the author's means of information will doubtless render him a better witness.

despotism, was no less pleased to take the lead in executing it: his departure and that of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus—alike pious and picturesque, and doubtless circulating as authentic at the annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated to the honour of their œkist—it is the Delphian god who directs the scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed Dolonkians going to Delphi to crave assistance towards procuring Grecian colonists, were directed to choose for their œkist the individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the Sacred Road, through Phokis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving a single hospitable invitation. At length they entered Athens, and passed by the house of Miltiadês while he himself was sitting in front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly: upon which they apprised him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle, and adjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an affirmative answer, he consented; sailing as œkist at the head of a body of Athenian emigrants to the Chersonese.¹

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half; so that the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out,² though the protection was not permanently kept up. He also entered into a war with Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambushade and become a prisoner. Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of Crœsus king of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces

First Miltiadês—œkist of the Chersonese.

¹ Herodot. vi. 36, 37.

² Thus the Scythians broke into the Chersonese even during the government of Miltiadês son of Kimôn, nephew of Miltiadês the œkist, about forty years after the wall had been erected (Herodot. vi. 40). Again Periklês re-established the cross-wall, on sending to the Chersonese a fresh band of 1000 Athenian settlers (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19): lastly, Derkyllidas the Lacedæmonian built it anew, in consequence of loud complaints raised by the inhabit-

ants of their defenceless condition—about 397 B.C. (Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 2, 8–10). So imperfect however did the protection prove, that about half a century afterwards, during the first years of the conquests of Philip of Macedon, an idea was entertained of digging through the isthmus, and converting the peninsula into an island (Demosthenês, Philippic ii. 6. p. 92, and De Haloneso, c. 10. p. 86); an idea however never carried into effect.

addressed to the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their prisoner. Miltiadês had acquired much favour with Croesus, in what manner we are not told. He died childless some time afterwards, while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by assassination some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at Athens.¹

The expedition of Miltiadês to the Chersonese must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Croesus (546 B.C.). But it was not till much later—probably during the third and most powerful period of Peisistratus—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigæum in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mityleneans: Peisistratus retook it,² and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mityleneans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537-527 B.C.) not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polykratês and the Samians.³ Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonese and Sigæum.⁴ To the former of the two, Hippias sent out Miltiadês, nephew of the first œkist, as governor after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprison-
Second Miltiadês—sent out thither by the Peisistratids.
ing the principal men in each town. He farther took into his pay a regiment of five hundred mercenaries, and married Hegesipylê daughter of the Thracian king Olorus.⁵ It must have been about 518 B.C. that this second Miltiadês went out to the Chersonese.⁶ He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there

¹ Herodot. vi. 38, 39.

² Herodot. v. 94. I have already said that I conceive this as a different war from that in which the poet Alkæus was engaged.

³ Herodot. iii. 39.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 104, 139, 140.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 39-103. Cornelius Nepos in his life of Miltiadês confounds in one biography the adventures of two persons—Miltiadês son of Kypselus, the œkist—and Miltiadês son of Kimôn, the victor of Marathon—the uncle and the

nephew.

⁶ There is nothing that I know to mark the date except that it was earlier than the death of Hipparchus in 514 B.C., and also earlier than the expedition of Darius against the Scythians, about 516 B.C., in which expedition Miltiadês was engaged: see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, and J. M. Schultz, *Beitrag zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschichten von der 63^{sten} bis zur 72^{sten} Olympiade*, p. 165, in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*, 1841.

from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B.C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, however, though Athenian possessions, were now tributary and dependant on Persia. It was to Persia that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantidês as well as Darius as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alkmæonids at their head. Believing the favourable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydrion in the mountain range of Parnês, which separates Attica from Bœotia.¹ But their schemes altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas king of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected manœuvre, which, favoured by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B.C.,² the Delphian temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by such assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their munificent benefactor Croesus fell a victim to the Persians in

¹ Herodot. v. 62. The unfortunate struggle at Leipsydrion became afterwards the theme of a popular song (Athenæus, xv. p. 695): see Hesychius, v. Λειψύδριον, and Aristotle, *Fragm. 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία*, 37, ed. Neumann.

If it be true that Alkibiadês, grand-

father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, took part with Kleisthenês and the Alkmæonid exiles in this struggle (see Isokratês, *De Bigis*, Or. xvi. p. 351) he must have been a mere youth.

² Pausan. x. 5, 5.

546 B.C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was three hundred talents (equal probably to about 115,000*l.* sterling)¹—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length however the money was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a contract for the building of the temple. The Alkmæônids, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Peisistratus, took the contract. In executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone.² As was before remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles (whose property had been confiscated) so amply furnished with money, unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenês the Alkmæônid, grandson of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês,³ inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Hêrê. But the fact is unquestionable, and they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after the death of Hipparchus—512 B.C.—more than thirty years after the conflagration.

The Alkmæônids rebuild the temple with magnificence.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on

¹ Herodot. i. 50, ii 180. I have taken the 300 talents of Herodotus as being Ægean talents, which are to Attic talents in the ratio of 5 : 3. The Inscriptions prove that the accounts of the temple were kept by the Amphiktyons on the Ægean scale of money: see Corpus Inscip. Boëckh, No. 1688, and Boëckh, *Metrologie*, vii. 4.

² Herodot. v. 62. The words of the historian would seem to imply that they only began to think of this scheme of building the temple after the defeat of Leipsydrion, and a year or two before the expulsion of Hippias; a supposition quite inadmissible, since the temple must have taken some years in building.

The loose and prejudiced statement in Philochorus, affirming that the Peisi-

stratids caused the Delphian temple to be burnt, and also that they were at last deposited by the victorious arm of the Alkmæônids (Philochori Fragment. 70, ed. Didot) makes us feel the value of Herodotus and Thucydides as authorities.

³ Herodot. vi. 128; Cicero, *De Legg.* ii. 16. The deposit here mentioned by Cicero, which may very probably have been recorded in an inscription in the temple, must have been made before the time of the Persian conquest of Samos—indeed before the death of Polykratês in 522 B.C., after which period the island fell at once into a precarious situation, and very soon afterwards into the greatest calamities.

so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude towards the Alkmæônids was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Kleisthenês was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain—"Athens must be liberated." The constant repetition of that mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship towards the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius son of Aster was despatched by sea to Athens at the head of a Spartan force to expel them. On landing at Phalêrum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by one thousand horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalêrum this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius were driven back to their ships with great loss, and he himself slain.¹ The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Kleomenês in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenês marched on without farther resistance to Athens, where he found himself, together with the Alkmæônids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except round the acropolis, into which Hippias retired, with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was noway prepared for a long blockade. Yet, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; in which proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the space of five days.

Gratitude
of the Del-
phians to-
wards them
—they pro-
cure from
the oracle
directions to
Sparta, en-
joining the
expulsion of
Hippias.

Spartan
expeditions
into Attica.

¹ Herodot. v. 62, 63.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B.C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder.¹ It was put down through the aid of foreigners,² and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile—probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation. An altar was erected in the acropolis, with a column hard by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.³

¹ Herodot. v. 64, 65.

² Thucyd. vi. 56, 57.

³ Thucyd. vi. 55. ὥς δ' τε βωμὸς σημαίνει, καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας, ἣ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλει σταθεῖσα.

Dr. Thirlwall, after mentioning the departure of Hippias, proceeds as follows: "After his departure many severe measures were taken against his adherents, who appear to have been for a long time afterwards a formidable party. They were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their political privileges. The family of the tyrants was condemned to perpetual banishment, and appears to have been excepted from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times." (Hist. of Gr. ch. xi. vol. ii. p. 81.)

I cannot but think that Dr. Thirlwall has here been misled by insufficient authority. He refers to the oration of Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, sect. 106 and 78 (sect. 106 coincides in part with ch. 18 in the ed. of Dobree). An attentive reading of it will show that it is utterly unworthy of credit in regard to matters anterior to the speaker by one generation or more. The orators often permit themselves great licence in speaking of past facts, but Andokidês in this chapter passes the bounds even of rhetorical licence. First, he states something not bearing the least analogy to the narrative of Herodotus as to the circumstances preceding the expulsion of the Peisistratids, and indeed tacitly setting aside that narrative; next, he actually jumbles together the two capital and distinct

exploits of Athens—the battle of Marathon and the repulse of Xerxês ten years after it. I state this latter charge in the words of Sluiter and Valckenaer, before I consider the former charge: "Verissime ad hæc verba notat Valckenaerius—Confundere videtur Andocidês diversissima; Persica sub Miltiade et Dario et victoriam Marathoniam (v. 14)—quæque evenere sub Themistocle, Xerxis gesta. Hic urbem incendio delevit, non ille. (v. 20.) Nihil magis manifestum est, quam diversa ab oratore confundi." (Sluiter, *Lect. Andocidæ*, p. 147.)

The criticism of these commentators is perfectly borne out by the words of the orator, which are too long to find a place here. But immediately prior to those words he expresses himself as follows, and this is the passage which serves as Dr. Thirlwall's authority: Οἱ γὰρ πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι, γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι εἶχον τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔφυγε, νικῆσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγοῦντος Λεωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, καὶ Χαρίου οὗ ἕκείνος τὴν θυγατέρα εἶχεν ἐξ ἧς ὁ ἡμέτερος ἦν πάππος, κατελθόντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἡτίμωσαν.

Both Sluiter (*Lect. And.* p. 8) and Dr. Thirlwall (*Hist.* p. 80) refer this alleged victory of Leogoras and the Athenian demus to the action described by Herodotus (v. 64) as having been fought by Kleomenês of Sparta against the Thessalian cavalry. But the two events have not a single circumstance in

common, except that each is a victory over the Peisistratidæ or their allies: nor could they well be the same event described in different terms, seeing that Kleomenês, marching from Sparta to Athens, could not have fought the Thes-salians at Pallênê, which lay on the road from *Marathon* to Athens. Pallênê was the place where Peisistratus, advancing from Marathon to Athens on occasion of his second restoration, gained his complete victory over the opposing party, and marched on afterwards to Athens without farther resistance (Herodot. i. 63).

If then we compare the statement given by Andokidês of the preceding circumstances whereby the dynasty of the Peisistratids was put down, with that given by Herodotus, we shall see that the two are radically different; we cannot blend them together, but must make our election between them. Not less different are the representations of the two as to the circumstances which immediately ensued on the fall of Hippias: they would scarcely appear to relate to the same event. That "the adherents of the Peisistratidæ were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their political privileges," which is the assertion of Andokidês and Dr. Thirlwall, is not only not stated by Herodotus, but is highly improbable if we accept the facts which he does state; for he tells us that Hippias capitulated and agreed to retire while possessing ample means of resistance—simply from regard to the safety of his children. It is not to be supposed that he would leave his intimate partisans exposed to danger; such of them as felt themselves obnoxious would naturally retire along with him; and if this be what is meant by "many persons condemned to exile," there is no reason to call it in question. But there is little probability that any one was put to death, and still less probability that any were punished by the loss of their political privileges. Within a year afterwards came the comprehensive constitution of Kleisthenês, to be described in the following chapter. Now I consider it eminently unlikely that there were a considerable class of residents in Attica left out of this constitution, under the category of partisans of Peisistratus; indeed the fact cannot be so, if it be true that the very first person banished under the Kleisthenean ostracism was a person named Hipparchus, a kinsman of Pei-

sistratus (Androtion, Fr. 5, ed. Didot; Harpokration, v. Ἰππάρχος); and this latter circumstance depends upon evidence better than that of Andokidês. That there were a party in Attica attached to the Peisistratids I do not doubt. But that they were "a powerful party" (as Dr. Thirlwall imagines), I see nothing to show; and the extraordinary vigour and unanimity of the Athenian people under the Kleisthenean constitution will go far to prove that such could not have been the case.

I will add another reason to evince how completely Andokidês misconceives the history of Athens between 510–480 B.C. He says that when the Peisistratids were put down, many of their partisans were banished, many others allowed to stay at home with the loss of their political privileges; but that afterwards when the overwhelming dangers of the Persian invasion supervened, the people passed a vote to restore the exiles and to remove the existing disfranchisements at home. He would thus have us believe that the exiled partisans of the Peisistratids were all restored, and the disfranchised partisans of the Peisistratids all enfranchised, just at the moment of the Persian invasion, and with the view of enabling Athens better to repel that grave danger. This is nothing less than a glaring mistake; for the first Persian invasion was undertaken with the express view of restoring Hippias, and with the presence of Hippias himself at Marathon; while the second Persian invasion was also brought on in part by the instigation of his family. Persons who had remained in exile or in a state of disfranchisement down to that time, in consequence of their attachment to the Peisistratids, could not in common prudence be called into action at the moment of peril to help in repelling Hippias himself. It is very true that the exiles and the disfranchised were re-admitted, shortly before the invasion of Xerxês, and under the then pressing calamities of the state. But these persons were not philo-Peisistratids; they were a number gradually accumulated from the sentences of exile and (atimy or) disfranchisement every year passed at Athens. These were punishments applied by the Athenian law to various crimes and public omissions—the persons so sentenced were not politically disaffected, and their aid would then be of use in defending the state against a foreign enemy.

In regard to "the exception of the family of Peisistratus from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times," I will also remark, that in the decree of amnesty there is no mention of them by name, nor any special exception made against them: among a list of various categories excepted, those are named "who have been condemned to death or exile either as murderers or as despots" (*ἡ σφαγῆς ἢ τυραννίδος*, Andokid. c. 13). It is by no means certain that the *descendants* of Peisistratus would be comprised in this exception, which mentions only the person himself condemned; but even if this were otherwise, the exception is a mere continuance of similar words of exception in the old Solonian law, anterior to Peisistratus; and therefore affords no indication of particular feeling against the Peisistratids.

Andokidēs is a useful authority for the politics of Athens in his own time

(between 420–390 B.C.), but in regard to the previous history of Athens between 510–480 B.C., his assertions are so loose, confused, and unscrupulous, that he is a witness of no value. The mere circumstance noted by Valckenaer, that he has confounded together Marathon and Salamis, would be sufficient to show this. But when we add to such genuine ignorance his mention of his two great-grandfathers in prominent and victorious leadership, which it is hardly credible that they could ever have occupied—when we recollect that the facts which he alleges to have preceded and accompanied the expulsion of the Peisistratids are not only at variance with those stated by Herodotus, but so contrived as to found a factitious analogy for the cause which he is himself pleading—we shall hardly be able to acquit him of something worse than ignorance in his deposition.

CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS.—REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

WITH Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which he and his father before him had leaned for defence as well as for enforcement of authority. Kleomenês with his Lacedæmonian forces retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences, between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms of the Solonian constitution. The nine archons, and the probouleutic or preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings of the people—or rather of such portion of the people as was comprised in the gentes, phratries, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued to subsist—but all within the tether and subservient to the purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number as real master, among the chief administrators, and always retained possession of the acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and reality. There appeared again, what Attica had not known for thirty years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as leaders—on one side, Isagoras son of Tisander, a person of illustrious descent—on the other, Kleisthenês the Alkmæônid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the

State of
Athens after
the expulsion
of Hippias.

Opposing
party-
leaders—
Kleisthenês
—Isagoras.

dethroned despots. In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenês had the worst of it, and in consequence of this defeat (says the historian), "he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from everything."¹ His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy: it was a real and important revolution.

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families—the gentes and the phratries. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers. Moreover they tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where immigrants would commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenês, breaking down the existing wall of privilege, imparted the political franchise to the excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old. For the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling which in the existing state of the Greek mind could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers. It could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly Kleisthenês abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves.² Putting

Democratical
revolution
headed by
Kleisthenês.

Re-arrange-
ment and
extension of
the political
franchise.
Formation
of ten new
tribes, in-
cluding an
increased
number of
the popula-
tion.

¹ Herodot. v. 66–69. ἐσπούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται—ὥς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, πρότερον ἀπωσμένον πάντων, τότε πρὸς τὴν ἐωυτοῦ μοῖρην προσεθήκατο, etc.

Κλεισθένης—πολλοὺς ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους.

Several able critics, and Dr. Thirlwall among the number, consider this passage as affording no sense, and assume some conjectural emendation to be in-

² Aristot. Polit. iii. 1, 10; vi. 2, 11.

out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes: Kleisthenês, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities,¹ deriving their names from the four sons of Ion—just as his grandfather the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sikyôn. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians,² and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence.

But the scope of Kleisthenês was something far more extensive. He abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic, but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies. And, indeed, if we study the circumstances of the case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding. For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may be very sure, therefore, that both the Senate of Four Hundred and the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to be of little public estimation, and were

dispensable; though there is no particular emendation which suggests itself as pre-eminently plausible. Under these circumstances, I rather prefer to make the best of the words as they stand; which, though unusual, seem to me not absolutely inadmissible. The expression *ξένος μέτοικος* (which is a perfectly good one, as we find in Aristoph. Equit. 347—*εἶπου δικιδίον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου*) may be considered as the correlative to *δούλους μετοίκους*—the last word being construed both with *δούλους* and with *ξένους*. I apprehend that there always must have been in Attica a certain number of intelligent slaves living apart from their masters (*χωρὶς οἰκούντες*), in a state between slavery and

freedom, working partly on condition of a fixed payment to him, partly for themselves, and perhaps continuing to pass nominally as slaves after they had bought their liberty by instalments. Such men would be *δούλοι μέτοικοι*: indeed there are cases in which *δούλοι* signifies *freedmen* (Meier, *De Gentilitate Atticâ*, p. 6): they must have been industrious and pushing men, valuable partisans to a political revolution. See K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alterth.* ch. 111. not. 15.

¹ Herodot. v. 69. *Κλεισθένης—ὑπεριδὼν Ἴωνας, ἵνα μὴ σφισι αἱ αὐταὶ ἔωσι φυλαὶ καὶ Ἴωσι.*

² Such a disposition seems evident in Herodot. i. 143.

probably attended only by a few partisans. Under such circumstances, the difference between qualified citizens and men not so qualified—between members of the four old tribes and men not members—became during this period practically effaced. This in fact was the only species of good which a Grecian despotism ever seems to have done. It confounded the privileged and the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate and the public assembly regained their efficiency; but had they been continued on the old footing, including none but members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been re-invested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If in addition we consider the political excitement of the moment—the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile—the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms by the corruption of which the despot had reigned—we shall see that prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Kleisthenês had learnt some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenês may have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it formed the ground of quarrel (and no other ground is mentioned) between him and Isagoras. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in the existing senate and public assembly, to prevent it from being carried without an actual appeal to the people. His opposition to it, moreover, is not difficult to understand; for necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, not of gentes—of fellow-demots, not of fellow-gentiles. It thus broke up those associations, re-

Grounds of
opposition to
it in ancient
Athenian
feeling.

ligious, social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome who composed the *gentes* and *curiæ*—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations—formed for a long time two separate and opposing fractions in the same city, each with its own separate organisation. Only by slow degrees did the plebs gain ground, while the political value of the patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the plebeian tribe. So to, in the Italian and German cities of the middle ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into wealth and importance.¹ But the reform of Kleisthenês effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots. The Athenian people, politically considered, thus became one homogeneous whole, distributed for convenience into parts, numerical, local, and politically equal. It is however to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the *gentes* and *phratries* which composed them were left untouched, continuing to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called—Erechthêis, Ægêis, Pandionis, Leontis, Akamantis, Cênêis, Kekerôpis, Hippothontis, Æantis, Antiochis; names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend. This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B.C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetrias, afterwards designated anew by the names of Ptolemais and Attalis: the mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings, and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes—cantons, parishes, or townships—in Attica. But the total

¹ In illustration of what is here stated, see the account of the modifications of the constitution of Zurich, in Blüntschli, Staats und Rechts Geschichte der Stadt Zurich, Look iii. ch. 2. p. 322; also, Kortüm, Entstehungs Geschichte der Freistädtischen Bünde im Mittelalter, ch. 5. p. 74-75.

number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for though we know that in the time of Polemô (the third century B.C.) it was one hundred and seventy-four, we cannot be sure that it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenês at first recognised exactly one hundred demes, distributed in equal proportion among his ten tribes.¹ Such construction of the words however is more than doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the change of number had been so considerable as the difference between one hundred and one hundred and seventy-four, some positive evidence of it would probably be found—partly because Kleisthenês would indeed have a motive to render the amount of citizen population nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal, in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes, as found or modified by Kleisthenês, to have subsisted afterwards with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of the tribes.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain, and more important to notice. The demes which Kleisthenês assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other: and therefore the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of the factions arising out of neighbourhood will appear to have been more especially necessary, when we recollect that the quarrels of the Paralî, the Diakrii, the Pediaki, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented

Demes belonging to each tribe usually not adjacent to each other.

¹ Herodot. v. 69. δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένευε εἰς τὰς φυλάς.

Schömann contends that Kleisthenês established exactly one hundred demes to the ten tribes (De Comitibus Atheniensium, Præf. p. xv. and page 363, and Antiquitat. Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxii. p. 260), and K. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats Alt. ch. 111) thinks that this is what Herodotus meant to affirm, though he does not believe the fact to have really stood so.

There is a difficulty in the construction of these words—δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένευε εἰς τὰς φυλάς. In my former edition, I followed many com-

mentators, in joining δέκα with φυλάς; which, though it brings out the sense required, is embarrassing from the position of the words. Mr. Scott (of Trinity College, Cambridge) has pointed out what seems a better construction, bringing out the same sense. He joins δέκα, not with φυλάς, but with κατένευε, upon the analogy of various passages—Xenophon. Cyropæd. vii. 5, 3. τὸ στράτευμα κατένειμε δώδεκα μέρη—Plato, Politicus. p. 283 D. διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη—Herodotus, vii. 121. τρεῖς μοίρας ὁ Ξέρξης δασάμενος πάντα τὸν πέζον στρατὸν—and various other passages.

by individual ambition. Moreover it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe. Kleisthenês distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes; while Peiræus and Phalêrum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest.¹ Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aggregate of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears apart from the whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honour of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice:² and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian government, we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions—a capital amendment, compared with the disputes of the preceding century, and traceable in part to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property, its public meetings and religious cere-

Arrange-
ments and
functions of
the deme.

¹ The deme *Melité* belonged to the tribe Kekropis; *Kollytus*, to the tribe Ægêis; *Kydathenæon*, to the tribe Pandionis; *Kerameis*, or *Kerameikus*, to the Akamantis; *Skumbônida*, to the Leontis.

All these five were demes within the city of Athens, and all belonged to different tribes.

Peiræus belonged to the Hippothoëntis; *Phalêrum*, to the Æantis; *Xypetê*, to the Kekropis; *Thymetadæ*, to the Hippothoëntis. These four demes, adjoining to each other, formed a sort of quadruple local union, for festivals and other purposes, among themselves; though three of them belonged to different tribes.

See the list of the Attic demes, with a careful statement of their localities in so far as ascertained, in Professor Ross, *Die Deme von Attika*, Halle 1846. The distribution of the city-demes, and

of Peiræus and Phalêrum, among different tribes, appears to me a clear proof of the intention of the original distributors. It shows that they wished from the beginning to make the demes constituting each tribe discontinuous, and that they desired to prevent both the growth of separate tribe-interests and ascendancy of one tribe over the rest: it contradicts the belief of those who suppose that the tribe was at first composed of continuous demes, and that the breach of continuity arose from subsequent changes.

Of course there were many cases in which adjoining demes belonged to the same tribe; but not one of the ten tribes was made up altogether of adjoining demes.

² See Boëckh, *Corp. Inscriptt.* No. 85, 128, 213, &c.

monies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens¹ was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged, in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature.² So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute,³ under the Kleisthenean system, for the Naukraries under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The Trittyes and Naukraries, though nominally preserved, and the latter augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Kleisthenês preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly or Ekklesia—the pre-considering senate composed of members from all the tribes—and the habit of annual election, as well as annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the Ekklesia. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such pre-existing institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Kleisthenean Ekklesia acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually-changed senate, instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian

Solonian constitution preserved with modifications.

¹ We may remark that this register was called by a special name, the Lexiarchic register; while the primitive register of phrators and gentiles always retained, even in the time of the orators, its original name of *the common register*.—Harpokration, v. Κοινὸν γραμματεῖον καὶ λεξιαρχικόν.

² See Schömann, *Antiq. Jur. P. Græc.* ch. xxiv. The oration of Demosthenês

against Eubulidês is instructive about these proceedings of the assembled demots: compare Harpokration, v. Διαψήφισις, and Meier, *De Bonis Damnatorum*, ch. xii. p. 78, &c.

³ Aristot. *Fragment. de Republ.*, ed. Neumann—*Ἀθην. πολιτ.* Fr. 40. p. 88; Schol. ad Aristophan. *Ran.* 37; Harpokration, v. Δήμαρχος—Ναυκραρικά; Photius, v. *Ναυκραρία*.

democracy: moreover the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved) of determining the names of the senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual senate, so it transformed no less directly the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes—each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen. Moreover there were now created, for the first time, ten *stratêgi* or generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon or polemarch, no *stratêgi* then existing. Even after the *stratêgi* had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution, the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with them—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten *stratêgi*, but even occupied the post of honour on the right wing.¹ The ten generals, annually changed, are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by this remodelling of the military force. The functions of the generals became more extensive as the democracy advanced, so that they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the *stratêgi* on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency, on the other side, by the rise of the popular *dikasteries* or numerous jury-courts. We may be sure that these popular *dikasteries* had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the Peisistratids, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a

¹ Herodot. vi. 109–111.

nominal responsibility of the latter, at the end of their year of office, to an acquiescent Ekklesia. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature (over and above this annual trial of responsibility) had been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to Kleisthenês, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate Heliæa, not less than as voters in the Ekklesia—and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or pannels for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematised; until at length, in the time of Periklês, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot particularise the different steps whereby such final development was attained, and whereby the judicial competence of the archon was cut down to the mere power of inflicting a small fine. But the first steps of it are found in the revolution of Kleisthenês, and it seems to have been consummated after the battle of Plataea. Of the function exercised by the nine archons, as well as by many other magistrates and official persons at Athens, in convoking a dikastery or jury-court, bringing on causes for trial, and presiding over the trial—a function constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the Hegemony or presidency of a dikastery—I shall speak more at length hereafter. At present I wish merely to bring to view the increased and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the memorable turn of affairs now before us.

The judicial assembly of citizens—or Heliæa—subsequently divided into bodies judging apart. The political assembly, or Ekklesia.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military. The appointment of magistrates and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. A board of ten, called Apodektæ, were invested with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed, receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them under competent authority. Of

Financial arrangements.

this board the first nomination is expressly ascribed to Kleisthenês,¹ as a substitute for certain persons called Kôlakretæ, who had performed the same function before and who were now retained only for subordinate services. The duties of the Apodektæ were afterwards limited to receiving the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of the goddess Athênê, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated arrangement cannot be referred to

Senate of
Five Hun-
dred.

Kleisthenês. From his time forward too, the Senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the Ekklesia. It embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays. The year is distributed into ten portions called Prytanies—the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of The Prytanês: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually determined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year of twelve lunar months, or 354 days, six of the prytanes contained thirty-five days, four of them contained thirty-six: in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover a farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days each, and of the fifty tribe-senators into five bodies of ten each, was recognised. Each body of ten presided in the senate for one period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for a new chairman called Epistatês, to whom during his day of office were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together with the city seal. The remaining senators, not belonging to the prytanising tribe, might of course attend if they chose. But the attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and to ensure a constant representation of the collective people.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the Ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required—usually by the senate, though the stratêgi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by the prytanes, and questions were put to

Ekklesia, or
political
assembly.

¹ Harpokration, v. Ἀποδέκται.

the vote by their Epistatês or chairman. But the nine representatives of the non-prytanising tribes were always present as a matter of course, and seem indeed in the days of the orators to have acquired to themselves the direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for the vote¹—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes. When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the Ekklesia, as first organised by Kleisthenês (I have already remarked that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice between 400-330 B.C. had been always the practice), it will appear probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and no more; giving to the senate and the stratêgi power of convening special meetings if needful, but establishing one Ekklesia during each prytany, or ten in the year, as a regular necessity of state. How often the ancient Ekklesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Peisistratus, we cannot exactly say—probably but seldom during the year. Under the Peisistratids, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality. Hence the re-establishment of it by Kleisthenês, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the Ekklesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men were thus trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiarised with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This was an idea new to the Athenian bosom. With it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law—words which no Athenian citizen ever afterwards heard unmoved: together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one and indivisible, which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal specialties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction

¹ See the valuable treatise of Schömann, *De Comitibus, passim*; also his *Antiq. Jur. Publ. Gr. ch. xxxi.*; Harpokration, v. *Κυρία Ἐκκλησία*; Pollux, viii. 95.

Kleisthenês
the real
author of
the Athenian
democracy.

against the Peisistratids, but still more by the fact that the opposing leader, Kleisthenês, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and the Ekklesia are both Solonian—but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic proportions. How vigorous was the burst of Athenian enthusiasm, altering instantaneously the position of Athens among the powers of Greece, we shall hear presently from the lips of Herodotus, and shall find still more unequivocally marked in the facts of his history.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their Ekklesia, who received from Kleisthenês the real attributes of sovereignty—it was by him also that the people were first called into direct action as dikasts or jurors. I have already remarked that this custom may be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of Solon, since that lawgiver invested the popular assembly with the power of pronouncing the judgement of accountability upon the archons after their year of office. Here again the building, afterwards so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation, though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dikasteries, in the elaborate form in which they existed from Periklês downward, were introduced all at once by Kleisthenês, it is impossible to believe. Yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem, that at first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed bearing the name of the Heliæa, or Heliasts; private offences and disputes between man and man being still determined by individual magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still residing in the Senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that this was the state of things established by Kleisthenês, which afterwards came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial duty gradually accruing to the Heliasts, so that it was necessary to subdivide the collective Heliæa.

Judicial
attributes of
the people
—their gra-
dual enlarge-
ment.

According to the subdivision, as practised in the times best known, 6000 citizens above thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole number, 600 from each of the ten tribes: 5000 of these citizens were arranged in ten pannels or decuries of 500 each, the remaining 1000 being reserved to fill up vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole 6000 took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words; after which every man received a ticket inscribed with his own name as well as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or crimes ripe for trial, the Thesmothets or six inferior archons determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to the number wanted—next, in which court, or under the presidency of what magistrate, the decury B or E should sit, so that it could not be known beforehand in what cause each would be judge. In the number of persons who actually attended and sat, however, there seems to have been much variety, and sometimes two decuries sat together.¹ The arrangement here described, we must recollect, is given to us as belonging to those times when the dikasts received a regular pay, after every day's sitting; and it can hardly have long continued without that condition, which was not realised before the time of Periklês. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature was called *the Heliaea*—a name which belongs properly to the collective assembly of the people; this collective assembly having been itself the original judicature. I conceive that the practice of distributing this collective assembly or *Heliaea* into sections of jurors for judicial duty, may have begun under one form or another soon after the reform of Kleisthenês, since the direct interference of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But it could only have been matured by degrees into

¹ See in particular on this subject the treatise of Schömann, *De Sortitione Judicum* (Gripswald, 1820), and the work of the same author, *Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc.* ch. 49–55. p. 264 *seqq.*; also Heffter, *Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung*, part ii. ch. 2. p. 51 *seqq.*; Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, p. 127–135.

The views of Schömann respecting the sortition of the Athenian jurors have been bitterly attacked, but in no way refuted, by F. V. Fritzsche (*De Sortitione Judicum apud Athenienses Commentatio*, Leipsic, 1835).

Two or three of these dikastic tickets, marking the name and the deme of the citizen, and the letter of the decury to

which during that particular year he belonged, have been recently dug up near Athens:—

Δ. Διόδωρος	E. Δεινίας
Φρεάριος.	Ἀλαϊεύς.
(Boëckh, <i>Corp. Inscrp.</i> No. 207, 208.)	

Fritzsche (p. 73) considers these to be tickets of senators, not of dikasts; contrary to all probability.

For the Heliastic oath, and its remarkable particulars, see Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. p. 746. See also Aristophanês, *Plutus*, 277 (with the valuable Scholia, though from different hands and not all of equal correctness) and 972; *Ekklesiazusæ*, 678 *seq.*

that constant and systematic service which the pay of Periklês called forth at last in completeness. Under the last-mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon or polemarch withdrawn from all military functions. But this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the stratêgi, but enjoyed a sort of pre-eminence over them: nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeidês was archon—for the magisterial decisions of Aristeidês formed one of the principal foundations of his honourable surname, the Just.¹

With this question as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Kleisthenês in the popular dikastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law; relating, first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon—next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that in the time of Periklês, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot—moreover all citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the Dokimasy, or legal examination into their status of citizen and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery, and presidency over it when afterwards assembled, together with the power of imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders. Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas, was that it equalised the chance of office between rich and poor: but so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor. In fact, it would be less democratical than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself.² Again, choice

Three points in Athenian constitutional law, hanging together:—Universal admissibility of citizens—Choice by lot—Reduced functions of the magistrates chosen by lot.

¹ Plutarch, Arist. 7; Herodot. vi. 109–111.

² Aristotle puts these two together; election of magistrates by the mass of the citizens, but only out of persons possessing a high pecuniary qualifica-

tion: this he ranks as the least democratical democracy, if one may use the phrase (Politic. iii. 6–11), or a mean between democracy and oligarchy—an ἀριστοκρατία or πολιτεία in his sense of the word (iv. 7, 3). He puts the em-

by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed only by a few, were indispensable—nor was it ever applied throughout the whole history of democratical Athens, to the stratêgi or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain, that at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular dikasts or to the ten elected stratêgi: so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity—at least there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; while the Dokimasy excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. Periklês,¹ though chosen stratêgus year after year successively, was never archon; and it may be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations² it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labour, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who

ployment of the lot as a 'symptom of decisive and extreme democracy, such as would never tolerate a pecuniary qualification of eligibility.

So again Plato (Legg. iii. p. 692), after remarking that the legislator of Sparta first provided the senate, next the ephors, as a bridle upon the kings, says of the ephors that they were "something nearly approaching to an authority emanating from the lot"—*οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δύναμews*.

Upon which passage there are some good remarks in Schömann's edition of Plutarch's Lives of Agis and Kleomenês (Comment. ad Ag. c. 8. p. 119). It is to be recollected that the actual mode in which the Spartan ephors were chosen, as I have already stated in my first volume, cannot be clearly made out, and has been much debated by critics:—

"Mihi hæc verba, quum illud quidem manifestum faciant, quod etiam aliunde constat, sorte captos ephoros non esse, tum hoc alterum, quod Hermannus statuit, creationem sortitioni non absimilem fuisse, nequaquam demonstrare vi-

dentur. Nimirum nihil aliud nisi prope accedere ephorum magistratus ad eos dicitur, qui sortito capiantur. *Sortitis autem magistratibus hoc maxime proprium est, ut promiscue—non ex genere, censu, dignitate—a quolibet capi possint: quum obrem quum ephori quoque fere promiscue fierent ex omni multitudine civium, poterat haud dubie magistratus eorum ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δύναμews esse dici, etiamsi αἵρετοὶ essent—h. e. suffragiis creati. Et video Lachmannum quoque p. 165. not. 1. de Platonis loco similiter judicare."*

The employment of the lot, as Schömann remarks, implies universal admissibility of all citizens to office: though the converse does not hold good—the latter does not of necessity imply the former. Now as we know that universal admissibility did not become the law of Athens until after the battle of Plataea, so we may conclude that the employment of the lot had no place before that epoch—i. e. had no place under the constitution of Kleisthenês.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9–16.

² See a passage about such characters in Plato, Republic, v. p. 475 B.

might have given offence to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable, either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the Dokimasy before, and accountability after office. This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favour at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalise the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the state—without applying it to all or to the most responsible and difficult. Hardly would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning offenders.

I think therefore that these three points—1. The opening of the post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; 2. The choice of archons by lot; 3. The diminished range of the archon's duties and responsibilities, through the extension of those belonging to the popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the stratêgi on the other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the other two, and probably coming a little before them.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us¹ that the oligarchical,² but high-principled, Aristeidês was himself the proposer of this constitutional change, shortly after the battle of Plataea, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind that rich and poor have been so completely equalised as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle; nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with

¹ Plutarch, Arist. 22.

² So at least the supporters of the constitution of Kleisthenês were called by the contemporaries of Periklês.

freshly-kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really "common" to all, and that the archons, *stratêgi*, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility.¹ No mention is made of the lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us, that down to the invasion of Xerxês, not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or *Thêtic* class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens—not taken by lot. Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war and the oligarchy of Thirty; but we thus learn that Kleisthenês in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least. He recognised the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices—such as the archon, the *stratêgus*, &c. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. For his constitution gave to the collective bodies—senate, *ekklesia*, and *heliæa* or *dikastery*—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined. And we may well suppose that the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates—especially since many of the newly-enfranchised citizens had been before metics and slaves. Indeed it is to be added, that even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history.²

Constitution of Kleisthenês retained the Solonian law of exclusion as to individual office.

¹ Plutarch, *Arist. ut sup. γράφει ψήφισμα, κοινήν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι.*

² So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth century, the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state,

even after those offices had come to be elected by the people. The habitual misrule and oppression of the nobles gradually put an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the twelfth century, the twelve consuls with the *Podestat* possessed all the powers of

The choice of the stratêgi remained ever afterwards upon the footing on which Aristeidês thus placed it; but the lot for the choice of archon must have been introduced shortly after his proposition of universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of democratical feeling—introduced as a farther corrective, because the poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was nevertheless not elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution of the *Helîæa*, or aggregate body of dikasts or jurors, into separate pannels or dikasteries for the decision of judicial matters, was first regularised. It was this change that stole away from the archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was this change that Periklês more fully consummated by ensuring pay to the dikasts.

But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of Plataea. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of Kleisthenês. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Periklês to Demosthenês, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution:¹—1. It still recognised the archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon or polemarch as joint military commander along with the stratêgi. 2. It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot.²

government: these consuls were nominated by one hundred electors chosen by and among the people. Sismondi observes—"Cependant le peuple imposa lui-même à ces électeurs, la règle fondamentale de choisir tous les magistrats dans le corps de la noblesse. Ce n'étoit point encore la possession des magistratures que l'on contestoit aux gentils-hommes: on demandoit seulement qu'ils fussent les mandataires immédiats de la nation. Mais plus d'une fois, en dépit du droit incontestable des citoyens, les consuls regnant s'attribuèrent l'élection de leurs successeurs." (Sismondi, *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes*, chap. xii. vol. ii. p. 240.)

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 15. τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθένους ἐγείρειν ἀριστοκρατίαν πειρωμένου: compare, Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 2, and *Isokratês*, *Areopagiticus*, Or. vii. p. 143, p. 192 ed. Bek.

² Herodotus speaks of Kallimachus the Polemarch at Marathon as ὁ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχὼν Πολέμαρχος (vi. 110).

I cannot but think that in this case he transfers to the year 490 B.C. the practice of his own time. The polemarch at the time of the battle of Marathon was in a certain sense the first stratêgus; and the stratêgi were never taken by lot, but always chosen by show of hands, even to the end of the democracy. It seems impossible to believe that the stratêgi were elected, and that the polemarch, at the time when his functions were the same as theirs, was chosen by lot.

Herodotus seems to have conceived the choice of magistrates by lot as being of the essence of a democracy (Herodot. iii. 80).

Plutarch also (*Periklês*, c. 9) seems to have conceived the choice of archons

3. It still excluded the fourth class of the Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far—that whereas Solon had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (the *Pentakosio-medimni*) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenês opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that Aristeidês, assuredly not a rich man, became archon. I am also inclined to believe that the senate of Five Hundred as constituted by Kleisthenês was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes—and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty senators all at once by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valuable; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover the office of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock therefore to the feelings of semi-democratised Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty *prytanes*, would be less than if they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that of Kleisthenês is to be found in the position of the senate of Areopagus. Under the former, that senate had been

*Senate of
Areopagus.*

by lot as a very ancient institution of Athens: nevertheless it results from the first chapter of his life of Aristeidês—an obscure chapter, in which conflicting authorities are mentioned without being well discriminated—that Aristeidês was chosen archon by the people—not drawn by lot: an additional reason for believing this is, that he was archon in the year following the battle of Marathon, at which he had been one of the ten generals. Idomeneus distinctly affirmed this to be the fact—*οὐ κινάμεντον, ἀλλ' ἐλομένων Ἀθηναίων* (Plutarch, *Arist.* c. 1).

Isokratês also (*Areopagit.* Or. vii. p. 144, p. 195 ed. Bekker) conceived the constitution of Kleisthenês as including all the three points noticed in the text:—1. A high pecuniary qualification of eligibility for individual offices. 2. Election to these offices by all the citizens, and accountability to the same after office. 3. No employment of the

lot.—He even contends that this election is more truly democratical than sortition; since the latter process might admit men attached to oligarchy, which would not happen under the former—*ἔπειτα καὶ δημοτικωτέραν ἐνόμιζον ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ λαγχάνειν γιγνομένην· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ κληρώσει τὴν τύχην βραβεύσειν, καὶ πολλάκις λήψεσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, &c.* This would be a good argument if there were no pecuniary qualification for eligibility—such pecuniary qualification is a provision which he lays down, but which he does not find it convenient to insist upon emphatically.

I do not here advert to the *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, the *νομοφύλακες*, and the sworn *νομόθεται*—all of them institutions belonging to the time of Periklês at the earliest; not to that of Kleisthenês.

the principal body in the state, and Solon had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy and kept down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as during the preceding thirty years every archon had been a creature of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Kleisthenês and his partisans—perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. Now during this important interval, the new-modelled senate of Five Hundred and the popular assembly stepped into that ascendancy which they never afterwards lost. From the time of Kleisthenês forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state. Yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Platæa, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B.C.) were all elected by the ekklesia, not chosen by lot—and that the fourth or poorest and most numerous class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests, of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Periklês and Ephialtês, in times when portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenês, yet remains to be noticed—the ostracism; upon which I have already made some remarks¹ in touching upon the memorable Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. It is hardly too much to say, that without this protective process none of the other institutions would have reached maturity.

By the ostracism a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defence, for a term of ten years—subsequently diminished to five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputa-

¹ See above, chap. xi.

tion tainted ; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise ;¹ and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, the conspiracy between Nikias and Alkibiadês fixed it upon Hyperbolus : the two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracising vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other ; but before the day arrived, they accommodated their own quarrel. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony : “ it was not against such men as him (said the comic writer Plato²) that the shell was intended to be used.” The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell or potsherd the name of the person whom a citizen

¹ Aristeidês Rhetor, Orat. xlvi. vol. ii. p. 317, ed. Dindorf.

² Plutarch (Nikias, c. 11; Alkibiad. c. 13; Aristeid. c. 7): Thucyd. viii. 73. Plato Comicus said respecting Hyperbolus—

Οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων οὔτεκ' ὄστραχ' ἠνέβη.

Theophrastus had stated that Phæax, and not Nikias, was the rival of Alkibiadês on this occasion when Hyperbolus was ostracised ; but most authors (says Plutarch) represent Nikias as the person. It is curious that there should be any difference of statement about a fact so notorious, and in the best-known time of Athenian history.

Taylor thinks that the oration which now passes as that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês, is really by Phæax, and was read by Plutarch, as the oration of Phæax in an actual contest of ostracism between Phæax, Nikias, and Alkibiadês. He is opposed by Ruhken and Valckenaer (see Sluiter's preface to that oration, c. 1, and Ruhnken, Hist. Critic. Oratt. Græcor. p. 135). I cannot agree with either: I cannot think with him, that it is a real oration of Phæax; nor with them, that it is a real oration in any genuine cause of ostracism whatever. It appears to me to have been composed after the ostracism had fallen into desuetude, and when the Athenians had not only become somewhat ashamed of it, but had lost the familiar conception of what it really was. For how otherwise can we explain the fact, that the author of that oration complains that he is about to be ostracised without any secret voting, in which the very

essence of the ostracism consisted, and from which its name was borrowed (*οὔτε διαψηφισαμένων κρυβδῆν*, c. 2)? His oration is framed as if the audience whom he was addressing were about to ostracise one out of the three by show of hands. But the process of ostracising included no meeting and haranguing—nothing but simple deposit of the shells or sherds in a cask; as may be seen by the description of the special railing-in of the agora, and by the story (true or false) of the unlettered country-citizen coming in to the city to give his vote, and asking Aristeidês, without even knowing his person, to write the name for him on the shell (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 7). There was indeed previous discussion in the senate as well as in the ekklesia, whether a vote of ostracism should be entered upon at all; but the author of the oration to which I allude does not address himself to *that* question; he assumes that the vote is actually about to be taken, and that one of the three—himself, Nikias, or Alkibiadês—must be ostracised (c. 1). Now, doubtless, in practice the decision commonly lay between two formidable rivals; but it was not publicly or formally put so before the people: every citizen might write upon the shell such name as he chose. Farther, the open denunciation of the injustice of ostracism as a system (c. 2), proves an age later than the banishment of Hyperbolus. Moreover the author having begun by remarking that he stands in contest with Nikias as well as with Alkibiadês, says nothing more about Nikias to the end of the speech.

thought it prudent for a time to banish ; which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote towards the sentence.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak—the good as well as the bad—the democratical, the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded by his mercenary troop. Accordingly, no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by direct aid of the people in support of the government ; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was therefore of the greatest possible moment. Now a despot or an oligarchy might exercise at pleasure preventive means,¹ much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon, mentioned in my last chapter as directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defence as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Kleisthenês, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum. But we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere, absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any constitution. Their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megaklês, Lykurgus, and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances

Weakness
of the public
force in the
Grecian go-
vernments.

Past vio-
lences of the
Athenian
nobles.

¹ See the discussion of the ostracism in Aristot. Politic. iii. 8, where he recognises the problem as one common to all governments.

Compare also a good Dissertation—J. A. Paradys, De Ostracismo Athenien-

sium, Lugduni Batavor. 1793 ; K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer, ch. 130 ; and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxxv. p. 233.

of the latter ; and though Kleisthenês, the son of Megaklês, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution, he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. "If the Athenians were wise (Aristeidês is reported to have said,¹ in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistoklês), they would cast both Themistoklês and me into the barathrum."² And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Koryræan sedition, in the third book of Thucydidês, together with the reflections of the historian upon it,³ will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenês had to protect the democratical constitution—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support ; next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution. To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good will, but kindle the passionate attachment, of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality—a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of

Necessity of creating a constitutional morality.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 3.

² The barathrum was a deep pit, said to have had iron spikes at the bottom, into which criminals condemned to death were sometimes cast. Though probably an ancient Athenian punishment, it seems to have become at the very least extremely rare, if not entirely disused, during the times of Athens

historically known to us; but the phrase continued in speech after the practice had become obsolete. The iron spikes depend on the evidence of the Schol. Aristophan. Plutus, 431—a very doubtful authority, when we read the legend which he blends with his statement.

³ Thucyd. iii. 70, 81, 82.

action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint—of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss Cantons; while the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendancy for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the state to the full licence of pacific criticism.

Purpose and working of the ostracism. At the epoch of Kleisthenês, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the regifuge at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians—he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens. But from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected. Accordingly, Kleisthenês had to find the means of eliminating beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterwards, with all that bloodshed and

reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous under democratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes. Now the security which Kleisthenês provided, was, to call in the positive judgement of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of *privilegium* (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies, not a peculiar favour granted to any one, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well-defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. “No law shall be made against any single citizen, without the same being made against *all* Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to 6000 citizens voting secretly.”¹ Such was that general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure.² If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell or a potsherd with the name of the person written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day the number of votes were summed up, and if 6000 votes were found to have been given against any

¹ Andokidês, *De Mysteriis*, p. 12. c. 13. Μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ’ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις· εἰ μὴ ἐξακισχιλίοις δόξῃ, κρυβδὴν ψηφισομένοις. According to the usual looseness in dealing with the name of Solon, this has been called a law of Solon (see Petit. *Leg. Att.* p. 188), though it certainly cannot be older than Kleisthenês.

“Privilegia ne irroganto,” said the law of the Twelve Tables at Rome (Cicero, *Legg.* iii. 4–19).

² Aristotle and Philochorus, ap. Photium, *App.* p. 672 and 675, ed. Porson.

It would rather appear by that passage that the ostracism was never formally abrogated; and that even in the later times, to which the description of Aristotle refers, the form was still preserved of putting the question whether the public safety called for an ostracising vote, long after it had passed both out of use and out of mind.

one person, that person was ostracised; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing.¹ Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extra popular or privileged few. Nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgement of the people (so the Athenians felt), there was no appeal. Their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgement with the best securities for rectitude, and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when I come to speak of the working of their mature democracy. Meanwhile in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy—the vote of ostracism—it will be found that the securities devised by Kleisthenês, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy. Now the large minimum of votes required (one-fourth of the entire citizen population) went far to ensure this effect—the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a

¹ Philochorus, *ut supra*; Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 7; Schol. ad Aristophan. Equit. 851; Pollux, viii. 19.

There is a difference of opinion among the authorities, as well as among the expositors, whether the minimum of 6000 applies to the votes given in all, or to the votes given against any one name. I embrace the latter opinion, which is supported by Philochorus, Pollux, and the Schol. on Aristophanês, though Plutarch countenances the former. Boëckh, in his Public Economy of Athens, and Wachsmuth (i. 1. p. 272) are in favour of Plutarch and the former opinion; Paradys (Dissertat. De Ostr. p. 25), Platner, and Heumann (see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Gr. Staats-

alt. ch. 130, not. 6) support the other, which appears to me the right one.

For the purpose, so unequivocally pronounced, of the general law determining the absolute minimum necessary for a *privilegium*, would by no means be obtained, if the simple majority of votes among 6000 voters in all, had been allowed to take effect. A person might then be ostracised with a very small number of votes against him, and without creating any reasonable presumption that he was dangerous to the constitution; which was by no means either the purpose of Kleisthenês, or the well-understood operation of the ostracism, so long as it continued to be a reality.

genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again, Kleisthenês did not permit the process of ostracising to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one without exception was exposed to the sentence ; so that the friends of Themistoklês could not invoke it against Aristeidês,¹ nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance—the precise index of that growing internecive hostility, which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the ekklesia: moreover, after all, the ekklesia did not itself ostracise, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. We must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself ; so that the citizen, in giving his ostracising vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him,—“Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the state? if so, whom?”—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice—a perversion, involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without its protective benefits.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile. This is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly it never deprived the public of candidates for poli-

¹ The practical working of the ostracism presents it as a struggle between two contending leaders, accompanied with chance of banishment to both—Periklês πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα

περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστάς, καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἐταιρείαν (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 14: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11).

tical influence: and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted—evil too diminished, in the cases of Kimon and Aristeidês, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return—two remarks will be quite sufficient to offer in the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force¹—a result, upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenês could have ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered.² To the nascent democracy, it was absolutely indispensable: to the growing, yet militant, democracy, it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, was the last occasion of its employment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiadês) to turn to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a manœuvre have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenês and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism:

¹ It is not necessary in this remark to take notice, either of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, or of that of Thirty, called the Thirty Tyrants, established during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, and after the ostracism had been discontinued. Neither of these changes were brought about by the excessive ascendancy of any one or few men: both of them grew out of the embarrassments and dangers of Athens in the latter period of her great foreign war.

² Aristotle (Polit. iii. 8, 6) seems to recognise the political necessity of the ostracism, as applied even to obvious superiority of wealth, connexion, &c. (which he distinguishes pointedly from superiority of merit and character), and upon principles of symmetry only, even

apart from dangerous designs on the part of the superior mind. No painter (he observes) will permit a foot, in his picture of a man, to be of disproportionate size with the entire body, though separately taken it may be finely painted; nor will the chorus-master allow any one voice, however beautiful, to predominate beyond a certain proportion over the rest.

His final conclusion is, however, that the legislator ought, if possible, so to construct his constitution, as to have no need of such exceptional remedy; but if this cannot be done, then the second-best step is to apply the ostracism. Compare also v. 2, 5.

The last century of the free Athenian democracy realised the first of these alternatives.

first of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled Peisistratid despots;¹ then Aristeidês, Themistoklês, Kimon, and Thucydidês son of Melêsias, all of them renowned political leaders: also Alkibiadês and Megaklês (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alkibiadês), and Kallias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens;² lastly, Damôn, the preceptor of Periklês in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy.³ In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthênes himself is said to have been ostracised under his own law, and Xanthippos; but both upon authority too weak to trust.⁴ Miltiadês was not ostracised at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

I should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar institution of Kleisthenês, if the erroneous accusations, against the Athenian democracy, of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne, numbering a certain amount of supporters, is as a matter of course excluded from the country. The duke of Bordeaux cannot now reside in France—nor could Napoleon after 1815—nor Charles Edward in England during the last century. No man treats this as any extravagant injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism—with a stronger case in favour of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy,⁵ and not from justifiable fears—an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism

Ostracism analogous to the exclusion of a known pretender to the throne in a monarchy.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Harpokration, v. Ἱππάρχος.

² Lysias cont. Alkibiad. A. c. 11. p. 143; Harpokration, v. Ἀλκιβιάδης: Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 11, 12. p. 129, 130: this last oration may afford evidence as to the facts mentioned in it, though I cannot imagine it to be either genuine or belonging to the time to which it professes to refer, as has been observed in a previous note.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4; Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 1.

⁴ Ælian, V. H. xiii. 24; Herakleidês, περὶ Πολιτειῶν, c. 1, ed. Köhler.

⁵ Plutarch, Themistoklês, 22; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 7, παραμυθία φόβου καὶ κουφισμός. See the same opinions repeated by Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, ch. 48, vol. i. p. 272, and by Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern, vol. i. p. 386.

so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed—but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Kleisthenês.

Effect of the long ascendancy of Periklês in strengthening constitutional morality.

It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity,¹ on the part both of the democracy and its best friends—fear perfectly well-grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper, the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling, that it might safely be dispensed with, must have been strengthened by the long ascendancy of Periklês—by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; and by the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thucydidês—aided by numerous partisans and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before or since—in their attempts to get him ostracised. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens towards philosophers so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damon; but Periklês himself (to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy the comic poet Kratinus²) “holds his head as high as if he carried the Odeion upon it, now that the shell has gone by”—*i. e.* now that he has escaped the ostracism. If Periklês was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damon and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracised. Both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the state—whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power, that the 6000 citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον.

² Kratinus ap. Plutarch. Periklês, c. 13.

Ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς οὐδὲ προσέρχεται

Περικλῆς, τῷδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου
ἔχων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦστρακον παροίχεται.

For the attacks of the comic writers upon Damon, see Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4.

against real danger. Such a change in the character of the persons ostracised plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dissevered from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose—it lived to be twice dishonoured—and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos,¹ at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied, as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs; for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states—the more so as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism—so the process was denominated at Syracuse.²

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty, as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthênes and the un-franchised multitude. It is to be distinguished both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterwards from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, towards the close of the career of Periklês. It was indeed a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshalled in the ranks of hoplites alongside of new companions in arms—he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown—he found the year distri-

Ostracism
in other
Grecian
cities.

Striking
effect of the
revolution of
Kleisthênes
on the minds
of the citi-
zens.

¹ Aristot. Polit. iii. 8, 4; v. 2. 5.

² Diodor. xi. 55-87. This author describes very imperfectly the Athenian ostracism, transferring to it apparently the circumstances of the Syracusan Petalism.

buted afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanes, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ekklesia at which he had a right to be present—his ekklesia was convoked and presided by senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to number and distribution—his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribemen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was, the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign Dêmos or people, apart from all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; while to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind—capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthênes and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favour, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Kleomênes and the Lacedæmonians. Kleomênês listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenês, who, as belonging to the Alkmæônid family, was supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megaklês, the destroyer of the usurper Kylôn. Kleomênês sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion “of the accursed”—so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterwards, when the same manœuvre was practised by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Periklês. This requisition, recommended by Isagoras, was so well-timed, that Kleisthenês, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily; so that Kleomênês, though arriving at Athens only with a small force, found himself

Isagoras calls
in Kleomênês
and the
Lacedæmo-
nians
against it.

master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile seven hundred families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenês. His next attempt was to dissolve the new senate of Five Hundred, and to place the whole government in the hands of three hundred adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Peisistratus, the senate of that day had not only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. Now, the new senate of Kleisthenês resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, while the citizens generally, even after the banishment of the chief Kleisthenean partisans, manifested their feelings in a way at once so hostile and so determined, that Kleomenês and Isagoras were altogether baffled. They were compelled to retire into the acropolis and stand upon the defensive. This symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned,¹ and executed by the people.

Kleomenês
and Isagoras
expelled
from Athens.

Kleisthenês, with the seven hundred exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernês, the Persian Satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance. He probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernês, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, replied that if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of submission. But their countrymen on their return disavowed them with scorn and indignation.²

Recall of
Kleisthenês
—Athens
solicits the
alliance of
the Persians.

It was at this time that the first connexion began between Athens and the little Bœotian town of Plataea, situated on the

¹ Herodot. v. 70–72: compare Schol. ad Aristophan. Lysistr. 274.

² Herodot. v. 73.

northern slope of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river Asôpus—on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this occasion that we first become acquainted with the Bœotians and their politics. In one of my preceding volumes,¹ the Bœotian federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Plataea had been (so the Thebans affirmed) their latest foundation;² it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Kleomenês was on his way back from Athens, the Plataeans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craving the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendering their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Bœotia, and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Plataeans followed. Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they despatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be resisted, and protection was promised. It was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Plataean territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favour of Plataea, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bœotian federation.³ The Thebans, finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and attacked the Athenians on their return, but sustained a complete defeat: a breach of faith which the Athenians avenged by joining to Plataea the portion of Theban territory south of the Asôpus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except the enmity of Bœotia—as Kleomenês had foreseen. Their alliance with Plataea, long-continued, and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be

¹ See part ii. ch. 3.

² Thucyd. iii. 61.

³ Herodot. vi. 108. *ἐγὼν Ὁθηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους εἰς Βοιω-*

τοὺς τελέειν. This is an important circumstance, in regard to Grecian political feeling: I shall advert to it hereafter.

found, if we except one splendid occasion,¹ productive only of

¹ Herodot. vi. 108. Thucydidēs (iii. 58), when recounting the capture of Plataea by the Lacedæmonians in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, states that the alliance between Plataea and Athens was then in its 93rd year of date; according to which reckoning it would begin in the year 519 B.C., where Mr. Clinton and other chronologers place it.

I venture to think that the immediate circumstances, as recounted in the text from Herodotus (whether Thucydidēs conceived them in the same way, cannot be determined), which brought about the junction of Plataea with Athens, cannot have taken place in 519 B.C., but must have happened *after* the expulsion of Hippias from Athens in 510 B.C.—for the following reasons:—

1. No mention is made of Hippias, who yet, if the event had happened in 519 B.C., must have been the person to determine whether the Athenians should assist Plataea or not. The Plataean envoys present themselves at a public sacrifice in the attitude of suppliants, so as to touch the feelings of the Athenian citizens generally: had Hippias been then despot, *he* would have been the person to be propitiated and to determine for or against assistance.

2. We know no cause which should have brought Kleomenēs with a Lacedæmonian force near to Plataea in the year 519 B.C.: we know from the statement of Herodotus (v. 76) that no Lacedæmonian expedition against Attica took place at that time. But in the year to which I have referred the event, Kleomenēs is on his march near the spot upon a known and assignable object. From the very tenor of the narrative, it is plain that Kleomenēs and his army were not designedly in Bœotia, nor meddling with Bœotian affairs, at the time when the Plataeans solicited his aid; for he declines to interpose in the matter, pleading the great distance between Sparta and Plataea as a reason.

3. Again, Kleomenēs, in advising the Plataeans to solicit Athens, does not give the advice through good will towards them, but through a desire to harass and perplex the Athenians, by entangling them in a quarrel with the Bœotians. At the point of time to which I have referred the incident, this was a very natural desire: he was angry, and perhaps alarmed, at the recent events which had brought about

his expulsion from Athens. But what was there to make him conceive such a feeling against Athens during the reign of Hippias? That despot was on terms of the closest intimacy with Sparta: the Peisistratids were (ξείνους—ξείνους ταμάλιστα—Herod. v. 63, 90, 91) “the particular guests” of the Spartans, who were only induced to take part against Hippias from a reluctant obedience to the oracles procured one after another by Kleisthenēs. The motive therefore assigned by Herodotus, for the advice given by Kleomenēs to the Plataeans, can have no application to the time when Hippias was still despot.

4. That Herodotus did not conceive the victory gained by the Athenians over Thebes as having taken place *before* the expulsion of Hippias, is evident from his emphatic contrast between their warlike spirit and success when liberated from the despots, and their timidity or backwardness while under Hippias (Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιιοικεόντων ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῶ πρώτοι ἐγένοντο· δημοῖ δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν, ἐθελοκάκειον, &c. v. 78). The man who wrote thus cannot have believed that in the year 519 B.C., while Hippias was in full sway, the Athenians gained an important victory over the Thebans, cut off a considerable portion of the Theban territory for the purpose of joining it to that of the Plataeans, and showed from that time forward their constant superiority over Thebes by protecting her inferior neighbour against her.

These different reasons, taking them altogether, appear to me to show that the first alliance between Athens and Plataea, as Herodotus conceives and describes it, cannot have taken place before the expulsion of Hippias, in 510 B.C.; and induce me to believe either that Thucydidēs was mistaken in the date of that event, or that Herodotus has not correctly described the facts. Not seeing any reason to suspect the description given by the latter, I have departed, though unwillingly, from the date of Thucydidēs.

The application of the Plataeans to Kleomenēs, and his advice grounded thereupon, may be connected more suitably with his first expedition to Athens after the expulsion of Hippias, than with his second.

burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

Meanwhile Kleomenês had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force. He summoned allies from all the various states of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted measures with the Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater confidence in their hostile dispositions towards Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Platœa. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenês and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment towards Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favourably disposed rather than otherwise towards that city, resolved to proceed no farther, withdrew their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time, king Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. Two such examples, operating upon the pre-existing sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow.¹

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognised head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance,² summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognised in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove

¹ Herodot. v. 75.

² Compare Kortüm, *Zur Geschichte Hellenischer Staats-Verfassungen*, p. 35 (Heidelberg, 1821).

I doubt however his interpretation of the words in Herodotus (v. 63)—*εἴτε ἰδίῳ στόλῳ, εἴτε δημοσίῳ χρησόμενοι*.

the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand—which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenês entered it. The former seized Cēnoê and Hysiæ, the frontier demes of Attica on the side towards Plataea; while the latter assailed the north-eastern frontier which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their forces at Eleusis against Kleomenês, leaving the Bœotians and Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking-up of the invading army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character—killing a large number, and capturing 700 prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man. Of the sum thus raised, a tenth was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the acropolis was burnt by Xerxês: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung.¹

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of 4000 of their citizens as Klêruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ—proprietors probably in the fertile plain of Lêlantum between Chalkis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer

Signal successes of Athens against Bœotians and Chalkidians.

Plantation of Athenian settlers or Klêruchs in the territory of Chalkis.

¹ Herodot. v. 77; Ælian, V. H. vi. 1; Pausan. i. 28, 2.

citizens—partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Attic Klêruchs (I can find no other name by which to speak of them) did not lose their birth-right as Athenian citizens. They were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different name—but they corresponded very nearly to the colonies formerly planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city; for though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labour for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families possessed of landed property became extinct. Yet this did not at all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors, for the lands rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance or bequest or intermarriage to other proprietors for the most part in easy circumstances—since one opulent family usually intermarried with another. I shall enter more fully at a future opportunity into this question—the great and serious problem of population, as it affected the Greek communities generally, and as it was dealt with in theory by the powerful minds of Plato and Aristotle—at present it is sufficient to notice that the numerous Klêruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally, according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

Distress of
the Thebans
—they ask
assistance
from Ægina.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies, still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to “solicit aid from those nearest to them.”¹ “How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbours, of Tanagra, Korôneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power.” An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and

¹ Herodot. v. 80.

brought up a happy meaning. "Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thêbê (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asôpus. Let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans." If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest. Envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans; who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries—the Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain however that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æakids Telamôn and Pêleus were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; so that the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes,¹ and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens, without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.²

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens—repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon—then again breaking out—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxês, was appeased only with the conquest of the island

The Æginetans make war on Athens.

¹ In the expression of Herodotus, the Æakid heroes are really sent from Ægina, and really sent back by the Thebans (v. 80, 81)—Οἱ δὲ σφι αἰτέουσι ἐπικουρίην τοὺς Αἰακίδας συμπέμπειν ἔφασαν—αὐτὶς οἱ Θηβαῖοι πέμψαντες, τοὺς μὲν Αἰακίδας σφι ἀπεδίδοσαν, τῶν δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐδέοντο. Compare again v. 75; viii. 64; and Polyb. vii. 9, 2. θεῶν τῶν συστρατευομένων.

Justin gives a narrative of an analogous application from the Epizephyrian Lokrians to Sparta (xx. 3): "Territi Locrenses ad Spartanos decurrunt: auxilium supplices deprecantur: illi longinquâ militiâ gravati, auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere eos jubent. Neque legati responsum sociæ urbis spreverunt; profectique in proximum templum, facto sacrificio, auxilium deorum implorant.

Litatis hostiis, obtentoque, ut rebantur, quod petebant—haud secus latî quam si deos ipsos secum arrecturi essent—pulvinaria iis in navi componunt, faustisque profecti omnibus, solatia suis pro auxiliis deportant." In comparing the expressions of Herodotus with those of Justin, we see that the former believes the direct literal presence and action of the Æakid heroes ("the Thebans sent back the heroes, and asked for men"), while the latter explains away the divine intervention into a mere fancy and feeling on the part of those to whom it is supposed to be accorded. This was the tone of those later authors whom Justin followed: compare also Pausan. iii. 19, 2.

² Herodot. v. 81, 82.

about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants. There had been indeed, according to Herodotus,¹ a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina—of which he gives the account in a singular narrative blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, &c. But at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalêrum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist them.² It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Boeotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes; but the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenês and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured.³ Moreover Kleomenês, when shut up in the acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realised—Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Kleomenês, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his residence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus, and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new æra in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Kleomenês against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that

¹ Herodot. v. 83–88.

² Herodot. v. 81–89. *μεγάλως Ἀθη-* | *ναίους ἐσινέοντο.*

³ Herodot. v. 90.

expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learnt the necessity, in order to ensure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here then is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece towards a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units: first we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece—power, unrivalled training, undisturbed antiquity, &c.: next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless: lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities, and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history: the proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

First formal convocation at Sparta—march of Greece towards a political system.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him—their resentment and alarm at the newborn insolence of Athens,¹ already tasted by her immediate neighbours, and menacing to every state represented in the convocation—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a reparation of past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias—no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens—and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now re-appeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosiklês protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain. No language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured forth. “Surely heaven and earth are about to change places—the fish

Proceedings of the convocation—animated protest of Corinth against any interference in favour of Hippias—the Spartan allies refuse to interfere.

¹ Herodot. v. 90, 91.

are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot.¹ First try what it is, for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you by the common gods of Hellas—plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you.”

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with Sosiklês in adjuring the Lacedæmonians² “not to revolutionise any Hellenic city.” No one listened to Hippias when he replied, and warned the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Peisistratidæ back again. He knew well (says Herodotus) that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man; but no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeium; the Spartans not venturing to espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies.”³

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind: fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies. The idea of a revolution (implying thereby an organic and comprehensive change of which the party using the word disapproves) consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy; the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, and there prevails neither fear of Athens nor hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of precedence between these two sentiments reversed. The antimonarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent political antipathies—the antithesis between democracy and oli-

¹ Herodot. v. 92. . . . τυραννίδας ἐς τὰς πόλεις κατὰγειν παρασκευάζεσθε, τοῦ οὔτε ἀδικώτερον οὔδέν ἐστι κατ’ ἀνθρώπους οὔτε μαιφονώτερον.

² Herodot. v. 93. μὴ ποιεῖν μηδὲν νεώτερον περὶ πόλιν Ἑλλάδα.

³ Herodot. v. 93, 94.

garchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party movement. Moreover a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathising friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian Sosiklês just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thucydidês.¹ It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandisement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to ; but the first unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution and after the expulsion of Hippias, is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian proceeds—"Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find proof not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is : since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbours, but so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master ; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit." The same comparison re-appears a short time afterwards, where he tells us that "the Athenians, when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta ; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission."²

Striking development of Athenian energy after the revolution of Kleisthenês—language of Herodotus.

¹ Thucydid. i. 68-71, 120-124.

² Herodot. v. 78-91. 'Αθηναῖοι μὲν νυν ἡβῆοντο· δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἐν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἡ ἰσηγορίῃ ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ 'Αθηναῖοι τυραννεύοντες μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῶ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν, ἐθελο-

κάκεον, ὡς δεσπότη ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτοὶ ἕκαστος ἐωὐτῷ προθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.

(c. 91.) Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι—νόφ λαβόντες, ὡς ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἔδν τὸ γένος τὸ 'Αττικόν, ἰσόρρυπον τῷ ἐωὐτῶν ἀν γένοιτο, κατεχόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ τυραννίδι, ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχέσθαι ἐτοῖμον.

ment wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or from better laws, or better administration. These indeed were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was, the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign People, composed of free and equal citizens—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago.

Effect upon
their minds
of the idea
or theory of
democracy.

It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference (although improvements in the practical working of all governments tend to foster it) is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was pre-eminently seductive; creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other governments could extort. Herodotus,¹ in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in

¹ Herodot. iii. 80. Πλήθος δὲ ἄρχον, πρῶτα μὲν, οὕνομα πάντων καλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην· δεύτερα δὲ, τούτων τῶν ὁ μόναρχος, ποίει οὐδέν· πάλω μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλευματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.

The democratical speaker at Syracuse, Athenagoras, also puts this name and promise in the first rank of advantages — (Thucyd. vi. 39) — ἐγὼ δὲ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὀνόμασθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρος, &c.

the front rank of the advantages of democracy “its most splendid name and promise”—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do: but it was what no other government in Greece *could* do: a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded, and which is even implied as the natural state of the public mind in Solon’s famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition.¹ Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the sentiment here described only in its least honourable manifestations—in the caricatures of Aristophanês, or in the empty common-places of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value, of democratical sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Periklês,² while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchical Nikias in the harbour of Syracuse, when he is endeavouring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratical patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony.³ From the time of Kleisthenês downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character; and if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratical constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it—next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice towards it and with reference to it.

¹ See the preceding chapter xi. of this History, vol. iii. p. 193, respecting the Solonian declaration here adverted to.

² See the two speeches of Periklês in Thucyd. ii. 35-46, and ii. 60-64. Compare the reflections of Thucydides upon

the two democracies of Athens and Syracuse—vi. 69 and vii. 21-55.

³ Thucyd. vii. 69. Πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτακτοῦ πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν διαίταν ἐξουσίας, &c.

Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed—the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens.

We shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phænomenon in tracing down the history from Kleisthenês to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labour and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants, to the time of Demosthenês —(I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly understood by contrasting it with another)—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is com-

Diminution of this active sentiment in the restored democracy after the Thirty Tyrants.

paratively inoperative—the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy as protecting him and ensuring to him valuable rights, and he is moreover willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties towards it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendancy, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenês contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæroneia, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a source of protection and good government.¹ That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip. Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked: For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of main-

¹ Compare the remarkable speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta (Thucyd. i. 68–71), with the φιλοπραγμοσύνη which Demosthenês so emphatically no-

tices in Philip (Olynthiac. i. 6. p. 13): also Philippic. i. 2, and the Philippics and Olynthiacs generally.

aining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever, when the Macedonians were once organised under an enterprising and semi-hellenised prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenês; that the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigour. During the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratical fervour under Kleisthenês now opening—a feeling, which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.

CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—CYRUS.

IN the preceding chapter I have followed the history of Central Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now revert to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings as connected with them, at the point in which they were left in my seventeenth chapter.

The concluding facts recounted in that chapter were of sad and serious moment to the Hellenic world. The Ionic and State of Asia before the rise of the Persian monarchy. Æolic Greeks on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the Lydian king Croesus: “down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks had been free.” Their conqueror Croesus, who ascended the throne in 560 B.C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyagês, extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but comprising in a south-eastern direction Persis proper or Farsistan, and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the east by the line of Mount Zagros (the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey). Babylonia, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, was occupied by the Assyrians or Chaldæans, under their king Labynêtus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly by prodigies of labour, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an honest eye-witness who describes it afterwards in its decline—but which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldæan dominion under Labynêtus reached to the borders of Egypt, including as dependent territories both Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favourably disposed to Grecian commerce

and settlement. Both with Labynêtus and with Amasis, Croesus was on terms of alliance; and as Astyagês was his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years or a little more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

Great power
and alliances
of Croesus.

The rise and fall of Oriental dynasties has been in all times distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and greedy, acquires dominion; while his successors, abandoning themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of the Persian empire, first the subject and afterwards the dethroner of the Median Astyagês, corresponds to this general description, as far at least as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth, even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have to choose between different accounts at variance with each other, and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the character of romance. The *Cyropædia* of Xenophon is memorable and interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a philosophical novel.¹ That it should have been quoted so largely as authority on matters of history, is only one proof among many how easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between Cyrus and Astyagês, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kambyshês and Mandanê and grandson of Astyagês, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in respect to tragical incident and contrast. Astyagês, alarmed by a dream, condemns the newborn infant of his daughter Mandanê to be exposed: Harpagus, to whom the order is given, delivers the child to one of the royal herdsmen, who exposes it in the mountains, where it is miraculously suckled by a bitch.² Thus preserved, and

Rise of
Cyrus—
uncertainty
of his early
history.

Story of
Astyagês.

¹ Among the lost productions of Antisthenês, the contemporary of Xenophon and Plato, and emanating like them from the tuition of Sokratês, was one, *Kûpos*, ἡ περὶ Βασιλείας (Diogenes

Laërt. vi. 15).

² That this was the real story—a close parallel of Romulus and Remus—we may see by Herodotus, i. 122. Some rationalising Greeks or Persians trans-

afterwards brought up as the herdsman's child, Cyrus manifests great superiority both physical and mental, is chosen king in play by the boys of the village, and in this capacity severely chastises the son of one of the courtiers; for which offence he is carried before Astyagês, who recognises him for his grandson, but is assured by the Magi that the dream is out, and that he has no farther danger to apprehend from the boy—and therefore permits him to live. With Harpagus, however, Astyagês is extremely incensed, for not having executed his orders: he causes the son of Harpagus to be slain, and served up to be eaten by his unconscious father at a regal banquet. The father, apprised afterwards of the fact, dissembles his feelings, but meditates a deadly vengeance against Astyagês for this Thyestean meal. He persuades Cyrus, who has been sent back to his father and mother in Persia, to head a revolt of the Persians against the Medes; whilst Astyagês—to fill up the Grecian conception of madness as a precursor to ruin—sends an army against the revolters, commanded by Harpagus himself. Of course the army is defeated—Astyagês, after a vain resistance, is dethroned—Cyrus becomes king in his place—and Harpagus repays the outrage which he has undergone by the bitterest insults.

Such are the heads of a beautiful narrative which is given at some length in Herodotus. It will probably appear to the reader sufficiently romantic; though the historian intimates that he had heard three other narratives different from it, and that all were more full of marvels, as well as in wider circulation, than his own, which he had borrowed from some unusually sober-minded Persian informants.¹ In what points the other three stories departed from it we do not hear.

formed it into a more plausible tale—that the herdsman's wife who suckled the boy Cyrus was named *Κυνώ* (*Κυνών* is a dog, male or female); contending that this latter was the real basis of fact, and that the intervention of the bitch was an exaggeration built upon the name of the woman, in order that the divine protection shown to Cyrus might be still more manifest—οἱ δὲ τοκέες παραλαμβάντες τὸ οὐνομα τοῦτο (ἵνα θειοτέρως δοκέη τοῖσι Περσῶσι περιεῖναι σφὶ δ παῖς), κατέβαλον φάτιν ὡς ἐκκείμενον Κῦρον κύων ἐξέθρεψε· ἐνθεῦτεν μὲν ἡ φάτις αὐτὴ κεχωρήκεε.

In the first volume of this History I have noticed various transformations operated by Palæphatus and others

upon the Greek myths—the ram which carried Phryxus and Hellê across the Hellespont is represented to us as having been in *reality* a man named *Krius*, who aided their flight—the winged horse which carried Bellerophon was a ship named Pegasus, &c.

This same operation has here been performed upon the story of the suckling of Cyrus; for we shall run little risk in affirming that the miraculous story is the older of the two. The feelings which welcome a miraculous story are early and primitive; those which break down the miracle into a commonplace fact are of subsequent growth.

¹ Herodot. i. 95. Ὡς ὃν Περσέων μετεξέτεροι λέγουσιν, οἱ μὴ βου-

To the historian of Halikarnassus we have to oppose the physician of the neighbouring town Knidus—Ktêsias, who contradicted Herodotus, not without strong terms of cen-^{Herodotus and Ktêsias.} sure, on many points, and especially upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to Astyagês.¹ However indignant we may be with Ktêsias for the disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian, whose work is to us inestimable—we must nevertheless admit, that as surgeon in actual attendance on king Artaxerxês Mnêmon, and healer of the wound inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus the younger,² he had better opportunities even than Herodotus of conversing with sober-minded Persians; and that the discrepancies between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories. Herodotus himself was in fact compelled to choose one out of four. So rare and late a plant is historical authenticity.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural, and four nomadic tribes—all of them^{Condition of the native Persians at the first rise of Cyrus.} rude, hardy, and brave³—dwelling in a mountainous region, clothed in skins, ignorant of wine, or fruit, or any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one another. First in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the

λόμενοι σεμνοῦν τὰ περὶ Κῦρον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἔοντα λέγειν λόγον, κατὰ ταῦτα γράψω ἐπιστάμενος περὶ Κύρου καὶ τριφασίας ἁλλας λόγων ὁδοὺς φῆναι. His informants were thus select persons, who differed from the Persians generally.

The long narrative respecting the infancy and growth of Cyrus is contained in Herodot. i. 107–129.

¹ See the Extracts from the lost Persian History of Ktêsias, in Photius Cod. lxxii., also appended to Schweighäuser's edition of Herodotus, vol. iv. p. 345. Φησὶ δὲ (Ktêsias) αὐτὸν τῶν πλειόνων & ἱστορεῖ αὐτόπτην γενόμενον, ἢ

παρ' αὐτῶν Περσῶν (ἐνθα τὸ δρᾶν μὴ ἐνεχώρει) αὐτήκοον καταστάντα, οὕτως τὴν ἱστορίαν συγγράψαι.

To the discrepancies between Xenophon, Herodotus, and Ktêsias, on the subject of Cyrus, is to be added the statement of Æschylus (Persæ, 747), the oldest authority of them all, and that of the Armenian historians: see Bähr ad Ktesian, p. 85: compare Bähr's comments on the discrepancies, p. 87.

² Xenophon, Anab. i. 8, 26.

³ Herodot. i. 71–153; Arrian, v. 4; Strabo, xv. p. 727; Plato, Legg. iii. p. 695.

first phratry or clan among the Pasargadæ were, the Achæmenidæ, to whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction, we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila,¹ which he saw in his march with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris, gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle. However this may be, the preponderance of the Persians was at last complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation in the empire, after the Persians, properly so called; and by early Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called “the Mede”² as well as “the Persian.” The Median Ekbatana too remained as one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the kings of Persia; Susa on the Choaspês, on the Kissian plain farther southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

The vast space of country comprised between the Indus on the east, the Oxus and Caspian Sea to the north, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the south, and the line of Mount Zagros to the west, appears to have been occupied in these times by a great variety of different tribes and people, yet all or most of them belonging to the religion of Zoroaster, and speaking dialects of the Zend language.³ It was known amongst its inhabitants by the common name of Iran or Aria: it is, in its central parts at least, a high, cold plateau, totally destitute of wood and scantily supplied with water; much of it indeed is a salt and sandy desert, unsusceptible of culture. Parts of it are eminently fertile, where water can be procured and irrigation applied. Scattered masses of tolerably dense population thus grew up; but continuity of cultivation is not practicable, and in ancient times, as at present, a large proportion of the population of Iran seems to have consisted of wandering or nomadic tribes with their tents and cattle. The rich pastures, and the freshness of the summer climate, in the region of mountain and

¹ Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 3, 6; iii. 4, 7–12. Strabo had read accounts which represented the last battle between Astyagês and Cyrus to have been fought near Pasargadæ (xv. p. 730).

² Xenophanês, *Fragm.* p. 39, ap. Schneidewin, *Delectus Poett. Elegiac.* Græc.—

Πήλικος ἦσθ' ὅθ' ὁ Μῆδος ἀφίκετο;

compare Theognis, v. 775, and Herodot. i. 163.

³ Strabo, xv. p. 724. *δμόγλωττοι παρὰ μικρόν*. See Heeren, *Ueber den Verkehr der Alten Welt*, part i. book i. p. 320–340, and Ritter, *Erdkunde*, West Asien, b. iii. Abtheil. ii. sect. 1 and 2. p. 17–84.

valley near Ekbatana, are extolled by modern travellers, just as they attracted the Great King in ancient times during the hot months. The more southerly province called Persis proper (Farsistan) consists also in part of mountain land interspersed with valley and plain, abundantly watered, and ample in pasture, sloping gradually down to low grounds on the sea-coast which are hot and dry: the care bestowed, both by Medes and Persians, on the breeding of their horses, was remarkable.¹ There were doubtless material differences between different parts of the population of this vast plateau of Iran. Yet it seems that along with their common language and religion, they had also something of a common character, which contrasted with the Indian population east of the Indus, the Assyrians west of Mount Zagros, and the Massagetæ and other Nomads of the Caspian and the Sea of Aral—less brutish, restless, and bloodthirsty, than the latter—more fierce, contemptuous and extortionate, and less capable of sustained industry, than the two former. There can be little doubt, at the time of which we are now speaking, when the wealth and cultivation of Assyria were at their maximum, that Iran also was far better peopled than ever it has been since European observers have been able to survey it; especially the north-eastern portion, Baktria and Sogdiana; so that the invasions of the Nomads from Turkestan and Tartary, which have been so destructive at various intervals since the Mahomedan conquest, were before that period successfully kept back.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of the Median kings. If we may believe Ktésias, even the distant province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings. At first it resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of Astyagês, as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged his authority.²

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus and Croesus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyagês, and before the conquest of Baktria.³ Croesus was the assailant, wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the Persian conqueror, and to increase his

¹ About the province of Persis, see Strabo, xv. p. 727; Diodor. xix. 21; Quintus Curtius, v. 13, 14. p. 432-434, with the valuable explanatory notes of Müttzell (Berlin, 1841). Compare also

Morier's Second Journey in Persia, p. 49-120, and Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, p. 712-738.

² Ktésias, Persica, c. 2.

³ Herodot. i. 153.

own dominions. His more prudent councillors in vain represented to him that he had little to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and poor. He is represented as just at that time recovering from the affliction arising out of the death of his son.

To ask advice of the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no pious king would omit. But in the present perilous question, Cræsus did more—he took a precaution so extreme, that if his piety had not been placed beyond all doubt by his extraordinary munificence to the temples, he might have drawn upon himself the suspicion of a guilty scepticism.¹ Before

he would send to ask advice respecting the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the chief surrounding oracles — Delphi, Dôdôna, Branchidæ near Milêtus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Trophônus at Lebadeia, and Ammôn in Libya. His envoys started from Sardis

on the same day, and were all directed on the hundredth day afterwards, to ask at the respective oracles how Cræsus was at that precise moment employed. This was a severe trial: of the manner in which it was met by four out of the six oracles consulted, we have no information, and it rather appears that their answers were unsatisfactory. But Amphiaraus maintained his credit undiminished, while Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision, as to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might be disposed to scoff at divination. No sooner had the envoys put the question to the Delphian priestess, on the day named, “What is Cræsus now doing?” than she exclaimed, in the accustomed hexameter verse,² “I know the number of grains of sand, and the measures of the sea: I understand the dumb, and I hear the man who speaks not. The smell reaches me of a hard-skinned tortoise boiled in a copper with lamb’s flesh—copper above and copper below.” Cræsus was awestruck on receiving this reply. It described with the utmost detail that which he had been really doing, so that he accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaraus the only trustworthy oracles on earth—following up these feelings with a holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favour of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon a vast sacrificial pile

¹ That this point of view should not be noticed in Herodotus, may appear singular, when we read his story (vi. 86) about the Milesian Glaukus, and the judgement that overtook him for

having tested the oracle; but it is put forward by Xenophon as constituting part of the guilt of Cræsus (Cyropæd. vii. 2, 17).

² Herodot. i. 47, 48, 49, 50.

were placed the most splendid purple robes and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver; besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in gold and silver—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, &c., the size and weight of which we read with astonishment; the more so as Herodotus himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi.¹ Nor was Crœsus altogether unmindful of Amphiaraus, whose answer had been creditable, though less triumphant than that of the Pythian priestess. He sent to Amphiaraus a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterwards seen at Thebes by Herodotus: this large donative may help the reader to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask at the same time, whether Crœsus should undertake an ex-
pedition against the Persians—and if so, whether he
should solicit any allies to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of Apollo and of Amphiaraus was decisive, recommending him to invite the alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most momentous question, their answer was as remarkable for circumspection as it had been before for detective sagacity: they told Crœsus, that if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The blindness of Crœsus interpreted this declaration into an unqualified promise of success: he sent farther presents to the oracle, and again inquired whether his kingdom would be durable. “When a mule shall become king of the Medes (replied the priestess), then must thou run away—be not ashamed.”²

More assured than ever by such an answer, Crœsus sent to Sparta, under the kings Anaxandridês and Aristo, to
tender presents and solicit their alliance.³ His propo-
sitions were favourably entertained—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance now formed was altogether general—no express effort being as yet demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state into Asiatic politics; and that too without any of the generous Hellenic sympathy which afterwards induced Athens to send her citizens across the Ægean. At this time Crœsus was the master and tribute-exactor of the Asiatic Greeks, whose contingents seem to have formed part of his army for the expedition now contemplated;

¹ Herodot. i. 52, 53, 54.² Herodot. i. 55.³ Herodot. i. 67–70.

an army consisting principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median and Lydian empires: and Croesus, marching across that river into the territory of the Syrians or Assyrians of Kappadokia, took the city of Pteria, with many of its surrounding dependencies, inflicting damage and destruction upon these distant subjects of Ekbatana. Cyrus lost no time in bringing an army to their defence considerably larger than that of Croesus; trying at the same time, though unsuccessfully, to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took place between the two armies, but with indecisive result: after which Croesus, seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, and collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching Sardis he despatched envoys to Labynêtus king of Babylon; to Amasis king of Egypt; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies; calling upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course of the fifth month. In the meantime, he dismissed all the foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.¹

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted with success. And on the part of the Lacedæmonians at least, there was no tardiness; for their ships were ready and their troops almost on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Croesus was already ruined.² Cyrus had foreseen and forestalled the defensive plan of his enemy. Pushing on with his army to Sardis without delay, he obliged the Lydian prince to give battle with his own unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was highly favourable to the Lydian cavalry, which at that time (Herodotus tells us) was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus, employing a stratagem whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable, placed in front of his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure either to smell or to behold.³ The horsemen of Croesus were thus obliged to dismount; nevertheless they fought bravely on foot, and were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Croesus had still good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies, to whom he sent pressing envoys of accele-

¹ Herodot. i. 77.

² Herodot. i. 83.

³ The story about this successful em-

ployment of the camels appears also in Xenophon, Cyropæd. vii. 1, 47.

ration. For Sardis was considered impregnable—one assault had already been repulsed, and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the northern side of Tmôlus; it was well fortified everywhere except towards the mountain; and on that side, the rock was so precipitous and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought unnecessary, nor did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible in that quarter. But Hyrcæades, a Persian soldier, having accidentally seen one of the garrison descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet which had rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found it not impracticable; others followed his example, the strong hold was thus seized first, and the whole city speedily taken by storm.¹

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Crœsus, who was accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn and terrible spectacle; the captive king was destined to be burnt in chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood. We are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition, in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktésias both agree, though they describe differently the particular miracles wrought.² It is certain that Crœsus, after some time, was released and well treated by his

Crœsus becomes prisoner of Cyrus—how treated.

¹ Herodot. i. 84.

² Compare Herodot. i. 84–87, and Ktésias, Persica, c. 4; which latter seems to have been copied by Polyænus, vii. 6, 10.

It is remarkable that among the miracles enumerated by Ktésias, no mention is made of fire or of the pile of wood kindled: we have the chains of Crœsus miraculously struck off, in the midst of thunder and lightning, but no fire mentioned. This is deserving of notice, as illustrating the fact that Ktésias derived his information from Persian narrators, who would not be likely to impute to Cyrus the use of fire for such a purpose. The Persians worshipped fire as a god, and considered it impious to burn a dead body (Herodot. iii. 16). Now Herodotus seems to have heard the story about the burning from Lydian informants (λέγεται ὑπὸ Λυδῶν, Herodot. i. 87). Whether the

Lydians regarded fire in the same point of view as the Persians, we do not know; but even if they did, they would not be indisposed to impute to Cyrus an act of gross impiety, just as the Egyptians imputed another act equally gross to Kambysês, which Herodotus himself treats as a falsehood (iii. 16).

The long narrative given by Nikolaus Damaskênus of the treatment of Crœsus by Cyrus, has been supposed by some to have been borrowed from the Lydian historian Xanthus, elder contemporary of Herodotus. But it seems to me a mere compilation, not well put together, from Xenophon's Cyropædia and from the narrative of Herodotus, perhaps including some particular incidents out of Xanthus (see Nikol. Damas. Fragm. ed. Orell. p. 57–70, and the Fragments of Xanthus in Didot's Historic. Græcor. Fragm. p. 40).

conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the latter as well as of his son Kambysês:¹ Ktêsias also acquaints us that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barênê, was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not unfrequent with the Persian kings.

The prudent counsel and remarks as to the relations between Persians and Lydians, whereby Crœsus is said by Herodotus to have first earned this favourable treatment, are hardly worth repeating; but the indignant remonstrance sent by Crœsus to the Delphian god is too characteristic to be passed over. He obtained permission from Cyrus to lay upon the holy pavement of the Delphian temple the chains with which he had at first been bound. The Lydian envoys were instructed, after exhibiting to the god these humiliating memorials, to ask whether it was his custom to deceive his benefactors, and whether he was not ashamed to have encouraged the king of Lydia in an enterprise so disastrous? The god, condescending to justify himself by the lips of the priestess, replied—"Not even a god can escape his destiny. Crœsus has suffered for the sin of his fifth ancestor (Gygês), who, conspiring with a woman, slew his master and wrongfully seized the sceptre. Apollo employed all his influence with the Mœræ (Fates) to obtain that this sin might be expiated by the children of Crœsus, and not by Crœsus himself; but the Mœræ would grant nothing more than a postponement of the judgement for three years. Let Crœsus know that Apollo has thus procured for him a reign three years longer than his original destiny,² after having tried in vain to rescue him altogether. Moreover he sent that rain which at the critical moment extinguished the burning pile. Nor has Crœsus any right to complain of the prophecy by which he was encouraged to enter on the war; for when the god told him, that he would subvert *a great empire*, it was his duty to have again inquired which empire the god meant; and if he neither understood the meaning, nor chose to ask for information, he has himself to blame for the result. Besides, Crœsus neglected the warning given to him, about the acquisition of the Median kingdom by a mule: Cyrus was that mule—son of a Median mother of royal breed, by a Persian father at once of different race and of lower position."

¹ Justin (i. 7) seems to copy Ktêsias, about the treatment of Crœsus.

² Herodot. i. 91. Προθυμεομένου δὲ Λοξίῳ ὅπως ἂν κατὰ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς Κροῖσου γένοιτο τὸ Σαρδίων πάθος, καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸν Κροῖσον, οὐκ οἶόν τε

ἐγένετο παραγαγεῖν Μοίρας· ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωκαν αὐται, ἠνύσατο, καὶ ἐχαριστὰ οἱ τρία γὰρ ἔτεα ἐπανεβάλετο τὴν Σαρδίων ἄλωσιν· Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιστάσθω Κροῖσος, ὥς ὕστερον τοῖσι ἔτεσι τούτοις ἀλὺς τῆς πεπρωμένης.

This triumphant justification extorted even from Cræsus himself a full confession, that the sin lay with him, and not with the god.¹ It certainly illustrates in a remarkable manner ^{Successful justification of the oracle.} the theological ideas of the time. It shows us how much, in the mind of Herodotus, the facts of the centuries preceding his own, unrecorded as they were by any contemporary authority, tended to cast themselves into a sort of religious drama; the threads of the historical web being in part put together, in part originally spun, for the purpose of setting forth the religious sentiment and doctrine woven in as a pattern. The Pythian priestess predicts to Gygês that the crime which he had committed in assassinating his master would be expiated by his fifth descendant, though, as Herodotus tells us, no one took any notice of this prophecy until it was at last fulfilled:² we see thus that the history of the first Mermnad king is made up after the catastrophe of the last. There was something in the main facts of the history of Cræsus profoundly striking to the Greek mind: a king ^{Fate of Cræsus impressive to the Greek mind.} at the summit of wealth and power—pious in the extreme and munificent towards the gods—the first destroyer of Hellenic liberty in Asia—then precipitated, at once and on a sudden, into the abyss of ruin. The sin of the first parent helped much towards the solution of this perplexing problem, as well as to exalt the credit of the oracle, when made to assume the shape of an unnoticed prophecy. In the affecting story (discussed in a former chapter³) of Solon and Cræsus, the Lydian king is punished with an acute domestic affliction because he thought himself the happiest of mankind—the gods not suffering any one to be arrogant except themselves;⁴ and the warning of Solon is made to recur to Cræsus after he has become the prisoner of Cyrus, in the narrative of Herodotus. To the same vein of thought belongs the story, just recounted, of the relations of Cræsus with the Delphian oracle. An account is provided, satisfactory to the religious feelings of the Greeks, how and why he was ruined—but nothing less than the overruling and omnipotent Mœræ could be invoked to explain so stupendous a result. It is rarely that these supreme goddesses—or hyper-goddesses, since the gods themselves must submit to them—are brought into such distinct light and action. Usually

¹ Herodot. i. 91. Ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας συν-
έγνω ἑωυτοῦ εἶναι τὴν ἀμαρτάν, καὶ οὐ
τοῦ θεοῦ.

Xenophon also in the Cyropædia (vii.
2, 16–25) brings Cræsus to the same
result of confession and humiliation,

though by steps somewhat different.

² Herodot. i. 13.

³ See above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p. 201.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 10. οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρο-
νέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ θεὸς ἢ ἑωυτόν.

they are kept in the dark, or are left to be understood as the unseen stumbling-block in cases of extreme incomprehensibility; and it is difficult clearly to determine (as in the case of some complicated political constitutions) where the Greeks conceived sovereign power to reside, in respect to the government of the world.

The Moeræ
or Fates.

But here the sovereignty of the Moeræ, and the subordinate agency of the gods, are unequivocally set forth.¹ The gods are still extremely powerful, because the Moeræ comply with their requests up to a certain point, not thinking it proper to

¹ In the oracle reported in Herodot. vii. 141. as delivered by the Pythian priestess to Athens on occasion of the approach of Xerxês, Zeus is represented in the same supreme position as the present oracle assigns to the Moeræ or Fates: Pallas in vain attempts to propitiate him in favour of Athens, just as in this case Apollo tries to mitigate the Moeræ in respect to Cræsus—

Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δί' Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι,
Δισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ,
&c.

Compare also viii. 109 and ix. 16.

O. Müller (Dissertation on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 222, Eng. Transl.) says—"On no occasion does Zeus Sotër exert his influence directly, like Apollo, Minerva, and the Erinnyes; but whereas Apollo is prophet and exegetes by virtue of wisdom derived from him, and Minerva is indebted to him for her sway over states and assemblies—nay, the very Erinnyes exercise their functions in his name—this Zeus stands always in the background, and has in reality only to settle a conflict existing within himself. For with Æschylus, as with all men of profound feeling among the Greeks from the earliest times, Jupiter is the only real god in the higher sense of the word. Although he is in the spirit of ancient theology a generated god arisen out of an imperfect state of things, and not produced till the third stage of a development of nature—still he is, at the time we are speaking of, the spirit that pervades and governs the universe."

To the same purpose Klausen expresses himself (Theologumena Æschyli, p. 6-69).

It is perfectly true that many passages may be produced from Greek authors which ascribe to Zeus the supreme power here noted. But it is equally true that this conception is not

uniformly adhered to, and that sometimes the Fates or Moeræ are represented as supreme; occasionally represented as the stronger and Zeus as the weaker (Promêtheus, 515). The whole tenor of the Prometheus of Æschylus, in fact, brings out the conception of a Zeus τύραννος—whose power is not supreme, even for the time; and is not destined to continue permanently even at its existing height. The explanations given by Klausen of this drama appear to me incorrect; nor do I understand how it is to be reconciled with the above passage quoted from O. Müller.

The two oracles here cited from Herodotus exhibit plainly the fluctuation of Greek opinion on this subject: in the one, the supreme determination, and the inexorability which accompanies it, are ascribed to Zeus—in the other, to the Moeræ. This double point of view adapted itself to different occasions, and served as a help for the interpretation of different events. Zeus was supposed to have certain sympathies for human beings; misfortunes happened to various men which he not only did not wish to bring on, but would have been disposed to avert; here the Moeræ, who had no sympathies, were introduced as an explanatory cause, tacitly implied as overruling Zeus. "Cum Furis Æschylus Parcas tantum non ubique conjungit," says Klausen (Theol. Æsch. p. 39); and this entire absence of human sympathies constitutes the common point of both—that in which the Moeræ and the Erinnyes differ from all the other gods—πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον θεῶν, οὐ θεοῖς ὁμοίαν (Æschyl. Sept. ad Theb. 720): compare Eumenid. 961, 172, and indeed the general strain of that fearful tragedy.

In Æschylus, as in Herodotus, Apollo is represented as exercising persuasive powers over the Moeræ (Eumenid. 724)—Μοίρας ἐπεισας ἀφθίτους θεῖναι βροτοῦς.

be wholly inexorable ; but their compliance is carried no farther than they themselves choose ; nor would they, even in deference to Apollo,¹ alter the original sentence of punishment for the sin of Gygês in the person of his fifth descendant—a sentence moreover which Apollo himself had formally prophesied shortly after the sin was committed ; so that, if the Moeræ had listened to his intercession on behalf of Crœsus, his own prophetic credit would have been endangered. Their unalterable resolution has predetermined the ruin of Crœsus, and the grandeur of the event is manifested by the circumstance, that even Apollo himself cannot prevail upon them to alter it, or to grant more than a three years' respite. The religious element must here be viewed as giving the form—the historical element as giving the matter only, and not the whole matter—of the story. These two elements will be found conjoined more or less throughout most of the history of Herodotus, though as we descend to later times, we shall find the latter element in constantly increasing proportion. His conception of history is extremely different from that of Thucydidês, who lays down to himself the true scheme and purpose of the historian, common to him with the philosopher—to recount and interpret the past, as a rational aid towards prevision of the future.²

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas generally—took place in 546 B.C.³ B.C. 546.
Sorely did the Ionic Greeks now repent that they had rejected the

¹ The language of Herodotus deserves attention : Apollo tells Crœsus — “ I applied to the Moeræ to get the execution of the judgement postponed from your time to that of your children—but I could not prevail upon them ; but as much as they would yield of their own accord, I procured for you ” (*δὸν δὲ ἐν ἐδωκα ν αὐταί, ἐχαρίσατό οἱ—i. 91*).

² Thucyd. i. 22.

³ This important date depends upon the evidence of Solinus (Polyhistor. i. 112) and Sosikratês (ap. Diog. Laërt. i. 95): see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellen.* ad ann. 546, and his Appendix, ch. 17, upon the Lydian kings.

Mr. Clinton and most of the chronologists accept the date without hesitation, but Volney (*Recherches sur l'Histoire Ancienne*, vol. i. p. 306–308; *Chronologie des Rois Lydiens*) rejects it altogether; considering the capture of Sardis to have occurred in 557 B.C.,

and the reign of Crœsus to have begun in 571 B.C. He treats very contemptuously the authority of Solinus and Sosikratês, and has an elaborate argumentation to prove that the date which he adopts is borne out by Herodotus. This latter does not appear to me at all satisfactory: I adopt the date of Solinus and Sosikratês (though agreeing with Volney that such positive authority is not very considerable), because there is nothing to contradict them, and because the date which they give seems in consonance with the stream of the history.

Volney's arguments suppose in the mind of Herodotus a degree of chronological precision altogether unreasonable, in reference to events anterior to contemporary records. He (like other chronologists) exhausts his ingenuity to find a proper point of historical time for the supposed conversation between Solon and Crœsus (p. 320).

propositions made to them by Cyrus for revolting from Croesus —though at the time when these propositions were made it would have been highly imprudent to listen to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the conqueror entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries, on the footing which they had occupied under Croesus. The reply was a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to whom the terms which they asked were granted :¹ why this favourable exception was extended to them, we do not know.

The other continental Ionians and Æolians (exclusive of Milêtus and exclusive also of the insular cities which the Persians had no means of attacking), seized with alarm, began to put themselves in a condition of defence. It seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began to erect walls ; and the Phokæans especially devoted to that purpose a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthônus, king of Tartêssus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they thought it advisable to send a

joint embassy entreating aid from Sparta. They doubtless were not un-apprised that the Spartans had actually equipped an army for the support of Croesus. Their deputies went to Sparta, where the Phôkæan Pythermus, appointed by the rest to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe² in order to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing need of succour against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians refused the prayer ; nevertheless they despatched to Phôkæa some commissioners to investigate the state of affairs—whom perhaps persuaded by the Phôkæans, sent Lakrinês, one of their number, to the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on any city of Hellas—for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. “Who are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me such a notice?” Having received the answer, wherein it was stated that the Lacedæmonian had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he exclaimed—“I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one another and

¹ Herodot. i. 141.

² Herodot. i. 152. The purple garment, so attractive a spectacle amid the plain clothing universal at Sparta, marked the contrast between Asiatic and European Greece.

for swear themselves. If I live they shall have troubles of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians." To buy or sell appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice: for they carried out consistently one step farther, the principle upon which even many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits generally.¹

This blank menace of Lakrinês, an insulting provocation to the enemy rather than a real support to the distressed, was the only benefit which the Ionic Greeks derived from Sparta. They were left to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror; who presently however quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his conquests in the East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison in the citadel, but consigning the large treasure captured, with authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas. As he carried away Crœsus along with him, he probably considered himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital, when he received the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to hire fresh troops. On hearing this news, Cyrus addressed himself to Crœsus (according to Herodotus) in terms of much wrath against the Lydians, and even intimated that he should be compelled to sell them all as slaves. Upon which Crœsus, full of alarm for his people, contended strenuously that Paktyas alone was in fault and deserving of punishment; but he at the same time advised Cyrus to disarm the Lydian population, and to enforce upon them both effeminate attire and habits of playing on the harp and shopkeeping. "By this process (he said) you will soon see them become women instead of men."² This suggestion is said to have been accepted by Cyrus, and executed by his general Mazarês. The conversation here reported, and the deliberate plan for enervating the Lydian character supposed to be pursued by Cyrus, is evidently an hypothesis imagined by some of the contemporaries or predecessors of Herodotus, to explain the contrast between the Lydians whom they saw before them, after two or three generations of slavery, and the old irresistible horsemen of whom they heard in fame, at the time when Crœsus was lord from the Halys to the Ægean Sea.

To return to Paktyas—he had commenced his revolt, come down

¹ Herodot. i. 153. ταῦτα ἐς τοὺς Ἕπαι, &c.
πάντας Ἕλληνας ἀπέβριψε ὁ Κῦρος τὰ ² Herodot. i. 155.

to the sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up the governor Tabalus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median general Mazarês was approaching at the head of an army despatched by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kymê for protection as a suppliant. Presently arrived a menacing summons from Mazarês, demanding that he should be given up forthwith, which plunged the Kymæans into profound dismay. The idea of giving up a suppliant to destruction was shocking to Grecian sentiment. They sent to solicit advice from the holy temple of Apollo at Branchidæ near Milêtus; and the reply directed, that Paktyas should be surrendered. Nevertheless so ignominious did such a surrender appear, that Aristodikus and some other Kymæan citizens denounced the messengers as liars, and required that a more trustworthy deputation should be sent to consult the god. Aristodikus himself, forming one of the second body, stated the perplexity to the oracle, and received a repetition of the same answer; whereupon he proceeded to rob the birds' nests which existed in abundance in and about the temple. A voice from the inner oracular chamber speedily arrested him, exclaiming—"Most impious of men, how darest thou to do such things? Wilt thou snatch my suppliants from the temple itself?" Unabashed by the rebuke, Aristodikus replied—"Master, thus dost *thou* help suppliants thyself: and dost thou command the Kymæans to give up a suppliant?" "Yes, I do command it" (rejoined the god forthwith), in order that the crime may bring destruction upon you the sooner, and that you may not in future come to consult the oracle upon the surrender of suppliants."

The ingenuity of Aristodikus thus completely nullified the oracular response, and left the Kymæans in their original perplexity. Not choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylênê, whither the envoys of Mazarês followed and demanded him; offering a reward so considerable, that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed away the suppliant to Chios, where he took refuge in the temple of Athênê Poliuchus. But here again the pursuers followed. The Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a district on the continent over

¹ Herodot. i. 159.

against the island of Lesbos) as purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus, who had given the most express orders for this capture: hence the unusual intensity of the pursuit. But it appears that the territory of Atarneus was considered as having been ignominiously acquired by the Chians: none even of their own citizens would employ any article of its produce for holy or sacrificial purposes.¹

Mazarês next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively made a gallant but ineffectual resistance. The Persian general by his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced one after the other. With all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder than those which had been imposed upon them by Croesus, because Cyrus had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single exception of Milêtus, and because they had since given additional offence by aiding the revolt of Paktyas. The inhabitants of Priênê were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazarês, and had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on Sardis.²

Harpagus
succeeds
Mazarês—
conquest of
Ionia by the
Persians.

Among these unfortunate towns thus changing their master and passing into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice—Teôs and Phôkæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdêra—others to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria: a portion of them however must have remained to take the chances of subjection, since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still Hellenic.³

Fate of
Phôkæa.

The fate of Phôkæa, similar in the main, is given to us with

¹ Herodot. i. 160. The short fragment from Charôn of Lampsakus, which Plutarch (*De Malignitat.* Herod. p. 859) cites here, in support of one among his many unjust censures on Herodotus, is noway inconsistent with the statement of the latter, but rather tends to confirm it.

In writing this treatise on the alleged ill-temper of Herodotus, we see that Plutarch had before him the history of Charôn of Lampsakus, more ancient by one generation than the historian whom

he was assailing, and also belonging to Asiatic Greece. Of course it suited the purpose of his work to produce all the contradictions to Herodotus which he could find in Charôn: the fact that he has produced none of any moment, tends to strengthen our faith in the historian of Halikarnassus, and to show that in the main his narrative was in accordance with that of Charôn.

² Herodot. i. 161–169.

³ Herodot. i. 168; Skymnus Chius, *Fragm.* v. 153; Dionys. *Perieg.* v. 553.

more striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting, since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the west. I have already described their adventurous exploring voyages of former days into the interior of the Adriatic, and along the whole northern and western coasts of the Mediterranean as far as Tartêssus (the region around and adjoining to Cadiz)—together with the favourable reception given to them by old Arganthônus, king of the country, who invited them to immigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering them the choice of any site which they might desire. His invitation was declined, though probably the Phôkæans may have subsequently regretted the refusal; and he then manifested his goodwill towards them by a large present to defray the expense of constructing fortifications round their town.¹ The walls, erected in part by this aid, were both extensive and well-built. Yet they could not hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them, while he was politic enough at

• ¹ Herodot. i. 163. 'Ο δὲ πυνθόμενος παρ' αὐτῶν τὸν Μῆδον ὥς αἰξοίτο, ἐδίδου σφι χρήματα τεῖχος περιβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν.

I do not understand why the commentators debate what or who is meant by τὸν Μῆδον: it plainly means the Median or Persian power generally: but the chronological difficulty is a real one, if we are to suppose that there was time between the first alarm conceived of the Median power by the Ionians, and the siege of Phôkæa by Harpagus, to inform Arganthônus of the circumstances, and to procure from him this large aid as well as to build the fortifications. The Ionic Greeks neither actually did conceive, nor had reason to conceive, any alarm respecting Persian power, until the arrival of Cyrus before Sardis; and within a month from that time Sardis was in his possession. If we are to suppose communication with Arganthônus grounded upon this circumstance, at the distance of Tartêssus and under the circumstances of ancient navigation, we must necessarily imagine also that the attack made by Harpagus upon Phôkæa (which city he assailed before any of the rest) was postponed for at least two or three years. Such postponement is not wholly impossible, yet it is not in the spirit of the Herodotean narrative, nor do I think it likely. It is much more probable that the informants of Herodotus made a

slip in chronology, and ascribed the donations of Arganthônus to a motive which did not really dictate them.

As to the fortifications (which Phôkæa and the other Ionic cities are reported to have erected after the conquest of Sardis by the Persians), the case may stand thus. While these cities were all independent, before they were first conquered by Croesus, they must undoubtedly have had fortifications. When Croesus conquered them, he directed the demolition of the fortifications; but demolition does not necessarily mean pulling down the entire walls: when one or a few breaches are made, the city is laid open, and the purpose of Croesus would thus be answered. Such may well have been the state of the Ionian cities at the time when they first thought it necessary to provide defences against the Persians at Sardis: they repaired and perfected the breached fortifications.

The conjecture of Larcher (see the Notes both of Larcher and Wesseling) —τὸν Λυδὸν instead of τὸν Μῆδον—is not an unreasonable one, if it had any authority: the donation of Arganthônus would then be transferred to the period anterior to the Lydian conquest: it would get rid of the chronological difficulty above adverted to, but it would introduce some new awkwardness into the narrative.

the same time to tempt them with offers of a moderate capitulation ; requiring only that they should breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers, and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token of subjection. To accept these terms was to submit themselves to the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that they would be observed. The Phôkæans, while they asked for one day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that during that day Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls. With this demand the latter complied, intimating at the same time that he saw clearly through the meaning of it. The Phôkæans, having determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town should not be shared by its inhabitants, employed their day of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on shipboard their wives and children as well as their furniture and the moveable decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving to the conqueror a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian garrison.¹

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios. At least when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians the neighbouring islands of Cænussæ as a permanent abode, the latter were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It was necessary to look farther for a settlement ; while Arganthônus, their protector, being now dead, Tartêssus was no longer inviting. Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of Corsica had been founded from Phôkæa by the direction of the oracle, and thither the general body of Phôkæans now resolved to repair. Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first sailed back to Phôkæa, surprised the Persian garrison whom Harpagus had left in the town, and slew them. They then sunk in the harbour a great lump of iron, binding themselves by a solemn and unanimous oath never again to see Phôkæa until that iron should come up to the surface. Nevertheless, in spite of the oath, the voyage of exile had been scarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having so bound themselves—and became home-sick.² They broke their vow and returned to Phôkæa. Yet since Herodotus does not mention any divine judgement as having

Emigration of the Phôkæans vowed by all, executed only by one half.

¹ Herodot. i. 164.

² Herodot. i. 165. *ὑπερημίσεας τῶν ἀστῶν ἔλαβε πόθος τε καὶ οἶκτος τῆς πόλιος καὶ τῶν ἡθέων τῆς χώρας· ψευδόρκιοί τε γενόμενοι, &c.* The colloquial term which I have ventured to place in the

text expresses exactly, as well as briefly, the meaning of the historian. A public oath, taken by most of the Greek cities with similar ceremony of lumps of iron thrown into the sea, is mentioned in Plutarch, Aristid. c. 25.

been consequent on the perjury, we may perhaps suspect that some grey-headed citizen, to whom transportation to Corsica might be little less than a sentence of death, both persuaded himself, and certified to his companions, that he had seen the sunken lump of iron raised up and floating for a while buoyant upon the waves. Harpagus must have been induced to pardon the previous slaughter of his Persian garrison, or at least to believe that it had been done by those Phôkæans who still persisted in exile. He wanted tribute-paying subjects, not an empty military post, and the repentant home-seekers were allowed to number themselves among the slaves of the Great King.

Meanwhile the smaller but more resolute half of the Phôkæans executed their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children, in sixty pentekontêrs or armed ships, and established themselves along with the previous settlers. They remained there for five years,¹ during which time their indiscriminate piracies had become so intolerable (even down to this time, piracy committed against a foreign vessel seems to have been practised frequently and without much disrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian sea-ports along the Mediterranean coast of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to put them down. There subsisted particular treaties between these two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preserved by Polybius between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B.C.) may be considered as a specimen.² Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuscan ships, attacking the sixty Phôkæan ships near Alalia, destroyed forty of them, yet not without such severe loss to themselves that the victory was said to be on the side of the latter; who however, in spite of this Kadmeian victory (so a battle was denominated in which the victors lost more than the vanquished), were compelled to carry back their remaining twenty vessels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives and families, in so far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium. At last these unhappy exiles found a permanent home by establishing the new settlement of Elea or Velia in the Gulf of Policastro, on the Italian coast (then called CEnôtrian) southward from Poseidônia or Pæstum. It is probable that they were here joined by other exiles from Ionia, in particular by the Kolophonian philosopher and poet Xenophanês, from whom what was afterwards called the Eleatic school of philosophy, distinguished both for bold consistency and dialectic acuteness, took its rise. The Phôkæan captives, taken

¹ Herodot. i. 166.

² Aristot. Polit. iii. 5, 11; Polyb. iii. 22.

prisoners in the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to death. But a divine judgement overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus, a century afterwards, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.¹

Such was the fate of the Phôkæan exiles, while their brethren at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the other Ionic and Æolic Greeks, except Samos and Milêtus. For even the insular inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea, since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce their independence and enrol themselves as Persian subjects—both of them possessing strips of the mainland which they were unable to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under the despotism of Polykratês, a higher degree of power than ever: perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have rather favoured the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn describes in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of marked despondency. One of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priênê, went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective emigration of the entire population of the Ionic towns to the island of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom (he urged) was now open to them in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed, which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbours. The proposition found no favour; the reason of which is sufficiently evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable local attachment on the part of the Phôkæan majority. But Herodotus bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation and regrets that it was not acted upon.² Had such been the case, the subsequent history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly altered.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants of Asia Minor—Karians, Kaurians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus and Hali-

Proposition of Bias for a Pan-Ionic emigration not adopted.

Entire conquest of Asia Minor by the Persians.

¹ Herodot. i. 167.

² Herodot. i. 170. Πυνθάνομαι γνώμην
βίαντα ἄνδρα Πριηνέα ἀποδέξασθαι Ἴωσι

χρησιμωτάτην, τῇ εἰ ἐπείθοντο, παρείχε-
αν σφι εὐδαιμονέειν Ἑλλήνων μάλιστα.

karnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle.¹ Neither Karians nor Kaunians offered any serious resistance. The Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate defence. Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it with their own hands; consuming in the flames their women, children and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to a man in combat with the enemy.² Such an act of brave and even ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting, however, the languid defence and easy submission of the Greeks of Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians and colonists from Sparta. The want of steadfast courage, often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or rather upon that mixture of indigenous with Hellenic population, which all the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies, presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable; for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even governed by a line of Karian despots.

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor; probably also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Croesus. The tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria, of which I shall speak in the coming chapter.

¹ Herodot. i. 174.

² Herodot. i. 176. The whole population of Xanthus perished, except eighty families accidentally absent: the subsequent occupants of the town were recruited from strangers. Nearly five

centuries afterwards, their descendants in the same city slew themselves in the like desperate and tragical manner, to avoid surrendering to the Roman army under Marcus Brutus (Plutarch, Brutus, c. 31).

CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

In the preceding chapter an account has been given, the best which we can pick out from Herodotus, of the steps by which the Asiatic Greeks became subject to Persia. If his narrative is meagre, on a matter which vitally concerned not only so many of his brother Greeks, but even his own native city, we can hardly expect that he should tell us much respecting the other conquests of Cyrus. He seems to withhold intentionally various details which had come to his knowledge, and merely intimates in general terms that while Harpagus was engaged on the coast of the Ægean, Cyrus himself assailed and subdued all the nations of Upper Asia, "not omitting any one of them."¹ He alludes to the Baktrians and the Sakæ,² who are also named by Ktésias as having become subject partly by force, partly by capitulation. But he deems only two of the exploits of Cyrus worthy of special notice—the conquest of Babylon, and the final expedition against the Massagetæ. In the short abstract which we now possess of the lost work of Ktésias, no mention appears of the important conquest of Babylon. His narrative, indeed, as far as the abstract enables us to follow it, diverges materially from that of Herodotus, and must have been founded on data altogether different.

"I shall mention (says Herodotus)³ those conquests which gave Cyrus most trouble, and are most memorable: after he had subdued all the rest of the continent, he attacked the Assyrians." Those who recollect the description of Babylon and its surrounding territory, as given in a former chapter, will not be surprised to learn that the capture of it gave the Persian aggressor much trouble. Their only surprise will be, how it could ever have been taken at all—or indeed how a hostile army could have even reached it. Herodotus informs us that the Babylonian queen Nitôkris (mother of that very Labynêtus who was king when Cyrus attacked the place) apprehensive of invasion from the

¹ Herodot. i. 177.² Herodot. i. 153.³ Herodot. i. 177. τὰ δὲ οἱ πάρεσχε

πόνον τε πλεῖστον, καὶ ἀξιαπληγυτάτα
ἐστὶ, τούτων ἐπιμνήσομαι.

Medes after their capture of Nineveh, had executed many laborious works near the Euphratês for the purpose of obstructing their approach. Moreover there existed what was called the wall of Media (probably built by her, but certainly built prior to the Persian conquest), one hundred feet high and twenty feet thick,¹ across the entire space of seventy-five miles which joined the Tigris with one of the canals of the Euphratês: while the canals themselves, as we may see by the march of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, presented means of defence altogether insuperable by a rude army such as that of the Persians. On the east, the territory of Babylonia was defended by the Tigris, which cannot be forded lower than the ancient Nineveh or the modern Mosul.² In addition to these ramparts, natural as well as artificial, to protect the territory—populous, cultivated, productive, and offering every motive to its inhabitants to resist even the entrance of an enemy—we are told that the Babylonians were so thoroughly prepared for the inroad of Cyrus that they had accumulated within their walls a store of provisions for many years. Strange as it may seem, we must suppose that the king of Babylon, after all the cost and labour spent in providing defences for the territory, voluntarily neglected to avail himself of them, suffered the invader to tread down the fertile Babylonia without resistance, and merely drew out the citizens to oppose

Difficult
approach to
Babylon—no
resistance
made to the
invaders.

¹ See Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 7, 15; ii. 4, 12. For the inextricable difficulties in which the Ten Thousand Greeks were involved, after the battle of Kunaxa, and the insurmountable obstacles which impeded their march, assuming any resisting force whatever, see Xenoph. *Anab.* ii. 1, 11; ii. 2, 3; ii. 3, 10; ii. 4, 12, 13. These obstacles doubtless served as a protection to them against attack, not less than as an impediment to their advance; and the well-supplied villages enabled them to obtain plenty of provisions: hence the anxiety of the Great King to help them across the Tigris out of Babylonia. But it is not easy to see how, in the face of such difficulties, any invading army could reach Babylon.

Ritter represents the wall of Media as having reached across from the Euphratês to the Tigris at the point where they come nearest together, about 200 stadia or twenty-five miles across. But it is nowhere stated, so far as I can find, that this wall reached to the Euphratês—still less that its length was 200 stadia, for the passages of Strabo cited by Rit-

ter do not prove either point (ii. 80; xi. 529). And Xenophon (ii. 4, 12) gives the length of the wall as I have stated it in the text, = 20 parasangs = 600 stadia = 75 miles.

The passage of the *Anabasis* (i. 7, 15) seems to connect the Median wall with the canals, and not with the river Euphratês. The narrative of Herodotus (as I have remarked in a former chapter) leads us to suppose that he descended that river to Babylon; and if we suppose that the wall did not reach the Euphratês, this would afford some reason why he makes no mention of it. See Ritter, *West-Asien*, b. iii. *Abtheilung* iii. *Abschn.* i. *sect.* 29. p. 19-22.

² 'Ο Τίγρης μέγας τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ διαβατὸς ἐς τε ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκβολήν (*Arrian* vii. 7, 7). By which he means, that it is not fordable below the ancient Nineveh or Mosul; for a little above that spot, Alexander himself forded it with his army, a few days before the battle of Arbêla—not without very great difficulty (*Arrian*, iii. 7, 8; *Diodor.* xvii 55).

him when he arrived under the walls of the city—if the statement of Herodotus is correct.¹ And we may illustrate this unaccountable omission by that which we know to have happened in the march of the younger Cyrus to Kunaxa against his brother Artaxerxês Mnêmon. The latter had caused to be dug, expressly in preparation for this invasion, a broad and deep ditch (thirty feet wide and eight feet deep) from the wall of Media to the river Euphratês, a distance of twelve parasangs or forty-five English miles, leaving only a passage of twenty feet broad close alongside of the river. Yet when the invading army arrived at this important pass, they found not a man there to defend it, and all of them marched without resistance through the narrow inlet. Cyrus the younger, who had up to that moment felt assured that his brother would fight, now supposed that he had given up the idea of defending Babylon:² instead of which, two days afterwards, Artaxerxês attacked him on an open plain of ground where there was no advantage of position on either side; though the invaders were taken rather unawares in consequence of their extreme confidence arising from recent unopposed entrance within the artificial ditch. This anecdote is the more valuable as an illustration, because all its circumstances are transmitted to us by a discerning eye-witness. And both the two incidents here brought into comparison demonstrate the recklessness, changefulness, and incapacity of calculation, belonging to the Asiatic mind of that day—as well as the great command of hands possessed by these kings, and their prodigal waste of human labour.³ We shall see, as we advance in this history, farther evidences of the same attributes, which it is essential to bear in mind, for the purpose of appreciating both Grecian dealing with Asiatics, and the comparative absence of such defects in the Grecian character. Vast walls and deep ditches are an inestimable aid to a brave and well-commanded garrison; but they cannot be made entirely to supply the want of bravery and intelligence.

In whatever manner the difficulties of approaching Babylon may have been overcome, the fact that they were overcome by Cyrus is certain. On first setting out for this conquest, he was about to cross the river Gyndês (one of the

Cyrus distributes the river Gyndês into many channels.

¹ Herodot. i. 190. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο ἐλαύνων ἀγχοῦ τῆς πόλιος, συνέβαλόν τε οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι, καὶ ἐσσωθέντες τῇ μάχῃ, κατελήθησαν ἐς τὸ ἔστυ.

Just as if Babylon was as easy to be approached as Sardis.—About the provisions, οἳ τε ἐπιστάμενοι ἔτι πρότερον τὸν Κύρον οὐκ ἀτρεμίζοντα, ἀλλ' ὀρέοντες αὐτὸν παντὶ ὁμοίως ἔθνεϊ ἐπιχειρόντα,

προεσάξαντο σίτια ἐτέων κάρτα πολλῶν.

² Xenophon, Anab. i. 7, 14–20; Diodor. xiv. 22; Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 7. I follow Xenophon without hesitation, where he differs from these two latter.

³ Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 3, 26, about the πολυχειρία of the barbaric kings.

affluents from the East which joins the Tigris near the modern Bagdad, and along which lay the high road crossing the pass of Mount Zagros from Babylon to Ekbatana), when one of the sacred white horses, which accompanied him, entered the river in pure wantonness and tried to cross it by himself.¹ The Gyndês resented this insult and the horse was drowned: upon which Cyrus swore in his wrath that he would so break the strength of the river as that women in future should pass it without wetting their knees. Accordingly he employed his entire army, during the whole summer season, in digging three hundred and sixty artificial channels to disseminate the unity of the stream. Such, according to Herodotus, was the incident which postponed for one year the fall of the great Babylon. But in the next spring Cyrus and his army were before the walls, after having defeated and driven in the population who came out to fight. These walls were artificial mountains (three hundred feet high, seventy-five feet thick, and forming a square of fifteen miles to each side), within which the besieged defied attack, and even blockade, having previously stored up several years' provision. Through the midst of the town, however, flowed the Euphratês. That river, which had been so laboriously trained to serve for protection, trade, and sustenance to the Babylonians, was now made the avenue of their ruin. Having left a detachment of his army at the two points where the Euphratês enters and quits the city, Cyrus retired with the remainder to the higher part of its course, where an ancient Babylonian queen had prepared one of the great lateral reservoirs for carrying off in case of need the superfluity of its water. Near this point

He takes
Babylon, by
drawing off
for a time
the waters
of the Eu-
phrates.

Cyrus caused another reservoir and another canal of communication to be dug, by means of which he drew off the water of the Euphratês to such a degree that it

became not above the height of a man's thigh. The

period chosen was that of a great Babylonian festival, when the whole population were engaged in amusement and revelry. The Persian troops left near the town, watching their opportunity, entered from both sides along the bed of the river, and took it by surprise with scarcely any resistance. At no other time, except during a festival, could they have done this (says Herodotus) had the river been ever so low; for both banks throughout the whole length of the town were provided with quays, with continuous walls,

¹ Herodot. i. 189-202. ἐνθαῦτα οἱ τῶν τις ἱρῶν ἱππῶν τῶν λευκῶν ὑπὸ ὕβριος ἐσβὰς εἰς τὸν πόταμον, διαβαίνειν ἐπει- | ρᾶτο. . . . Κάρτα τε ἐχαλέπαινε τῷ πο- | τάμῳ ὁ Κῦρος τοῦτο ὑβρίσαντι, &c.

and with gates at the end of every street which led down to the river at right angles; so that if the population had not been disqualified by the influences of the moment, they would have caught the assailants in the bed of the river "as in a trap," and overwhelmed them from the walls alongside. Within a square of fifteen miles to each side, we are not surprised to hear that both the extremities were already in the power of the besiegers before the central population heard of it, and while they were yet absorbed in unconscious festivity.¹

Such is the account given by Herodotus of the circumstances which placed Babylon—the greatest city of Western Asia—in the power of the Persians. To what extent the information communicated to him was incorrect or exaggerated, we cannot now decide. The way in which the city was treated would lead us to suppose that its acquisition cannot have cost the conqueror either much time or much loss. Cyrus comes into the list as king of Babylon, and the inhabitants with their whole territory become tributary to the Persians, forming the richest satrapy in the empire; but we do not hear that the people were otherwise ill-used, and it is certain that the vast walls and gates were left untouched. This was very different from the way in which the Medes had treated Nineveh, which seems to have been ruined and for a long time absolutely uninhabited, though re-occupied on a reduced scale under the Parthian empire; and very different also from the way in which Babylon itself was treated twenty years afterwards by Darius, when reconquered after a revolt.

Babylon left
in undi-
minished
strength and
population.

¹ Herodot. i. 191. This latter portion of the story, if we may judge from the expression of Herodotus, seems to excite more doubt in his mind than all the rest, for he thinks it necessary to add, "as the residents at Babylon say," ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων. Yet if we assume the size of the place to be what he has affirmed, there seems nothing remarkable in the fact that the people in the centre did not at once hear of the capture; for the first business of the assailants would be to possess themselves of the walls and gates. It is a lively illustration of prodigious magnitude, and as such it is given by Aristotle (Polit. iii. 1, 12); who however exaggerates it by giving as a report that the inhabitants in the centre did not hear of the capture until the third day. No such exaggeration as this appears in Herodotus.

Xenophon, in the Cyropædia (vii. 5,

7-18), following the story that Cyrus drained off the Euphrates, represents it as effected in a manner differing from Herodotus. According to him, Cyrus dug two vast and deep ditches, one on each side round the town, from the river above the town to the river below it: watching the opportunity of a festival day in Babylon, he let the water into both of these side ditches, which fell into the main stream again below the town: hence the main stream in its passage through the town became nearly dry. The narrative of Xenophon, however, betrays itself as not having been written from information received on the spot, like that of Herodotus; for he talks of *ai áκραι* of Babylon, just as he speaks of the *áκραι* of the hill-towns of Karia (compare Cyropædia, vii. 4, 1, 7, with vii. 5, 34). There were no *áκραι* on the dead flat of Babylon.

The importance of Babylon, marking as it does one of the peculiar forms of civilization belonging to the ancient world in a state of full development, gives an interest even to the half-authenticated stories respecting its capture. The other exploits ascribed to Cyrus—his invasion of India, across the desert of Arachosia¹—and his attack upon the Massagetæ, Nomads ruled by queen Tomyris and greatly resembling the Scythians, across the mysterious river which Herodotus calls Araxês—are too little known to be at all dwelt upon. In the latter he is said to have perished, his army being defeated in a bloody battle.² He was buried at Pasargadæ, in his native province of Persis proper, where his tomb was honoured and watched until the breaking up of the empire,³ while his memory was held in profound veneration among the Persians. Of his real exploits we know little or nothing, but in what we read respecting him there seems, though amidst constant fighting, very little cruelty. Xenophon has selected his life as the subject of a moral romance, which for a long time was cited as authentic history, and which even now serves as an authority, express or implied, for disputable and even incorrect conclusions. His extraordinary activity and conquests admit of no doubt. He left the Persian empire⁴ extending from Sogdiana and the rivers Jaxartês and Indus eastward, to the Hellespont and the Syrian coast westward, and his successors made no permanent addition to it except that of Egypt. Phenicia and Judæa were dependencies of Babylon, at the time when he conquered it, with their princes and grandees in Babylonian captivity. As they seem to have yielded to him, and become his tributaries,⁵ without difficulty; so the restoration of their captives was conceded to them. It was from Cyrus that the habits of the Persian kings took commencement, to dwell at Susa in the winter, and Ekbatana during the summer; the primitive territory of Persis, with its two towns of Persepolis and Pasargadæ, being reserved for the burial-place of the kings and the religious sanctuary of the empire. How or when the conquest of Susiana was made, we are not informed. It lay eastward of the Tigris, between Babylonia and Persis proper, and

Cyrus attacks the Massagetæ—is defeated and slain.

¹ Arrian, vi. 24, 4.

² Herodot. i. 205–214; Arrian, v. 4, 14; Justin, i. 8; Strabo, xi. p. 512.

According to Ktésias, Cyrus was slain in an expedition against the Derbikes, a people in the Caucasian regions—though his army afterwards prove victorious and conquer the country (Ktesisæ Persica, c. 8–9)—see the comment of Bähr on the passage in his edition of Ktésias.

³ Strabo, xv. p. 730, 731; Arrian, vi. 29.

⁴ The town Kyra, or Kyropolis, on the river Sihon or Jaxartês, was said to have been founded by Cyrus—it was destroyed by Alexander (Strabo, xi. p. 517, 518; Arrian, iv. 2, 2; Curtius, vii. 6, 16).

⁵ Herodot. iii. 19.

its people, the Kissians, as far as we can discern, were of Assyrian and not of Arian race. The river Choaspês near Susa was supposed to furnish the only water fit for the palate of the Great King, and is said to have been carried about with him wherever he went.¹

While the conquests of Cyrus contributed to assimilate the distinct types of civilization in Western Asia—not by elevating the worse, but by degrading the better—upon the native Persians themselves they operated as an extraordinary stimulus, provoking alike their pride, ambition, cupidity, and warlike propensities. Not only did the territory of Persis proper pay no tribute to Susa or Ekbatana—being the only district so exempted between the Jaxartês and the Mediterranean—but the vast tributes received from the remaining empire were distributed to a great degree among its inhabitants. Empire to them meant—for the great men, lucrative satrapies or pachalics, with powers altogether unlimited, pomp inferior only to that of the Great King, and standing armies which they employed at their own discretion sometimes against each other²—for the common soldiers, drawn from their fields or flocks, constant plunder, abundant maintenance, and an unrestrained licence, either in the suite of one of the satraps, or in the large permanent troop which moved from Susa to Ekbatana with the Great King. And if the entire population of Persis proper did not migrate from their abodes to occupy some of those more inviting spots which the immensity of the imperial dominion furnished—a dominion extending (to use the language of Cyrus the younger before the battle of Kunaxa)³ from the region of insupportable heat to that of insupportable cold—this was only because the early kings discouraged such a movement, in order that the nation might maintain its military hardihood⁴ and be in a situation to furnish undiminished supplies of soldiers. The self-esteem and arrogance of the Persians were no less remarkable than their avidity for sensual enjoyment. They were fond of wine to excess: their wives and their concubines were both numerous; and they adopted eagerly from foreign nations new fashions of luxury as well as of ornament. Even to novelties in religion, they were not strongly averse. For though disciples of Zoroaster, with Magi as their priests and as indispensable companions of their sacrifices, worshipping Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, &c.,

Extraordinary stimulus to the Persians, from the conquests of Cyrus.

Character of the Persians.

¹ Herodot. i. 188; Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 3; Diodor. xvii. 71.

² Xenophon, Anab. i. 1, 8.

³ Xenophon, Anab. i. 7, 6; Cyropæd. viii. 6, 19.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 122.

and recognising neither image, temple, nor altar—yet they had adopted the voluptuous worship of the goddess Mylitta from the Assyrians and Arabians. A numerous male offspring was the Persian's boast. His warlike character and consciousness of force were displayed in the education of these youths, who were taught, from five years old to twenty, only three things—to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth.¹ To owe money, or even to buy and sell, was accounted among the Persians disgraceful—a sentiment which they defended by saying that both the one and the other imposed the necessity of telling falsehood. To exact tribute from subjects, to receive pay or presents from the king, and to give away without forethought whatever was not immediately wanted, was their mode of dealing with money. Industrious pursuits were left to the conquered, who were fortunate if by paying a fixed contribution, and sending a military contingent when required, they could purchase undisturbed immunity for their remaining concerns.² They could not thus purchase safety for the family hearth, since we find instances of noble Grecian maidens torn from their parents for the harem of the satrap.³

To a people of this character, whose conceptions of political society went no farther than personal obedience to a chief, a conqueror like Cyrus would communicate the strongest excitement and enthusiasm of which they were capable. He had found them slaves, and made them masters: he was the first and greatest of national benefactors,⁴ as well as the most forward of leaders in the field: they followed him from one conquest to another, during the thirty years of his reign, their love of empire growing with the empire itself. And this impulse of aggrandisement continued unabated during the reigns of his three next successors—Kambysês, Darius, and Xerxês—until it was at length violently stifled by the humiliating defeats of Plataea and Salamis; after which the Persians became content with defending themselves at home and playing a secon-

Thirst for foreign conquest among the Persians, for three reigns after Cyrus.

¹ The modern Persians at this day exhibit almost matchless skill in shooting with the firelock, as well as with the bow, on horseback—see Sir John Malcolm, *Sketches of Persia*, ch. xvii. p. 201; see also Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, p. 32.

² About the attributes of the Persian character, see Herodot. i. 131-140: compare i. 153.

He expresses himself very strongly as to the facility with which the Persians imbibed foreign customs, and

especially foreign luxuries (i. 135)—*ξεινικά δὲ νόμια Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα—καὶ εὐπαθείας τε παντοδαπὰς πυνθανόμενοι ἐπιτηδεύουσι.*

That rigid tenacity of customs and exclusiveness of tastes, which mark the modern Orientals, appear to be of the growth of Mahometanism, and to distinguish them greatly from the old Zoroastrian Persians.

³ Herodot. ix. 76; Plutarch, *Artaxerx.* c. 26.

⁴ Herodot. i. 210; iii. 159.

dary game. But at the time when Kambysês son of Cyrus succeeded to his father's sceptre, Persian spirit was at its highest point. He was not long in fixing upon a prey both richer and less hazardous than the Massagetæ, at the opposite extremity of the empire. Phenicia and Judæa being already subject to him, he resolved to invade Egypt, then highly flourishing under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis. Not much pretence was needed to colour the aggression; so that the various stories which Herodotus mentions as causes of the war, are only interesting inasmuch as they imply a vein of Egyptian party-feeling—affirming that the invasion was brought upon Amasis by a daughter of Apriês, and was thus a judgement upon Amasis for having deposed Apriês. As to the manner in which the daughter had produced this effect, indeed, the most contradictory stories were circulated.¹

Kambysês summoned the forces of his empire for this new enterprise, and among them both the Phenicians and the Asiatic Greeks, Æolic as well as Ionic,² insular as well as continental—nearly all the maritime force and skill of the Ægean Sea. He was apprised by a Greek deserter from the mercenaries in Egypt, named Phanês, of the difficulties of the march, and the best method of surmounting them; especially the three days of sandy desert, altogether without water, which lay between Egypt and Judæa. By the aid of the neighbouring Arabians—with whom he concluded a treaty, and who were requited for this service with the title of equal allies, free from all tribute—he was enabled to surmount this serious difficulty, and to reach Pelusium at the eastern mouth of the Nile, where the Ionian and Karian troops in the Egyptian service, as well as the Egyptian military, were assembled to oppose him.³

B.C. 525.

Kambysês
succeeds his
father Cyrus
—his inva-
sion of Egypt.

Fortunately for himself, the Egyptian king Amasis had died during the interval of the Persian preparations, a few months before the expedition took place—after forty-four years of unabated prosperity. His death, at this critical moment, was probably the main cause of the easy conquest which followed; his son Psammenitus succeeding to his crown, but neither to his abilities nor his influence. The result of the invasion was foreshadowed, as usual, by

Death of
Amasis king
of Egypt,
at the time
when the
Persian ex-
pedition
was pre-
paring—his
son Psam-
menitus suc-
ceeds.

¹ Herodot. iii. 1-4.

² Herodot. iii. 1, 19, 44.

³ The narrative of Ktésias is, in respect both to the Egyptian expedition and to the other incidents of Persian history, quite different in its details from that of Herodotus, agreeing only in the main events (Ktésias, Persica, c.

7). To blend the two together is impossible.

Tacitus (Histor. i. 11) notes the difficulty of approach for an invading army to Egypt — “Ægyptum, provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione ac lasciviâ discordem et mobilem,” &c.

a menacing prodigy—rain falling at Thebes in Upper Egypt—
 Conquest of Egypt by Kamby&eas. It was brought about by a single victory, though bravely
 disputed, at Pelusium,—followed by the capture of Mem—
 phis with the person of king Psammenitus, after a siege of some
 duration. Kamby&es had sent forward a Mitylen&ean ship to Mem—
 phis, with heralds to summon the city. The Egyptians, in a
 paroxysm of fury, rushed out of the walls, destroyed the vessel,
 and tore the crew into pieces—a savage proceeding which drew
 upon them severe retribution after the capture. Psammenitus,
 after being at first treated with harshness and insult, was at length
 released and even allowed to retain his regal dignity as a dependent
 of Persia. But being soon detected, or at least believed to be con—
 cerned, in raising revolt against the conquerors, he was put to
 death, and Egypt was placed under a satrap.¹

Submission of Kyr&en& and Barka to Kamby&es—his projects for conquering Libya and Ethiopia disappointed. There yet lay beyond Egypt territories for the Persians to con—
 quer, though Kyr&en& and Barka, the Greek colonies near
 the coast of Libya, placed themselves at once out of the
 reach of danger by sending to Kamby&es tribute and
 submission at Memphis. He projected three new enter—
 prises: one against Carthage, by sea; the other two, by
 land—against the Ethiopians, far to the southward up
 the course of the Nile—and against the oracle and Oasis of Zeus
 Ammon, amidst the deserts of Libya. Towards Ethiopia he
 himself conducted his troops, but was compelled to bring them
 back without reaching it, since they were on the point of perishing
 with famine; while the division which he sent against the temple
 of Ammon is said to have been overwhelmed by a sand-storm in
 the desert. The expedition against Carthage was given up, for a
 reason which well deserves to be commemorated. The Phenicians,
 who formed the most efficient part of his navy, refused to serve
 against their kinsmen and colonists, pleading the sanctity of mutual
 oaths as well as the ties both of relationship and traffic.² Even
 the frantic Kamby&es was compelled to accept, and perhaps to
 respect, this honourable refusal; which was not imitated by the
 Ionic Greeks when Darius and Xerx&es demanded the aid of their
 ships against Athens—we must add, however, that they were then
 in a situation much more exposed and helpless than that in which
 the Phenicians stood before Kamby&es.

Among the sacred animals so numerous and so different through—
 out the various nomes of Egypt, the most venerated of all was
 the bull Apis. Such peculiar conditions were required by the

¹ Herodot. iii. 10–16. About the | see iii. c. 5, 88–91.
 Arabians, between Jud&ea and Egypt, | ² Herodot. iii. 19.

Egyptian religion as to the birth, the age, and the marks of this animal, that when he died, it was difficult to find a new calf properly qualified to succeed him. Much time was sometimes spent in the search, and when an unexceptionable successor was at last found, the demonstrations of joy in Memphis were extravagant and universal. At the moment when Kambyssês returned to Memphis from his Ethiopian expedition, full of humiliation for the result, it so happened that a new Apis was just discovered; and as the population of the city gave vent to their usual festive pomp and delight, he construed it into an intentional insult towards his own recent misfortunes. In vain did the priests and magistrates explain to him the real cause of these popular manifestations. He persisted in his belief, punished some of them with death and others with stripes, and commanded every man seen in holiday attire to be slain. Farthermore—to carry his outrage against Egyptian feeling to the uttermost pitch—he sent for the newly-discovered Apis, and plunged his dagger into the side of the animal, who shortly afterwards died of the wound.¹

After this brutal deed—calculated to efface in the minds of the Egyptian priests the enormities of Cheops and Chephrên, and doubtless unparalleled in all the 24,000 years of their anterior history—Kambyssês lost every spark of reason which yet remained to him. The Egyptians found in this visitation a new proof of the avenging interference of their gods. Not only did he commit every variety of studied outrage against the conquered people among whom he was tarrying, as well as their temples and their sepulchres—but he also dealt his blows against his Persian friends and even his nearest blood-relations. Among these revolting atrocities, one of the greatest deserves peculiar notice, because the fate of the empire was afterwards materially affected by it. His younger brother Smerdis had accompanied him into Egypt, but had been sent back to Susa, because the king became jealous of the admiration which his personal strength and qualities called forth.² That jealousy was aggravated into alarm and hatred by a dream portending dominion and conquest to Smerdis, and the frantic Kambyssês sent to Susa secretly a confidential Persian, Prexaspês, with express orders to get rid of his brother. Prexaspês fulfilled his commission effec-

Insults of
Kambyssês to
the Egyptian
religion.

Madness of
Kambyssês—
he puts to
death his
younger brother
Smerdis.

¹ Herodot. iii. 29.

² Ktésias calls the brother Tanyoxarkês, and says that Cyrus had left him satrap, without tribute, of Baktria and the neighbouring regions (Persica, c.

8). Xenophon in the Cyropædia also calls him Tanyoxarkês, but gives him a different satrapy (Cyropæd. viii. 7, 11).

tively, burying the slain prince with his own hands,¹ and keeping the deed concealed from all except a few of the chiefs at the royal residence.

Among these few chiefs, however, there was one, the Median Patizeithês, belonging to the order of the Magi, who saw in it a convenient stepping-stone for his own personal ambition, and made use of it as a means of covertly supplanting the dynasty of the great Cyrus. Enjoying the full confidence of Kambyssês, he had been left by the prince on departing for Egypt in the entire management of the palace and treasures, with extensive authority.² Moreover he happened to have a brother extremely resembling in person the deceased Smerdis. As the open and dangerous madness of Kambyssês contributed to alienate from him the minds of the Persians, Patizeithês resolved to proclaim this brother as king in his room as if it were the younger son of Cyrus succeeding to the disqualified elder. On one important point, the false Smerdis differed from the true. He had lost his ears, which Cyrus himself had caused to be cut off for an offence; but the personal resemblance, after all, was of little importance, since he was seldom or never allowed to show himself to the people.³ Kambyssês heard of this revolt in Syria on his return from Egypt. He was mounting his horse in haste for the purpose of going to suppress it when an accident from his sword put an end to his life. Herodotus tells us that before his death he summoned the Persians around him, confessed that he had been guilty of putting his brother to death, and apprised them that the reigning Smerdis was only Median pretender—conjuring them at the same time not to submit to the disgrace of being ruled by any other than a Persian and an Achæmenid. But if it be true that he ever made known the facts, no one believed him. For Prexaspês on his part was compelled by regard to his own safety, to deny that he had imbrued his hands in the blood of a son of Cyrus;⁴ and thus the opportune death of Kambyssês placed the false Smerdis without opposition at the head of the Persians, who all, or for the most part, believed themselves to be ruled by a genuine son of Cyrus. Kambyssês had reigned for seven years and five months.

¹ Herodot. iii. 30–62.

² Herodot. iii. 61–63.

³ Herodot. iii. 68–69.—“*Auribus decisis vivere jubet*,” says Tacitus about a case under the Parthian government

(Annal. xii. 14)—and the Turkish authorities have not given up the infliction of it at the present moment, or at least down to a very recent period.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 64–66.

For seven months did Smerdis reign without opposition, seconded by his brother Patizeithês. If he manifested his distrust of the haughty Persians around him by neither inviting them into his palace nor showing himself out of it, he at the same time studiously conciliated the favour of the subject-provinces, by remission of tribute and of military service for three years.¹ Such a departure from the Persian principle of government was in itself sufficient to disgust the warlike and rapacious Achæmenids at Susa ; but it seems that their suspicions as to his genuine character had never been entirely set at rest, and in the eighth month those suspicions were converted into certainty. According to what seems to have been the Persian usage, he had taken to himself the entire harem of his predecessor, among whose wives was numbered Phædymê, daughter of a distinguished Persian named Otanês. At the instance of her father, Phædymê undertook the dangerous task of feeling the head of Smerdis while he slept, and thus detected the absence of ears.² Otanês, possessed of the decisive information, lost no time in concerting, with five other noble Achæmenids, means for ridding themselves of a king who was at once a Mede, a Magian, and a man without ears ;³ Darius, son of Hystaspês the satrap of Persis proper, arriving just in time to join the conspiracy as the seventh. How these seven noblemen slew Smerdis in his palace at Susa—how they subsequently debated among themselves whether they should establish in Persia a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—how, after the first of the three had been resolved upon, it was determined that the future king, whichever he might be, should be bound to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators—how Darius became king from the circumstance of his horse being the first to neigh among those of the conspirators at a given spot, by the stratagem of the groom Œbarês—how Otanês, standing aside beforehand from this lottery for the throne, reserved for himself as well as for his descendants perfect freedom and exemption from the rule of the future king, whichever might draw the prize—all these incidents may be found recounted by Herodotus with his usual vivacity, but with no small addition of Hellenic ideas as well as of dramatic ornament.

It was thus that the upright tiara, the privileged head-dress of

B.C. 521.

Reign of the false Smerdis—conspiracy of the seven Persian noblemen against him—he is slain—Darius succeeds to the throne.

¹ Herodot. iii. 67.

² Herodot. iii. 68–69.

³ Herodot. iii. 69–73. ἀρχόμεθα μὲν ἴδοντες Πέρσαι, ὑπὸ Μήδου ἀνδρὸς μάγου, καὶ τούτου ἄτα οὐκ ἔχοντος.

Compare the description of the insupportable repugnance of the Greeks of Kyrênê to be governed by the lame Battus (Herodot. iv. 161).

the Persian kings,¹ passed away from the lineage of Cyrus, yet without departing from the great phratry of the Achæmenidæ—to which Darius and his father Hystaspês, as well as Cyrus, belonged. That important fact is unquestionable, and probably the acts ascribed to the seven conspirators are in the main true, apart from their discussions and intentions. But, on this as well as on other occasions, we must guard ourselves against an illusion which the historical manner of Herodotus is apt to create. He presents to us with so much descriptive force the personal narrative—individual action and speech, with all its accompanying hopes, fears, doubts and passions—that our attention is distracted from the political bearing of what is going on; which we are compelled often to gather up from hints in the speeches of performers, or from consequences afterwards indirectly noticed. When we put together all the incidental notices which he lets drop, it will be found that the change of sceptre from Smerdis to Darius was a far larger political event than his direct narrative would seem to announce. Smerdis represents preponderance to the Medes over the Persians, and comparative degradation to the latter; who, by the installation of Darius, are again placed in the ascendent. The Medes and the Magians are in this case identical; for the Magians, though indispensable in the capacity of priests to the Persians, were essentially one of the seven Median tribes.² It thus appears that though Smerdis ruled as a son of the great Cyrus, yet he ruled by means of Medes and Magians, depriving the Persians of that supreme privilege and predominance to which they had become accustomed.³ We see this by what followed immediately after the assassination of Smerdis and his brother in the palace. The seven conspirators,

Political bearing of this conspiracy—Smerdis represents Median preponderance, which is again put down by Darius.

¹ Compare Aristophan. Aves, 487, with the Scholia, and Herodot. vii. 61; Arrian, iv. 6, 29. The cap of the Persians generally was loose, low, clinging about the head in folds; that of the king was high and erect above the head. See the notes of Wesseling and Schweighhäuser upon *πίλοι ἀπαγέες* in Herodot. l. c.

² Herodot. i. 101–120.

³ In the speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Kambysês on his death-bed, addressed to the Persians around him in a strain of prophetic adjuration (iii. 65), he says—*Καὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τάδε ἐπισκῆπτω, θεοὺς τοὺς βασιλῆτους ἐπικαλέων, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν καὶ μάλιστα Ἀχαιμενιδέων τοῖσι παροῦσι, μὴ*

περιῦδεῖν τὴν ἡγεμονίην αὐτῆς ἐς Μήδους περιελθοῦσαν· ἀλλ' εἴτε δόλῳ ἔχουσι αὐτὴν κτησάμενοι (the personification of the deceased son of Cyrus), *δόλῳ ἀπαρεθῆναι ὑπὸ ὑμέων· εἴτε καὶ σθένει τεφ κατεργασάμενοι, σθένει κατὰ τὸ κάρτερον ἀνασώσασθαι* (the forcible opposition of the Medes to Darius, which he put down by superior force on the Persian side): compare the speech of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 73), and that of Prexaspês (iii. 75); also Plato, Legg. iii. 12. p. 695.

Heeren has taken a correct view of the reign of Smerdis the Magian and its political character (*Ideen über den Verkehr, &c. der Alten Welt*, part i. abth. i. p. 431).

exhibiting the bloody heads of both these victims as an evidence of their deed, instigated the Persians in Susa to a general massacre of the Magians, many of whom were actually slain, and the rest only escaped by flight, concealment, or the hour of night. And the anniversary of this day was celebrated afterwards among the Persians by a solemnity and festival, called the Magophonia; no Magian being ever allowed on that day to appear in public.¹ The descendants of the Seven maintained a privileged name and rank,² even down to the extinction of the monarchy by Alexander the Great.

Furthermore, it appears that the authority of Darius was not readily acknowledged throughout the empire, and that an interval of confusion ensued before it became so.³ The Medes actually revolted, and tried to maintain themselves by force against Darius, who however found means to subdue them: though when he convoked his troops from the various provinces, he did not receive from the satraps universal obedience. The powerful Oroëtês especially, who had been appointed by Cyrus satrap of Lydia and Ionia, not only sent no troops to the aid of Darius against the Medes,⁴ but even took advantage of the disturbed state of the government to put to death his private enemy Mitrobatês satrap of Phrygia, and appropriate that satrapy in addition to his own. Aryandês also, the satrap nominated by Kambyssês in Egypt, comported himself as the equal of Darius rather than as his subject.⁵ The subject provinces generally, to whom Smerdis had granted remission of tribute and military service for the space of three years, were grateful and attached to his memory, and noway pleased with the new dynasty. Moreover the

Revolt of the Medes—suppressed. Discontents of the satraps.

¹ Herodot. iii. 79. Σπασόμενοι δὲ τὰ ἐγχειρίδια, ἐκτεινον δκου τινα μάγον εὐρισκον· εἰ δὲ μὴ νύξ ἐπελθοῦσα ἔσχε, ἔλιπον ἂν οὐδένα μάγον. Ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην θεραπεύουσι Πέρσαι κοινῇ μάλιστα τῶν ἡμερέων· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὀρτὴν μεγάλην ἀνάγουσι, ἣ κέκληται ὑπὸ Περσέων Μαγοφόνια.

The periodical celebration of the Magophonia is attested by Ktésias—one of the few points of complete agreement with Herodotus. He farther agrees in saying that a Magian usurped the throne, through likeness of person to the deceased son of Cyrus, whom Kambyssês had slain—but all his other statements differ from Herodotus (Ktésias, 10–14).

² Even at the battle of Arbela—“Summæ Orsines præerat, a septem Persis oriundus, ad Cyrum quoque,

nobilissimum regem, originem sui referens.” (Quintus Curtius, iv. 12, 7, or iv. 45, 7, Zumpt): compare Strabo, xi. p. 531; Florus, iii. 5, 1.

³ Herodot. iii. 127. Δαρεῖος—ἄτε οἰδεόντων οἱ ἔτι τῶν πρηγμάτων, &c.—mention of the ταραχή (iii. 126, 150).

⁴ Herodot. iii. 126. Μετὰ γὰρ τὸν Καμβύσεω θάνατον, καὶ τῶν Μάγων τὴν βασιλητὴν, μένων ἐν τῇσι Σάρδισι Ὀροίτης, ὠφέλει μὲν οὐδὲν Πέρσας, ὑπὸ Μήδων ἀπαιρημένους τὴν ἀρχήν· ὁ δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ταραχῇ κατὰ μὲν ἐκτείνει Μιτροβάτεια. . . . ἄλλα τε ἐξέβρισε παντοῖα, &c.

⁵ Herodot. iv. 166. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρυάνδης ἦν οὗτος τῆς Αἰγύπτου ὑπαρχος ὑπὸ Καμβύσεω κατεστεινός· ὃς ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ παρυσεύμενος Δαρεῖφ διεφθάρη.

revolt of the Babylonians, conceived a year or two before it was executed, took its rise from the feelings of this time.¹ But the renewal of the old conflict between the two principal sections of the empire, Medes and Persians, is doubtless the most important feature in this political revolution. The false Smerdis with his brother, both of them Medes and Magians, had revived the Median nationality to a state of supremacy over the Persian, recalling the memory of what it had been under Astyagês; while Darius—a pure Persian, and not (like the mule Cyrus) half Mede and half Persian—replaced the Persian nationality in its ascendent condition, though not without the necessity of suppressing by force a rebellion of the Medes.²

¹ Herodot. iii. 67–150.

² Herodot. i. 130. Ἀστυάγης μὲν νυν βασιλεύσας ἐπ' ἕτεα πέντε καὶ τριήκοντα, οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς κατεπαύθη. Μῆδοι δὲ ὑπέκλυψαν Πέρσῃσι διὰ τὴν τούτου πικρότητα. . . . Ὅστέρω μέντοι χρόνῳ μετεμέλησέ τέ σφι ταῦτα ποιήσασι, καὶ ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Δαρείου· ἀποστάντες δὲ, ὅπισω κατεστράφησαν, μάχῃ νικηθέντες· τότε δὲ, ἐπὶ Ἀστυάγεος, οἱ Πέρσαι τε καὶ ὁ Κῦρος ἐπαναστάντες τοῖσι Μήδοισι, ἤρχον τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου τῆς Ἀσίης.

This passage — asserting that the Medes, some time after the deposition of Astyagês and the acquisition of Persian supremacy by Cyrus, repented of having suffered their discontent against Astyagês to place this supremacy in the hands of the Persians, revolted from Darius, and were reconquered after a contest—appears to me to have been misunderstood by chronologists. Dodwell, Larcher, and Mr. Fynes Clinton (indeed most, if not all, of the chronologists) explain it as alluding to a revolt of the Medes against the Persian king Darius Nothus, mentioned in the Hellenica of Xenophon (i. 2, 12), and belonging to the year 408 B.C. See Larcher ad Herodot. i. 130, and his Vie d'Hérodote, prefixed to his translation (p. lxxxix.); also Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 408 and 455, and his Appendix, c. 18, p. 316.

The revolt of the Medes alluded to by Herodotus is, in my judgement, completely distinct from the revolt mentioned by Xenophon: to identify the two, as these eminent chronologists do, is an hypothesis not only having nothing to recommend it, but open to grave objection. The revolt mentioned by Herodotus was against Darius son of Hystaspês, not against Darius Nothus; and I have set forth with peculiar care the

circumstances connected with the conspiracy and accession of the former, for the purpose of showing that they all decidedly imply that conflict between Median and Persian supremacy, which Herodotus directly announces in the passage now before us.

1. When Herodotus speaks of Darius, without any adjective designation, why should we imagine that he means any other than Darius the son of Hystaspês, on whom he dwells so copiously in his narrative? Once only in the course of his history (ix. 108) another Darius (the young prince, son of Xerxês the first) is mentioned; but with this exception, Darius son of Hystaspês is uniformly throughout the work spoken of under his simple name: Darius Nothus is never alluded to at all.

2. The deposition of Astyagês took place in 559 B.C.; the beginning of the reign of Darius occurred in 520 B.C. Now repentance on the part of the Medes, for what they had done at the former of those two epochs, might naturally prompt them to try to repair it in the latter. But between the deposition of Astyagês in 559 B.C., and the revolt mentioned by Xenophon against Darius Nothus in 408 B.C., the interval is more than 150 years. To ascribe a revolt which took place in 408 B.C. to repentance for something which had occurred 150 years before, is unnatural and far-fetched, if not positively inadmissible.

The preceding arguments go to show that the natural construction of the passage in Herodotus points to Darius son of Hystaspês, and not to Darius Nothus; but this is not all. There are yet stronger reasons why the reference to Darius Nothus should be discarded.

It has already been observed that the subjugation of the reculant Medes was not the only embarrassment of the first years of Darius.

The supposed mention in Herodotus of a fact so late as 408 B.C. perplexes the whole chronology of his life and authorship. According to the usual statement of his biography, which there is no reason to call in question, he was born in 484 B.C. Here then is an event alluded to in his history, which occurred when the historian was seventy-six years old, and the allusion to which he must be presumed to have written when about eighty years old, if not more; for his mention of the fact by no means implies that it was particularly recent. Those who adopt this view do not imagine that he wrote his whole history at that age; but they maintain that he made later additions, of which they contend that this is one. I do not say that this is impossible: we know that Isokratēs composed his Panathenaic oration at the age of ninety-four; but it must be admitted to be highly improbable—a supposition which ought not to be advanced without some cogent proof to support it. But here no proof whatever is produced. Herodotus mentions a revolt of the Medes against Darius—Xenophon also mentions a revolt of the Medes against Darius; hence chronologists have taken it as a matter of course, that both authors must allude to the same event; though the supposition is unnatural as regards the text, and still more unnatural as regards the biography of Herodotus.

In respect to that biography, Mr. Clinton appears to me to have adopted another erroneous opinion; in which, however, both Larcher and Wesseling are against him, though Dahlmann and Heyse agree with him. He maintains that the passage in Herodotus (iii. 15), wherein it is stated that Pausiris succeeded his father Amyrtæus by consent of the Persians in the government of Egypt, is to be referred to a fact which happened subsequent to the year 414 B.C., or the tenth year of Darius Nothus; since it was in that year that Amyrtæus acquired the government of Egypt. But this opinion rests altogether upon the assumption, that a certain Amyrtæus, whose name and date occur in Manetho (see Eusebius, *Chronicon*), is the same person as the Amyrtæus mentioned in Herodotus; which identity is not only not proved,

but is extremely improbable, since Mr. Clinton himself admits (F. H. Appendix, p. 317), while maintaining the identity—"He (Amyrtæus) had conducted a war against the Persian government *more than fifty years before.*" This, though not impossible, is surely very improbable; it is at least equally probable that the Amyrtæus of Manetho was a different person from (perhaps even the *grandson* of) that Amyrtæus in Herodotus who had carried on war against the Persians more than fifty years before; it appears to me, indeed, that this is the more reasonable hypothesis of the two.

I have permitted myself to prolong this note to an unusual length, because the supposed mention of such recent events in the history of Herodotus, as those in the reign of Darius Nothus, has introduced very gratuitous assumptions as to the time and manner in which that history was composed. It cannot be shown that there is a single event of precise and ascertained date, alluded to in his history, later than the capture of the Lacedæmonian heralds in the year 430 B.C. (Herodot. vii. 137: see Larcher, *Vie d'Hérodote*, p. lxxxix.); and this renders the composition of his history as an entire work much more smooth and intelligible.

It may be worth while to add, that if we read attentively Herodotus vi. 98—and reflect at the same time that the destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse (the greatest of all Hellenic disasters, hardly inferior for its time to the Russian campaign of Napoleon, and especially impressive to one living at Thuri, as may be seen by the life of Lysias, Plutarch, *Vit. X. Oratt.* p. 835) happened during the reign of Darius Nothus in 415 B.C.—we shall not readily admit the hypothesis of additions made to the history during the reign of the latter, or so late as 408 B.C. Herodotus would hardly have dwelt so expressly and emphatically upon mischief done by Greeks to each other in the reigns of Darius son of Hystaspēs, Xerxēs and Artaxerxēs, if he had lived to witness the greater mischiefs so inflicted during the reign of Darius Nothus, and had kept his history before him for the purpose of inserting new events. The destruction of the Athenians before Syracuse would have been

Orœtês, satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, ruling seemingly the entire western coast of Asia Minor—possessing a large military force and revenue, and surrounded by a body-guard of 1000 native Persians—maintained a haughty independence. He secretly made away with couriers sent to summon him to Susa, and even wreaked his vengeance upon some of the principal Persians who had privately offended him. Darius, not thinking it prudent to attack him by open force, proposed to the chief Persians at Susa the dangerous problem of destroying him by stratagem. Thirty among them volunteered to undertake it, and Bagæus son of Artontês, to whom on drawing lots the task devolved, accomplished it by a manoeuvre which might serve as a lesson to the Ottoman government in its embarrassments with contumacious Pachas. Having proceeded to Sardis, furnished with many different royal ordinances, formally set forth and bearing the seal of Darius, he was presented to Orœtês in audience, with the public secretary of the satrapy close at hand, and the Persian guards standing around. He presented his ordinances to be read aloud by the secretary, choosing first those which related to matters of no great importance; but when he saw that the guards listened with profound reverence, and that the king's name and seal imposed upon them irresistibly, he ventured upon the real purport of his perilous mission. An ordinance was handed to the secretary, and read by him aloud, as follows: "Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer as guards to Orœtês." The obedient guards at once delivered up their spears, when Bagæus caused the final warrant to be read to them: "King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Orœtês." The guards drew their swords and killed him on the spot: his large treasure was conveyed to Susa: Darius became undisputed master, and probably Bagæus satrap.¹

Another devoted adherent, and another yet more memorable piece of cunning, laid prostrate before Darius the mighty walls and gates of the revolted Babylon. The inhabitants of that city had employed themselves assiduously—both during

a thousand times more striking to his imagination than the revolt of the Medes against Darius Nothus, and would have impelled him with much greater force to alter or enlarge the chapter vi. 98.

The sentiment too which Herodotus places in the mouth of Demaratus respecting the Spartans (vii. 104) appears to have been written *before* the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria, in 425 B.C., rather than *after* it: compare

Thucyd. iv. 40.

Dahlmann (*Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte*, vol. ii. p. 41–47) and Heyse (*Quæstiones Herodotæ*, p. 74–77, Berlin 1827) both profess to point out six passages in Herodotus which mark events of later date than 430 B.C. But none of the chronological indications which they adduce appear to me trustworthy.

¹ Herodot. iii. 127, 128.

the lax provincial superintendence of the false Smerdis and during the period of confusion and conflict which elapsed before Darius became firmly established and obeyed—in making every preparation both for declaring and sustaining their independence. Having accumulated a large store of provisions and other requisites for a long siege, without previous detection, they at length proclaimed their independence openly. Such was the intensity of their resolution to shake off the yoke, that they had recourse to a proceeding, which, if correctly reported by Herodotus, forms one of the most frightful enormities recorded in his history. To make their provisions last out longer, they strangled all the women in the city, reserving only their mothers, and one woman to each family for the purpose of baking.¹ We cannot but suppose that this has been magnified from a partial into a universal destruction; but taking it even with such allowance, it illustrates that ferocious force of will—and that predominance of strong nationality, combined with antipathy to foreigners, over all the gentler sympathies—which seems to mark the Semitic nations, and which may be traced so conspicuously in the Jewish history of Josephus.

Darius, assembling all the forces in his power, laid siege to the revolted city, but could make no impression upon it either by force or by stratagem. He tried to repeat the proceeding by which Cyrus had taken it at first; but the besieged were found this time on their guard. The siege had lasted twenty months without the smallest progress, and the Babylonians derided the besiegers from the height of their impregnable walls, when a distinguished Persian nobleman Zopyrus—son of Megabyzus who had been one of the seven conspirators against Smerdis—presented himself one day before Darius in a state of frightful mutilation. His nose and ears were cut off, and his body misused in every way. He had designedly thus maimed himself, “thinking it intolerable that Assyrians should thus laugh the Persians to scorn,”² in the intention, which he presently intimated to Darius, of passing into the town as a deserter, with the view of betraying it—for which purpose measures were concerted. The Babylonians, seeing a Persian of the highest rank in so calamitous a condition, readily believed his assurance that he had been thus punished by the king’s order, and that he came over to them as the only means of procuring for himself signal vengeance. Entrusted by them with the command of a

¹ Herodot. iii. 150.

² Herodot. iii. 155. *δεινόν τι ποιούμενος, Ἀσσυρίους Πέρσῃσι καταγελάειν.* Compare the speech of Mardonius, vii. 9.

The horror of Darius, at the first sight of Zopyrus in this condition, is strongly dramatised by Herodotus.

detachment, he gained several advantages in different sallies, according to previous concert with Darius, until at length the Babylonians, grateful and confident, placed under his charge the principal gates. At the critical moment these gates were thrown open, and the Persians became masters of the city.¹

Thus was the impregnable Babylon a second time reduced.² Darius took precautions on this occasion to put it out of condition for resisting a third time. He caused the walls and gates to be demolished, and three thousand of the principal citizens to be crucified. The remaining inhabitants were left in the dismantled city, fifty thousand women being levied by assessment upon the neighbouring provinces, to supply the place of the women strangled when it first revolted.³ Zopyrus was appointed satrap of the territory for life, with enjoyment of its entire revenues, receiving besides every additional reward which it was in the power of Darius to bestow, and generous assurances from the latter that he

Reconquered
and dis-
mantled by
Darius.

¹ Herodot. iii. 154–158.

² Ktésias represents the revolt and recapture of Babylon to have taken place, not under Darius, but under his son and successor Xerxès. He says that the Babylonians, revolting, slew their satrap Zopyrus; that they were besieged by Xerxès, and that Megabyzus son of Zopyrus caused the city to be taken by practising that very stratagem which Herodotus ascribes to Zopyrus himself (Persica, c. 20–22).

This seems inconsistent with the fact, that Megabyzus was general of the Persian army in Egypt in the war with the Athenians, about 460 B.C. (Diodor. Sic. xi. 75–77). He would hardly have been sent on active service had he been so fearfully mutilated: moreover, the whole story of Ktésias appears to me far less probable than that of Herodotus; for on this, as on other occasions, to blend the two together is impossible.

³ Herodot. iii. 159, 160. “From the women thus introduced (says Herodotus) the present Babylonians are sprung.”

To crucify subdued revolters by thousands is, fortunately, so little in harmony with modern European manners, that it may not be amiss to strengthen the confidence of the reader in the accuracy of Herodotus, by producing an analogous narrative of incidents far more recent. Voltaire gives, from the MS. of General Lefort, one of the principal and confidential officers of Peter

the Great, the following account of the suppression of the revolted Strelitzes at Moscow in 1698: these Strelitzes were the old native militia or Janissaries of the Russian Czars, opposed to all the reforms of Peter.

“Pour étouffer ces troubles, le czar part secrètement de Vienne, arrive enfin à Moscou, et surprend tout le monde par sa présence: il récompense les troupes qui ont vaincu les Strélitz: les prisons étaient pleines de ces malheureux. Si leur crime était grand, le châtiment le fut aussi. Leurs chefs, plusieurs officiers, et quelques prêtres, furent condamnés à la mort: quelques-uns furent roués, deux femmes enterées vives. On pendit autour des murailles de la ville et on fit périr dans d'autres supplices deux mille Strélitz: leurs corps restèrent deux jours exposés sur les grands chemins, et surtout autour du monastère où résidaient les princesses Sophie et Eudoxe. On érigea des colonnes de pierre où le crime et le châtiment furent gravés. Un très-grand nombre qui avaient leurs femmes et leurs enfans furent dispersés avec leurs familles dans la Sibérie, dans le royaume d'Astrakhan, dans le pays d'Azof: par là du moins leur punition fut utile à l'état: ils servirent à défricher des terres qui manquaient d'habitans et de culture.” (Voltaire, Histoire de Russie, part i. ch. x. tom. 31. of the Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire, p. 148, ed. Paris, 1825.)

would rather have Zopyrus without wounds than the possession of Babylon. I have already intimated in a former chapter that the demolition of the walls here mentioned is not to be regarded as complete and continuous, nor was there any necessity that it should be so. Partial demolition would be quite sufficient to leave the city without defence; and the description given by Herodotus of the state of things as they stood at the time of his visit, proves that portions of the walls yet subsisted. One circumstance is yet to be added in reference to the subsequent condition of Babylon under the Persian empire. The city with the territory belonging to it constituted a satrapy, which not only paid a larger tribute (one thousand Euboic talents of silver) and contributed a much larger amount of provisions in kind for the maintenance of the Persian court, than any other among the twenty satrapies of the empire, but furnished besides an annual supply of five hundred eunuch youths.¹ We may presume that this was intended in part as a punishment for the past revolt, since the like obligation was not imposed upon any other satrapy.

Thus firmly established on the throne, Darius occupied it for thirty-six years. His reign was one of organization, different from that of his two predecessors; a difference which the Persians well understood and noted, calling Organization of the Persian empire by Darius. Cyrus the father, Kambyshês the master, and Darius the retail-trader or huckster.² In the mouth of the Persians this latter epithet must be construed as no insignificant compliment, since it intimates that he was the first to introduce some methodical order into the imperial administration and finances. Under the two former kings there was no definite amount of tribute levied upon the subject provinces. They furnished what were called presents, subject to no fixed limit except such as might be satisfactory to the satrap in each district. But Darius—succeeding as he did to Smerdis, who had rendered himself popular with the provinces by large financial exemptions, and having farther to encounter jealousy and dissatisfaction from Persians, his former equals in rank—probably felt it expedient to relieve the provinces from the burden of undefined exactions. He distributed the whole empire into twenty departments, imposing upon each a fixed annual tax, and a fixed contri-

¹ Herodot. iii. 92.

² Herodot. iii. 89. What the Persian denomination was, which Herodotus or his informants translated *κάπηλος*, we do not know; but this latter word was used often by Greeks to signify a cheat or deceiver generally: see Etymologic.

Magn. p. 490, 11, and Suidas, v. *Κάπηλος*. 'Ο δ' Αἰσχύλος τὰ δόλια πάντα καλεῖ *κάπηλα*—"*Κάπηλα προσφέρων τεχνήματα*." (Æschylus, Fragment. 328, ed. Dindorf: compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 953.)

bution for the maintenance of the court. This must doubtless have been a great improvement, though the limitation of the sum which the Great King at Susa would require, did not at all prevent the satrap in his own province from indefinite requisitions beyond it. The satrap was a little king, who acted nearly as he pleased in the internal administration of his province, subject only to the necessity of sending up the imperial tribute, of keeping off foreign enemies, and of furnishing an adequate military contingent for the foreign enterprises of the Great King. To every satrap was attached a royal secretary or comptroller of the revenue,¹ who probably managed the imperial finances in the province, and to whom the court of Susa might perhaps look as a watch upon the satrap himself. It is not to be supposed that the Persian authorities in any province meddled with the details of taxation or contribution, as they bore upon individuals. The court having fixed the entire sum payable by the satrapy in the aggregate, the satrap or the secretary apportioned it among the various component districts, towns, or provinces, leaving to the local authorities in each of these latter the task of assessing it upon individual inhabitants. From necessity, therefore, as well as from indolence of temper and political incompetence, the Persians were compelled to respect the authorities which they found standing both in town and country, and to leave in their hands a large measure of genuine influence; frequently overruled indeed by oppressive interference on the part of the satrap, whenever any of his passions prompted—but never entirely superseded. In the important towns and stations, Persian garrisons were usually kept, and against the excesses of the military there was probably little or no protection to the subject people. Yet still the provincial governments were allowed to continue, and often even the petty kings who had governed separate districts during their state of independence prior to the Persian conquest, retained their title and dignity as tributaries to the court of Susa.² The empire of the Great King was thus an aggregate of heterogeneous elements, connected together by no tie except that of common fear and subjection—noway coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any common system or spirit of nationality. It resembled, in its main political features, the Turkish and Persian

¹ Herodot. iii. 128. This division of power, and double appointment by the Great King, appears to have been retained until the close of the Persian empire: see Quintus Curtius, v. 1, 17–20 (v. 3, 19–21, Zumpt). The present

Turkish government nominates a Defterdar as finance administrator in each province, with authority derived directly from itself, and professedly independent of the Pacha.

² Herodot. iii. 15.

empires of the present day,¹ though distinguished materially by the many differences arising out of Mahometanism and Christianity, and perhaps hardly reaching the same extreme of rapacity, corruption, and cruelty in detail.

Darius distributed the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, each including a certain continuous territory, and one or more nations inhabiting it, the names of which Herodotus sets forth. The amount of tribute payable by each satrapy was determined: payable in gold, according to the Euboic talent, by the Indians in the easternmost satrapy—in silver, according to the Babylonian or larger talent, by the remaining nineteen. Herodotus computes the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1. From the nineteen satrapies which paid in silver, there was levied annually the sum of 7740 Babylonian talents, equal to something about 2,964,000*l.* sterling: from the Indians, who alone paid in gold, there was received a sum equal (at the rate of 1 : 13) to 4680 Euboic talents of silver, or to about 1,290,000*l.* sterling.² To explain how it happened that this one satrapy was charged with a sum equal to two-fifths of the aggregate charge on the other nineteen, Herodotus dwells upon the vast population, the extensive

Twenty satrapies with a fixed tribute apportioned to each.

¹ Respecting the administration of the modern Persian empire, see Kinneir, *Geograph. Memoir of Persia*, pp. 29, 43, 47.

² Herodot. iii. 95. The text of Herodotus contains an erroneous summing up of items, which critics have no means of correcting with certainty. Nor is it possible to trust the large sum which he alleges to have been levied from the Indians, though all the other items, included in the nineteen silver-paying divisions, seem within the probable truth. Indeed both Rennell and Robertson think the total too small: the charges on some of the satrapies are decidedly smaller than the reality.

The vast sum of 50,000 talents is said to have been found by Alexander the Great laid up by successive kings at Susa alone, besides the treasures at Persepolis, Pasargadæ, and elsewhere (Arrian. iii. 16, 22; Plutarch, *Alexand.* 37). Presuming these talents to be Babylonian or Æginæan talents (in the proportion 5 : 3 to Attic talents), 50,000 talents would be equal to £19,000,000 sterling: if they were Attic talents, it would be equal to £11,600,000 sterling. The statements of Diodorus give even much larger sums (xvii. 66–71: compare Curtius, v. 2, 8; v. 6, 9; Strabo,

xv. p. 730). It is plain that the numerical affirmations were different in different authors, and one cannot pretend to pronounce on the trustworthiness of such large figures without knowing more of the original returns on which they were founded. That there were prodigious sums of gold and silver, is quite unquestionable. Respecting the statement of the Persian revenue given by Herodotus, see Boëckh, *Metrologie*, ch. v. 1, 2.

Amedée Jaubert, in 1806, estimated the population of the modern Persian empire at about 7,000,000 souls; of which about 6,000,000 settled population, the rest nomadic: he also estimated the Schah's revenue at about 2,900,000 tomans, or £1,500,000 sterling. Others calculated the population higher, at nearer 12,000,000 souls. Kinneir gives the revenue at something more than £3,000,000 sterling: he thinks that the whole territory between the Euphratès and the Indus does not contain above 18,000,000 of souls (*Geogr. Memoir of Persia*, p. 44–47: compare Ritter, *West Asien*, Abtheil. ii. Abschn. iv. p. 879–889).

The modern Persian empire contains not so much as the eastern half of the ancient, which covered all Asiatic Turkey and Egypt besides.

territory, and the abundant produce in gold, among those whom he calls Indians—the easternmost inhabitants of the earth, since beyond them there was nothing but uninhabitable sand—reaching, as far as we can make it out, from Baktria southward along the Indus to its mouth, but how far eastward we cannot determine. Darius is said to have undertaken an expedition against them and subdued them. Moreover, he is affirmed to have constructed and despatched vessels down the Indus, from the city of Kaspatyri and the territory of the Paktyes, in its upper regions, all the way down to its mouth: then into the Indian Ocean, round the peninsula of Arabia, and up the Red Sea to Egypt. The ships were commanded by a Greek—Skylax, of Karyanda on the south-western coast of Asia Minor;¹ who, if this statement be correct, executed a scheme of nautical enterprise not only one hundred and seventy years earlier, but also far more extensive, than the famous voyage of Nearchus, admiral of Alexander the Great, who only went from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. The eastern portions of the Persian empire remained so unknown and unvisited until the Macedonian invasion, that we are unable to criticise these isolated statements of Herodotus. None of the Persian kings subsequent to Darius appear to have visited them, and whether the prodigious sum demandable from them according to the Persian rent-roll was ever regularly levied, may reasonably be doubted. At the same time, we may readily believe that the mountains in the northern parts of Persian India (Cabul and Little Thibet) were at that time extremely productive in gold, and that quantities of that metal, such as now appear almost fabulous, may have been often obtained. It seems that the produce of gold in all parts of the earth, as far as hitherto known, is obtained exclusively near the surface; so that a country once rich in that metal may well have been exhausted of its whole supply, and left at a later period without any gold at all.

Imposts
upon the
different
satrapies.

Of the nineteen silver-paying satrapies, the most heavily imposed was Babylonia, which paid 1000 talents. The next in amount of charge was Egypt, paying 700 talents, besides the produce of the fish from the lake of Moëris: the

¹ Herodot. iii. 102, iv. 44. See the two Excursus of Bähr on these two chapters, vol. ii. p. 648–671 of his edit. of Herodotus.

It certainly is singular that neither Nearchus, nor Ptolemy, nor Aristobulus, nor Arrian, take any notice of this remarkable voyage distinctly asserted by

Herodotus to have been accomplished. Such silence however affords no sufficient reason for calling the narrative in question. The attention of the Persian kings, successors to Darius, came to be far more occupied with the western than with the eastern portions of their empire.

remaining satrapies varied in amount, down as low as 170 talents; which was the sum charged on the seventh satrapy (in the enumeration of Herodotus) comprising the Sattagydæ, the Gandarii, the Dodikæ, and the Aparytæ. The Ionians, Æolians, Magnesians on the Mæander and on Mount Sipylus, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians—including the coast of Asia Minor southward of Kanê, and from thence round the southern promontory to Phasêlis—were rated as one division, paying 400 talents. Yet we may be sure that much more than this was really taken from the people, when we read that Magnesia alone afterwards paid to Themistoklês a revenue of 50 talents annually.¹ The Mysians and Lydians were included, with some others, in another division; and the Hellespontine Greeks in a third, with Phrygians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, and Syrians, paying 360 talents—nearly the same as was paid by Syria proper, Phenicia and Judæa, with the island of Cyprus. Independent of this regular tribute, with the undefined sums extorted over and above it,² there were some dependent nations, which, though exempt from tribute, furnished occasional sums called presents. Farther contributions were exacted for the maintenance of the vast suite who always personally attended the king. One entire third of this last burden was borne by Babylonia alone in consequence of its exuberant fertility:³ it was paid in produce, as indeed the peculiar productions of every part of the empire seem to have been sent up for the regal consumption.

However imperfectly we are now able to follow the geographical distribution of the subject nations as given by Herodotus, it is extremely valuable as the only professed statistics remaining, of the entire Persian empire. The arrangement of satrapies, which he describes, underwent modification in subsequent times; at least it does not harmonise with various statements in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, and in other authors who recount Persian affairs belonging to the fourth century B.C. But we find in no other author except Herodotus any entire survey and distribution of the empire. It is indeed a new tendency which now manifests itself in the Persian Darius, compared with his predecessors: not simply to conquer, to extort, and to give away—but to do all this with something like method and

Organizing tendency of Darius—first imperial coinage—imperial roads and posts.

¹ Thucyd. i. 138.

² Herodot. iii. 117.

³ Herodot. i. 192. Compare the description of the dinner and supper of

the Great King, in Polyænus, iv. 3, 32; also Ktésias and Deinôn ap. Athenæum, ii. p. 67.

system,¹ and to define the obligations of the satraps towards Susa. Another remarkable example of the same tendency is to be found in the fact, that Darius was the first Persian king who coined money. His coin both in gold and silver, the Daric, was the earliest produce of a Persian mint.² The revenue, as brought to Susa in metallic money of various descriptions, was melted down separately, and poured in a fluid state into jars or earthenware vessels. When the metal had cooled and hardened, the jar was broken, leaving a standing solid mass from which portions were cut off as the occasion required.³ And in addition to these administrative, financial, and monetary arrangements, of which Darius was the first originator, we may probably ascribe to him the first introduction of that system of roads, resting-places, and permanent relays of couriers, which connected both Susa and Ekbatana with the distant portions of the empire. Herodotus describes in considerable detail the imperial road from Sardis to Susa, a journey of ninety days, crossing the Halys, the Euphratês, the Tigris, the Greater and Lesser Zab, the Gyndês, and the Choaspês. In his time it was kept in excellent order, with convenience for travellers.⁴

It was Darius also who first completed the conquest of the Ionic Greeks by the acquisition of the important island of Samos. That island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian general Harpagus effected the conquest of Ionia, and even when Chios and Lesbos

Island of Samos—its condition at the accession of Darius. Polykratês.

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. 12. p. 695.

² Herodot. iv. 166; Plutarch, Kimon, 10.

The gold Daric, of the weight of two Attic drachmæ (Stater Daricus), equivalent to 20 Attic silver drachmæ (Xenoph. Anab. i. 7, 18), would be about 16s. 3d. English. But it seems doubtful whether that ratio between gold and silver (10 : 1) can be reckoned upon as the ordinary ratio in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Mr. Hussey calculates the golden Daric as equal to £1 1s. 3d. English (Hussey, Essay on the Ancient Weights and Money, Oxford 1836, ch. iv. s. 8. p. 68; ch. vii. s. 3. p. 103).

I cannot think, with Mr. Hussey, that there is any reason for believing either the name or the coin *Daric* to be older than Darius son of Hystaspês. Compare Boëckh, Metrologie, ix. 5. p. 129.

Particular statements respecting the value of gold and silver, as exchanged

one against the other, are to be received with some reserve as the basis of any general estimate, since we have not the means of comparing a great many such statements together. For the process of coinage was imperfectly performed, and the different pieces, both of gold and silver, in circulation, differed materially in weight one with the other. Herodotus gives the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1.

³ Herodot. iii. 96.

⁴ Herodot. v. 52–53; viii. 98. “It appears to be a favourite idea with all barbarous princes, that the badness of the roads adds considerably to the natural strength of their dominions. The Turks and Persians are undoubtedly of this opinion: the public highways are therefore neglected, and particularly so towards the frontiers.” (Kinneir, Geog. Mem. of Pers. p. 43.)

The description of Herodotus contrasts favourably with the picture here given by Mr. Kinneir.

submitted. The Persians had no fleet to attack it; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to round the Triopian cape. Indeed the depression which overtook the other cities of Ionia tended rather to the aggrandisement of Samos, under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykratês. That ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus (seemingly between 536-532 B.C.), contrived to seize by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the aid of his brothers Pantagnôtus and Sylosôn, and a small band of conspirators.¹ At first the three brothers shared the supreme power; but presently Polykratês put to death Pantagnôtus, banished Sylosôn, and made himself despot alone. In this station his ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune were alike remarkable. He conquered several of the neighbouring islands, and even some towns on the mainland: he carried on successful war against Milêtus, and signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Milêtus: he got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pentekonteres, and one thousand mercenary bowmen—aspiring to nothing less than the dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the greatest in the Grecian world.² He had been in intimate alliance with Amasis king of Egypt, who however ultimately broke with him. Considering his behaviour towards allies, this rupture is not at all surprising; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of Polykratês—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of the envious gods. Indeed Herodotus—deeply penetrated with this belief in an ever-present Nemesis, which allows no man to be very happy, or long happy, with impunity—throws it into the form of an epistolary warning from Amasis to Polykratês, advising him to inflict upon himself some seasonable mischief or suffering; in order, if possible, to avert the ultimate judgement—to let blood in time, so that the plethora of happiness might not end in apoplexy.³ Pursuant to such counsel, Polykratês threw into the sea a favourite ring of matchless price and beauty; but unfortunately, in a few days, the ring re-appeared in the belly of a fine fish, which a fisherman had sent to him as a

¹ Herodot. iii. 120.

² Herodot. iii. 39; Thucyd. i. 13.

³ Herodot. iii. 40-42. . . . ἦν δὲ μὴ
ἐναλλάξ ἤδη τῶνδ' αὐτοῦ αἱ εὐτύχαι τοι

τοιαύταισι πάθαισι προσπίπτωσι, τρόπῳ
τῷ ἐξ ἐμεῦ ὑποκειμένῳ ἀκέραιο: compare
vii. 203, and i. 32.

present. Amasis, now forewarned that the final apoplexy was inevitable, broke off the alliance with Polykratês without delay. This well-known story, interesting as evidence of ancient belief, is not less to be noted as showing the power of that belief to beget fictitious details out of real characters, such as I have already touched upon in the history of Solon and Croesus, and elsewhere.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it was Polykratês, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his friendship with Amasis;¹ finding it suitable to his policy to cultivate the alliance of Kambysês, when that prince was preparing for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion the Ionic subjects of Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykratês deeming it a good opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambysês eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate in the Ægean; upon which forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape: very contradictory stories had reached Herodotus. But they certainly returned to Samos, attacked Polykratês at home, and were driven off by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.²

We may here notice the gradually increasing tendency in the Grecian world to recognise Sparta as something like a head, protector, or referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta in this character, is that of Croesus against Cyrus; next, that of the Ionic Greeks against the latter: the instance of the Samians now before us, is the third. The important events connected with, and consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens, manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen years after the present event; they have been already recounted in a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits is essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

On reaching Sparta, the Samian exiles, borne down with despondency and suffering, entered at large into the particulars of

¹ Herodot. iii. 44.

² Herodot. iii. 44.

Polykratês
breaks with
Amasis king
of Egypt,
and allies
himself with
Kambysês.

B.C. 524.

their case. Their long speaking annoyed instead of moving the Spartans, who said, or are made to say—"We have forgotten the first part of the speech, and the last part is unintelligible to us." Upon which the Samians appeared the next day simply with an empty wallet, saying—"Our wallet has no meal in it." "Your wallet is superfluous" (said the Spartans); *i.e.* the words would have been sufficient without it.¹ The aid which they implored was granted.

The Samian exiles, expelled by Polykratês, apply to Sparta for aid.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians—who joined them in the expedition now contemplated—had separate grounds of quarrel with the Samians,² which operated as a more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykratês as an example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed the only facts which we know, to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against Polykratês and Hippias: there may have been other cases, but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be, a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles back to Samos, and assailed Polykratês in the city: they did their best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any success. "The city would have been taken," says Herodotus, "if all the Lacedæmonians had acted like Archias and Lykôpas"—who, pressing closely upon the retreating Samians, were shut within the town-gates, and perished. The historian had heard this exploit in personal conversation with Archias, grandson of the person above-mentioned, in the deme Pitana at Sparta—whose father had been named Samius, and who respected the Samians above any other Greeks, because they had bestowed upon the two brave warriors, slain within their town, an honourable and public funeral.³ It is rarely that Herodotus thus specifies his informants: had he done so more frequently, the value as well as the interest of his history would have been materially increased.

The Lacedæmonians attack Samos, but are repulsed.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder, weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The Siphnians of that day were the

Attack on Siphnos by the Samian exiles.

¹ Herodot. iii. 46. τῷ θυλάκῳ περι-
εἶργασθαι.

² Herodot. iii. 47, 48, 52.
³ Herodot. iii. 54-56.

wealthiest islanders in the Ægean, from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines,—the produce of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a tithe for the Delphian temple.¹ Their treasure-chamber was among the most richly-furnished of which that holy place could boast, and they themselves probably, in these times of early prosperity, were numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian festival. The Samians, landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution, under the name of a loan, of ten talents. Upon refusal, they proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them 100 talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermionê, in the Argolic peninsula, the neighbouring island of Hydrea, famous in modern Greek warfare. Yet it appears that their plans must have been subsequently changed, for instead of occupying it, they placed it under the care of the Trœzenians, and repaired themselves to Krete, for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydônia. In this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that place; but after they had remained there five years, the Kretans obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery.²

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykratês. Prosperity of Polykratês. Meanwhile that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever. Samos under him was “the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric.”³ The great works admired by Herodotus in the island⁴—an aqueduct for the city, tunnelled through a mountain for the length of seven furlongs—a mole to protect the harbour, two furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep—and the vast temple of Hêrê—may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykratês as instances of the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish their subjects.⁵ The earliest of all Grecian thalassokrats, or sea-kings—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as well as of many among its islands—he displayed his love of letters by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the Delian Apollo⁶ the neighbouring

¹ Herodot. iii. 57. νησιωτέων μάλιστα ἐπλούτεον.

² Herodot. iii. 58, 59.

³ Herodot. iii. 139. πολίων πασέων πρώτην Ἑλληνίδων καὶ βαρβάρων.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 60.

⁵ Aristot. Polit. v. 9, 4. τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα δύναται ταῦτόν, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πένιν τῶν ἀρχομένων.

⁶ Thucyd. i. 14, iii. 104.

island of Rhêneia. But while thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandisement, he was precipitated on a sudden into the abyss of ruin;¹ and that too, as if to demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen. The Persian satrap Oroëtês, on the neighbouring mainland, conceived an implacable hatred against him: no one could tell why—for he had no design of attacking the island; and the trifling reasons conjecturally assigned, only prove that the real reason, whatever it might be, was unknown. Availing himself of the notorious ambition and cupidity of Polykratês, Oroëtês sent to Samos a messenger, pretending that his life was menaced by Kambysês, and that he was anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed to Polykratês a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money, provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away. Mæandrius, secretary of Polykratês, was sent over to Magnêsia on the Mæander to make inquiries. He there saw the satrap with eight large coffers full of gold—or rather apparently so, being in reality full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top²—tied up ready for departure. The cupidity of Polykratês was not proof against so rich a bait. He crossed over to Magnêsia with a considerable suite, and thus came into the power of Oroëtês, in spite of the warnings of his prophets and the agony of his terrified daughter, to whom his approaching fate had been revealed in a dream. The satrap slew him and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring them a free government—but retaining both the foreigners and the slaves as prisoners.³ The death of Oroëtês himself, which ensued shortly afterwards, has already been described: it is considered by Herodotus as a judgement for his flagitious deed in the case of Polykratês.⁴

He is slain
by the Per-
sian satrap
Oroëtês.

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos; and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykratês filled him with surprise and consternation. Though possessed of the fort-

¹ Herodot. iii. 120.

² Compare the trick of Hannibal at Gortyn in Krete — Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 9).

³ Herodot. iii. 124, 125.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 126. Ὀρόλτεα Πολυκράτεος τίσις μετῆλθον.

resses, the soldiers, and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery of his powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise the island. “He wished (say the historian in a remarkable phrase¹) to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed to do so.” His

Mæandrius, lieutenant of Polykratês in Samos—he desires to establish a free government after the death of Polykratês—conduct of the Samians.

first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar, in honour of Zeus Eleutherius, and to enclose a piece of ground as precinct which still existed in the time of Herodotus; he next convened an assembly of the Samians. “You know (said he) that the whole power of Polykratês is now in my hands, and that there is nothing to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless what I condemn in another I will not do myself, and I have always disapproved of Polykratês, and others like him, for seeking to rule over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykratês has come to the end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim among you equal law; reserving to myself as privilege first, six talents out of the treasures of Polykratês—next, the hereditary priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants for ever. To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct as the God of that freedom which I now hand over to you.”

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian hearers. One of the chief men among them, Telesarchus, exclaimed with the applause of the rest, “You rule us low-born and scoundrel as you are! you are not worthy to rule—don’t think of that, but give us some account of the money which you have been handling.”²

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at all hazards, which he resolved to do. Retiring into the acropolis under pretence of preparing his money accounts for examination he sent for Telesarchus and his chief political enemies, one by one—intimating that the accounts were open to inspection. As fast as they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained

¹ Herodot. iii. 142. τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ ἀνδρῶν βουλομένῳ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐξεγένετο. Compare his remark on Kadmus, who voluntarily resigned the despotism at Kôs (vii. 164).

² Herodot. iii. 142. ‘ΑΛΛ’ οὐδ’ ἔξισαι σύ γ’ ἡμέων ἄρχειν, γεγονώς τε κακὸς καὶ ἐὼν ὑλεθρός· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως λόγον δώσεις τῶν ἐνεχείρισας χρημάτων.

in the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed successor of Polykratês. After a short hour of insane boastfulness, the Samians found themselves again enslaved. "It seemed (says Herodotus) that they were not willing to be free."¹

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that of the Athenians about twelve years afterwards, on the expulsion of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The position of the Samians was far the more favourable of the two, for the quiet and successful working of a free government; since they had the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own power of enforcing it. They passed at once from extreme subjection to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the past; showed themselves both anxious to acquire the rights, and willing to perform the obligations, of a free community; listened to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame by heroic efforts forces very greatly superior. If we compare the reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other,² we shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply between the Athenians and the Samians—a difference partly referable, doubtless, to the pure Hellenism of the former, contrasted with the half-Asiatized Hellenism of the latter—but also traceable in a great degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution, overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the Peisistratids which followed.

Mæandrius becomes despot. Contrast between the Athenians and the Samians.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his brother Lykarêtus, under the idea that this would enable him more easily to seize the sceptre. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have continued as despot for a year or two. It was however a weak despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different from the iron hand of Polykratês. In this untoward condition the Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their sceptre and acropolis—and what was much more formidable, a Persian army to back him.

¹ Herodot. iii. 143. οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς οἴκασι, ἐβουλέατο εἶναι ἐλευθεροί.

² Herodot. v. 78. and iii. 142, 143.

Sylosôn, the brother of Polykratês, having taken part originally in his brother's conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykratês, and until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed about a year after the death of Polykratês. He happened to be at Memphis in Egypt during the time when Kambyshês was there with his conquering army, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note, was serving among his guards. Sylosôn was walking in the agora of Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great fancy, and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Sylosôn to reply,¹ "I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it you for nothing, if it must be yours." Darius thanked him and accepted the cloak; and for some years the donor accused himself of a silly piece of good nature.² But as events came round, Sylosôn at length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as a Greek, the benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal presence. Darius had forgotten his person, but perfectly remembered the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind—and showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great King, former favours, though small, rendered to the simple soldier at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Sylosôn in profusion, but he rejected them—requesting that the island of Samos might be conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanês, the originator of the conspiracy against Smerdis, was sent down to the coast of Ionia with an army, carried Sylosôn over to Samos, and landed him unexpectedly on the island.³

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a convention with Otanês, whereby he agreed to make way for Sylosôn, to evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city; retaining possession, however, for such time as might be necessary to embark his property and treasures, of the acropolis, which had a separate

¹ Herodot. iii. 139. Ὁ δὲ Συλοσῶν, δρέων τὸν Δαρεῖον μεγάλως ἐπιθυμῶντα τῆς χλάνιδος, θείῃ τύχῃ χρεώμενος, λέγει.

² Herodot. iii. 140. ἥπιστάτο οἱ τοῦτο ἀπολωλέναι δι' εὐηθίην.

³ Herodot. iii. 141-144.

landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret portal for embarkation—probably one of the precautionary provisions of Polykratês. Otanês willingly granted these conditions, and himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being quartered around; while Sylosôn seemed on the point of ascending the seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the Samians were destined to a fate more calamitous. Mæandrius had a brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper and half a madman, whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man, looking out of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis, unguarded, and relying upon the convention: it seems that these were the chief officers whose rank gave them the privilege of being carried about on their seats.¹ The sight inflamed both his wrath and his insane ambition. He clamoured for liberty and admission to his brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. “Here are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon, though I have done no wrong worthy of bonds; while you do not dare to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are afraid of them, give me your guards; I will make the Persians repent of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island forthwith.”²

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos for ever, had little personal motive to care what became of the population. He had probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honourable intentions after the death of Polykratês, nor was he displeased to hand over to Sylosôn an odious and blood-stained sceptre, which he foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother’s mad project. He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis to his brother Charilaus; who immediately armed the guards, sallied forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians. Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before the army could be got

¹ Herodot. iii. 146. τῶν Περσέων τοὺς διφροφορευμένους καὶ λόγου πλείστου ἀξίους.

² Herodot. iii. 145. Ἐμὲ μὲν, ὃ καὶ κίστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐόντα σεωυτοῦ ἀδελφεόν, καὶ ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ, δῆσας γοργύρης ἡξίωσας· ὁρέων δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας

ἐκβάλλοντάς τέ σε καὶ ἄνοικον ποιεῦντας, οὐ τολμᾷς τίσασθαι, οὕτω δὴ τι ἐόντας εὐπετέας χειρωθῆναι.

The highly dramatic manner of Herodotus cannot be melted down into smooth historical recital.

together; but at length Otanês collected his troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis. While he immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as Mæandrius had foreseen, to take a signal revenge for the treacherous slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian people and massacre them without discrimination—man and boy, on ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully executed, and Samos was handed over to Sylosôn, stripped of its male inhabitants.¹ Of Charilaus and the acropolis we hear no farther: perhaps he and his guards may have escaped by sea. Lykarêtus,² the other brother of Mæandrius, must have remained either in the service of Sylosôn or in that of the Persians; for we find him some years afterwards entrusted by the latter with an important command.

Sylosôn was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children: we may however presume, that the deed of blood has been described by the historian as more sweeping than it really was. It seems nevertheless to have set heavily on the conscience of Otanês, who was induced some time afterwards, by a dream and by a painful disease, to take measures for repeopling the island.³ From whence the new population came, we are not told; but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or satrap.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles under Polykratês, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose of re-establishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce king Kleomenês by the display of his treasures and finely-wrought gold plate. The king however, not without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan leading men, prevailed with the ephors to send Mæandrius away.⁴

Sylosôn seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent: some years afterwards we find his son Æakês reigning in the island.⁵ Strabo states that it was the harsh rule of Sylosôn which caused

¹ Herodot. iii. 149. *ἔρημον ἐοῦσαν ἀνδρῶν.*

² Herodot. v. 27.

³ Herodot. iii. 149.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 148.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 13.

the depopulation of the island. But the cause just recounted out of Herodotus is both very different, and sufficiently plausible in itself; and as Strabo seems in the main to have derived his account from Herodotus, we may suppose that on this point he has incorrectly remembered his authority.¹

¹ Strabo, xiv. p. 638. He gives a proverbial phrase about the depopulation of the island—

Ἐκρητι Συλοσῶντος εὐρυχωρίη, which is perfectly consistent with the narrative of Herodotus.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES.—DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.

DARIUS had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire, having put down the refractory satrap Oroëtês, as well as the revolted Medes and Babylonians. He had moreover completed the conquest of Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus comprised all Asia Minor with its Conquering dispositions of Darius. neighbouring islands. But this was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent upon their king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage: he had married Atossa and Artystonê, daughters of Cyrus—and Parmys, daughter of Smerdis the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of her brother Kambysês; next, of the Magian Smerdis his successor; and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children.¹ Of those children the eldest was Xerxês, respecting whom more will be said hereafter.

Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece—the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxês—was a person of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband,² as well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus. Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius would have been directed not against the steppes of Scythia, but against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least so Herodotus assures us. The grand object of that historian is to set forth the contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world. Accordingly with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere to the careful

¹ Herodot. iii. 88, vii. 2.

² Herodot. vii. 3. ἡ γὰρ Ἀτοσσα εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος. Compare the description given of the ascendancy of the

savage Sultana Parysatis over her son Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 16, 19, 23).

reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real dangers which were averted at Marathon and Plataea by recounting the first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians—how it originated and how it was abandoned. For this purpose—according to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of particular persons—he gives us the interesting, but romantic history, of the Krotoniate surgeon Dêmokêdês.

Dêmokêdês, son of a citizen of Krotôn named Kalliphôn, had turned his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the two) and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Krotôn (550-520); a time when the science of the surgeon as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer were prosecuted in that city more actively than in any part of Greece. Kalliphôn, the father of Dêmokêdês, was a man of such severe temper, that the son ran away from him and resolved to maintain himself by his talents elsewhere. Retiring to Ægina, he there began to practise in his profession. So rapid was his success even in the first year—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and apparatus¹—that the citizens of the

Dêmokêdês
—the Kro-
toniate sur-
geon—his
adventures
—he is car-
ried as a
slave to Susa.

¹ Herodot. iii. 131. ἀσκεύης περ' ἐὼν, καὶ ἔχων οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἔστιν ἐργαλῆα—the description refers to surgical rather than to medical practice.

That curious assemblage of the cases of particular patients with remarks, known in the works of Hippokratês under the title Ἐπιδήμια (Notes of visits to different cities), is very illustrative of what Herodotus here mentions about Dêmokêdês. Consult also the valuable Prolegomena of M. Littré, in his edition of Hippokratês, as to the character, means of action, and itinerant habits of the Grecian ἱατροί: see particularly the preface to vol. v. p. 12, where he enumerates the various places visited and noted by Hippokratês. The greater number of the Hippocratic observations refer to various parts of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; but there are some also which refer to patients in the islands of Syros and Delos, at Athens, Salamis, Elis, Corinth, and Æniadæ in Akarnania. “On voit par là combien étoit juste le nom de Periodeutes ou voyageurs donnés à ces anciens médecins.”

Again, M. Littré, in the same preface, p. 25, illustrates the proceedings and residence of the ancient ἱατρός—“On se tromperoit si on se représentoit la demeure d'un médecin d'alors comme celle d'un médecin d'aujourd'hui. La maison du médecin de l'antiquité, du moins au temps d'Hippocrate et aux époques voisines, renfermoit un local destiné à la pratique d'un grand nombre d'opérations, contenant les machines et les instrumens nécessaires, et de plus étant aussi une boutique de pharmacie. Ce local se nommait ἱατρεῖον.” See Plato, Legg. i. p. 646, iv. p. 720. Timæus accused Aristotle of having begun as a surgeon, practising to great profit in a surgery or ἱατρεῖον, and having quitted this occupation late in life to devote himself to the study of science—σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον ἱατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα (Polyb. xii. 9).

See also the Remarques Retrospectives attached by M. Littré to volume iv. of the same work (p. 654-658), where he dwells upon the intimate union of surgical and medical practice in antiquity. At the same time, it

island made a contract with him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about 383*l.* sterling, an Æginæan talent). The year afterwards he was invited to come to Athens, then under the Peisistratids, at a salary of 100 minæ or 1*2*/₃ talent; and in the following year, Polykratês of Samos tempted him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and accompanied him in his last calamitous visit to the satrap Oroetês: on the murder of Polykratês, being seized among the slaves and foreign attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and neglect. When again, soon after, Oroetês himself was slain, Dêmokêdês was numbered among his slaves and chattels, and sent up to Susa.

He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first men in their profession,¹ whom he habitually employed, did him no good, but only aggravated his torture. For seven days and nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis accidentally recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves of Oroetês. Search was immediately made, and the miserable slave was brought, in chains as well as in rags,² into the presence of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery, he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument to overcome it. Dêmokêdês now saw that there was no resource, admitted that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his utmost in the case before him.

He cures
Darius, who
rewards him
munificently.

He was fortunate enough to succeed perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound

must be remarked that a passage in the remarkable medical oath, published in the collection of Hippocratic treatises, recognises in the plainest manner the distinction between the physician and the operator—the former binds himself by this oath not to perform the operation “even of lithotomy, but to leave it to the operators or workmen:” Οὐ τέμνω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντας, ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάτησιν ἀνδράσι πρήξις τῆσδε (Œuvres d’Hippocrate, vol. iv. p. 630, ed. Littré). M. Littré (p. 617) contests this explanation, remarking that the various Hippocratic treatises represent the *ιατρός* as

performing all sorts of operations, even such as require violent and mechanical dealing. But the words of the oath are so explicit, that it seems more reasonable to assign to the oath itself a later date than the treatises, when the habits of practitioners may have changed.

¹ About the Persian habit of sending to Egypt for surgeons, compare Herodot. iii. 1.

² Herodot. iii. 129. τὸν δὲ ὡς ἐξεῦρον ἐν τοῖσι Ὀροίτῳ ἀνδραπόδοισι δοκῶν δὴ ἀπημελημένον, παρήγον ἐς μέσον, πέδας τε ἔλκοντα καὶ βάκεσιν ἐσθημένον.

state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with two sets of chains in solid gold—a commemoration of the state in which Dêmokêdês had first come before him. He next sent him into the harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as the man who had restored the king to life, upon which the grateful sultanas each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters;¹ in all so numerous, that the slave Skitôn who followed him was enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor. This was not all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture, made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description of favour. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him. But Dêmokêdês had the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an unfortunate companion of his imprisonment—an Eleian prophet, who had followed the fortunes of Polykratês.

But there was one favour which Darius would on no account grant; yet upon this one Dêmokêdês had set his heart—the liberty of returning to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill, enabled him to escape from the splendour of his second detention, as it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumour formed upon the breast of Atossa: at first she said nothing to any one, but it became too bad for concealment, and she was forced to consult Dêmokêdês. He promised to cure her, but required from her a solemn oath that she would afterwards do for him anything which he should ask—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing indecent.² The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to repay it by procuring his liberty. Knowing that the favour would be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, he taught her a stratagem for obtaining under false pretences the consent of Darius. She took an early opportunity (Herodotus tells us,³ in bed) of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some positive addition to the power

He procures permission, by artifice and through the influence of Atossa, to return to Greece.

¹ Herodot. iii. 130. The golden stater was equal to about 1*l.* 1*s.* 3*d.* English money (Hussey, *Ancient Weights*, vii. 3. p. 103).

The ladies in a Persian harem appear to have been less unapproachable and invisible than those in modern Turkey; in spite of the observation of Plutarch, *Artaxerxês*, c. 27.

² Herodot. iii. 133. *δεήσεσθαι δὲ οὐ-*

δενδς τῶν δσα αἰσχύνην ἔστι φέροντα. Another Greek physician at the court of Susa, about seventy years afterwards—Apollonidês of Kôs—in attendance on a Persian princess, did not impose upon himself the same restraint: his intrigue was divulged, and he was put to death miserably (*Ktésias, Persica*, c. 42).

³ Herodot. iii. 134.

and splendour of the empire; and when Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it and to turn his forces first against Greece—"I have heard (she said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos and Corinth, and I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered at Plataea and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by Herodotus)—you have near you the best person possible to give information about Greece—that Greek who cured your foot." Darius was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into Greece to procure information, along with Dêmokêdês. Selecting fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities of Greece, under guidance of Dêmokêdês, but with peremptory orders upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next sent for Dêmokêdês himself, explained to him what he wanted, and enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been completed. He farther desired him to carry away all the ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations of equal value should make up the loss. Lastly, he directed that a store-ship, "filled with all manner of good things," should accompany the voyage. Dêmokêdês undertook the mission with every appearance of sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what he already possessed at Susa—saying, that he should like to find his property and furniture again on coming back, and that the store-ship alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage and for all necessary presents.

Accordingly he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon in Phenicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large store-ship in company. The voyage of survey into Greece was commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in Greece—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks, crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities, taking memoranda¹ of everything worthy of note which they saw. Such a Periplûs, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable, as an account of the actual

Atossa suggests to Darius an expedition against Greece—Dêmokêdês with some Persians is sent to procure information for him.

¹ Herodot. iii. 136. *προσίσχοντες δὲ αὐτῆς τὰ παραθαλάσσια ἐθησαντο καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο.*

state of the Grecian world about 518 B.C. As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Dêmokêdês—now within a short distance of his own home, Krotôn—found an opportunity of executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request, Aristophilidês the king of Tarentum seized the fifteen Persians and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders from off their ships—while Dêmokêdês himself made his escape to Krotôn. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilidês released the Persians; who, pursuing their voyage, went on to Krotôn, found Dêmokêdês in the market-place, and laid hands upon him. But his fellow-citizens rescued him, not without opposition from some who were afraid of provoking the Great King—and in spite of remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves. Indeed the Krotoniates not only protected the restored exile, but even robbed the Persians of their store-ship. The latter, disabled from proceeding farther as well by this loss as by the secession of Dêmokêdês, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in that neighbourhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them and carried them up to Susa—a service for which Darius promised him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen—an honourable contrast to Dêmokêdês, who had not scrupled to impel the stream of Persian conquest against his country, in order to procure his own release—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius, employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force was out of the question.¹ The last words addressed by Dêmokêdês at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint Darius that he (Dêmokêdês) was about to marry the daughter of the Krotoniate Milo—one of the first men in Krotôn as well as the greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great with Darius—probably from the talk of Dêmokêdês himself: moreover gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vain-glorious Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace and per-

Voyage of Dêmokêdês along the coast of Greece—he stays at Krotôn—fate of his Persian companions.

¹ Herodot. iii. 137, 138.

haps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very purpose.¹

Thus finishes the history of Dêmokêdês, and of the "first Persians (to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into Greece."² It is a history well-deserving of attention, even looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as they do into the full movement of the ancient world—incidents which I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the dramatic amplification of the historian. Even at that early date, Greek medical intelligence stands out in a surpassing manner, and Dêmokêdês is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were seized, carried up to Susa,³ and there detained for the Great King, his court, and harem.

But his history suggests in another point of view far more serious reflections. Like the Milesian Histiaëus (of whom I shall speak hereafter), he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention at Susa. Now the influence which he originated was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516-514 B.C.), Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids. What she was under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter. She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots. Moreover Grecian habit of co-operation was then only just commencing. But fortunately the Persian invader did not touch the shore of

¹ Herodot. iii. 137. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτό μοι σπεῦσαι δοκέει τὸν γάμον τοῦτον τελέσας χρήματα μέγαλα Δημοκῆδης, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς Δαρείου ἐὼν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐωῦτοῦ δόκιμος.

² Herodot. iii. 138.

³ Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 33. Ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἶει (says Sokratês) διὰ σοφ.αν ἀναρπάστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγενεσθαι, καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν;

We shall run little risk in conjecturing that among the intelligent and able

men thus carried off, surgeons and physicians would be selected as the first and most essential.

Apollônidês of Kôs (whose calamitous end has been alluded to in a previous note) was resident as surgeon or physician with Artaxerxês Longimanus (Ktésias, Persica, c. 30), and Polykritus of Mendê, as well as Ktésias himself, with Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 31).

Greece until more than twenty years afterwards, in 490 B.C.; and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance had become decupled; besides which, their conduct had so provoked the Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them, and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defence was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxês had listened to the best of his own counsellors. But had Darius—at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force—landed at Marathon in 514 B.C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.C., he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his efforts, like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike perilous and unprofitable. His personal ardour was wasted on those unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate of Cyrus—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Dêmokêdês, might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail Greece instead of Scythia—a choice in favour of which all other recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece would then probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500-300 B.C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud. Indeed it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent contingencies—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the

Persæ of Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxês had just undergone in his flight from Greece,¹ we do not easily persuade ourselves to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Hêrakleid and Alkmæônid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have been thus reversed—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens in Persia—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be pre-occupied with a project not less insane even than those of Kambysês against Ethiopia and the Libyan desert. Such at least is the moral of the story of Dêmokêdês.

That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now to be recounted. It was undertaken by Darius for the purpose of avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his brother Artabanus,² Darius summoned the whole force of his empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus—a force not less than 700,000 horse and foot, and 600 ships, according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations composing

About 516-
515 B.C.

Darius
marches
against
Scythia.

¹ Æschyl. Pers. 435–845, &c.

² Herodot. iv. 1, 83. There is nothing to mark the precise year of the Scythian expedition; but as the accession of Darius is fixed to 521 B.C., and as the expedition is connected with the early part of his reign, we may conceive him to have entered upon it as soon as his hands were free; that is, as soon as he had put down the revolted satraps and provinces, Orctês, the Medes, Babylonians, &c. Five years seems a reasonable time to allow for these necessities of the empire, which would bring the Scythian expedition to 516–515 B.C. There is reason for supposing it to have been before 514 B.C., for in that year Hipparchus was slain at Athens, and Hippias the surviving brother, looking out for securities and alliances abroad, gave his daughter in marriage to Æantidês son of Hippoklus despot of Lampsakus, “perceiving that Hippoklus and his son had great influence with Darius” (Thucyd. vi. 59). Now Hippoklus could not well have acquired

this influence *before* the Scythian expedition; for Darius came down then for the first time to the western sea: Hippoklus served upon that expedition (Herodot. iv. 138), and it was probably then that his favour was acquired, and farther confirmed during the time that Darius stayed at Sardis after his return from Scythia.

Professor Schultz (Beiträge zu genaueren Zeit-bestimmungen der Hellen. Geschicht. von der 63^{en} bis zur 72^{en} Olympiade, p. 168, in the Kieler Philolog. Studien) places the expedition in 513 B.C.; but I think a year or two earlier is more probable. Larcher, Wesseling, and Bähr (ad Herodot. iv. 145) place it in 508 B.C., which is later than the truth; indeed Larcher himself places the reduction of Lemnos and Imbros by Otanês in 511 B.C., though that event decidedly came after the Scythian expedition (Herodot. v. 27; Larcher, Table Chronologique, Trad. d'Hérodote. t. vii. p. 633–635).

the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterwards seen by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium—the inscriptions were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian architect Mandroklês had been directed to throw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders for military service should be punctually obeyed, and so impatient were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named Œobazus entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of them should be left at home—an answer which the unsuspecting father heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home—for they were all put to death.¹ A proceeding similar to this is ascribed afterwards to Xerxês;² whether true or not as matters of fact, they illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.

The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phenician fleet was not brought into the Ægean until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all or most of the Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition.³ Of Ionic Greeks were seen—Strattis, despot of Chios; Æakês son of Sylosôn, despot of Samos; Laodamas, of Phôkæa; and Histiaeus, of Milêtus. From the Æolic towns, Aristagoras of Kymê; from the Hellespontine Greeks, Daphnis of Abydos, Hippoklus of Lampakus, Hêrophantus of Parium, Metrodôrus of Prokonnêsus, Aristagoras of Kyzikus, and Miltiadês of the Thracian Chersonese—all these are mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled at the Bosphorus, was sent forward into the Euxine to the mouth of the Danube—with orders to sail up the river two days' journey, above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a bridge of boats over it. Darius, having liberally recompensed the architect Mandroklês, crossed the bridge over the Bosphorus, and began his march through Thrace, receiving the submission of various Thracian tribes in his way, and subduing others—especially the Getæ north of Mount Hæmus, who were compelled to increase still

His naval force formed of Asiatic and insular Greeks.

He directs the Greeks to throw a bridge over the Danube and crosses the river.

¹ Herodot. iv. 84.

² Herodot. vii. 39.

³ Herodot. iv. 97, 137, 138.

farther the numbers of his vast army.¹ On arriving at the Danube, he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the Ionians. We may remark, here as on so many other occasions, that all operations requiring intelligence are performed for the Persians either by Greeks or by Phenicians—more usually by the former. He crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers²—for so the Danube was imagined to be in the fifth century B.C.—and directed his march into Scythia.

As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and intelligibly: we know that Darius marched his army into Scythia, and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all which happened between his crossing and recrossing the Danube, we find nothing approaching to authentic statement, nor even what we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which exaggerating fancy has been at work—all is inexplicable mystery. Ktésias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the Scythian territory—that he then exchanged bows with the king of Scythia and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest—and that being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the loss of one-tenth part of his army,³ being compelled to break down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is said; but the narrative of Ktésias, defective as it is, is much less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense host of Darius as it were through fairy-land—heedless of distance, large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies, destruction of the country (in so far as it could be destroyed) by the retreating Scythians, &c. He tells us that the Persian army consisted chiefly of foot—that there were no roads nor agriculture; yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Bory-

¹ Herodot. iv. 89–93.

² Herodot. iv. 48–50. Ἰστρος—μέγιστος ποταμὸν πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, &c.

³ Ktésias, Persica, c. 17. Justin (ii. 5—compare also xxxviii. 7) seems to follow the narrative of Ktésias.

Æschylus (Persæ, 864), who presents the deceased Darius as a glorious contrast with the living Xerxês, talks of the splendid conquests which he made

by means of others—“without crossing the Halys himself, nor leaving his home.” We are led to suppose, by the language which Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eidôlon of Darius (v. 720–745), that he had forgotten the bridge thrown across the Bosphorus by order of Darius; for the latter is made to condemn severely the impious insolence of Xerxês in bridging over the Hellespont.

sthenês (Dnieper), Hypakyris, Gerrhos, and Tanais.¹ How these rivers could have been passed in the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture, since it was not winter-time to convert them into ice : nor does the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable, is, that in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia or Borysthenês, and the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and the Borysthenês, across whose country it would seem that this march of Darius must have carried him—Herodotus does not say anything ; though we should have expected that he would have had better means of informing himself about this part of the march than about any other, and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.

He marches into Scythia—narrative of his march impossible and unintelligible, considered as history.

The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality. It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians with all their barbarous neighbours from the Carpathian mountains to the river Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni, the Budini, the Gelôni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri—all of them bordering on that vast quadrangular area of 4000 stadia for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it²—are brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians. The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians, the Budini, and the Gelôni, all eastward of the

The description of his march is rather to be looked upon as a fancy-picture, illustrative of Scythian warfare.

¹ Herodot. iv. 136. ἄτε δὲ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολλοῦ ἐόντος πεζοῦ στρατοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς οὐκ ἐπισταμένον, ὥστε οὐ τετμημένων τῶν ὁδῶν, τοῦ δὲ Σκυθικοῦ, ἰσχυρότεω, καὶ τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπισταμένον, &c. Compare c. 128.

The number and size of the rivers are mentioned by Herodotus as the principal wonder of Scythia, c. 82—Θωυμάσια δὲ ἡ χώρα αὐτῇ οὐκ ἔχει,

χωρὶς ἢ διὰ ποτάμους τε πολλῶ μεγίστους καὶ ἀριθμὸν πλείστους, &c. He ranks the Borysthenês as the largest of all rivers except the Nile and the Danube (c. 53). The Hypanis also (Bog) is πόταμος ἐν ὀλίγοις μέγας (c. 52).

But he appears to forget the existence of these rivers when he is describing the Persian march.

² Herodot. iv. 101.

Tanais¹—in the negative by the rest. The Scythians, removing their waggons with their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia to the north-eastern extremity of the territory of the Budini,² several days' journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover they destroy the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during all this long march (says Herodotus) the Persians "found nothing to damage, inasmuch as the country was barren." We can hardly understand therefore what they found to live upon. It is in the territory of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Gelôni; and they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river Oarus. For what purposes these fortresses could have been intended Herodotus gives no intimation; but he says that the unfinished work was yet to be seen even in his day.³

Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories above-mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians into *their* territory on pain of being themselves treated as enemies.⁴ Accordingly the Scythians, avoiding the boundaries of the Agathyrsi, direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march backwards and forwards, there are partial skirmishes and combats of horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement. And though Darius

¹ Herodot. iv. 118, 119.

² Herodot. iv. 120-122.

³ Herodot. iv. 123. "Ὅσον μὲν δὴ χρόνον οἱ Πέρσαι ἤϊσαν διὰ τῆς Σκυθικῆς καὶ τῆς Σαυρομάτιδος χώρας, οἱ δὲ εἶχον οὐδὲν σίνεσθαι, ἅτε τῆς χώρας εἰούσης χέρσου· ἐπεὶ δὲ τε εἰς τὴν τῶν Βουδίνων χώραν ἐσέβαλον, &c. See Rennell, Geograph. System of Herodotus, p. 114, about the Oarus.

The erections, whatever they were, which were supposed to mark the extreme point of the march of Darius,

may be compared to those evidences of the extreme advance of Dionysus, which the Macedonian army saw on the north of the Jaxartês—"Liberi patris terminos." Quintus Curtius, vii. 9, 15 (vii. 37, 16, Zumpt.)

⁴ Herodot. iv. 125. Hekataeus ranks the Melanchlæni as a Scythian *ἔθνος* (Hekat. Fragment. 154, ed. Klausen): he also mentions several other subdivisions of Scythians, who cannot be farther authenticated (Fragm. 155-160).

challenges them formally by means of a herald, with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthysus not only refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers—it will then (he adds) be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not.¹ The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when Idanthysus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid retreat towards the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with them—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by their braying.² However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused, as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of the bridge, urging them to break it down and leave the Persian king to his fate—inevitable destruction with his whole army.³

Here we re-enter the world of reality, at the north bank of the Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads who formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. “The Scythians⁴ (says he), in regard to one of the greatest of human matters, have struck out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do

Strong impression produced upon the imagination of Herodotus by the Scythians.

¹ Herodot. iv. 126, 127.

² Herodot. iv. 128–132. The bird, the mouse, the frog, and the arrows, are explained to mean: Unless you take to the air like a bird, to the earth like a mouse, or to the water like a frog, you will become the victim of the Scythian arrows.

³ Herodot. iv. 133.

⁴ Herodot. iv. 46. Τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένει ἐν μὲν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται, τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν· τὰ μέντοι ἄλλα οὐκ ἄγαμαι. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον οὕτω σφι ἀνεύρηται, ὥστε ἀποφυγέειν τε μηδένα ἐπελ-

θόντα ἐπὶ σφέας, μὴ βουλομένους τε ἐξευρεθῆναι, καταλαβεῖν μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι. Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ἢ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες, ἔωσι ἱπποτόξοι, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ’ ἀρότου, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματα δὲ σφι ἢ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οἱτοὶ ἀμαχοὶ τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν;

Ἐξεύρηται δὲ σφι ταῦτα, τῆς τε γῆς εὐρύτης ἐπιτηδέης, καὶ τῶν ποτάμων ἐόντων σφι συμμάχων, &c.

Compare this with the oration of the Scythian envoys to Alexander the Great, as it stands in Quintus Curtius, vii. 8, 22 (vii. 35, 22, Zumpt).

not admire them ; but they have contrived this great object, that no invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose. For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all house-carriers and horse-bowmen—living, not from the plough, but from cattle, and having their dwellings on waggons—how can they be otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?" The protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius—who can neither overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even escapes in safety—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out of it to the Danube ; for of the many different guesses,¹ by which critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon any positive grounds. We can trace the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out what were his substantive data.

The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on the out-march and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned, are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his first crossing is very curious : I have reserved it until the present moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which happened on his return.

On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of

¹ The statement of Strabo (vii. p. 305), which restricts the march of Darius to the country between the Danube and the Tyras (Dniester), is justly pronounced by Niebuhr (*Kleine Schriften*, p. 372) to be a mere supposition suggested by the probabilities of the case, because it could not be understood how his large army should cross even the Dniester: it is not to be treated as an affirmation resting upon any authority. "As Herodotus tells us what is impossible (adds Niebuhr), we know nothing at all historically respecting the expedition."

So again the conjecture of Palmerius (*Exercitationes ad Auctores Græcos*, p. 21) carries on the march somewhat farther than the Dniester—to the Hypanis, or *perhaps* to the Borysthenês. Rennell, Klaproth, and Reichard, are not

afraid to extend the march on to the Wolga. Dr. Thirlwall stops within the Tanais, admitting however that no correct historical account can be given of it. Eichwald supposes a long march up the Dniester into Volhynia and Lithuania.

Compare Ukert, *Skythien*, p. 26 ; Dahlmann, *Historische Forschungen*, ii. p. 159–164 ; Schaffarik, *Slavische Alterthümer*, i. 10, 3. i. 13, 4–5 ; and Mr. Kenrick, *Remarks on the Life and Writings of Herodotus*, prefixed to his *Notes on the Second Book of Herodotus*, p. xxi. The latter is among those who cannot swim the Dniester: he says—"Probably the Dniester (Tyras) was the real limit of the expedition, and Bessarabia, Moldavia, and the Bukovina, the scene of it."

boats ready ; and when the whole army had passed over, he ordered the Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march into Scythia,¹ the ships being left with nothing but the rowers and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylenæan general Kôês ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian king to listen to advice. Kôês urged that the march on which they were proceeding might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable ; because the Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered. As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it. Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it, and desired that Kôês would ask him after his return for a suitable reward—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. “Take this cord (said he to the Ionians): untie one of the knots in it each day after my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the bridge until you shall have untied all the knots ; but if by that time I shall not have returned, then depart and sail home.”² With such orders he began his march into the interior. This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple expedients for numeration and counting of time then practised, but also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine. No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith : he will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and re-enter Media from the eastern side of the Euxine : when he is reminded that possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within sixty days, if it happens at all ; and that should he remain absent more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube. The reader who looks at

Orders given
by Darius to
the Ionians
at the bridge
over the
Danube.

¹ Herodot. iv. 97. Δαρείος ἐκέλευσε τοὺς Ἴωνας τὴν σχεδίην λύσαντας ἐπεσθαι κατ' ἡπειρον ἐωϋτῷ, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν νέων στρατόν.

² Herodot. iv. 98. ἦν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ

τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ παρέω, ἀλλὰ διέλθωσι ὑμῖν αἱ ἡμέραι τῶν ἀμμάτων, ἀποπλέετε ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτέων· μέχρι δὲ τούτου, ἐπεὶ τε οὕτω μετέδοξε, φυλάσσετε τὴν σχεδίην.

a map of the Euxine and its surrounding territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception; but he should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover, he tells us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into Media from the north,¹ while the Spartans were invited to land on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartês, on the north of Sogdiana and on the east of the Sea of Aral, supposed that they had reached the Tanais and called the river by that name²—we shall not be astonished at the erroneous estimation of distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.

The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army, when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but of a body of Scythians; who acquainted them that Darius was in full retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the whole army depended upon that bridge. They endeavoured to prevail upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring them that if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was inevitable—of course the Ionians themselves would then be free. At first the latter were favourably disposed towards the proposition, which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiadês, despot or governor of the Thracian Chersonese.³ Had he prevailed, the victor of Marathon (for such we shall hereafter find him) would have thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though leaning at first towards his suggestion, were speedily converted by the representations of Histiaëus of Milêtus, who reminded

The Ionians left in guard of the bridge; their conduct when Darius's return is delayed.

¹ Herodot. vi. 84. Compare his account of the marches of the Cimmerians and of the Scythians into Asia Minor and Media respectively (Herodot. i. 103, 104, iv. 12).

² Arrian, Exp. Al. iii. 6, 15; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 45; Quint. Curt. vii. 7, 4. vii. 8, 30 (vii. 29, 5. vii. 36, 7, Zumpt).

³ Herodot. iv. 133, 136, 137.

them that the maintenance of his own ascendancy over the Milesians, and that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of Persian support alone—the feeling of the population being everywhere against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians, and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the length of a bow-shot; while the Scythians departed, under the persuasion that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means of crossing the river.¹ It appears that they missed the track of the retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation and suffering, to reach the Danube in safety. Arriving during the darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the bridge no longer joining the northern bank. An Egyptian herald, of stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible the name of Histiaëus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the bridge was re-established, and the Persian army passed over before the Scythians returned to the spot.²

The Ionian despots preserve the bridge and enable Darius to recross the river, as a means of support to their own dominion at home.

There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity eminently favourable, such as never again returned, for emancipating themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the determination was made, especially the Milesian Histiaëus, were not induced to preserve the bridge by any honourable reluctance to betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very good evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge of the Milesian historian Hekataëus, who took an active part in the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards, and who may perhaps have been personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt, and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histiaëus of Milêtus will appear on the same occasion as the fomenter of it, in order to procure his release from an honourable detention at Susa near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot, having deprived his countrymen of that real and favourable

Opportunity lost of emancipation from the Persians.

¹ Herodot. iv. 137–139.

² Herodot. iv. 140–141.

chance of emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to them, threw them into revolt a few years afterwards against the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.

Extricated from the perils of Scythian warfare, Darius marched southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left however a con-

Conquest of Thrace by the Persians as far as the river Strymon—Myrkinus near that river given to Histæus.

siderable army in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance,¹ but was at length subdued; after which all the Thracian tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and becoming subject to tribute.² Near the lower Strymon was the Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to Histæus of Milêtus; for both this Milesian, and Kôês of Mitylênê, had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube.³ Kôês requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylênê, which was accomplished by Persian authority; but Histæus solicited that the territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the site in question was presented to Histæus, who entered actively upon his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent hereafter as the site of Amphipolis; it offered great temptation to settlers, as fertile, well-wooded, convenient for maritime commerce, and near to auriferous and argenteriferous mountains.⁴

It seems however that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta, proposing a simultaneous invasion of Persia, from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians. The Athenian Miltiadês, who was despot or governor of the Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the real cause of such retirement. Miltiadês could not remain in the Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly

¹ Herodot. iv. 143, 144, v. 1, 2.

² Herodot. v. 2.

³ Herodot. v. 11.

⁴ Herodot. v. 23.

enmity of Darius by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.¹

¹ Herodot. vi. 40–84. That Miltiadês could have remained in the Chersonese undisturbed, during the interval between the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt (when the Persians were complete masters of those regions, and when Otanês was punishing other towns in the neighbourhood for evasion of service under Darius), after he had declared so pointedly against the Persians on a matter of life and death to the king and army—appears to me, as it does to Dr. Thirlwall (History of Gr. vol. ii. App. ii. p. 486, ch. xiv. p. 226–249), eminently improbable. So forcibly does Dr. Thirlwall feel the difficulty, that he suspects the reported conduct and exhortations of Miltiadês at the bridge over the Danube to have been a falsehood, fabricated by Miltiadês himself twenty years afterwards, for the purpose of acquiring popularity at Athens during the time immediately preceding the battle of Marathon.

I cannot think this hypothesis admissible. It directly contradicts Herodotus on a matter of fact very conspicuous, and upon which good means of information seem to have been within his reach. I have already observed that the historian Hekataeus must have possessed personal knowledge of all the relations between the Ionians and Darius, and that he very probably may have been even present at the bridge: all the information given by Hekataeus upon these points would be open to the inquiries of Herodotus. The unbounded gratitude of Darius towards Histiaeus shows that some one or more of the Ionic despots present at the bridge must have powerfully enforced the expediency of breaking it down. That the name of the despot who stood forward as chief mover of this resolution should have been forgotten and not mentioned at the time, is highly improbable; yet such must have been the case, if a fabrication by Miltiadês twenty years afterwards could successfully fill up the blank with his own name. The two most prominent matters talked of, after the retreat of Darius, in reference to the bridge, would probably be the name of the leader who urged its destruction, and the name of Histiaeus who preserved it; indeed the mere fact of the mischievous influence exercised by the latter afterwards, would be

pretty sure to keep these points of the case in full view.

There are means of escaping from the difficulty of the case, I think, without contradicting Herodotus on any matter of fact important and conspicuous, or indeed on any matter of fact whatever. We see by vi. 40, that Miltiadês *did quit the Chersonese* between the close of the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt; Herodotus indeed tells us that he quitted it in consequence of an incursion of the Scythians. Now without denying the fact of such an incursion, we may well suppose the historian to have been mistaken in assigning it as the cause of the flight of Miltiadês. The latter was prevented from living in the Chersonese continuously, during the interval between the Persian invasion of Scythia and the Ionic revolt, by fear of Persian enmity: it is not necessary for us to believe that he was never there at all, but his residence there must have been interrupted and insecure. The chronological data in Herodot. vi. 40 are exceedingly obscure and perplexing; but it seems to me that the supposition which I suggest introduces a plausible coherence into the series of historical facts, with the slightest possible contradiction to our capital witness.

The only achievement of Miltiadês, between the affair on the Danube and his return to Athens shortly before the battle of Marathon, is the conquest of Lemnos; and *that* must have taken place evidently while the Persians were occupied by the Ionic revolt (between 502–494 B.C.). There is nothing in his recorded deeds inconsistent with the belief, therefore, that between 515–502 B.C. he may not have resided in the Chersonese at all, or at least not for very long together: and the statement of Cornelius Nepos, that he quitted it immediately after the return from Scythia, from fear of the Persians, may be substantially true. Dr. Thirlwall observes (p. 487)—“As little would it appear that when the Scythians invaded the Chersonese, Miltiadês was conscious of having endeavoured to render them an important service. He flies before them, though he had been so secure while the Persian arms were in his neighbourhood.” He has here put his finger on what I believe to be the error

The conquests of Megabazus did not stop at the western bank of the Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman carrying a vessel on her head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same time. This woman had been brought over (we are told) by her two brothers Pigrês and Mantyês for the express purpose of arresting the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be constituted despots of their countrymen; and we may presume that their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were in the genius of the Persian government.¹

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by the strangers: at length the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women under pretence that they should return after a bath, he brought back in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers. Presently the Persians, proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death. Their retinue, and the splendid carriages and equipment which they had brought, disappeared at the same time, without any tidings reaching the Persian army. And when Bubarês, another eminent Persian, was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his sister Gygæa in marriage.²

Macedonians
and Pæo-
nians con-
quered by
Megabazus.

Insolence
and murder
of the Per-
sian envoys
in Mace-
donia.

of Herodotus — the supposition that Miltiadês fled from the Chersonese to avoid the Scythians, whereas he really left it to avoid the Persians.

The story of Strabo (xiii. p. 591), that Darius caused the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont to be burnt down, in order to hinder them from affording means of transport to the Scythians into Asia, seems to me highly improbable. These towns appear in their ordinary condition, Abydus

among them, at the time of the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards (Herodot. v. 117).

¹ Herodot. v. 13–16. Nikolaus Damaskênus (Fragm. p. 36, ed. Orell.) tells a similar story about the means by which a Mysian woman attracted the notice of the Lydian king Alyattês. Such repetition of a striking story, in reference to different people and times, has many parallels in ancient history.

² Herodot. v. 20, 21.

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the Pæonians from the river Strymon. Having become alarmed at the progress of Histiaeus with his new city of Myrkinus, he communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was prevailed upon to send for Histiaeus, retaining him about his person, and carrying him to Susa as counsellor and friend, with every mark of honour, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not unreasonable; but this detention of Histiaeus at Susa became in the sequel an important event.¹

Histiaeus founds a prosperous colony at Myrkinus—Darius sends for him into Asia.

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother Artaphernês satrap of Sardis, and Otanês general of the forces on the coast in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and Chalkêdon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lampônium. With the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest—the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all. These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities.² They were distinguished also for ancient worship of Hêphæstus, together with mystic rites in honour of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to their Great Goddess. In their two cities—Hephæstias on the east of the island and Myrina on the west—they held out bravely against Otanês, and did not submit until they had undergone long and severe hardship. Lykarêtus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he soon after died.³ It is pro-

Otanês Persian general on the Hellespont—he conquers the Pelasgic population of Lemnos, Imbros, &c.

¹ Herodot. v. 23, 24.

² Herodot. vi. 138. Æschyl. Choëphor. 632; Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀῆμνος.

The mystic rites in honour of the Kabeiri at Lemnos and Imbros are particularly noticed by Pherekydês (ap. Strabo. x. p. 472): compare Photius, v. Κάβειροι, and the remarkable description of the periodical Lemnian solemnity in Philostratus (Heroi. p. 740).

The volcanic mountain Mosychlus, in the north-eastern portion of the island,

was still burning in the fourth century B.C. (Antimach. Fragment. xviii. p. 103, Düntzer Epicc. Græc. Fragm.)

Welcker's Dissertation (Die Æschylische Trilogie, p. 248 seqq.) enlarges much upon the Lemnian and Samothracian worship.

³ Herodot. v. 26, 27. The twenty-seventh chapter is extremely perplexing. As the text reads at present, we ought to make Lykarêtus the subject of certain predications which yet

bable that the Pelasgic population of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated from fear of Darius.¹

Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterwards their lot was again changed—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced. They were conquered by Miltiadês from the Thracian Chersonese; from Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within one day's sail with a north wind. The Hephæstieans abandoned their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the inhabitants of Myrina stood a siege,² and were not expelled without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxês), remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.)—which guaranteed universal autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small—they were specially reserved, and considered as united with Athens.³ The property in their soil was held by men who, without losing their Athenian citizenship, became Lemnian Kleruchs, and as such were classified apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy or departure from the country.⁴ It is probable that a considerable number of poor Athenian citizens were provided with lots of land

seem properly referable to Otanês. We must consider the words from Οἱ μὲν δὲ Λήμνιοι—down to τελευτᾷ—as parenthetical. This is awkward; but it seems the least difficulty in the case, and the commentators are driven to adopt it.

¹ Zenob. Proverb. iii. 85.

² Herodot. vi. 140. Charax ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ἡφαιστία.

³ Xenophon. Hellen. v. 1, 31. Compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245, where the words ἡμέτεραι ἀποίκιαι doubtless mean Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 28, v. 8, vii. 57; Phylarchus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 255; Demosthen. Philippic. 1. c. 12. p. 17, R.: compare the Inscription No. 1686 in the collection of Boëckh, with his remarks, p. 297.

About the stratagems resorted to be-

fore the Athenian Dikastery to procure delay by pretended absence in Lemnos or Skyros, see Isæus, Or. vi. p. 58 (p. 80 Bek.); Pollux, viii. 7, 81: Hesych. v. Ἰμβριος; Suidas, v. Λήμνία δίκη: compare also Carl Rhode, Res Lemnicæ, p. 50 (Wratistaw 1829).

It seems as if εἰς Λῆμνον πλεῖν had come to be a proverbial expression at Athens for getting out of the way—evading the performance of duty: this seems to be the sense of Demosthenês, Philipp. 1. c. 9. p. 14. ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν Λῆμνον τὸν παρ' ὑμῶν ἱππαρχὸν δεῖ πλεῖν, τῶν δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων ἀγωνιζομένων Μενέλαον ἱππαρχεῖν.

From the passage of Isæus above alluded to, which Rhode seems to me to construe incorrectly, it appears that there was a legal *connubium* between Athenian citizens and Lemnian women.

in these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiadês made the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica, and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend, he tells us nothing about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens jointly with Miltiadês from the Chersonese, during the period that the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between 502–494 B.C.—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiadês would have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian Otanês, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.

In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiadês, I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that conquest—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt (which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly caused by it in so far as it occupied the attention of the Persians—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted Ionians. When Miltiadês was driven out of the Chersonese by the Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived from having subdued Lemnos,¹ contributed both to neutralize the enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the Marathonian combat.

¹ Herodot. vi. 136.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.

HITHERTO the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiaëus, he left Artaphernês his brother as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histiaëus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B.C., from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years—"a respite from suffering," to use the significant phrase of the historian.¹

It was about the year 506 B.C. that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous

¹ Herodot. v. 27. Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, ἀνεως κακῶν ἦν—or ἀνεσις κακῶν—if the conjecture of some critics be adopted. Mr. Clinton, with Larcher and others (see *Fasti Hellen.* App. 18. p. 314), construe this passage as if the comma were to be placed after μετὰ δὲ, so that the historian would be made to affirm that the period of repose lasted only a short time. It appears to me that the comma ought rather to be placed after χρόνον, and that the "short time" refers to those evils which the historian had been describing before. There must have been an interval of eight years at least, if not of ten years, between the events which the historian had been describing (the evils inflicted by the attacks of Otanês) and the breaking out of the Ionic revolt; which latter event no one places earlier than 504 B.C.,

though some prefer 502 B.C., others even 500 B.C.

If indeed we admitted with Wesseling (ad Herodot. vi. 40; and Mr. Clinton seems inclined towards the same opinion, see p. 314 *ut sup.*) that the Scythian expedition is to be placed in 508–507 B.C., then indeed the interval between the campaign of Otanês and the Ionic revolt would be contracted into one or two years. But I have already observed that I cannot think 508 B.C. a correct date for the Scythian expedition: it seems to me to belong to about 515 B.C. Nor do I know what reason there is for determining the date as Wesseling does, except this very phrase οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, which is, on every supposition, exceedingly vague, and which he appears to me not to have construed in the best way.

refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigæum as a petitioner to Artaphernês at Sardis. He now doubtless found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus, whose favour with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in this design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety.¹ Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that the satrap was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

Application of the banished Hippias to Artaphernês satrap of Sardis.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians.² It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of 8000 heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark in the project along with him—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighbouring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos,

About 502 B.C.

State of the island of Naxos—Naxian exiles solicit aid from Aristagoras of Miletus.

¹ Herodot. v. 96. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφέρνης ἐκέλευέ σφας εἰ βουλόατο σοοὶ εἶναι, καταδέκεσθαι ὀπίσω τὸν Ἰππίην.

² Herodot. v. 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (Herodot. i. 64), was expelled from this post by the Lacedæmonians (De Herodot. Malig-

nitat. c. 21. p. 859). I confess that I do not place much confidence in the statements of that treatise as to the many despots expelled by Sparta: we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of 100 ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernês entertained the proposition with eagerness, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring 200 ships instead of 100. Messengers despatched to Susa having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.¹

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont: on reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbour of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance; so that the success of Aristagoras would

Expedition
against
Naxos un-
dertaken by
Aristagoras
with the
assistance of
Artaphernês
the satrap.

have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabatês, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch. He discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus) left without a single man on board. Incensed at such neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards through one of the apertures for oars in the ship's side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabatês for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabatês with disdain, reminding him that according to the instructions of Artaphernês, he was only second—himself (Aristagoras) being first. The pride of Megabatês could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, proba-

Its failure,
through dis-
pute between
Aristagoras
and the
Persian ge-
neral Mega-
batês.

¹ Herodot. v. 30, 31.

bly delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.¹

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabatês, deceived Artaphernês, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, and it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law Histiaëus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiaëus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved—branded upon it the words necessary—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined.² Histiaëus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to re-establish order. His message, arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Milêtus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception—the historian Hekataëus of Milêtus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighbouring temple of Apollo at Branchidæ for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone (he said) could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy assuredly would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, were listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures—though highly useful for the impending struggle,

Alarm of
Aristagoras
—he deter-
mines to re-
volt against
Persia—in-
stigation to
the same
effect from
Histiaëus.

¹ Herodot. v. 34, 35.

² Herodot. v. 35: compare Polyæn. i. 24, and Aulus Gellius, N. A. xvii. 9.

and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekataëus anticipated—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial :¹ perhaps indeed Hekataëus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have argued the question as if Milêtus were to stand alone in the revolt ; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt. Their first step was to conciliate popular favour throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendancy, as Histiaëus had well argued at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favourable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. For the fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Accordingly Iatragoras was despatched from Milêtus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful : the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands—among them Histiaëus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians),² Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about ; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned to death by the Mitylæans.³

¹ Herodot. v. 36.

² Compare Herodotus, v. 121 and vii. 98. Oliatus was son of Ibanôlis, as was

also the Mylasian Herakleidês mentioned in v. 121.

³ Herodot. v. 36, 37. vi. 9.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekataëus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Extension of the revolt throughout Asiatic Greece—Aristagoras goes to solicit aid from Sparta.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals and to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenês; to whom he addressed himself, “holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers.” Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus.¹ Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare, of the Asiatics. Such enemies as the latter (he said) could be at once put down, and their wealth appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian.² He then traced out on

¹ Herodot. v. 49. τῷ δὲ (Κλεομένει) ἐς λόγους ἦε, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι, ἔχων χάλκεον πῖνακα, ἐν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περιόδου ἐντετέμνητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see Strabo, i. p. 7; Agathemerus, 1. c. 1; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 1.

Grosskurd, in his note on the above passage of Strabo, as well as Larcher and other critics, appear to think, that though this tablet or chart of Anaximander was the earliest which embraced the whole known earth, there were among the Greeks others still earlier, which described particular countries. There is no proof of this, nor can I

think it probable: the passage of Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 279) with the Scholia to it, which is cited as evidence, appears to me unworthy of attention.

Among the Roman Agrimensores, it was the ancient practice to engrave their plans, of land surveyed, upon tablets of brass, which were deposited in the public archives, and of which copies were made for private use, though the original was referred to in case of legal dispute (Siculus Flaccus ap. Rei Agrariæ Scriptores, p. 16, ed. Goes: compare Giraud, Recherches sur le Droit de Propriété, p. 116, Aix 1838).

² Herodot. v. 49. δεικνὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἐς τὴν γῆς γῆς περίοδον, τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τῷ πῖνακι ἐντετεμμένην.

his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich. He concluded by magnifying especially the vast treasures at Susa—"Instead of fighting your neighbours (he concluded), Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself rulers of all Asia,¹ a prize not less easy than lucrative?" Kleomenês replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered with more frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenês interrupted him—"Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger: you are no

Refusal of
the Spartans
to assist him.

friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months' journey from the sea." In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource.

Taking in his hand the bough of supplication, he again went to the house of Kleomenês, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgô, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenês to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length the little girl suddenly exclaimed, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away." The exclamation so struck Kleomenês, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.²

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. Yet we may be permitted to doubt whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450-440 B.C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B.C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who

¹ Herodot. v. 49. παρέχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίης πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως, ἄλλο τι αἰρήσεσθε;

² Herodot. v. 49, 50, 51. Compare Plutarch. Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 240.

We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life and time of

Kleomenês, that the Spartan king has the active management and direction of foreign affairs—subject however to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehaviour (Herodot. vi. 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

dared to look them in the face.¹ To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B.C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas—a character which we thus find more and more recognised and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance that Croesus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now, they accepted such priority as a matter of course.²

Aristagoras applies to Athens—obtains aid both from Athens and Eretria.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. Here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis (or mother-city) of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favour by the Athenians; who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians—ships which are designated by Herodotus, “the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians”—as the ships in which Paris

¹ Herodot. vi. 112. *πρῶτοί τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὀρέοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ τῇν τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.*

² Aristagoras says to the Spartans (v. 49)—*τὰ κατήκοντα γὰρ ἐστὶ ταῦτα· Ἰώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων, ὕνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσφ’* *πρὸς τῇσι τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (Herodot. v.

49). In reference to the earlier incident (Herodot. i. 70)—*Τουτέων τε ὧν εἵνεκεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν συμμαχίην ἐδέξαντο, καὶ ὅτι ἐκ πάντων σφέας προκρίνας Ἑλλήνων, αἰρέετο φίλους* (Croesus).

An interval of rather more than forty years separates the two events, during which both the feelings of the Spartans, and the feelings of others towards them, had undergone a material change.

crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus farther remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenês, thus imposed upon the 30,000 citizens of Athens.¹ But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.²

March of
Aristagoras
up to Sardis
with the
Athenian
and Eretrian
allies—burn-
ing of the
town—re-
treat and de-
feat of these
Greeks by
the Persians.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Milêtus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succour of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus with others. The ships were left at Korêssus,³ a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first along the river Kayster, next across the mountain range of Tmôlus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Milêtus,⁴ and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighbouring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus; who found himself moreover obliged to evacuate Sardis owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all

¹ Herodot. v. 99. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἴκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἓνα, εἰ Κλεομένηα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μόνον οὐκ οἶός τε ἐγένετο διαβαλέειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο.

² Herodot. v. 98; Homer, Iliad, v. 62. The criticism of Plutarch (De Malignitat. Herodot. p. 861) on this passage, is rather more pertinent than the criticisms in that ill-tempered composition generally are.

³ About Korêssus, see Diodor. xiv. 99 and Xenophon. Hellen. i. 2, 7.

⁴ Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysanias in his history of Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milêtus, and the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to Sardis: see Plutarch. de Herodot. Malignit. p. 861—though the citation is given there confusedly, so that we cannot make much out of it.

of them had thatched roofs. Hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in flame. Obligated to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious. They evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmôlus, and when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkidês the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle ;¹ a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkylidas, in 396 B.C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.²

The Athenians abandon the alliance.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides—encouraging the revolt, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him : the Karians embraced his cause warmly ; even the Kaunians who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis ; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island, finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant, shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and the other revolting cities,

Extension of the revolt to Cyprus and Byzantium.

¹ Herodot. v. 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian and Ionian force: see Plu-

tarch. de Herodot. Malign. *ut sup.*

² About Derkylidas, see Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 2, 17-19.

and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.¹

The rebellion had now assumed a character so serious, that the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces,² the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army;³ while the force under Artaphernês at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit; so that we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.⁴

Apprised of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favour of the sea-fight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished.⁵ But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to

Phenician
fleet called
forth by the
Persians.

Persian and
Phenician
armament
sent against
Cyprus —
the Ionians
send aid
thither —
victory of the
Persians —
they recon-
quer the
island.

¹ Herodot. v. 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of Salamis (Diodor. xiv. 98, xv. 2), about 386 B.C.; most of the petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects, but in 351 B.C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor. xvi. 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii. 20, 8).

² Herodot. v. 116. Κύπριοι μὲν δὴ, ἐνιαυτὸν ἐλεύθεροι γενόμενοι, αὐτοὶ ἐκ νέης κατεδεδούλωντο.

³ Herodot. vi. 6. Κίλικες καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι.

⁴ Herodot. v. 109. Ἡμέας ἀπέπεμψε τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων φυλάσσοντας τὴν θάλασσαν, etc.: compare vi. 7.

⁵ Herodot. v. 112.

break the enemy's ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind-legs and strike out with his fore-legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse. By previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore-legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example; while the brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli on the north coast of the island: this latter was son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remaining for the revolters, the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken; not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.¹

¹ Herodot. v. 112-115. It is not uninteresting to compare, with this reconquest of Cyprus by the Persians, the conquest of the same island by the Turks in 1570, when they expelled from it the Venetians. See the narrative of that conquest (effected in the reign of Selim II. by the Seraskier Mustapha-Pasha), in Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs*, book xxxvi. vol. iii. p. 578-589. Of the two principal towns, Nikosia in the centre of the island, and Famagusta on the north-eastern coast, the first, after a long siege, was taken by storm, and the inhabitants of every sex and age either put to death or carried into slavery; while the second, after a most gallant defence, was allowed to capitulate. But the terms of the capitulation were violated in the most flagitious manner by the Seraskier, who treated the brave Venetian governor, Bragadino, with frightful cruelty, cutting off his nose and ears, exposing him to all sorts of insults, and ultimately causing him to be flayed alive. The skin of this unfortunate general was conveyed to Constantinople as a trophy, but in after times found its way to Venice.

We read of nothing like this treatment of Bragadino in the Persian reconquest of Cyprus, though it was a subjugation after revolt; indeed nothing like it in all Persian warfare.

Von Hammer gives a short sketch (not always very accurate as to ancient times) of the condition of Cyprus under its successive masters—Persians, Græco-Egyptians, Romans, Arabians, the dynasty of Lusignan, Venetians, and Turks—the last seems decidedly the worst of all.

In reference to the above-mentioned piece of cruelty, I may mention that the Persian king Kambyasês caused one of the royal judges (according to Herodotus, v. 25), who had taken a bribe to render an iniquitous judgement, to be flayed alive, and his skin to be stretched upon the seat on which his son was placed to succeed him; as a lesson of justice to the latter. A similar story is told respecting the Persian king Artaxerxês Mnêmon; and what is still more remarkable, the same story is also recounted in the Turkish history, as an act of Mahomet II. (Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmannisch. Reichs*, book xvii.; vol. ii. p. 209; Diodorus, xv. 10).

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis, Daurisês, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurisês attacked the towns near the Hellespont¹—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and Pæsus—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who with another division had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast—the former taking Klazomenæ,² the latter Kymê.

There remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighbourhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favour of a contrary policy³—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory however, after a sharp contest, declared in favour of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers. Two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, re-united after the flight in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius near Labranda,⁴ were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate for ever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle

Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6) had good reason to treat the reality of the fact as problematical.

¹ Herodot. v. 117.

² Herodot. v. 122–124.

³ Herodot. v. 118. On the topography of this spot, as described in Herodotus, see a good note in Weissenborn, *Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt. Griechischen Geschichte*, p. 116, Jena 1844.

He thinks, with much reason, that the river Marsyas here mentioned cannot be that which flows through Kelænæ, but another of the same name which flows into the Mæander from the south-west.

⁴ About the village of Labranda and

the temple of Zeus Stratius, see Strabo, xiv. p. 659. Labranda was a village in the territory of, and seven miles distant from, the inland town of Mylasa. It was Karian at the time of the Ionic revolt, but partially hellenized before the year 350 B.C. About this latter epoch, the three rural tribes of Mylasa—constituting, along with the citizens of the town, the Mylasene community—were, *Ταρκόνδαρα*, *Ὀτάρκονδα*, *Ἀδβρανδα*—see the Inscription in Boëckh's Collection, No. 2695, and in Franz, *Epigraphicæ Græca*, No. 73. p. 191. In the Lydian language, *Ἀδβρυς* is said to have signified a hatchet (Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr.* c. 45. p. 314).

was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians.¹ The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault the Karian cities, but Herakleidês of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurisês with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honour to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Milêtus.²

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milêtus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace near the Strymon (which Histiaëus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekataëus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighbouring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Milêtus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered.³ Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. It is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekataëus—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear

Aristagoras
loses courage
and abandons the
country.

¹ Herodot. v. 118, 119.

² Herodot. v. 120, 121; vi. 25.

³ Herodot. v. 125; Strabo, xiv. p. 635.

him company. But he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighbouring Thracian town.¹ Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief,² paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained. Nevertheless it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolt was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histæus of Milêtus, his father-in-law and jointly with him the fomentor of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active co-operation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius)—who are *they*?” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying—“Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner—“Master, remember the Athenians:” for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.³

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards Marathon and Salamis—and he marks the beginning of the new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared

¹ Herodot. v. 126.

² Herodot. vi. 5. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι, ἄσμενοι ἀπαλλαχθέντες καὶ Ἀρισταγόρεω, οὐδαμῶς ἔτοιμοι ἔσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δεῖκεσθαι ἐς τὴν χώραν, οἷά τε ἐλευθερίης γευσάμενοι.

³ Herodot. v. 105. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαι μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι. Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot. iv. 94).

to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the *Iliad* to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklos and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiaëus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he (Histiaëus) had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa. "Send me down to the spot (he asseverated), and I engage not merely to quell the revolt and put into your hands the traitor who heads it—but also not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia." An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favourite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.¹ By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them.² But on

reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiaëus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernês detected his evasions, and said—"I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiaëus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on."³ Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite coast, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia. He was released however on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt; and he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia—to prevent which translation he (Histiaëus) had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though

Histiaëus suspected by Artaphernês—flees to Chios.

¹ Herodot. v. 107, vi. 2. Compare the advice of Bias of Priênê to the Ionians, when the Persian conqueror Cyrus was approaching, to found a Pan-Ionic colony in Sardinia (Herodot. i. 170): the idea started by Aristagoras has been alluded to just above (Herodot. v. 124).

Pausanias (iv. 23, 2) puts into the mouth of Mantiklus, son of Aristo-

menês, a recommendation to the Messenians, when conquered a second time by the Spartans, to migrate to Sardinia.

² Herodot. v. 106, 107.

³ Herodot. vi. 1. Οὕτω τοι, Ἱστίαιε, ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρήγματα· τοῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα ἔβραψας μὲν σὺ, ὑπεδῆσατο δὲ Ἀρισταγόρης.

nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the goodwill of the Chians, who carried him back to Milêtus: but before he departed, he despatched to Sardis some letters, addressed to distinguished Persians, framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Darius, and intended to invite them to actual revolt. His messenger, Hermippus of Atarneus, betrayed him, and carried his letters straight to Artaphernês. The satrap desired that these letters might be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, but that the answers sent to Histiaëus might be handed to himself. Such was the tenor of the answers, that Artaphernês was induced to seize and put to death several of the Persians around him: but Histiaëus was disappointed in his purpose of bringing about a revolt in the place.¹

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiaëus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot: nevertheless he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine.² The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen even down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice amidst the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Milêtus, against which city Artaphernês had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than 600 ships strong, co-operated on the coast.³ To meet such a land-force in the field was far beyond the strength of the Ionians, and the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having

He attempts
in vain to
procure ad-
mission into
Milêtus—
puts himself
at the head
of a small
piratical
squadron.

Large Per-
sian force
assembled,
aided by the
Phenician
fleet, for
the siege of
Milêtus.

¹ Herodot. vi. 2-5.

² Herodot. vi. 5-26.

³ Herodot. vi. 6-9.

sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of 353 ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê—then a little island near Milêtus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing, while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teôs—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy from Lesbos.¹

The allied
Grecian fleet
mustered at
Ladê.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success therefore were at least equal between the two, and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavouring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative.² The confederates at Ladê seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

Attempts of
the Persians
to disunite
the allies,
by means
of the exiled
despots.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis,

¹ Herodot. vi. 8.

² Herodot. vi. 9, 10.

coupled with the fact that they *were* Athenians—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise. Each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phôkæan Dionysius—unfortunately the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phôkæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships, and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Ladê, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or co-operation in the hour of battle—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty. You will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterwards; but if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me. I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten.”¹

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Ladê, and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labours and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on

¹ Herodot. vi. 11. Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ τοῦτοισι ὡς δρηπέτησι· νῦν δὲ ὑμεῖς, ἢ μὲν βούλησθε τάλαιπωρίας ἐνδέκεσθαι, τὸ παραχρῆμα μὲν πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται, οἳ τὲ δὲ ἔσεσθε, ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους, εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι, &c.

shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer's sun. Such labour was new to the Ionian crews. They endured it for seven successive days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: "Which of the Gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phôkæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships!¹ He has now got us and is ruining us without remedy; many of us are already sick, many others are sickening. We had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer." And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

Discontent of the Grecian crews - they refuse to act under Dionysius.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hekataeus the historian was probably present in the island of Ladê, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical manœuvres and labours imposed upon the Ionians, though men not unaccustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterwards purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterised him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only surpassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical manœuvring, which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter: at present I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Ladê, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of

Contrast of this incapacity of the Ionic crews with the subsequent severe discipline of the Athenian seaman.

¹ Herodot. vi. 12. Οἱ Ἴωνες, οἱ ἀπαθείες ἔόντες πόρων τοιούτων, τετρυμένοι τε τάλαιπωρίῃσι τε καὶ ἡελίῳ, ἔλεξαν πρὸς ἐωϋτοὺς τάδε—Τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες, τάδε ἀναπίπλαμεν, οἵτινες

παραφρονήσαντες, καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου, ἀνδρὶ Φωκαεὶ ἀλαζόνι, παρεχόμενῳ νέας τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν, &c.

Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy. But the Athenian navy, the child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labour and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece—of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Ladê, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phôkæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude; but we are surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such

Disorder and mistrust grow up in the fleet--treachery of the Samian captains.

superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot¹—Æakês son of Sylosôn. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters.² The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest. They fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius the Phôkæan also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language, and captured with his three ships the like number of Phenicians. But such examples of bravery did not compensate

¹ Herodot. vi. 13.

² Herodot. vi. 14, 15.

the treachery or cowardice of the rest. The defeat of the Ionians at Ladê was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible both in the battle and after it; for though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykalê, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward through the Ephesian territory to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment, that at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria,—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain.¹ It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents; nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.²

Complete
victory of
the Persian
fleet at Ladê
—ruin of the
Ionic fleet—
severe loss of
the Chians.

The Phôkæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Ladê was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phôkæa, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury towards Greeks.³ Such an employment seems then to have been considered perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakês. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town of Zankle,⁴ I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

Voluntary
exile and
adventures
of Dionysius.

The victory of Ladê enabled the Persians to attack Milêtus by

¹ Herodot. vi. 16.

² Thucyd. viii. 14.

³ Herodot. vi. 17. ληϊστής κατε-

στήκεε Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδενὸς, Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 22-25.

sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigour, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack. Their resources in this respect seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa to await the orders of Darius, who assigned to them a residence at Ampê, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burnt and pillaged, as Hekataëus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt. The large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily.¹ It is certain however that new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Milêtus; for it appears ever afterwards as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Milêtus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt,² carried with it the rapid submission of the

¹ Herodot. vi. 18, 19, 20, 22.

Μίλητος μὲν νυν Μιλησίων ἡρήμωτο.

² Herodot. vi. 18. αἰρέουσι κατ' ἄκρης, ἐν τῷ ἐκτῷ ἔτει ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσιος τῆς Ἀρισταγόρου. This is almost the only distinct chronological statement which we find in Herodotus respecting the Ionic revolt. The other evidences of time in his chapters are more or less equivocal: nor is there sufficient testimony before us to enable us to arrange the events, between the commencement of the Ionic revolt and the battle of Marathon, into the precise years to which they belong. The battle of Marathon stands fixed for September 490 B.C.: the siege of Milêtus may probably have been finished in 496–495 B.C., and the Ionic revolt may have begun in 502–501 B.C. Such are the dates which, on the whole, appear to me most probable, though I am far from considering them as certain.

Chronological critics differ considerably in their arrangement of the events here alluded to among particular years.

See Appendix No. 5, p. 244, in Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*; Professor Schultz, *Beyträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen von der 63^{en} zur 72^{en} Olympiade*, p. 177–183, in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*; and Weissenborn, *Beyträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alten Griechischen Geschichte*, Jena 1844, p. 87 *seqq.*: not to mention Reiz and Larcher. Mr. Clinton reckons only ten years from the beginning of the Ionic revolt to the battle of Marathon; which appears to me too short, though, on the other hand, the fourteen years reckoned by Larcher—much more the sixteen years reckoned by Reiz—are too long. Mr. Clinton compresses inconveniently the latter portion of the interval—that portion which elapsed between the siege of Milêtus and the battle of Marathon: and the very improbable supposition to which he is obliged to resort—of a confusion in the language of Herodotus between Attic and Olympic years—indicates that he is pressing the text of the historian too closely, when he states

neighbouring towns in Karia; and during the next summer—the Phenician fleet having wintered at Milêtus—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental.¹ Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—the towns in the Chersonese—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace—Prokonnêsus and Artake in the Propontis—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phenician fleet.² The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkêdôn fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria; while the Athenian Miltiadês only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pursuers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiadês had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phenicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiadês was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm,

The Phenician fleet reconquers all the coast-towns and islands.

Narrow escape of Miltiadês from their pursuit.

“that Herodotus specifies a term of three years between the capture of Milêtus and the expedition of Datis:” see F. H. ad ann. 499. He places the capture of Milêtus in 494 B.C.; which I am inclined to believe a year later—if not two years later—than the reality. Indeed as Mr. Clinton places the expedition of Aristagoras against Naxos (which was *immediately before* the breaking out of the revolt, since Aristagoras seized the Ionic despots while that fleet yet remained congregated immediately at the close of the expedition) in 501 B.C., and as Herodotus expressly says that Milêtus was taken in the sixth year after the revolt, it would follow that this capture ought to belong to 495, and not to 494 B.C. I incline to place it either in 496 or in 495; and the Naxian expedition in 502 or 501, leaning towards the earlier of the two dates: Schultz agrees with Larcher in placing the Naxian expedition in 504 B.C., yet he assigns the capture of Milêtus to 496 B.C.—whereas Herodotus states that the last of these two events was in the sixth year after the revolt, which revolt immediately succeeded on the first of the two, within the same summer. Weissenborn places the capture of Milêtus in 496 B.C., and the expedition to Naxos in 499—suspecting

that the text in Herodotus—ἐκτῷ ἔτει—is incorrect, and that it ought to be τετάρτῳ ἔτει, the fourth year (p. 125: compare the chronological table in his work, p. 222). He attempts to show that the particular incidents composing the Ionic revolt, as Herodotus recounts it, cannot be made to occupy more than four years; but his reasoning is in my judgement unsatisfactory, and the conjecture inadmissible. The distinct affirmation of the historian, as to the entire interval between the two events, is of much more evidentiary value than our conjectural summing up of the details.

It is vain, I think, to try to arrange these details according to precise years: this can only be done very loosely.

¹ Herodot. vi. 25.

² Herodot. vi. 31-33. It may perhaps be to this burning and sacking of the cities in the Propontis and on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont that Strabo (xiii. p. 591) makes allusion; though he ascribes the proceeding to a different cause—to the fear of Darius that the Scythians would cross into Asia to avenge themselves upon him for attacking them, and that the towns on the coast would furnish them with vessels for the passage.

but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.¹

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Ladê were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs or inmates of the harems. The cities, with their edifices sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it.² That much of this hard treatment is well-founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Ladê; while Æakês the despot of that island was reinstated in his government.³ It appears that several other despots were reinstated at the same time in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Amidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiaëus excites but little sympathy. He was carrying on his piracies at Byzantium when he learnt the surrender of Milêtus; he then thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels for Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who (like the Phôkæan Dionysius) did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode. Of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiaëus, and accompanied him to the plunder of Thasos.⁴ While besieging that town, he learnt the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Milêtus to attack the remaining Ionic towns. He therefore left his designs on Thasos unfinished,

¹ Herodot. vi. 41.

² Herodot. vi. 31, 32, 33.

³ Herodot. vi. 25.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 26-28. ἄγων Ἰώνων καὶ Αἰολέων συχνοῦς.

in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn, around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaïkus. Here he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernês the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly no doubt from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous, since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiaëus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honourably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.¹

We need not wonder that the capture of Milêtus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined) it was selected as the subject of a tragedy—The Capture of Milêtus—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theatre, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as “having recalled to them their own misfortunes.”² The piece was forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine;³ for it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one. Yet it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Æschylus,

B.C. 494-493.
Sympathy
and terror
of the
Athenians at
the capture
of Milêtus—
the tragic
writer Phry-
nichus is
fined.

¹ Herodot. vi. 28, 29, 30.

² Herodot. v. 21. *ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκητὰ κακὰ*: compare vii. 152; also Kalisthenês ap. Strabo. xiv. p. 635, and

Plutarch, Præcept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 814.

³ See Welcker, Griechische Tragödien, vol. i. p. 25.

in his *Persæ*, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Plataea. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phrynichus would have failed—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg by Count Tilly, in the 'Thirty Years' war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON.

IN the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernês the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernês proceeded to organise the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Proceedings of the satrap Artaphernês after the reconquest of Ionia. Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement; without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.¹ Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may however assume it as certain, that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of

¹ Herodot. vi. 42.

Pêdasa.¹ Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekataeus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernês, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He farther adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece Proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, and at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities;² leaving the people of each to govern themselves,

Mardonius comes with an army into Ionia—he puts down the despots in the Greek cities.

¹ Herodot. vi. 20.

² Herodot. vi. 43. In recounting this deposition of the despots by Mardonius, Herodotus reasons from it as an analogy for the purpose of vindicating the correctness of another of his statements, which (he acquaints us) many persons disputed; namely, the discussion which he reports to have taken place among the seven conspirators, after the death of the Magian Smerdis, whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—ἐνθαῦτα μέγι-

στον θώῤῥμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περσέων τοῖσι ἔπτα Ὀτάνεα γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ὥς χρέων εἴη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας· τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπαύσας πάντας δὲ Μαρδόνιος, δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλεις. Such passages as this let us into the controversies of the time, and prove that Herodotus found many objectors to his story about the discussion on theories of government among the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 80–82).

subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phænomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria;¹ so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxês would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land-army, and was himself wounded, in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and

He marches into Thrace and Macedonia—his fleet destroyed by a terrible storm near Mount Athos—he returns into Asia.

¹ Herodot. vi. 43, 44. ἐπορεύοντο δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ Ἐρετρίαν καὶ Ἀθήνας.

from thence across to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius; though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him.¹ We shall hear of him again under Xerxês.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The mines at Skaptê Hylê in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (46,000*l.*, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê Hylê. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdêra.²

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.³ Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transport for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected expedition was likely to expe-

Island of
Thasos—
prepares to
revolt from
the Persians
—forced to
submit.

Preparations
of Darius for
invading
Greece—
he sends
heralds
round the
Grecian
towns to
demand earth
and water—
many of
them submit.

¹ Herodot. vi. 44–94. Charon of Lampisakus had noticed the storm near Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet of Mardonius (Charonis Fragment. 3, ed. Didot; Athenæ. ix. p. 394).

² Herodot. vi. 46–48. See a similar case of disclosure arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Lesbos (Thucyd. iii. 2).

³ Herodot. vi. 94.

rience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included ; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.¹

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

Ægina
among those
towns which
submitted—
state and
relations of
this island.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—begun several years before, and growing out of the connexion between Athens and Plataea—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,² and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506–492 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued ; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the

¹ Herodot. vi. 48, 49. viii. 46.

² Herodot. v. 81–89. See above, chapter xxxi. The legendary story there given as the provocation of Ægina to the war is evidently not to be treated as a real and historical cause of war: a

state of quarrel causes all such stories to be raked up, and some probably to be invented. It is like the old alleged quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelasgi of Lemnos (vi. 127–140).

efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the Barathrum,¹ into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.²

¹ It is to this treatment of the herald that the story in Plutarch's *Life of Themistoklès* must allude, if that story indeed be true; for the Persian king was not likely to send a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, speaking Greek as well as his own native language. Themistoklès proposed and carried a vote that he should be put to death for having employed the Greek language as medium for barbaric dictation. (Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 6.) We should be glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

Pausanias states that it was Miltiadès who proposed the putting to death of the heralds at Athens (iii. 12, 6); and that the divine judgement fell upon his family in consequence of it. From whom Pausanias copied this statement I do not know: certainly not from Herodotus, who does not mention Miltiadès in the case, and expressly says

that he does not know in what manner the divine judgement overtook the Athenians for the crime—"except (says he) that their city and country was afterwards laid waste by Xerxès; but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage on the heralds" (Herodot. vii. 133).

The belief that there must have been a divine judgement of some sort or other, presented a strong stimulus to invent or twist some historical fact to correspond with it. Herodotus has sufficient regard for truth to resist this stimulus and to confess his ignorance; a circumstance which goes, along with others, to strengthen our confidence in his general authority. His silence weakens the credibility, but does not refute the allegation, of Pausanias with regard to Miltiadès—which is certainly not intrinsically improbable.

² Herodot. vii. 133.

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented “as treason to Hellas,” calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenês king of Sparta went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, “for the general benefit of Hellas.”¹

Effects of this act in throwing Sparta into a state of hostility against Persia.

The Athenians appeal to Sparta, in consequence of the medism of Ægina.

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by

Interference of Sparta—her distinct acquisition and acceptance of the leadership of Greece.

¹ Herodot. vi. 49. Ποιήσασι δὲ σφί (Αἰγινήταις) ταῦτα, ἰθέως Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπέκλειτο, δοκέοντες ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας δεδωκέναι (γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ), ὥς ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπὶ σφέας στρατεύωνται. Καὶ ἄσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο· φοιτέοντές τε εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην, κατηγόρεον τῶν Αἰγινητέων

τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Compare viii. 144, ix. 7. τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιούμενοι προδοῦναι—a new and very important phrase.

vii. 61. Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεομένεα, ἔοντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργαζόμενον, &c.

foreigners who invite alliance (Crœsus) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Plataeans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Plataeans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbour. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æeginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping, character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers¹—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persian²—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when

¹ Thucyd. i. 70–118. ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς (i. e. the Spartans) μελλήτας καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους.

² Herodot. vii. 145–148. Οἱ συνωμόται Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ.

Milêtus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos¹—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenês, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavourable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon,² and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia near Tiryns. Kleomenês, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenês, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,³ they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated

Victorious
war of
Sparta
against Ar-
gos.

¹ That which marks the siege of Milêtus, and the defeat of the Argeians by Kleomenês, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is—the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the same prophecy of the Pythia, one half alludes to the sufferings of Milêtus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot. vi. 19–77).

Χρεωμένοισι γὰρ Ἀργείοισι ἐν Δελφοῖσι περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλιος τῆς σφετέρης, τὸ μὲν ἐς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀργείους φέρον, τὴν δὲ παρενθήκην ἔχρησε ἐς Μιλησίους.

I consider this evidence of date to be better than the statement of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos immediately (*αὐτίκα*—Paus. iii.

4, 1) after the accession of Kleomenês, who, as he was king when Mæandrius came from Samos (Herodot. iii. 148), must have come to the throne not later than 518 or 517 B.C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B.C.; a date much too early for the war between Kleomenês and the Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii. 149).

² Herodot. vi. 92.

³ Herodot. vi. 78; compare Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xii. 6. Orders for evolutions in the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were not proclaimed by the herald, but transmitted through the various gradations of officers (Thucyd. v. 66).

to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenês, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and pro-

Destruction of the Argeians by Kleomenês in the grove of the hero Argus. claimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them—Kleomenês set fire to the grove and burnt it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword.¹ After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argus. Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenês might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valour of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls.² This is probably a mythe, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about “the female conquering the male.”³

Kleomenês returns without having attacked Argos. Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women

¹ Herodot. vi. 79, 80.

² Pausan. ii. 20, 7; Polyæn. viii. 33; Plutarch, De Virtut. Mulier. p. 245; Suidas, v. Τελέσιλλα.

Plutarch cites the historian Sokratês of Argos for this story about Telesilla; an historian, or perhaps composer of a *περιήγησις Ἀργους*, of unknown date: compare Diogen. Laërt. ii. 5, 47, and Plutarch, Question. Romaic. p. 270–277. According to his representation, Kleomenês and Demaratus jointly assaulted the town of Argos, and Demaratus, after having penetrated into the town and become master of the Pamphyliakon, was driven out again by the women. Now Herodotus informs us

that Kleomenês and Demaratus were never employed upon the same expedition, after the disagreement in their march to Attica (v. 75, vi. 64).

³ Herodot. vi. 77.

Ἄλλ' ὅταν ἡ θηλεία τὸν ἄρσενά νικήσασα
Ἐξελάσῃ, καὶ κύδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρῃται, &c.

If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it probably refers to Hôrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the Spartans.

Pausanias (ii. 20, 7) might reasonably doubt whether Herodotus understood this oracle in the same sense as he did: it is plain that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenês had actually marched to the attack of their city—we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops—with whom he marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenês had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênê on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenês returned with his remaining force to Sparta.¹

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Hêræum. There, though his sacrifice was favourable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue of Hêrê, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;² but the flash from her

¹ Herodot. vi. 80, 81: compare v. 72.

² Herodot. vi. 82. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἀγάλματος ἐξελάμψε, αἰρέειν ἂν κατ' ἀκρῆς τὴν πόλιν· ἐκ τῶν πτηθέων δὲ λάμψαντος, πᾶν οἱ πεποιῆσθαι δοκῶν ὁ θεὸς ἤθελε.

For the expression αἰρέειν κατ' ἀκρῆς, compare Herodot. vi. 21 and Damm. Lex. Homer. v. ἀκρός. In this expression as generally used, the last words

κατ' ἀκρῆς have lost their primitive and special sense, and do little more than intensify the simple αἰρέειν—equivalent to something like “de fond en comble:” for Kleomenês is accused by his enemies—φάμενοι μιν δωροδοκήσαντα, οὐκ ἐλέειν τὸ Ἄργος, παρέον εὐπετέως μιν ἐλεῖν. But in the story recounted by Kleomenês, the words κατ' ἀκρῆς come back to their primitive meaning,

He is tried
—his peculiar mode of
defence—
acquitted.

bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, ensuring to Kleomenês an honourable acquittal.¹

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of

Argos unable to interfere with Sparta in the affair of Ægina and in her presidential power.

a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other. Her title to this honour, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force

and serve as the foundation for his religious inference, from type to thing typified: if the light had shone from the head or *top* of the statue, this would have intimated that the gods meant him to take the city "*from top to bottom*."

In regard to this very illustrative story—which there seems no reason for mistrusting—the contrast between the point of view of Herodotus and that of the Spartan ephors deserves notice. Herodotus, while he affirms distinctly that it was the real story told by Kleo-

menês, suspects its truth, and utters as much of scepticism as his pious fear will permit him: the ephors find it in complete harmony both with their canon of belief and with their religious feeling—Κλεομένης δέ σφι ἔλεξε, οὔτε εἰ ψευδόμενος οὔτε εἰ ἀληθέα λέγων, ἔχω σαφηνέως εἶπαι· ἔλεξε δ' ὦν. . . . Ταῦτα δὲ λέγων, πιστά τε καὶ οἴκοτα ἔδοκε Σπαρτιήτησι λέγειν, καὶ ἀπέφυγε πολλὸν τοὺς διώκοντας.

¹ Compare Pausanias, ii. 20, 8.

of Greece. The ships which Kleomenês had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so.¹ The circumstances of the Kleomenic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenês passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenês in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them through it safely.² Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phænomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenês, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenês was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him,³ and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agêtus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agêtus asked from Aristo was at once

¹ Herodot. vi. 92.

² Herodot. vi. 50. Κρίος—ἔλεγε δὲ ταῦτα ἐξ ἐπιστολῆς τῆς Δημαρήτου.

Compare Pausan. iii. 4, 3.

³ Herodot. vi. 50-61, 64. Δημάρητος — φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος.

Kleomenês goes to Ægina to seize the medising leaders—resistance made to him, at the instigation of his colleague Demaratus.

given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agêtus, who was thunderstruck at the request and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath—"The child cannot be mine." He soon however retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.¹

Of these suspicions Kleomenês now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychidês, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina.

Leotychidês was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenês, espousing the pretensions of Leotychidês, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kôbon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo.² Leotychidês thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an atten-

¹ Herodot. vi. 61, 62, 63.

² Herodot. vi. 65, 66. In an analogous case afterwards, where the succession was disputed between Agesilaus the brother, and Leotychidês the reputed son, of the deceased king Agis, the Lacedæmonians appear to have taken upon themselves to pronounce Leotychidês illegitimate; or rather to assume

tacitly such illegitimacy by choosing Agesilaus in preference, without the aid of the oracle (Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 3, 1-4; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3). The previous oracle from Delphi, however, φυλάσσειν τὴν χεῖρην βασιλείαν, was cited on the occasion, and the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

dant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotychidês might in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying he covered his face and retired home from the theatre—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of Zeus Herkeios, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretence of going to consult the Delphian oracle.¹

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenês and Leotychidês became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate.² Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant favours and presents.³ We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxês, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenês, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychidês, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetaus did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenês made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful

Demaratus
leaves Sparta
and goes to
Darius.

Kleomenês
and Leoty-
chidês go
to Ægina,
seize ten
hostages, and
convey them
as prisoners
to Athens.

¹ Herodot. vi. 68, 69. The answer made by the mother to this appeal—informing Demaratus that he is the son either of King Aristo, or of the hero Astrobakus—is extremely interesting as an evidence of Grecian manners and feeling.

² Plutarch, Agis, c. 11. κατὰ δὲ τινὰ νόμον παλαῖον, ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνοῦσθαι, τὸν δ' ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μετοικισμῷ πρὸς ἑτέροισι ἀποθνήσκειν κελεύει.

³ Herodot. vi. 70.

men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.¹

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished, for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports both for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation: the troops were put on board and sailed along the coast to Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median²—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to

¹ Herodot. vi. 73.

² Herodot. vi. 94. Δατίην τε, ἑόντα Μῆδον γένος, &c.

Cornelius Nepos (Life of Pausanias,

c. 1) calls Mardonius a Mede; which cannot be true, since he was the son of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (Herodot. vi. 43).

conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.¹ These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistoklês and Aristeidês would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Dêmokêdês.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean² (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistoklês most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxês) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabatês with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians.³ Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane.

He crosses the Ægean — carries the island of Naxos without resistance—respects Delos.

Immense indeed was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phenician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow,⁴ and think of nothing but personal safety

¹ Herodot. vi. 94. ἐντειλάμενος δὲ ἀπέπεμπε, ἐξανδραποδίσαντας Ἑρετρίαν καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἄγειν ἐωϋτῷ ἐς ὕψιν τὰ ἀνδράποδα.

According to the Menexenus of Plato (c. 17. p. 245), Darius ordered Datis to fulfil this order on peril of his own head: no such harshness appears in

Herodotus.

² Thucyd. i. 93.

³ Herodot. vi. 95, 96. ἐπὶ ταύτην (Naxos) γὰρ δὴ πρώτην ἐπέϊχον στρατεύεσθαι οἱ Πέρσαι, μεμνημένοι τῶν πρότερον.

⁴ The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis had been repulsed from the

for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria !

From Naxos Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language ; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings ; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory.¹ The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced ; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighbouring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them ;

He reaches Eubœa—siege and capture of Eretria. island. We find this statement in Plutarch, *De Malign.* Herodot. c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded con-

traditions of Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. vi. 99.

while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians.¹ Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Æschinês was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of Orôpus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery.² It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios and Samos—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth.³ Evidently this is an idea, illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed

¹ Herodot. vi. 100. *Τῶν δὲ Ἑρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς βούλευμα, οἱ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσεω οἴσεσθαι προδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο.*

Allusion to this treason among the Eretrians is to be found in a saying of Themistoklês (Plutarch, Themist. c. 11).

The story told by Hêrakleidês Ponticus (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536), of an earlier Persian armament which had assailed Eretria and failed, cannot be at all understood; it rather looks like a mythe to explain the origin of the great wealth possessed by the family of Kallias at Athens—the *Λακκόπλουτος*. There is another story, having the same

explanatory object, in Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

² Herodot. vi. 101, 102.

³ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 698, and Menexen. c. 10. p. 240; Diogen. Laërt. iii. 33; Herodot. vi. 31: compare Strabo, x. p. 446, who ascribes to Herodotus the statement of Plato about the *σαγήνευσις* of Eretria. Plato says nothing about the betrayal of the city.

It is to be remarked, that in the passage of the *Treatise de Legibus*, Plato mentions this story (about the Persians having swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants) with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumour intentionally circulated by Datis with a view to frighten the Athenians. But in the *Menexenus*, the story is given as if it were an authentic historical fact.

the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians,¹ and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxês.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army were elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighbouring islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been found amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenês in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual

¹ Plutarch, *De Garrulitate*, c. 15. p. 510. The descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed upon their

ancestor. Herodotus does not mention Gongylus (*Xenoph. Hellen.* iii. 1, 6).

This surrender to the Persians drew upon the Eretrians bitter remarks at the time of the battle of Salamis (*Plutarch, Themistoklês*, c. 11).

archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenês. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form however which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517–516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiadês. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiaëus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt.¹ What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He availed himself, however, of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phenician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Milêtus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate

Miltiadês—his adventures—chosen one of the ten generals in the year in which the Persians landed at Marathon.

¹ The chapter of Herodotus (vi. 40) relating to the adventures of Miltiadês is extremely perplexing, as I have already remarked in a former note: and Wesseling considers that it involves chronological difficulties which our present MSS. do not enable us to clear up. Neither Schweighäuser, nor the explanation cited in Bähr's note, is satisfactory.

friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros ; and the Phenicians were most eager to capture Miltiadês himself,¹ inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phenician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised.² Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos ;³ and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiadês is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenês, like his younger contemporaries Themistoklês and Aristeidês. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklês, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistoklês and Aristeidês, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing.

¹ Herodot. vi. 43–104.

² Herodot. vi. 39–104.

³ Herodot. vi. 132. *Μιλτιάδης, και πρότερον εύδοκίμων* — i. e. before the

battle of Marathon. How much his reputation had been heightened by the conquest of Lemnos, see Herodot. vi. 136.

Instead of Attica disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistoklês, Aristeidês, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistoklês nor Aristeidês could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadês.¹ Both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeidês, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neoklês, father of Themistoklês, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklês must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklês, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydidês, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature² was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action: when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydidês draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readi-

¹ Herodot. vi. 35.

² Thucyd. i. 138. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ἄξιός θ' αὐτὸς θαυμάσαι· οἰκεία γὰρ συνέσει καὶ οὐτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἐπιμαθὼν, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνῶμων, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος

εἰκαστής. Καὶ ἂ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἶός τε· ὦν δὲ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρίναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο. Τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα· καὶ τὸ ζῦμπαν εἰπεῖν, φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι, κράτιστος δὲ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

ness and universality of Themistoklês probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Periklês especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistoklês had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydidês, and whom Aristophanês, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon.¹ There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydidês of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistoklês as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Periklês.

The general character given by Plutarch,² though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydidês. Themistoklês had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiadês acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandisement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honourable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He

¹ See the contrast of the old and new education, as set forth in Aristophanês, *Nubes*, 957–1003; also Rannæ, 1067.

About the training of Themistoklês, compared with that of the contempo-

raries of Periklês, see also Plutarch, *Themistokl.* c. 2.

² Plutarch, *Themistoklês*, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos, *Themist.* c. 1.

ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeidês we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydidês. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos,¹ however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeidês was inferior to Themistoklês in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenês, the first founder of the democracy²—as pursuing a straight and single-handed course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candour in political dispute—and as manifesting, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon³ and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucydidês ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Periklês;⁴ while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence

¹ Herodot. viii. 79; Plato, Gorgias, c. 172. *ἄριστον ἄνδρα ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ δίκαιότατον.*

² Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 1-4; Themistoklês, c. 3; *An Seni sit gerenda*

respublica, c. 12. p. 790; *Præcepta Reip. Gerend.* c. ii. p. 805).

³ Timokreon ap. Plutarch. Themistoklês, c. 21.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 65.

which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeidês—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklês—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity ; which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracising vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeidês,¹ on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honourable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honourable man in the country. The less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt : and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeidês as *The Just* man of Attica, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen ; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracised during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoklês was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril ; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxês brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistoklês would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidês would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidês and Miltiadês were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the

¹ Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 7.

Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistoklês also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,¹ though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.²

Miltiadês, Aristeidês, and perhaps Themistoklês were among the ten Strategi in 490 B.C.

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidês the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 48 hours.³ Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.⁴ Indeed their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and

The Athenians ask aid from Sparta—delay of the Spartans.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

² Herodot. vi. 109, 110.

³ Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or foot-messengers, will

travel for several days successively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (Geographical Memoir of Persia, p. 44).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 7-10.

ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dulness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidês was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiadês with the remaining four strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralysing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miltiadês himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalêrum, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiadês had to await the casting-vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing

Difference
of opinion
among the
ten generals
—five of
them recom-
mend an
immediate
battle, the
other five are
adverse to it.

Urgent
instances of
Miltiadês in
favour of an
immediate
battle—cast-
ing-vote of
the pole-
march deter-
mines it.

could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiadês) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadês; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeidês and Themistoklês are both recorded to have seconded Miltiadês warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadês their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.¹ Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Hêraklês near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plataea, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn, and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbour, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league.* Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plataea from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an

March of the Athenians to Marathon—the Plataeans spontaneously join them there.

¹ Herodot. vi. 110.

* Herodot. vi. 108–112.

indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,¹ and repaid by a grant to the Plataeans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or
Numbers of the armies. besides, the 1000 who came from Plataea.² This statement is no way improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Yet what proportion of these were fighting-men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have no means of determining.³ There were a

¹ Thucyd. iii. 55.

² Justin states 10,000 Athenians, besides 1000 Plataeans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Plutarch give 10,000 as the sum total of both. Justin, ii. 9; Corn. Nep. Miltiad. c. 4; Pausan. iv. 25, 5; x. 20, 2: compare also Suidas, v. Ἰππίας.

Heeren (De Fontibus Trogi Pompeii, Dissertat. ii. 7) affirms that Trogius or Justin follows Herodotus in matters concerning the Persian invasions of Greece. He cannot have compared the two very attentively; for Justin not only states several matters which are not to be found in Herodotus, but is at variance with the latter on some particulars not unimportant.

³ Justin (ii. 9) says that the total of the Persian army was 600,000, and that

200,000 perished. Plato (Menexen. p. 240) and Lysias (Orat. Funebr. c. 7) speak of the Persian total as 500,000 men. Valerius Maximus (v. 3), Pausanias (iv. 25), and Plutarch (Parallel. Græc. ad init.), give 300,000 men. Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of 110,000 men.

See the observations on the battle of Marathon made both by Colonel Leake and by Mr. Finlay, who have examined and described the locality: Leake on the Demi of Attica, in Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. ii. p. 160 seq.; and Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, in the same Transactions, vol. iii. p. 360-380, &c.

Both have given remarks on the probable numbers of the armies assembled;

certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular, that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with ^{Locality of Marathon.} which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march. It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargêttus and Pallênê, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while “its plain (says a careful modern observer¹) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay

but there are really no materials, even for a probable guess, in respect to the Persians. The silence of Herodotus (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the numbers of the army under Xerxês) seems to show that he had no information which he could trust. His account of the battle of Marathon presents him in honourable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him. For though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies; and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account—because it is so little—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

There is nothing in the account of Herodotus to make us believe that he had ever visited the ground of Marathon.

¹ See Mr. Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, Transactions, &c., vol. iii. pp. 364, 368, 383, *ut supra*: compare Hobhouse (Lord Broughton), Journey in Albania, i. p. 432.

Colonel Leake thinks that the ancient town of Marathon was not on the exact site of the modern Marathon, but at a place called Vraná, a little to the south of Marathon (Leake on the Demes of Attica, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, 1829, vol. ii. p. 166).

“Below these two points,” he observes, “(the tumuli of Vraná and the hill of Kotróni) the plain of Marathon expands to the shore of the bay, which is near two miles distant from the opening of the valley of Vraná. It is moderately well cultivated with corn, and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though rather inconveniently subject to inundations from the two torrents which cross it, particularly that of Marathóna. From Lucian (in Icaro-Menippo) it appears that the parts about Cenoê were noted for their fertility, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century has celebrated the vines and olives of Marathon. It is natural to suppose that the vineyards occupied the rising grounds; and it is probable that the olive-trees were chiefly situated in the two valleys, where some are still

and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both however leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiadês before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Hêrâklês near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them for the battle.¹ The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour,² and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged

growing: for as to the plain itself, the circumstances of the battle incline one to believe that it was anciently as destitute of trees as it is at the present day." (Leake, on the Demi of Attica, Trans. of Roy. Soc. of Literature, vol. ii. p. 162).

Colonel Leake farther says, respecting the fitness of the Marathonian ground for cavalry movements: "As I rode across the plain of Marathon with a peasant of Vraná, he remarked to me that it was a fine place for cavalry to fight in. None of the modern Marathonii were above the rank of labourers: they have heard that a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know." (Leake, *ut sup.*, ii. p. 175.)

¹ Herodot. vi. 107.

² Plutarch, Symposiac. i. 3. p. 619; Xenophon. Anab. i. 8, 21; Arrian, ii. 8, 18; iii. 11, 16.

We may compare, with this esta-

blished battle-array of the Persian armies, that of the Turkish armies, adopted and constantly followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium in 1386, gained by Amurath I. over the Karmanians. The European troops (or those of Rum) occupy the left wing: the Asiatic troops (or those of Anatoli) the right wing: the Janissaries are in the centre. The Sultan, or the Grand Visir, surrounded by the national cavalry or Spahis, is in the central point of all (Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmannischen Reichs, book v. vol. i. p. 199).

About the honour of occupying the right wing in a Grecian army, see in particular the animated dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeates before the battle of Plataea (Herodot. ix. 27). It is the post assigned to the heroic kings of legendary warfare (Eurip. Supplices, 657).

in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plataeans. It was necessary for Miltiadês to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the Ægean: but the elevated position of Miltiadês enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favourable for battle. Miltiadês, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or pæan which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run.¹ It doubtless

Battle of
Marathon—
rapid charge
of Miltiadês
— defeat of
the Persians.

¹ Herodot. vi. 112. Πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἕλληνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, δρόμῳ ἐς πολέμους ἐχρήσαντο.

The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most remarkable events connected with the battle. Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay seem disposed to reduce the run to a quick march; partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the defeat of the centre. It is very probable that a part of the mile run

over consisted of declivity. I accept the account of Herodotus literally, though whether the distance be exactly stated, we cannot certainly say: indeed the fact is, that it required some steadiness of discipline to prevent the step of hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run. See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 18; Diodor. xiv. 23: compare Polyæn. ii. 2, 3. The passage of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the disadvantages of the running charge.

Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay

operated beneficially in rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where moreover the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistoklês and Aristeidês among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ.¹ Miltiadês seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished.² The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.³ This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6400 men. The number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192.

try to point out the exact ground occupied by the two armies: they differ in the spot chosen, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence to be had in favour of any spot. Leake thinks that the Persian commanders were encamped in the plain of Tricorythos, separated from that of Marathon by the great marsh, and communicating with it only by means of a causeway (Leake, Transact. ii. p. 170).

¹ Herodot. vi. 113. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ἐνίκων οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ ῥήξαντες, ἐδίωκον ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν.

Herodotus here tells us the whole truth without disguise: Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 3) only says that the Persian centre made a longer resistance, and gave the tribes in the Grecian centre more trouble to overthrow.

² Pausan. i. 32, 6.

³ Herodot. vi. 113-115.

How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegirus son of Euphorion, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe,¹ and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable,² but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica³—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Miltiadês did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw

Ulterior plans of the Persians against Athens—party in Attica favourable to them.

¹ Herodot. vi. 114. This is the statement of Herodotus respecting Kynegirus. How creditably does his character as an historian contrast with that of the subsequent romancers! Justin tells us that Kynegirus first seized the vessel with his right hand: that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left: when he had lost that also, he seized the ship with his teeth “like a wild beast” (Justin, ii. 9)—Justin seems to have found this statement in many different authors: “Cynegiri militis virtus, multis scriptorum laudibus celebrata.”

² For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians slain, see Xenophon. Anab. iii. 2, 12; Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 26. p. 862; Justin, ii. 9; and Suidas, v. Ποικίλη.

In the account of Ktésias, Datis was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was further said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment; which was one of the grounds whereupon Xerxês afterwards invaded Greece. It is evident that in the authorities which Ktésias followed, the alleged death of Datis at Marathon was rather emphatically dwelt upon. See Ktésias, Persica, c. 18–21, with the note of Bähr, who is inclined to defend the statement against Herodotus.

³ Herodot. vi. 124. Ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἄσπις, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν· ἐγένετο γὰρ· ὅς μὲντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας οὐκ ἔχω τὸ προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τουτέων.

through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens.

Rapid march of Miltiadês back to Athens on the day of the battle. On the very day of the battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet.¹ Datis soon came off the port of Phalêrum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so

The Persians abandon the enterprise, and return home. dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Though too late how-

ever, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalêrum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Athens rescued by the speedy battle brought on by Miltiadês. Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to

¹ Herodot. vi. 116. Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλων Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὥς ποδῶν εἶχον, τάχιστα ἐβοήθειον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ· καὶ ἐφθησάν τε ἀπικόμενοι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἤκειν, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἀπιγμένοι ἐξ Ἡρακλήτου τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐς ἄλλο Ἡρακλήτον τὸ ἐν Κυ-

νοσάργει.

Plutarch (Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses, c. 8. p. 350) represents Miltiadês as returning to Athens on the day after the battle: it must have been on the same afternoon, according to the account of Herodotus.

their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalêrum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalêrum¹—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phalêric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxês led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighbourhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiadês so precipitated the battle, that this signal came too

¹ Herodot. v. 62, 63.

late, and was only given "when the Persians were already in their ships,"¹ after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiadês been as rapid after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadês belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favour—for the unexpected junction of the Plataeans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxês, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high-handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe

¹ Herodot. vi. 115. Τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ἀναδέξαι ἀσπίδα, εἰ οὖσι ἤδη ἐν τῇσι νηυσί.

that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistoklês as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon;¹ which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound.² It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxês, without faltering in their Pan-hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into common-place, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations.³ It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want

Immense effect of the Marathonian victory on the feelings of the Greeks—especially of the Athenians.

¹ Herodot. viii. 108. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὖρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμέας τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, νέφος τοσοῦτον ἀνθρώπων ἀνωσάμενοι.

² Pausanias, i. 14, 4; Thucyd. i. 73. φάμεν γὰρ Μαραθῶνι τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, &c.

Herodot. vi. 112. πρῶτοι τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὀρέοντες, καὶ ἀνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλλησι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

It is not unworthy of remark, that

the memorable oath in the oration of Demosthenês, de Coronâ, wherein he adjures the warriors of Marathon, copies the phrase of Thucydidês—οὐ μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, &c. (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 60).

³ So the computation stands in the language of Athenian orators (Herodot. ix. 27). It would be unfair to examine it critically.

of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistoklês¹ is said to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiadês, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450–440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to the Alkmæônids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæônids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Periklês son of Xanthippus, and Kimon son of Miltiadês, was at its height. Periklês belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæônid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies.² Moreover the enmity between Kimon and Periklês had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadês. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæônid, his marriage with Agaristê connected himself indirectly, and his son Periklês directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæônids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiadês; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, sup-

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3. According to Cicero (Epist. ad Attic. ix. 10) and Justin (ii. 9), Hippias was killed at Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἰππίας) says that he died afterwards at Lemnos. Neither of these statements seems pro-

bable. Hippias would hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian possession; and had he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to mention it.

² Thucyd. i. 126.

ported by the judgement of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeidês with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field¹ (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain Platæans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiadês himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalised warriors.² Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the sea-shore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same.³ The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Hêraklês.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians, without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippidês on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him;⁴ in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetus.⁵ Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds

Supernatural belief connected with the battle—commemorations of it.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34.

² Pausan. i. 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias ap. Athenæ. i. p. 28.

³ The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two hundred yards in circumference. (Leake on the Demi

of Attica; Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat. ii. p. 171.)

⁴ Herodot. vi. 105; Pausan. i. 28, 4.

⁵ Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24; Pausan. i. 32, 4.

himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pryed into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Poëkilê, wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes—Athênê, Hêraklês, Theseus, Echetus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiadês, while the Plataeans were distinguished by their Boëotian leather casques.¹ The sixth of the month Boëdromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of Plutarch.²

¹ Pausan. i. 15, 4; Dêmosthen. cont. Neær. c. 25.

² Herodot. vi. 120; Plutarch, Camill. c. 19; De Malignit. Herodoti, c. 26. p. 862; and De Gloriâ Atheniensium, c. 7.

Boëdromion was the third month of the Attic year, which year began shortly after the summer solstice. The first three Attic months, Hekatombæon, Metageitnion, Boëdromion, correspond (speaking in a loose manner) nearly to our July, August, September.

From the fact that the courier Pheidippidês reached Sparta on the ninth day of the moon, and that the 2000 Spartans arrived in Attica on the third day after the full moon, during which interval the battle took place—we see that the sixth day of Boëdromion could not be the sixth day of the moon. The Attic months, though professedly lunar months, did not at this time therefore accurately correspond with the course of the moon. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad an. 490 B.C. Plutarch (in the Treatise De Malign. Herodoti, above referred to) appears to have no conception of this discrepancy between the Attic month and the course of the moon. A portion of the censure which he casts on Herodotus is grounded on the assumption that the two must coincide.

M. Boëckh, following Fréret and Larcher, contests the statement of Plutarch, that the battle was fought on the sixth of the month Boëdromion, but upon reasons which appear to me insufficient. His chief argument rests upon another statement of Plutarch (derived from

some lost verses of Æschylus), that the tribe Æantis had the right wing or post of honour at the battle; and that the public vote, pursuant to which the army was led out of Athens, was passed during the prytany of the tribe Æantis. He assumes, that the reason why this tribe was posted on the right wing, must have been, that it had drawn by lot the first prytany in that particular year: if this be granted, then the vote for drawing out the army must have been passed in the first prytany, or within the first thirty-five or thirty-six days of the Attic year, during the space between the first of Hekatombæon and the fifth or sixth of Metageitnion. But it is certain that the interval, which took place between the army leaving the city and the battle, was much less than one month—we may even say less than one week. The battle therefore (Boëckh contends) must have been fought between the sixth and tenth of Metageitnion. (Plutarch, Symposiac. i. 10, 3, and Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i. p. 291.) Herodotus (vi. 111) says that the tribes were arranged in line *ὡς ἡριθμεύοντο*—"as they were numbered"—which is contended to mean necessarily the arrangement between them, determined by lot for the prytanies of that particular year. "In acie instruendâ (says Boëckh, Comment. ad Corp. Inscriptt. p. 299) Athenienses non constantem, sed variabilem secundum prytanias, ordinem secutos esse, ita ut tribus ex hoc ordine inde a dextro cornu disponderentur, docui in Commemoratione de pugnâ Marathoniâ." Proœmia Lect. Univ. Berolin. æstiv. a. 1816.

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the third day

The Proemia here referred to I have not been able to consult, and they may therefore contain additional reasons to prove the point advanced, viz. that the order of the ten tribes in line of battle, beginning from the right wing, was conformable to their order in prytanising, as drawn by lot for the year; but I think the passages of Herodotus and Plutarch now before us insufficient to establish this point. From the fact that the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, we are by no means warranted in inferring that that tribe had drawn by lot the earliest prytany in the year. Other reasons, in my judgement equally probable, may be assigned in explanation of the circumstance: one reason, I think, decidedly *more* probable. This reason is, that the battle was fought during the prytany of the tribe *Æantis*, which may be concluded from the statement of Plutarch, that the vote for marching out the army from Athens was passed during the prytany of that tribe; for the interval, between the march of the army out of the city and the battle, must have been only very few days. Moreover, the deme Marathon belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boëckh, ad Inscript. No. 172. p. 309): the battle being fought in their deme, the Marathonians may perhaps have claimed on this express ground the post of honour for their tribe; just as we see that at the first battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, the Mantineians were allowed to occupy the right wing or post of honour, "because the battle was fought in their territory" (Thucyd. v. 67). Lastly, the deme Aphidnæ also belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boëckh, l. c.): now the polemarch Kallimachus was an Aphidnæan (Herodot. vi. 109), and Herodotus expressly tells us, "the law or custom *then* stood among the Athenians, that the polemarch should have the right wing"—*ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δεξιόν* (vi. 111). Where the polemarch stood, there his tribe would be likely to stand: and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply that he identifies the tribe of the polemarch with the polemarch himself—*ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου, ἐξεδέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμέοντο αἱ φυλαί, ἐχόμεναι ἀλλήλων*—

meaning that the order of tribes began by that of the polemarch being in the leading position, and was then "taken up" by the rest "in numerical sequence"—i. e. in the order of their prytanising sequence for the year.

Here are a concurrence of reasons to explain why the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may not have been first in the order of prytanising tribes for the year. Boëckh therefore is not warranted in inferring the second of these two facts from the first.

The concurrence of these three reasons, all in favour of the same conclusion, and all independent of the reason supposed by Boëckh, appears to me to have great weight; but I regard the first of the three, even singly taken, as more probable than his reason. If my view of the case be correct, the sixth day of Boëdromion, the day of battle as given by Plutarch, is not to be called in question. That day comes in the second prytany of the year, which begins about the sixth of Metageitnion, and ends about the twelfth of Boëdromion, and which must in this year have fallen to the lot of the tribe *Æantis*. On the first or second day of Boëdromion, the vote for marching out the army may have passed; on the sixth the battle was fought; both during the prytany of this tribe.

I am not prepared to carry these reasons farther than the particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the vindication of the day of that battle as stated by Plutarch; nor would I apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It is certain that the army regulations of Athens were considerably modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian war, as well in other matters as in what regards the polemarch; and we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine whether in that later period the Athenians followed any known or perpetual rule in the battle order of the tribes. Military considerations, connected with the state of the particular army serving, must have prevented the constant observance of any rule. Thus we can hardly imagine that Nikias, commanding the army before Syracuse, could have been tied down to any invariable order of battle among the tribes to

of their march—a surprising effort, when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernês returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phenician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Dêlos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium or temple of Apollo on the eastern coast of Bœotia: the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterwards by

which his hoplites belonged. Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than one Attic year: can it be believed that Nikias, on receiving information from Athens of the sequence in which the prytanies of the tribes had been drawn by lot during the second year of his expedition, would be compelled to marshal his army in a new battle order conformably to it? As the military operations of the Athenians became more extensive, they would find it necessary to leave such dispositions more and more to the general serving in every particular campaign. It may well be doubted whether during the Peloponnesian war *any* established rule was observed in marshalling the tribes for battle.

One great motive which induces critics to maintain that the battle was fought in the Athenian month Metageitnion, is, that that month coincides with the Spartan month Karneius, so that the refusal of the Spartans to march before the full moon is construed to apply only to the peculiar sanctity of this last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the whole year. I perfectly agree with these critics, that the answer given by the Spartans to the courier Pheidippidês cannot be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan maxim, applicable throughout the whole year, not to begin a march in the second quarter of the moon: very possibly, as Boëckh remarks, there may have been some festival impending during the particular month in question, upon which the

Spartan refusal to march was founded. But no inference can be deduced from hence to disprove the sixth of Boëdromion as the day of the battle of Marathon: for though the months of every Grecian city were professedly lunar, yet they never coincided with each other exactly or long together, because the systems of intercalation adopted in different cities were different: there was great irregularity and confusion (Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 19; *Aristoxenus*, *Harmon.* ii. p. 30: compare also K. F. Hermann, *Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde*, p. 26, 27. Göttingen, 1844: and Boëckh, *ad Corp. Inscript.* T. i. p. 734).

Granting therefore that the answer given by the Spartans to Pheidippidês is to be construed, not as a general rule applicable to the whole year, but as referring to the particular month in which it was given—no inference can be drawn from hence as to the day of the battle of Marathon, because either one of the two following suppositions is possible:—1. The Spartans may have had solemnities on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it, in *other months* besides Karneius; 2. or the full moon of the Spartan Karneius may actually have fallen, in the year 490 B.C., on the fifth or sixth of the Attic month Boëdromion.

Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of Boëckh, but does not add anything material to the reasons in its favour (*Hist. of Gr.* vol. ii. *Append.* III. p. 488).

the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them, yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.¹

Happy would it have been for Miltiadês if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Kallimachus—"animam exhalasset opimam"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

Glory of Miltiadês—his subsequent conduct—unsuccessful expedition against Paros—bad hurt of Miltiadês.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch, that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiadês knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid

¹ Herodot. vi. 119. Darius—σφέας τῆς Κισσίνης χώρας κατοίκιτε ἐν σταθμῷ ἑωυτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἀρδέρικκα—ἐνθαῦτα τοὺς Ἐρετριέας κατοίκισε Δαρεῖος, οἳ καὶ μέχρι ἐμὲ εἶχον τὴν χώραν ταύτην, φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. The meaning of the word σταθμός is explained by Herodot. v. 52. σταθμός ἑωυτοῦ is the same as σταθμός βασιλεῖος: the particulars which Herodotus recounts about Arderikka, and its remarkable well or pit of bitumen, salt, and oil, give every reason to believe that he had himself stopped there.

Strabo places the captive Eretrians in

Gordyênê, which would be considerably higher up the Tigris; upon whose authority we do not know (Strabo, xv. 747).

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of these Eretrians in Kissia, by Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana, as they are alleged to have stood even in the first century of the Christian æra, cannot be safely quoted. With all the fiction there contained, some truth may perhaps be mingled; but we cannot discriminate it (Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. i. c. 24–30).

siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive (so Herodotus assures us¹) was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnês against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Miltiadês prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town.² Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timô, priestess or attendant in the temple of Dêmêtêr near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, he was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on ship-board; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiadês on his return.³ Of this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Periklês,

¹ Herodot. vi. 132. ἐπλεε ἐπὶ Πάρον, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς οἱ Πάριοι ὑπηρξαν πρότεροι στρυτευόμενοι τριήρεϊ ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἦν· ἀτὰρ τινα καὶ ἔγκοτον εἶχε τοῖσι Παρίοισι διὰ Λυσαγόρεα τὸν Τισίεω, ἐόντα γένος Πάριον, διαβαλόντα μιν πρὸς Ὑδάρνεα τὸν Πέρσην.

² Ephorus (Fragm. 107, ed. Didot; ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πάρος) gave an account of this expedition in several points different from Herodotus, which latter I here follow. The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect; the more so, since Ephorus gives his narrative as a sort of explanation of the peculiar phrase ἀναπαρίδζειν. Explanatory narratives of that sort are usually little worthy of attention.

³ Herodot. vi. 136. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐκ

Πάρου Μιλτιάδεα ἀπονοστήσαντα ἔσχον ἐν στόμασι, οἳ τε ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλιστα Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρωνος· δὲ θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα, ἐδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἶνεκεν. Μιλτιάδης δὲ, αὐτὸς μὲν παρεὼν, οὐκ ἀπελογέετο· ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. Προκειμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν κλίνῃ, ὑπεραπολογέοντο οἱ φίλοι, τῆς μάχης τε τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένης πολλὰ ἐπιμεμνημένοι, καὶ τὴν Λήμνου αἵρεσιν· ὡς ἐλὼν Λήμνον τε καὶ τισάμενος τοὺς Πελασγοὺς, παρέδωκε Ἀθηναίοισι. Προσγενομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ θανάτου, ζημιώσαντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πεντήκοντα τάλαντοισι, Μιλτιάδης μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα, σφακελίσαντός τε τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ σαπέντος, τελευτᾷ· τὰ δὲ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἐξέτισεν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ Κίμων.

became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiadês before the popular judicature, as having been guilty of deceiving the people and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none; all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity." Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiadês themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.¹ Of course, under such

Plato (*Gorgias*, c. 153. p. 516) says that the Athenians passed a vote to cast Miltiadês into the barathrum (*ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο*), and that he would have been actually thrown in, if it had not been for the Prytanis, i. e. the president, by turn for that day, of the prytanising senators and of the Ekklesia. The Prytanis may perhaps have been among those who spoke to the dikastery on behalf of Miltiadês, deprecating the proposition made by Xanthippus; but that he should have caused a vote once passed to be actually rescinded, is incredible. The Scholiast on *Aristeidês* (cited by Valckenaer ad *Herodot.* vi. 136) reduces the exaggeration of Plato

to something more reasonable—*Ὅτε γὰρ ἐκρίνετο Μιλτιάδης ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ, ἠθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι· ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγησά το αὐτόν.*

¹ That this was the habitual course of Attic procedure in respect to public indictments, wherever a positive amount of penalty was not previously determined, appears certain. See Platner, *Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern*, Abschn. vi. vol. i. p. 201; Heffter, *Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung*, p. 334. Meier and Schömann (*Der Attische Prozess*, b. iv. p. 725) maintain that any one of the dikasts might propose a third measure of penalty, distinct from that proposed by the accuser as well as the

circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadês, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death,

He is fined
—dies of his
wound—the
fine is paid
by his son
Kimon.

accused. In respect to public indictments, this opinion appears decidedly incorrect; but where the sentence to be pronounced involved a compensation for private wrong and an estimate of damages, we cannot so clearly determine whether there was not sometimes a greater latitude in originating propositions for the dikasts to vote upon. It is to be recollected that these dikasts were several hundred, sometimes even more, in number—that there was no discussion or deliberation among them—and that it was absolutely necessary for some distinct proposition to be laid before them to take a vote upon. In regard to some offences, the law expressly permitted what was called a *προστίμμη*; that is, after the dikasts had pronounced the full penalty demanded by the accuser, any other citizen, who thought the penalty so imposed insufficient, might call for a certain limited amount of additional penalty, and require the dikasts to vote upon it—ay or no. The votes of the dikasts were given, by depositing pebbles in two casks, under certain arrangements of detail.

The *ἀγὼν τιμητὸς*, *δίκη τιμητὸς*, or trial including this separate admeasurement of penalty—as distinguished from the *δίκη ἀτίμητος*, or trial where the penalty was predetermined, and where there was no *τίμησις*, or vote of admeasurement of penalty—is an important line of distinction in the subject-matter of Attic procedure; and the practice of calling on the accused party, after having been pronounced guilty, to impose upon himself a *counter-penalty* or *under-penalty* (*ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι* or *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι*) in contrast with that named by the accuser, was a convenient expedient for bringing the question to a substantive vote of the dikasts. Sometimes accused persons found it convenient to name very large penalties on themselves, in order to escape a capital sentence invoked by the accuser (see Dé-

mosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 34. p. 743 R.). Nor was there any fear (as Platner imagines) that in the generality of cases the dikasts would be left under the necessity of choosing between an extravagant penalty and something merely nominal; for the interest of the accused party himself would prevent this from happening. Sometimes we see him endeavouring by entreaties to prevail upon the accuser voluntarily to abate something of the penalty which he had at first named. The accuser might probably do this, if he saw that the dikasts were not likely to go along with that first proposition.

In one particular case, of immortal memory, that which Platner contemplates actually did happen; and the death of Sokratês was the effect of it. Sokratês, having been found guilty, only by a small majority of votes among the dikasts, was called upon to name a penalty upon himself, in opposition to that of death urged by Melêtus. He was in vain entreated by his friends to name a fine of some tolerable amount, which they would at once have paid in his behalf; but he would hardly be prevailed upon to name any penalty at all, affirming that he had deserved honour rather than punishment: at last he named a fine so small in amount, as to be really tantamount to an acquittal. Indeed, Xenophon states that he would not name any counter-penalty at all; and in the speech ascribed to him, he contended that he had even merited the signal honour of a public maintenance in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 27; Xenoph. Apol. Sok. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 41). Plato and Xenophon do not agree; but taking the two together, it would seem that he must have named a very small fine. There can be little doubt that this circumstance, together with the tenor of his defence, caused the dikasts to vote for the proposition of Melêtus.

proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay it: his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died.¹ But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was allowed for payment,² before absolute execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice,

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Miltiadês, c. 7; and Kimon, c. 1; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 4; Diodorus, Fragment. lib. x. All these authors probably drew from the same original fountain; perhaps Ephorus (see Marx ad Ephori Fragmenta, p. 212); but we have no means of determining. Respecting the alleged imprisonment of Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities, for their statements are all different. Diodorus states, that Kimon put himself voluntarily into prison after his father had died there, because he was not permitted on any other condition to obtain the body of his deceased father for burial. Cornelius Nepos affirms that he was imprisoned, as being legally liable to the state for the unpaid fine of his father. Lastly, Plutarch does not represent him as having been put into prison at all. Many of the Latin writers follow the statement of Diodorus: see the citations in Bos's note on the above passage of Cornelius Nepos.

There can be no hesitation in adopting the account of Plutarch as the true one. Kimon neither was, nor could be, in prison, by the Attic law, for an unpaid fine of his father; but after his

father's death, he became liable for the fine, in this sense—that he remained disfranchised (*ἀτιμος*) and excluded from his rights as a citizen, until the fine was paid: see Dêmôsthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 46. p. 762 R.

² See Boëckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii. ch. 13. p. 390 Engl. Transl. (vol. i. p. 420 Germ.); Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view of this point, with which I cannot concur (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. Append. II. p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv. p. 273).

Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 8; Kimon, c. 3) says that the misconduct connected with Paros was only a pretence with the Athenians for punishing Miltiadês; their real motive (he affirms) was envy and fear, the same feelings which dictated the ostracism of Kimon. How little there is to justify this fancy, may be seen even from the nature of the punishment inflicted. Fear would have prompted them to send away or put to death Miltiadês, not to fine him. The ostracism, which was dictated by fear, was a temporary banishment.

and imprisoning him forthwith : moreover if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.¹ To carry away the suffering general in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison—would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadês died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadês from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent, from the pinnacle of glory, to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,² is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

¹ The interval between his trial and his decease is expressed in Herodotus (vi. 136) by the difference between the present participle *σηπομένου* and the past participle *σαπέντος τοῦ μηροῦ*.

² Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio,

cap. 58. “L’opinione contro ai popoli nasce, perchè dei popoli ciascun dice male senza paura, e liberamente ancora mentre che regnano: dei principi si parla sempre con mille timori e mille rispetti.”

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiadês; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other: what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiadês, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

Fickleness and ingratitude imputed to the Athenians—how far they deserve the charge.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiadês deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment, upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who

has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a licence of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiadês. For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiadês.¹ His friends had nothing whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him—since his son Kimon actually did pay it. Those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude, unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine, that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime, have no other ground left except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not

¹ Machiavel will not even admit so much as *this*, in the clear and forcible statement which he gives of the question here alluded to: he contends that the man who has rendered services ought to be recompensed for them, but that he ought to be punished for subsequent crime just as if the previous services had not been rendered. He lays down this position in discussing the conduct of the Romans towards the victorious survivor of the three Horatii, after the battle with the Curiatii—“Erano stati i meriti di Orazio grandissimi, avendo con la sua virtù vinti i Curiazi. Era stato il fallo suo atroce, avendo morto la sorella. Nondimeno dispiacque tanto tale omicidio ai Romani, che lo condussero a disputare della vita, non ostante che gli meriti suoi fossero tanto grandi e si freschi. La qual cosa, a chi superficialmente la considerasse, parrebbe uno esempio d’ingratitude popolare. Nondimeno chi lo esaminerà meglio, e con migliore con-

siderazione ricercherà quali debbono essere gli ordini delle repubbliche, biasimerà quel popolo piuttosto per averlo assoluto, che per averlo voluto condannare: e la ragione è questa, che nessuna repubblica bene ordinata, non mai cancellò i demeriti con gli meriti dei suoi cittadini: ma avendo ordinati i premi ad una buona opera, e le pene ad una cattiva, ed avendo premiato uno per aver bene operato, se quel medesimo opera dipoi male, lo gastiga senza avere riguardo alcuno alle sue buone opere. E quando questi ordini sono bene osservati, una città vive libera molto tempo: altrimenti sempre rovinerà presto. *Perchè se, ad un cittadino che abbia fatto qualche egregia opera per la città, si aggiunge oltre alla riputazione, che quella cosa gli arreca, una audacia e confidenza di potere senza temer pena, far qualche opera non buona, diventerà in breve tempo tanto insolente, che si risolterà ogni civiltà.*”—Machiavel, Discorsi sop. Tit. Livio, ch. 24.

take upon me to pronounce : if the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it ; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiadês arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite : they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct.¹ That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favourable to his general character and behaviour : of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and which belongs more or less

Usual temper of the Athenian dikasts in estimating previous services.

¹ Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his *Discorsi sopra T. Livio*, examines the question, “Which of the two is more open to the charge of being ungrateful—a popular government or a king?” he thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare chap. 59 of the same work, where he again supports a similar opinion.

M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of the city

of Pisa to the cause of the Emperors and to the Ghibelin party—“Pise montra dans plus d’une occasion, par sa constance à supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la reconnaissance lie un peuple libre d’une manière plus puissante et plus durable qu’elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un seul homme.”—(*Histoire des Republ. Italiennes*, ch. xiii. tom. ii. p. 302.)

to the system of jury-trial everywhere ; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiadês, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs ;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiadês such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration unseated his rational judgement. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity ;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgement startling in its rapidity as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiadês been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Dêmosthenês indeed,¹ in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiadês as being noway more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiadês might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him ; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiadês ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—“Give me a fleet of ships : do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you.” Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation ; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon

Tendency
of eminent
Greeks to be
corrupted by
success.

¹ Dêmosthenês, Olynth. III. c. 9. p. 35 R.

to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistoklês.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiadês did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralised by success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiadês illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once

In what sense it is true that fickleness is an attribute of the Athenian democracy.

obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgements and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: Secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathising circle of neighbours. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, &c.;¹ and whether well-founded or ill-founded—it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies—especially when

¹ This is the general truth, which ancient authors often state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree:—"Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur." Again, Tacitus—"Nihil in vulgo modicum; terrere, ni paveant; ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni." (Annal. i. 29.) Herodotus, iii. 81. ὠθέει δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) ἐμπεσὼν τὰ πρήγματα ἀνευ νοῦ, χεϊμάρρῳ ποταμῷ ἵκελος.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his *Politica*, takes little or no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly. He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of the

multitude was represented by the sum total of each man's separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (Polit. iii. 6. 4. 10. 12), just as the property of the multitude, taken collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals judging jointly and judging separately: I do not indeed observe that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the difference here adverted to is important to notice: see *Politie*, iii. 10. 5, 6.

the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting *Dêmos* assembled in the Pnyx. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgement; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgements, and to neutralise the contagion of mere sympathising impulse. These were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendancy of Periklês, as depicted by Thucydidês: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. “When Periklês (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unseasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence.”¹ We shall find *Dêmosthenês*, with far inferior ascendancy, employed in the same honourable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent and forced itself upon every

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθοιτό | βεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικα-
τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, | θίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.
λέγων κατέπλησεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ φο-

one's notice—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present.¹ And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not at all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

¹ Such swing of the mind, from one intense feeling to another, is always deprecated by the Greek moralists, from the earliest to the latest: even Demokritus, in the fifth century B.C., ad-

monishes against it — Αἱ ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινεόμεναι τῶν ψυχῶν οὐτε εὐσταθείες εἰσὶν, οὔτε εὐθυμοί. (Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iii. p. 168. ed. Mullach ap. Stobæum, Florileg. i. 40.)

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.—PYTHAGORAS.—KROTON AND SYBARIS.

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, ^{Phalaris}_{despot of} Agrigentum, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560-540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements, which we find respecting it,¹ merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary licence of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself²—which had been taken away from Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage, to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command by undertaking the task of building a great temple³ to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretence, whereby he was enabled to assemble

¹ The letters of Bentley against Boyle, discussing the pretended Epistles of Phalaris—full of acuteness and learning, though beyond measure excursive—are quite sufficient to teach us that little can be safely asserted about Phalaris. His date is very imperfectly ascertained. Compare Bentley, p. 82, 83, and Seyfert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, p. 60: the latter assigns the reign of Phalaris to the years 570–554 B.C. It is surprising to see Seyfert citing the letters of the pseudo-Phalaris as an authority, after the exposure of Bentley.

² Pindar. *Pyth.* 1 *ad fin.* with the Scholia, p. 310, ed. Boëckh; Polyb. xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 99; Cicero *cont. Verr.* iv. 33. The contradiction of Timæus is noway sufficient to make us doubt

the authenticity of the story. Ebert (*Σικελίων*, part ii. p. 41–84, Königsberg, 1829) collects all the authorities about the bull of Phalaris. He believes the matter of fact substantially. Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, ii. 20) tells a story of the fable whereby Stêsichorus the poet dissuaded the inhabitants of Himera from granting a guard to Phalaris: Conon (*Narrat.* 42 ap. Photium) recounts the same story with the name of Hiero substituted for that of Phalaris. But it is not likely that either the one or the other could ever have been in such relations with the citizens of *Himera*. Compare Polybius, vii. 7, 2.

³ Polyæn. v. 1, 1; Cicero *de Officiis*, ii. 7.

and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Thesmophoria, to put down the authorities. He afterwards disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Têlemachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot Thêron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.¹

During the interval between 540-500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connexion with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of
Thalês.
Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thalês, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to the interval about 640-550 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataëus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony, introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokratês. Writers ancient as well as modern have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or

¹ Plutarch, *Philosophand. cum Principibus*, c. 3. p. 778.

sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thalês, Hippo, Anaximenêz, and Diogenês of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanês of Elea, and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians Parmenidês and Zêno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thalês), as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thalês partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, &c., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phænomena to be explained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of every thing which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thalês disengaged Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these

Ionic philo-
sophers—not
a school or
succession.

Step in phi-
losophy
commenced
by Thalês.

problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such as those of Thalês and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, &c.—to assign some comprehensive reason why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility; but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.¹

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsitæ*, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the antagonist force of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanês, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterwards in Ænesidêmus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated;

¹ The less these problems are adapted for rational solution, the more nobly do they present themselves in the language of a great poet: see as a specimen, Euripidês, Fragment 101, ed. Dindorf.

Ὀλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
ἔσχε μάθῃσιν, μήτε πολιτῶν

Ἐπὶ πημοσύνῃ, μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους
Πράξεις ὁρμῶν·
Ἄλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
Κόσμον ἀγῆρω, πῇ τε συνέστη·
Καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως.
Τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτε' αἰσχρῶν
ἔργων μελέτημα προσίξει.

the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like Sokratês and Plato, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under Thalês, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterwards developed them.

One cause of the vein of scepticism which runs through Grecian philosophy.

Though the celebrity of Thalês in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was serving in the Babylonian army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary Xenophanês assures us; and Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B.C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature (*φύσις*), first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter¹), with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thalês—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the year of occurrence.² But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primæval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality, and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came and into which every thing returned.³ The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining

Thalês—primæval element of water or the fluid.

¹ Vol. i. ch. xvi.

² Diogen. Laërt. i. 23; Herodot. i. 75; Apuleius, Florid. iv. p. 144, Bip.

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid, specifies several propositions said to have been discovered by Thalês (Brandis,

Handbuch der Gr. Philos. ch. xxviii. p. 110).

³ Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 3. p. 875. *ὅς ἐξ ὕδατος φησὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα ἀναλύεσθαι.*

always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thalês supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water¹—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thalês is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers, and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the primæval substance;² the universe being assimilated to an organised body or system.

Respecting Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thalês with some degree of generalization, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water³—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B.C.:

Anaximander. but both Anaximander, Xenophanês, and Pherekydês belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Praxiadês was a native of Milêtus—Xenophanês, a native of Kolophôn; the former among the earliest expositors of doctrine in prose,⁴ while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis, of his predecessor Thalês. Instead of the primæval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primæval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other⁵—a

¹ Aristotel. *ut supra*, and De Cœlo, ii. 13.

² Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2–5; Cicero, De Legg. ii. 11; Diogen. Laërt. i. 24.

³ Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Alexander Aphrodis. in Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3.

⁴ Apollodorus, in the second century B.C., had before him some brief expository treatises of Anaximander (Diogen. Laërt. ii. 2): Περὶ Φύσεως, Γῆς Περίοδον, Περὶ τῶν Ἀπλανῶν καὶ Σφαί-

ραν καὶ ἄλλα τινα. Suidas, v. Ἀναξίμανδρος. Themistius, Orat. xxv. p. 317: ἐθάρρησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἐξευεγκεῖν περὶ φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον.

⁵ Irenæus, ii. 19 (14), ap. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griech. Röm. Philos. ch. xxxv. p. 133: "Anaximander hoc quod immensum est, omnium initium subjecit, seminaliter habens in semetipso omnium genesin, ex quo immensos mundos constare ait."

primæval something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phænomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or Generation or Destruction—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves.¹ He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primæval Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this very power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle,² and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thalês, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phænomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for

Problem of the One and the Many—the Permanent and the Variable.

Aristotel. *Physic. Auscult.* iii 4. p. 203 Bek. οὐτε γὰρ μάτην αὐτὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι (τὸ ἄπειρον), οὐτε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, πλὴν ὡς ἀρχήν. Aristotle subjects this ἄπειρον to an elaborate discussion, in which he says very little more about Anaximander, who appears to have assumed it without anticipating discussion or objections. Whether Anaximander called his ἄπειρον divine, or god, as Tennemann (*Gesch. Philos.* i. 2. p. 67) and Panzerbieter affirm (*ad Diogenis Apolloniat. Fragment.* c. 13. p. 16), I think doubtful: this is rather an inference which Aristotle elicits from his language. Yet in another passage, which is difficult to reconcile, Aristotle ascribes to Anaximander the water-doc-

trine of Thalês (*Aristotel. de Xenophane*, p. 975, Bek.).

Anaximander seems to have followed speculations analogous to that of Thalês in explaining the first production of the human race (*Plutarch. Placit. Philos.* v. 19. p. 908), and in other matters (*ibid.* iii. 16. p. 896).

¹ *Aristotel. De Generat. et Destruct.* c. 3. p. 317, Bek. ὁ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διέτελεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφῆσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι πρῶτον: compare *Physic. Auscultat.* i. 4. p. 187, Bek.

² *Simplicius in Aristotel. Physic.* fol. 6, 32. πρῶτος αὐτὸς Ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thalês, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenês and others afterwards, and reproduced with many divergences of doctrine—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thalês, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought: we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic;¹ how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanês of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570-480 B.C.), migrated from Kolophon² to Zanklê and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540-530 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenidês, Zeno, and Melissus, pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanês—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which

Xenophanês
—his doctrine the opposite of that of Anaximander.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 81, 2. He agreed with Thalês in maintaining that the earth was stationary (Aristotel. de Cœlo,

ii. 13, p. 295, ed. Bekk.).

² Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

belongs to the age of Periklês, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.¹ His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod.² He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thalês and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander—not however to adopt it, but to reverse it—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and cancelling phænomenal changes: in this doctrine the Something or Substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist at all in any other sense: the Permanent was thus merged and lost in the Variable—the One in the Many. Xenophanês laid down the exact opposite: he conceived nature as one unchangeable and indivisible Whole, spherical, animated, endued with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God. He denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists (he maintained) could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognised the Permanent without the Variable³—the One without the Many. And his treatment of

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 22; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 294.

² Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathem. ix. 193.

³ Aristot. Metaphys. i. 5. p. 986, Bek. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίστασ, οὐθὲν διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων (τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐνδὸς καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) οὐδετέρας ἔοικε θιγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναι φησι τὸν θεόν.

Plutarch. ap. Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. i. 8. Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἰδίαν μὲν τινα ὁδὸν πεπορευμένος

καὶ παρηλλαχύϊαν πάντας τοὺς προειρημένους, οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν ἀπολείπει, ἀλλ' εἶναι λέγει τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ ὁμοιον. Compare Timon ap. Sext. Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. 224, 225. ἐδογματίζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις, ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῇ τοῖς πᾶσιν εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῇ καὶ ἀπαθῇ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν (Aristot. de Xenoph. c. 3. p. 977, Bek.). 'Αδύνατόν φησιν (ὁ Ξενοφάνης) εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστίν, γενέσθαι, &c.

One may reasonably doubt whether

the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the same time pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.¹ This

The Eleatic school, Parmenidês and Zeno, springing from Xenophanês — their dialectics — their great influence on Grecian speculation.

hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanês; at least we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle.² But his successors, Parmenidês and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a second part, in which the phænomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanês, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,³ which the nature of his philosophy was well-calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanês better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathised.

The cosmogony of Pherekydês of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,⁴ and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thalês, Anaximander, and Xenophanês, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many inte-

all the arguments ascribed to Xenophanês in the short but obscure treatise last quoted really belong to him.

¹ Clemens Alexand. Stromat. v. p. 601, vii. p. 711.

² Aristot. Metaphysic. i. 5. p. 986, Bek. μικρόν ἀγροικότερος.

³ Xenophanês, Fr. xiv. ed. Mullach;

Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii. 49–110; and Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 224; Plutarch adv. Colôtên. p. 1114: compare Karsten ad Parmenidis Fragmenta, p. 146.

⁴ See Brandis, Handbuch der Griech. Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxii.

resting questions were thus brought into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B.C., had never heard of—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanês—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak—Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendancy,—but afterwards banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without however still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amidst the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence. He was a native of Samos,¹ son of an opulent merchant named Mnêsarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo : born, as far as we can make out, about the fiftieth Olympiad, or 580 B.C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt²—perhaps also Phenicia and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560-540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by

¹ Herodot. iv. 95. The place of his nativity is certain from Herodotus, but even this fact was differently stated by other authors, who called him a Tyrrenian of Lemnos or Imbros (Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 1-10), a Syrian, a Phliasian, &c.

Cicero (De Repub. ii. 15: compare Livy, i. 18) censures the chronological blunder of those who made Pythagoras the preceptor of Numa; which certainly is a remarkable illustration how much confusion prevailed among literary men of antiquity about the dates

of events even of the sixth century B.C. Ovid follows this story without hesitation: see Metamorph. xv. 60, with Burmann's note.

² Cicero de Fin. v. 29; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3; Strabo, xiv. p. 638; Alexander Polyhistor ap. Cyrill. cont. Julian. iv. p. 128, ed. Spanh. For the vast reach of his supposed travels, see Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 11; Jamblic. 14, seqq.

The same extensive journeys are ascribed to Dêmokritus, Diogen. Laërt. ix. 35.

foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thalês, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydês of Syros :¹ amidst the towns of Ionia he would moreover have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c. must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanês of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying—"It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognised by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Hêrakteitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgement—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterwards, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment.²

¹ The connexion of Pythagoras with Pherekydês is noticed by Aristoxenus, ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 118, viii. 2; Cicero de Divinat. i. 13.

² Xenophanês, Fragm. 7, ed. Schneidewin; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36: compare Aulus Gellius, iv. 11 (we must remark that this or a like doctrine is not pecu-

Pythagoras combines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus),¹ with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenidês, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favour of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,² being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master.³ In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedoklês

liar to Pythagoreans, but believed by the poet Pindar, Olymp. ii. 68, and Fragment, Thren. x., as well as by the philosopher Pherekydês, Porphyrius de Antro Nympharum, c. 31).

Καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
Φασὶν ἐποικτεῖραι, καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος—
Παῦσαι, μὴδὲ ράπιζ· ἐπεὶ φίλου ἀνερὸς ἐστὶ
Ψυχὴ, τὴν ἔγνω φθεγξαμένης αἰών.

Consult also Sextus Empiricus, viii. 286, as to the *κοινωνία* between gods, men, and animals, believed both by Pythagoras and Empedoklês. That Herodotus (ii. 123) alludes to Orpheus and Pythagoras, though refraining designedly from mentioning names, there can hardly be any doubt: compare ii. 81; also Aristotle, de Animâ, i. 3, 23.

The testimony of Hêrakleitus is contained in Diogenes Laërtius, viii. 6, ix. 1. Ἡρακλεῖτος γοῦν ὁ φυσικὸς μονονουχὶ κέκραγε καὶ φησὶ Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ιστορίην ἡσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς, ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. Again, Πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὐθὶς δὲ Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἐκαταῖον.

Dr. Thirlwall conceives Xenophanês as having intended in the passage above-cited to treat the doctrine of the metempsychosis “with deserved ridicule” (Hist. of Greece, ch. xii. vol. ii. p. 162). Religious opinions are so apt to appear ridiculous to those who do not believe

them, that such a suspicion is not unnatural; yet I think, if Xenophanês had been so disposed, he would have found more ridiculous examples among the many which this doctrine might suggest. Indeed it seems hardly possible to present the metempsychosis in a more touching or respectable point of view than that which the lines of his poem set forth. The particular animal selected is that one between whom and man the sympathy is most marked and reciprocal, while the doctrine is made to enforce a practical lesson against cruelty.

¹ Herodot. i. 29, ii. 49, iv. 95. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ. Hippokratês distinguishes the σοφιστῆς from the ἱητρὸς, though both of them had handled the subject of medicine—the special from the general habits of investigation. (Hippokratês, Περὶ ἀρχαῆς ἱητρικῆς, c. 20. vol. i. p. 620, Littré.)

² See Lobeck’s learned and valuable treatise, Aglaophamus, Orphica, lib. ii. pp. 247, 698, 900; also Plato, Legg. vi. 782, and Euripid. Hippol. 946.

³ Plato’s conception of Pythagoras (Republ. x. p. 600) depicts him as something not unlike St. Benedict, or St. Francis, (or St. Elias, as some Carmelites have tried to make out: see Kuster ad Jamblich. c. 3)—Ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὀμηρὸς γενέσθαι, αἱ ἑκείνων ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς

seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about half a century afterwards.¹ While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men."² This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is however no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanês, Herakleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokratês³—we find in him chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras is inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life⁴—the Pythagorean life—and to promise divine favour to a

Pythagoras more a missionary and schoolmaster than a politician—his political efficiency exaggerated by later witnesses.

ὕστεροις δδόν τινα βίου παρέδωσαν Ὀμηρικὴν ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστερον ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγορεῖον τροπὸν ἐκονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πρὸς δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

The description of Melampus given in Herodot. ii. 49, very much fills up the idea of Pythagoras, as derived from ii. 81–123, and iv. 95. Pythagoras, as well as Melampus, was said to have pretended to divination and prophecy (Cicero, Divinat. i. 3, 46; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 29: compare Krische, De Societate a Pythagorâ in urbe Crotoniatarum conditâ Commentatio, ch. v. p. 72. Göttingen, 1831).

¹ Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch. Rom. Philosophie, part i. sect. xlvii. p. 191.

² Ælian, V. H. ii. 26; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 31, 140; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 20; Diodorus, Fragm. lib. x. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess.:—Timon ap. Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36; and Plutarch, Numa, c. 8.

Πυθαγόρην τε γόητος ἀποκλίναντ' ἐπὶ δόξαν Θήρῃ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, σεμνηγορίης δαριστήν.

³ Isokratês, Busiris, p. 402. ed. Auger. Πυθαγόρας δὲ Σάμιος, ἀφικόμενος

εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ μαθητὴς τῶν ἱερέων γενόμενος, τὴν τε ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασε.

Compare Aristotel. Magn. Moralia, i. 1, about Pythagoras as an ethical teacher. Dêmokritus, born about 460 B.C., wrote a treatise (now lost) respecting Pythagoras, whom he greatly admired: as far as we can judge, it would seem that he too must have considered Pythagoras as an ethical teacher (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 38; Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. ii. p. 113; Cicero de Orator. iii. 15).

⁴ Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 64, 115, 151, 199: see also the idea ascribed to Pythagoras, of divine inspirations coming on men (ἐπίπνοια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου). Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Eclog. Physic. p. 206; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 32.

Meiners renders it probable that the stories respecting the miraculous powers and properties of Pythagoras got into circulation either during his lifetime, or at least not long after his death (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, B. iii. vol. i. p. 504, 505).

select and docile few as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus (who was separated from him by about one intervening generation) left any memorials in writing.¹ Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolising fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phænomena, physical as well as moral. Such mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans his successors, and coinciding partly also (as has been before stated) with the studies of Anaximander and Thalês, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living as Pythagoras did at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the licence of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions,² his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect even without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his

His ethical training—probably not applied to all the members of his order.

¹ Respecting Philolaus, see the valuable collection of his fragments, and commentary on them, by Boëckh (*Philolaus des Pythagoreers Leben*, Berlin, 1819). That Philolaus was the first who composed a work on Pythagorean science, and thus made it known beyond the limits of the brotherhood—among others to Plato—appears well-established (Boëckh, *Philolaus*, p. 22; *Diogen. Laërt.* viii. 15-55; *Jamblichus*, c. 119). Simmias and Kebês, fellow-

disciples of Plato under Sokratês, had held intercourse with Philolaus at Thebes (*Plato, Phædon*, p. 61), perhaps about 420 B.C. The Pythagorean brotherhood had then been dispersed in various parts of Greece, though the attachment of its members to each other seems to have continued long afterwards.

² *Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid.* p. 384, ad fin. *Quintilian. Institut. Oratt.* ix. 4.

rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigour. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food; a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedoklês also did after him.¹ It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet on the other hand, it seems equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies; for Milo the Krotoniate was among them,² the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his age—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B.C., and then nearly died out; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokratês. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the orientalising tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythago-

¹ Empedoklês, ap. Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 14, 2; Sextus Empiric. ix. 127; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, p. 993, 996, 997; where he puts Pythagoras and Empedoklês together, as having both held the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both prohibited the eating of animal food. Empedoklês supposed that plants had souls, and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants as well as into animals. "I have been myself heretofore (said he) a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish of the sea."

ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμεν κοῦρός τε κόρη τε,
θάμνος τ', οἰωνός τε καὶ ἐξ ἀλὸς ἔμπυρος ἰχθύς.

(Diogen. L. viii. 77; Sturz. ad Empedokl. Frag. p. 466.) Pythagoras is said to have affirmed that he had been not only Euphorbus in the Grecian army before Troy, but also a tradesman, a courtesan, &c., and various other human characters, before his actual existence; he did not however extend the same intercommunion to plants, in any case.

The abstinence from animal food was an Orphic precept as well as a Pythagorean (Aristophan. Ran. 1032).

² Strabo, vi. p. 263; Diogen. L. viii. 40.

rean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism —Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into the Pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Plato. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of Pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all, endued with those talents for religious and personal ascendancy over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polykratês, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 535–530 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Milêtus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum

Decline and subsequent renovation of the Pythagorean order.

Pythagoras not merely a borrower, but an original and ascendent mind.—He passes from Samos to Kroton.

on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanês, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophon to Zanklê, Katana and Elea.¹

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity —among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested in part by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games—and the superiority of its physicians or surgeons.² These two points were in fact greatly connected with each other; for the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest—and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia—followed out the same general views and acted upon the same basis of knowledge, as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health.³ Of medical education properly so called, espe-

State of
Kroton—
oligarchical
government
—excellent
gymnastic
training and
medical
skill.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

² Herodot. iii. 131; Strabo, vi. p. 261; Menander de Encomiis, p. 96, ed. Heeren. 'Αθηναίους ἐπὶ ἀγαματοποιῶ τε καὶ ζωγραφικῇ, καὶ Κροτωνιάτας ἐπὶ ἰατρικῇ, μέγα φρονῆσαι, &c.

The Krotoniate Alkmaeon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Aristotel. Metaph. i. 5), is among the earliest names mentioned as philosophizing upon physical and medical subjects. See Brandis, Handbuch der Geschicht. der Philos. sect. lxxiii. p. 508, and Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 2. p. 752, Bekker.

The medical art in Egypt, at the time when Pythagoras visited that country, was sufficiently far advanced to excite the attention of an inquisitive traveller—the branches of it minutely subdivided and strict rules laid down for

practice (Herodot. ii. 84; Aristotel. Politic. iii. 10, 4).

³ See the analogy of the two strikingly brought out in the treatise of Hippokratês Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς, c. 3, 4, 7. vol. i. p. 580–584, ed. Littré.

Ἔτι γοῦν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων καὶ ἀσκησίων ἐπιμελόμενοι αἰεὶ τι προσεξευρίσκουσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτέην ὁδὸν ζητέοντες θ, τι ἔδων καὶ πίνων ἐπικρατήσῃ τε αὐτέων μάλιστα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς ἐωυτοῦ ἔσται (p. 580); again, p. 584: Τί οὖν φαίνεται ἑτεροῖον διανοηθεῖς ὁ καλούμενος ἱητρὸς καὶ ὁμολογημένως χειροτέχνης, ὃς ἐξεῦρε τὴν ἀμφὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας δίαίταν καὶ τροφήν, ἢ κεῖνος ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῖσι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι τροφήν, ἢ νῦν χρεόμεθα, ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς ἀγρίας καὶ θηριώδους εὐρών τε καὶ παρασκευάσας διαίτης: compare another passage not less illustrative in the treatise of Hip-

cially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Dêmokêdês (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo), to

pokratês *Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων*, c. 3, vol. ii. p. 245, ed. Littré.

Following the same general idea, that the theory and practice of the physician is a farther development and variety of that of the gymnastic trainer, I transcribe some observations from the excellent *Remarques Rétrospectives* of M. Littré, at the end of the fourth volume of his edition of Hippokratês (p. 662).

After having observed (p. 659) that physiology may be considered as divided into two parts—one relating to the mechanism of the functions; the other, to the effects produced upon the human body by the different influences which act upon it and the media by which it is surrounded; and after having observed that on the first of these two branches, the ancients could never make progress, from their ignorance of anatomy—he goes on to state, that respecting the second branch they acquired a large amount of knowledge:—

“Sur la physiologie des influences extérieures, la Grèce du temps d’Hippocrate et après lui fut le théâtre d’expériences en grand les plus importantes et les plus instructives. Toute la population (la population libre, s’entend) étoit soumise à un système régulier d’éducation physique (N.B. this is a little too strongly stated): dans quelques cités, à Lacédémone par exemple, les femmes n’en étoient pas exemptées. Ce système se composoit d’exercices et d’une alimentation, que combinèrent l’empirisme d’abord, puis une théorie plus savante: il concernoit (comme dit Hippocrate lui-même, en ne parlant, il est vrai, que de la partie alimentaire), il concernoit et les malades pour leur rétablissement, et les

gens bien portans pour la conservation de leur santé, et les personnes livrées aux exercices gymnastiques pour l’accroissement de leurs forces. On savoit au juste ce qu’il falloit pour conserver seulement le corps en bon état ou pour traiter un malade—pour former un militaire ou pour faire un athlète—et en particulier, un lutteur, un coureur, un sauteur, un pugiliste. Une classe d’hommes, les maîtres des gymnases, étoient exclusivement adonnés à la culture de cet art, auquel les médecins participoient dans les limites de leur profession; et Hippocrate, qui dans les *Aphorismes*, invoque l’exemple des athlètes, nous parle dans le *Traité des Articulations* des personnes maigres, qui n’ayant pas été amaigris par un procédé régulier de l’art, ont les chairs muqueuses. Les anciens médecins savoient, comme on le voit, procurer l’amaigrissement conformément à l’art, et reconnoître à ses effets un amaigrissement irrégulier: toutes choses auxquelles nos médecins sont étrangers, et dont on ne retrouve l’analogue que parmi les *entraîneurs* Anglois. Au reste cet ensemble de connoissances empiriques et théoriques doit être mis au rang des pertes fâcheuses qui ont accompagné la longue et turbulente transition du monde ancien au monde moderne. Les admirables institutions destinées dans l’antiquité à développer et affermir le corps, ont disparu: l’hygiène publique est destituée à cet égard de toute direction scientifique et générale, et demeure abandonnée complètement au hasard.”

See also the remarks of Plato respecting Herodikus, *De Republicâ*, iii. p. 406; Aristotel. *Politic.* iii. 11, 6. iv. 1, 1. viii. 4, 1.

whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôs and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Prytanis or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females.¹ His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhêgium, Katana, Himera, &c., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full:² and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleidês of Pontus, &c.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoreans,³ the last members of a declining sect,

Rapid and wonderful effects said to have been produced by the exhortations of Pythagoras.

¹ Valerius Maxim. viii. 15, xv. 1; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 45; Timæus, Fragm. 78, ed. Didot.

² Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 21–54; Jamblich. 33–35, 166.

³ The compilations of Porphyry and Jamblichus on the life of Pythagoras, copied from a great variety of authors, will doubtless contain some truth amidst their confused heap of statements, many incredible, and nearly all unauthenticated. But it is very difficult to single out what these portions of truth really are. Even Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus, the best authors from whom these biographers quote, lived near two centuries after the death of Pythagoras, and do not appear to have had any early memorials to consult, nor any better informants than the contemporary Pythagoreans—the last of an ex-

piring sect, and probably among the least eminent for intellect, since the philosophers of the Sokratic vein in its various branches carried off the acute and aspiring young men of that time.

Meiners, in his *Geschichte der Wissenschaften* (vol. i. b. iii. p. 191 *seq.*), has given a careful analysis of the various authors from whom the two biographers have borrowed, and a comparative estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of historical criticism, though the author exaggerates both the merits and the influence of the first Pythagoreans: Kiessling in the notes to his edition of Jamblichus has given some extracts from it, but by no means enough to dispense with the perusal of the original. I think Meiners allows too much

among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgement, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.C.¹ To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. But we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favoured by the gods and patentee of divine secrets, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn members, under one form or another, were a constant phænomenon in the Grecian cities.² Now the

He forms a powerful club or society, consisting of three hundred men taken from the wealthy classes at Kroton.

credit, on the whole, to Aristoxenus (see p. 214) and makes too little deduction for the various stories difficult to be believed, of which Aristoxenus is given as the source: of course the latter could not furnish better matter than he heard from his own witnesses. Where the judgement of Meiners is more severe, it is also better borne out, especially respecting Porphyry himself, and his scholar Jamblichus. These later Pythagorean philosophers seem to have set up as a formal canon of credibility, that which many religious men of antiquity acted upon from a mere unconscious sentiment and fear of giving offence to the gods—That it was *not right to disbelieve any story* recounted respecting the gods, and wherein the divine agency was introduced: no one could tell but what it *might be true*: to deny its truth was to set bounds to the divine omnipotence. Accordingly they made no difficulty in believing what was recounted about Aristæus, Abaris, and other eminent subjects of mythos (Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 138–148)—καὶ τοῦτό γε πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὁμῶς ἔχουσι πιστευτικῶς, οἷον περὶ Ἀρισταίου καὶ Ἀβάριδος τὰ μυθολογούμενα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται . . . τῶν τοιούτων δὲ τῶν δοκούντων μυθικῶν ἀπομνημονεύου-

σιν, ὥς οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ὅτι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγηται. Also not less formally laid down in Jamblichus, Adhortatio ad Philosophiam, as the fourth Symbolum, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. Περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖ, μηδὲ περὶ θείων δογμάτων. Reasoning from their principles, this was a consistent corollary to lay down; but it helps us to estimate their value as selectors and discriminators of accounts respecting Pythagoras. The extravagant compliments paid by the Emperor Julian in his letters to Jamblichus will not suffice to establish the authority of the latter as a critic and witness: see the Epistolæ 34, 40, 41, in Heyler's edit. of Julian's letters.

¹ Aulus Gell. N.A. iv. 11. Apollonius (ap. Jamblich. c. 262) alludes to τὰ ὑπομνήματα τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν: what the date of these may be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe them anterior to Aristoxenus.

² Thucyd. viii. 54. τὰς ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον οὔσαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπελθὼν, &c.

On this important passage, in which Thucydides notes the political clubs of Athens as sworn societies, numerous, notorious, and efficient—I shall speak

Pythagorean order at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel.¹ The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendancy in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendancy of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.² Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who revered him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political position—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model-city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by

Political
influence of
Pythagoras
—was an in-
direct result
of the consti-
tution of the
order.

farther in a future stage of the history. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

¹ Justin, xx. 4. “Sed trecenti ex juvenibus cum sodalitii juris sacramento quodam nexi, separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercerent, quasi cœtum clandestinæ conjurationis haberent, civitatem in se converterunt.”

Compare Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3; Apollonius ap. Jamblich. c. 254; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 33.

The story of the devoted attachments of the two Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias appears to be very well at-

tested: Aristoxenus heard it from the lips of the younger Dionysius the despot, whose sentence had elicited such manifestation of friendship (Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 59–62; Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 10; and Davis ad Cicero. Tusc. Disp. v. 22).

² Plutarch, Philosophand. cum Principib. c. i. p. 777. ἂν δ' ἄρχοντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάψηται (ὁ φιλόσοφος) καὶ τοῦτον ἀναπλήσῃ καλοκαγαθίας, πολλοὺς δι' ἐνὸς ὠφέλησεν, ὡς Πυθαγόρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσι τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν συγγενόμενος.

Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B.C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific idea—and manifesting adherence by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skilful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonised with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton.¹

¹ I transcribe here the summary given by Krische, at the close of his Dissertation on the Pythagorean order, p. 101. "*Societatis scopus fuit mere politicus, ut lapsam optimatum potestatem non modo in pristinum restitueret, sed firmaret amplificaretque: cum summo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt; moralis alter, alter ad literas spectans. Discipulos suos bonos probosque homines reddere voluit Pythagoras, et ut civitatem moderantes potestate sua non abuterentur ad plebem opprimendam; et ut plebs, intelligens suis commodis consuli, conditione sua contenta esset. Quoniam vero bonum sapiensque moderamen nisi a prudente literisque exulto viro exspectari (non) licet, philosophiae studium necessarium duxit Samius iis, qui ad civitatis clavum tenendum se accingerent.*"

This is the general view (coinciding substantially with that of O. Müller—*Dorians*, iii. 9, 16) given by an author

who has gone through the evidences with care and learning. It differs on some important points from the idea which I conceive of the primitive master and his contemporary brethren. It leaves out the religious ascendancy, which I imagine to have stood first among the means as well as among the premeditated purposes of Pythagoras, while it sets forth a reformatory political scheme as directly contemplated by him, of which there is no proof. Though the political ascendancy of the early Pythagoreans is the most prominent feature in their early history, it is not to be considered as the manifestation of any peculiar or settled political idea—it is rather a result of their position and means of union. Ritter observes (in my opinion more justly), "We must not believe that the mysteries of the Pythagorean order were of a simply political character: the most probable accounts warrant us

Niebuhr and O. Müller have even supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city¹—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendancy in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro,² who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation; and that the general of the order possessed that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from its warm admirers. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came

in considering that its central point was a mystic religious teaching" (*Geschicht. der Philosophie*, b. iv. ch. i. vol. i. p. 365–368): compare Hoeck. *Kreta*, vol. iii. p. 223.

Krische (p. 32) as well as Boëckh (*Philolaus*, p. 39–42) and O. Müller assimilate the Pythagorean life to the Dorian or Spartan habits, and call the Pythagorean philosophy the expression of Grecian Dorism, as opposed to the Ionians and the Ionic philosophy. I confess that I perceive no analogy between the two, either in action or speculation. The Spartans stand completely distinct from other Dorians; and even the Spartan habits of life, though they present some points of resemblance with the bodily training of the Pythagoreans, exhibit still more important points of difference, in respect to religious peculiarity and mysticism, as well as to the scientific ele-

ment embodied with it. The Pythagorean philosophy, and the Eleatic philosophy, were both equally opposed to the Ionic; yet neither of them is in any way connected with Dorian tendencies. Neither Elea nor Kroton were Doric cities; moreover Xenophanes as well as Pythagoras were both Ionians.

The general assertions respecting Ionic mobility and inconstancy, contrasted with Doric constancy and steadiness, will not be found borne out by a study of facts. The Dorism of Pythagoras appears to me a complete fancy. O. Müller even turns Kroton into a Dorian city, contrary to all evidence.

¹ Niebuhr, *Römisch. Gesch.* i. p. 165, 2nd edit.; O. Müller, *Hist. of Dorians*, iii. 9, 16: Krische is opposed to this idea, sect. v. p. 84.

² Varro ap. Augustin. *de Ordine*, ii. 30; Krische, p. 77.

to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skilfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity—we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanour¹—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which, fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.² Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokratês, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiadês,³ to which indeed the orator Æschinês distinctly

Causes
which led to
the subver-
sion of the
Pythagorean
order.

¹ Apollonius ap. Jamblichum, V. P. c. 254, 255, 256, 257. ἡγεμόνες δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς διαφορᾶς οἱ ταῖς συγγενείαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειότησιν ἐγγύτατα καθεστηκότες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. Αἴτιον δ' ἦν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τῶν πραττομένων, &c.: compare also the lines descriptive of Pythagoras, c. 259. Τοὺς μὲν ἐταίρους ἤγεν ἴσους μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι. Τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ' οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ, οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

That this Apollonius, cited both by Jamblichus and by Porphyry, is Apollonius of Tyana, has been rendered probable by Meiners (Gesch. der Wissensch. v. i. p. 239–245): compare Welcker, Prolegomena ad Theognid. p. xlv. xlv.

When we read the life of Apollonius

by Philostratus, we see that the former was himself extremely communicative: he might be the rather disposed therefore to think that the seclusion and reserve of Pythagoras was a defect, and to ascribe to it much of the mischief which afterwards overtook the order.

² Schleiermacher observes that “Philosophy among the Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their school with a practical brotherly partnership, such as was never on any other occasion seen in Greece” (Introduction to his Translation of Plato, p. 12). See also Theopompus, Fr. 68, ed. Didot, apud Athenæum, v. p. 213, and Euripidês, Mædæa, 294.

³ Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 12; Æschines, cont. Timarch. c. 34. ὑμεῖς, ἄ

ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokratês been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendancy had provoked such wide-spread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself farther to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendancy had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offence by refusing to divide among the people the recently

conquered territory of Sybaris.¹ In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo. The building was set on fire, and many of the members perished;² none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and commotion, from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæans, the original founders of Sybaris

Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείναντες, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκῶς, ἵνα τῶν τριάκοντα.

¹ This is stated in Jamblichus, c. 255; yet it is difficult to believe; for if the fact had been so, the destruction of the Pythagoreans would naturally have produced an allotment and permanent

occupation of the Sybaritan territory—which certainly did not take place, since Sybaris remained without resident possessors until the foundation of Thurii.

² Jamblichus, c. 255–259; Porphyry, c. 54–57; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 39; Diogen. x. Fragm. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess.

and Kroton—assisted indeed by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with common religious festivals, at a temple founded expressly for the purpose and dedicated to Zeus Homarius.¹ Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples;² others, that he had died a short time previously; others again affirmed that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterwards in exile, after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero.³ As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never re-

The Pythagorean order is reduced to a religious and philosophical sect, in which character it continues.

vived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were re-admitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia,⁴ from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and in other cities of Greece. Indeed some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even

¹ Polyb. ii. 39; Plutarch, *De Genio Socratis*, c. 13. p. 583; Aristoxenus, ap. Jamblich. c. 250. That the enemies of the order attacked it by setting fire to the house in which the members were assembled, is the circumstance in which all accounts agree. On all other points there is great discrepancy, especially respecting the names and date of the Pythagoreans who escaped: Boëckh (*Philolaus*, p. 9 *seq.*) and Brandis (*Handbuch der Gesch. Philos.* ch. lxxiii. p. 432) try to reconcile these discrepancies.

Aristophanês introduces Strepsiadês, at the close of the *Nubes*, as setting fire to the meeting-house (*φροντιστήριον*) of Sokratês and his disciple: possibly the Pythagorean conflagration may have suggested this.

² “Pythagoras Samius suspicione dominatûs injustâ vivus in fauo concrematus est” (Arnobius *adv. Gentes*, lib. i. p. 23, ed. Elmenhorst).

³ Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 2 (who seems to have copied from Dikæarchus: see Fuhr. *ad Dikæarchi Fragment.* p. 55); Justin, xx. 4; Diogen. *Lært.* viii. 40; Jamblichus, *V. P.* c. 249.

O. Müller says (*Dorians*, iii. 9, 16), that “the influence of the Pythagorean league upon the administration of the

Italian states was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many generations after the dissolution of the league itself.”

The first of these two assertions cannot be made out, and depends only on the statements of later encomiasts, who even supply materials to contradict their own general view. The judgement of Welcker respecting the influence of the Pythagoreans, much less favourable, is at the same time more probable (*Præfat. ad Theognid.* p. xlv.).

The second of the two assertions appears to me quite incorrect; the influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of Magna Græcia ceased altogether, as far as we are able to judge. An individual Pythagorean like Archytas might obtain influence, but this is not the influence of the order. Nor ought O. Müller to talk about the Italian Greeks giving up the Doric customs and adopting an Achæan government. There is nothing to prove that Kroton ever had Doric customs.

⁴ Aristotel. *de Cælo*, ii. 13. *οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγορεῖοι.* “Italici philosophi quondam nominati” (Cicero, *De Senectute*, c. 21).

acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B.C. 540–530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which humiliation is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian missionary.¹ As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis or Trionto, about twenty years afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B.C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of its much-denounced luxury War between Sybaris and Kroton. I have spoken in a former chapter.² It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader named Têlys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris.³ It appears too, that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of splendid muscular form

¹ Heyne places the date of the battle of Sagra about 560 B.C.; but this is very uncertain. See his *Opuscula*, vol. ii. Prolus. ii. p. 53, and Prolus. x. p. 184. See also Justin. xx. 3, and Strabo, vi. p. 261–263. It will be seen that the latter conceives the battle of the Sagra as having happened after the destruction of Sybaris by the Krotoniates; for he states twice, that the Krotoniates lost so many citizens at the Sagra, that the city did not long survive so terrible a blow: he cannot therefore have supposed that the complete triumph of the Krotoniates over the great Sybaris was gained afterwards.

² See above, chap. xxii.

³ Diodor. xii. 9. Herodotus calls Têlys in one place βασιλῆα, in another τύραννον of Sybaris (v. 44): this is not at variance with the story of Diodorus.

The story given by Athenæus, out of Herakleidês Ponticus, respecting the subversion of the dominion of Têlys, cannot be reconciled either with Herodotus or Diodorus (Athenæus, xii. p. 522). Dr. Thirlwall supposes the deposition of Têlys to have occurred between the defeat at the Traeis and the capture of Sybaris; but this is inconsistent with the statement of Herakleidês, and not countenanced by any other evidence.

and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Têlys.¹ According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Têlys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection: it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harboured in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Têlys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonour of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Têlys marched against Kroton at the head of a force which is reckoned at 300,000 men.² He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise; for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were so decisively unfavourable, that the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton.³ Near the river Traeis or Trionto, Têlys was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting (we are informed) of 100,000 men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed (we are told) in the costume and armed with the club of Heraklês. They were farther reinforced by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus (younger brother of king Kleomenês), then coasting along the Gulf of Tarentum with a body of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power⁴ in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros,⁵ their settlements planted on the Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. So eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it: the dry

Defeat of the Sybarites, and destruction of their city, partly through the aid of the Spartan Dorians.

¹ Herodot. v. 47.

² Diodor. xii. 9; Strabo, vi. p. 263; Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 260; Skymn. Chi. v. 340.

³ Herodot. v. 44.

⁴ Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 21; Strabo, vi. p. 253.

bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus,¹ who was among the settlers in the town of Thurii afterwards founded nearly adjoining. It appears however that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstances (as has been before noticed) the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish: they maintained themselves at Laos, Skidros, and elsewhere—and afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory: Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Milêtus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning.² The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris

¹ Herodot. v. 45; Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263. Strabo mentions expressly the turning of the river for the purpose of overwhelming the city—*ἐλόντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐπήγαγον τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κατέκλυσαν*. It is to this change in the channel of the river that I refer the expression in Herodotus—*τέμενός τε καὶ νηδὺν ἐόντα παρὰ τὸν ξηρὸν Κράθιν*. It was natural that the old deserted bed of the river should be called “*the dry Krathis*”: whereas, if we suppose that there was only one channel, the expression has no appropriate meaning. For I do not think that any one can be well satisfied with the explanation of Bähr — “*Vocatur Crathis hoc loco ξηρὸς siccus, ut qui*

hieme fluit, æstatis vero tempore exsiccatus est: quod adhuc in multis Italiæ inferioris fluviis observant.” I doubt whether this be true, as a matter of fact, respecting the river Krathis (see my preceding volume, ch. xxii.); but even if the fact were true, the epithet in Bähr’s sense has no especial significance for the purpose contemplated by Herodotus, who merely wishes to describe the site of the temple erected by Dorieus. “*Near the Krathis,*” or “*near the dry Krathis,*” would be equivalent expressions. if we adopted Bähr’s construction; whereas to say “*near the deserted channel of the Krathis,*” would be a good local designation.

² Herodot. vi. 21.

and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxês thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thurii and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written memorials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meagre and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honour of the Krathian Athênê.¹ This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighbouring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favourable promise of the oracle

Contradictory statements and arguments respecting the presence of Dorieus.

¹ Herodot. v. 45.

beforehand, a confident proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued), without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realised, and he would have succeeded. But the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument (Herodotus tells us) the Sybarites of his day especially insisted.¹ And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises—how scanty their stock was of such legitimate evidence—and how little they had yet learnt to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked, that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendancy in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a circumstance not easily explicable. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in which it is commonly represented. He tells us, that after much suffering in Magna Græcia from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation and even to establish something like a permanent league with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are, Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia.² But according to the

¹ Herodot. v. 45. Τοῦτο δὲ, αὐτοῦ Δωριέος τὸν θάνατον μαρτύριον μέγιστον ποιεῦνται (Συβαρίται), ὅτι παρὰ τὰ μαντευμένα ποιέων διεφθάρη. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέπρηξε μηδὲν, ἐπ' ᾧ δὲ ἐστάλη ἐποίησε, εἴλε ἂν τὴν Ἐρυκίνην χώραν καὶ ἐλὼν κάτεσχε, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ στρατὶς διεφθάρη.

² Polyb. ii. 39. Heyne thinks that the agreement here mentioned by Polybius took place Olymp. 80. 3; or indeed after the re-population of the Sybaritan territory by the foundation of Thurii (Opuscula, vol. ii.; Prolus. x. p. 189). But there seems great difficulty in imagining that the state of violent commo-

sequence of events and the fatal war (just described) between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the early history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

Indeed the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zaleukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zaleukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B.C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume that it was at some time between 600–500 B.C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily,¹ and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy—Leontini, Naxos, Zanklê, and Rhêgium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day,² and we are obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offences according to the property of the guilty person fined³—but

Charondas,
lawgiver of
Katana,
Naxos,
Zanklê, Rhê-
gium, &c.

tion—which (according to Polybius) was only appeased by this agreement—can possibly have lasted so long as half a century; the received date of the overthrow of the Pythagoreans being about 504 B.C.

¹ Aristot. Politic. ii. 9. 6, iv. 9. 10. Heyne puts Charondas much earlier than the foundation of Thurii, in which I think he is undoubtedly right: but without determining the date more exactly (Opuscul. vol. ii.; Prolus. ix. p. 160), Charondas must certainly have been earlier than Anaxilas of Rhêgium and the great Sicilian despots; which will place him higher than 500 B.C.: but I do not know that any more precise mark of time can be found.

² Diodorus, xii. 35; Stobæus, Serm. xlv. 20–40; Cicero de Legg. ii. 6. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, ch. 89; Heyne, Opuscul. vol. ii. p. 72–164. Brandis (Geschichte der Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxvi. p. 102) seems to conceive these prologues as genuine.

The mistakes and confusion made by

ancient writers respecting these lawgivers—even by writers earlier than Aristotle (Politic. ii. 9. 5)—are such as we have no means of clearing up.

Seneca (Epist. 90) calls both Zaleukus and Charondas disciples of Pythagoras; that the former was so, is not to be believed; but it is not wholly impossible that the latter may have been so, or at least a contemporary of the earliest Pythagoreans.

³ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 9. 8. Χαρόνδου δ' ἴδιον μὲν οὐθέν ἐστι πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτύρων· πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν· τῇ δ' ἀκριβεῖα τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. To the fulness and precision predicated respecting Charondas in the latter part of this passage, I refer the other passage in Politic. iv. 10. 6, which is not to be construed as if it meant that Charondas had graduated fines on the rich and poor with a distinct view to that political trick (of indirectly eliminating the poor from public duties) which Aristotle had been just adverting to—but merely means that Charondas

that there was nothing in his laws strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil. The indictment raised against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name,¹ which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

had been nice and minute in graduating pecuniary penalties generally, having reference to the wealth or poverty of the person sentenced.

¹ Πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν (Aristot. Politic. ii. 9. 8). See Harpokration, v. Ἐπεσκήψατο, and Pollux, viii. 33; Dêmosthenês cont. Stephanum, ii. c. 5; cont. Euerg. et Mnêsibul. c. 1. The word ἐπίσκηψις car-

ries with it the solemnity of meaning adverted to in the text, and seems to have been used specially with reference to an action or indictment against perjured witnesses: which indictment was permitted to be brought with a less degree of risk or cost to the accuser than most others in the Attic dikasteries (Dêmosth. cont. Euerg. et Mn. l. c.).

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES
• AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burthen. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.¹ Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendancy of that queen ensured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.² It deserves

Resolutions
of Darius to
invade
Greece a
second time.
His death.

¹ Herodot. vii. 3, 4.

² Herodot. vii. 1–4. He mentions—
simply as a report, and seemingly with-
out believing it himself—that Dema-

ratus the exiled king of Sparta was at
Susa at the moment when Darius was
about to choose a successor among his
sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias,

to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet un-
Succeeded by his son Xerxes. appeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest¹ and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of
B.C. 485. Revolt and reconquest of Egypt by the Persians. Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

Persic. c. 23); and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their

land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1-6): and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii. 239.

Plutarch (De Fraternali Amore, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

¹ Herod. vii. 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomanus, the last of the Persian kings (Plutarch, Alexand. c. 21).

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mar-
donius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. There were not wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Aleu-
adæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peisistratids however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed. When introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions, wherein the bridging of the Hellespont, and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,¹ strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements

Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of Greece—persons who advised and instigated him—persuasions which they employed—prophecies produced by Onomakritus.

¹ Herodot. vii. 6; viii. 20, 96, 77. Ὀνομάκριτος—κατέλεγε τῶν χρησμῶν—εἰ μὲν τι ἐνέοι σφάλμα φέρον τῷ Πέρσῃ, τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τὸν τε Ἑλλήσποντον ὡς ζευχθῆναι χρεόν εἶη ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς Πέρ-

σεω, τήν τε ἔλασιν ἐξηγεόμενος, &c.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies; it was of an extremely varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

of Onomakritus, and the political coöperation proffered by the Aleuadae, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Indeed it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honour obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.¹ The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged; and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings."² Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,³ when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece; setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandisement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear coördinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Croesus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down

¹ Æschylus, Pers. 761.

² Herodot. vii. 5. ὥς ἡ Εὐρώπη περι-
καλλῆς χώρα, καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει

τὰ ἡμέρα, βασιλεῖ τε μούνη θνητῶν ἀξίη
ἐκτῆσθαι—χώραν παμφορωτέραν (vii. 8)

³ Herodot. v. 49.

to the full expansion of his theme, "*Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello*," in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the *Iliad*: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the Gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the *Atreidæ* against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:¹ though the Godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting moreover chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the Godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination. For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honourable frankness which Plutarch calls his "malignity," neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valour, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.²

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, i. 3. *Δίδς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή*. Herodotus is characterized as *Ὁμήρου ζηλωτής*—*Ὀμηρικώτατος*—(Dionys. Halic. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus *De Sublim.* p. 86, ed. Pearce).

² While Plutarch (if indeed the treatise *de Herodoti Malignitate* be the work of Plutarch) treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious

deeds—Dionysius of Halikarnassus on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticising Athens, arising from his long banishment: *Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιεικής, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διάθεσις αὐθεκαστός τις*

Xerxes announces his project to an assembly of Persian counsellors—Mardonius and Artabanus—the evil and good genius.

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.¹ As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force² of Persia, and depreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor embolden him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at

καὶ πικρὰ, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτήματα ἐπεξέρχεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κεχωρηκότων καθάπαξ οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ὥσπερ ἠναγκασμένος. (Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis Judic. p. 774, Reiske.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucydides (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπὸ παντὸς φθόνου καὶ πάσης κολακείας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future inference—but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our

morality. Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never to have passed into history (σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεῖς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ἡγνοῆσθαι, *ibid.* p. 768)—and that especially Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many other causes to which it might have been imputed (ἐτέραις ἔχοντα πολλάις ἀφορμαῖς περιάψαι τὰς αἰτίας, p. 770). It will be found, however, if we read Thucydides with attention, that he does not throw the blame of the Peloponnesian war upon Athens, whatever may be thought of his strictures on her conduct in various particular cases.

¹ Herodot. viii. 99. Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τιθέντες: compare c. 100.

² Herodot. vii. 9.

sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction (averted only by Histæus and his influence) of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the Godhead towards overgrown human power.¹

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologising for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. “If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed.”² Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne³), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. “Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still

Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to renounce his project—his repeated dreams—divine command to invade Greece.

¹ Herodot. vii. 10.

² Herodot. vii. 15. Εἰ ὧν θεός ἐστι ὁ ἐπιπέμπων καὶ οἱ πάντως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστι γενέσθαι στρατηλασίην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπιπτήσεται καὶ σοι τὸντο τοῦτο ὄνειρον, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐντελλόμενον. Εὕρισκω δὲ ὧδε ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν

ἐμὴν σκευὴν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἐνδύς, μετὰ ταῦτα ἴσσοιο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνώσειας. Compare vii. 8. θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει, &c.

³ See Brissonius, De Regno Persarum, lib. i. p. 27.

continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine.”¹ Accordingly Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, “Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be.” With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. “I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsions is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands.”²

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataea—but still more in the influence of “mischievous Oneiros,” who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the Iliad) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyagês, Polykratês, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgement. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each

¹ Herodot. vii. 16. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσοῦτό γε εὐηθείης ἀνήκει τοῦτο, ὅτι δὴ κοτέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε δόξει ἐμὲ ὁρῶν σε ὁρᾶν, τῇ σῇ ἐσθῆτι τεκμαιρόμενον. . . . εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφοιτήσῃς γε συνεχέως, φαίην ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεῖον εἶναι.

² Herodot. vii. 18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὁρμή, καὶ Ἕλληνας, ὥς ἔοικε, φθορὴ τις καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τράπομαι, καὶ τὴν γνώμην

μετατίθεμαι. Ποίει δὲ οὕτω δκως, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντας, τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσεται μηδέν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδίδοντας in this place denotes what is expressed by τὸ χρέον γίγνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny—or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.

individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tell us¹) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and coloured by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed² into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the *Persæ* of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man;³ though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.⁴

¹ Herodot. vii. 12. Καὶ δὴ κού ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὄψιν τοιήνδε, ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use *δνειρον* in the neuter gender, not *δνειρος* in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii. 16) of *ἐῶντα* in place of *ἐῶντος*, is not at all called for. The masculine gender *δνειρος* is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter *δνειρον*.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish sultans, see Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book ii. vol. i. p. 49.

² Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, Alexander, c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyagès on the Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i. 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which induced him to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

³ Æschylus, *Pers.* 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare Sophocl. *Ajax*, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the *Oedipus Tyrannus*; Euripid. *Hecub.* 58; Pindar, *Olymp.* viii. 86; *Isthm.* vi. 39; Pausanias, ii. 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word *δεισιδαίμων* in Xenophon, *Agésilas*, c. 11. sect. 8.—“the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods”—opposed to the person who confides in continuance of success: and Klausen, *Theologumena Æschyli*, p. 18.

⁴ The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of his history in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos*, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112 *seq.* Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment, running through, and often overlaying or transforming, the matters of fact through a considerable portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict

Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ or interpreting guides around these holy places—were among his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so many different cities, must have been constantly in a situation to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were interesting both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were (as a general rule) accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch—both of whom, however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Hêraklêas at Tyre, and of Bêlus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i. 181; ii. 3, 44, 143), but also those of Delphi (*Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτως ἀκούσας γενέσθαι*, i. 20: compare i. 91, 92, 51); Dôdôna (ii. 52); of the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes (v. 59); of Athênê Alea at Tegea (i. 66); of Dêmêtêr at Paros (vi. 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of temple inspirations); of Halus in Achaia Phthiôtis (vii. 197); of the Kabeiri in Thrace (ii. 51); of persons connected with the Hêrôn of Protesilaus in the Chersonese (ix. 116, 120). The facts which these persons communicated to him were always presented along with associations referring to their own functions or religious sentiments, so that Herodotus did not introduce anything new when he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of Plutarch—“*Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carinæ*”—affords an instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons and events of Grecian history, to satisfy visitors who came full of curiosity—*φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι* and *φιλομαθεῖς* (Plutarch, *ib.* p. 394)—such as Herodotus was in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise: also Plutarch *De Defectu Oraculo-*

rum, p. 417—*οἱ Δελφῶν θεόλογοι*, &c. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events came somehow or other under her cognizance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller, annexed to his edition of Polemonis Fragmenta, c. 3. p. 157–162; *De Historiâ atque Arte Periegetarum*; also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part I. ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is thus not peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister observes (p. 31–136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the references in Monk, Euripid. *Alcestis*, 1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to the despot (iii. 80). He does not think himself obliged to *call* the gods just and merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes: and this latter vein is what really distinguishes the historian from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydidês, in whom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point illustrated in Creuzer, *Historische Kunst der Griechen*, Abschnitt iii. pp. 150–159.

Jäger (*Disputationes Herodotæ*, p. 16. Göttingen, 1828) professes to detect evidences of old age (*senile ingenium*) in the moralising colour which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe to have belonged to his

of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. ^{Vast preparations of Xerxes.} Considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxes began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transports, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,¹ was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdœra with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.² It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and

middle and mature age not less than to his latter years—if indeed he lived to be very old, which is noway proved, except upon reasons which I have already disputed. See Bähr, *Commentatio de Vitâ et Scriptis Herodoti*, in the fourth volume of his edition, c. 6. p. 388.

¹ Herodot. vii. 19. *χωρον παντα ερευνων της ηπειρου.*

² Herodot. vii. 106. *Κατέσταναν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐξελάσιος (i. e. the invasion by Xerxes) ὑπαρχοι ἐν τῇ*

Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. vii. 108. *ἐδεδούλωτο γὰρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται, ἡ μέχρι Θεσσαλίας πᾶσα, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ βασιλῆα δασμοφόρος, Μεγαβάζου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὄστερον Μαρδονίου;* also vii. 59, and Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 5, 11. Compare Æschylus, *Pers.* 871–896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his successor Darius, covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (Herodot. i. 209).

to the *medising* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.¹ From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and coöperate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.²

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a

March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia—collection of the invading army at Sardis—his numerous fleet and large magazines of provision beforehand.

He throws a bridge of boats across the Hellespont.

¹ Herodot. vii. 26–31.

² Herodot. vii. 23–25.

Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet Æschylus¹ speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other,—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighbourhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first entrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phœnicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phœnicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,² but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment. Moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. “Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes *will* cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water.”³

The bridge is destroyed by a storm—wrath of Xerxes—he puts to death the engineers and punishes the Hellespont.

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont. Herodotus calls them “non-Hellenic and

¹ Æschylus, Pers. 731, 754, 873.

² Plutarch (De Tranquillitate Animi, p. 470) speaks of them as having had their noses and ears cut off.

³ Herodot. vii. 34, 35. ἐνετέλλετο δὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς λέγειν βάρβαρα τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, ὅτι πικρὸν ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοῦ δίκην ἐπιτιθεῖ τῇνδε, ὅτι μιν ἡδίκησας, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἁδίκον παθόν. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ξέρξης διαβήσεται σε, ἣν τε σύ γε βούλη, ἣν τε καὶ μή· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ

δίκην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὥς ἔδοντι δολερῷ τε καὶ ἀλμυρῷ ποταμῷ.

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont—appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct of Xerxes himself (vii. 53): compare vii. 113, and vi. 76. The epithet *salt*, employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkable character of the water.

blasphemous terms," which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatises, as it were, a given position. It has been common however to set aside in this case not merely the words, but

Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving its reality.

even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,¹ as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny.

But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned.

To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion. And although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, banishing it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fiction—yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit: and even an intelligent man² may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,³ scourged and

¹ See Stanley and Blomfield ad *Æschyl. Pers.* 731, and K. O. Müller (in his *Review of Benjamin Constant's work Sur la Religion*), *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 59.

² See Auguste Comte, *Traité de Philosophie Positive*, vol. v. leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

³ See Wachsmuth, *Hellenisch. Alterthümer*, 2. i. p. 320, and K. F. Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndês, see *Herodot.* i. 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchês was thrown from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accident had happened, to cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there (*Herodot.* vii. 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of pre-

serving the life of their ancestor Perdikkas; after he had crossed it, the stream swelled and arrested his pursuers (*Herodot.* viii. 138): see an analogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the river Aôus, *Valerius Maxim.* i. 5. 2.

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, &c., Theagenês of Thasus, a statue was erected to his honour. A personal enemy, perhaps one of the 1400 defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the sea. The gods however were much displeased with the proceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to its place (*Pausan.* vi. 11.

pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exercised by Cyrus on the river Gyndês (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus¹ (as well as to Arrian afterwards), not childish, but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phœnicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former towards the latter.² They were moored by anchors head

Reconstruction of the bridge—
description of it in detail.

2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermês in Babrius, Fabul. 119, edition of Mr. Lewis.

¹ Herodot. vii. 35–54: compare viii. 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 14. 9.

² Herodot. vii. 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me to have been

erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighæuser is the most satisfactory.—τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλληνισμοῦ κατὰ ῥόον. The explanation given by Tzetzes of ἐπικαρσίας by the word πλαγίας seems to me hardly exact:

and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred and

it means, not *oblique*, but *at right angles with*. The course of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, flowing out of the Euxine sea, is conceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait, taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover Herodotus does not mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the one bridge were τοῦ Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας, and those of the other bridge τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον, as Bähr and other commentators suppose: both the predicates apply alike to both the bridges,—as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the other. Respecting the meaning of ἐπικάρσιος in Herodotus, see iv. 101; i. 180. In the Odyssey (ix. 70: compare Eustath. ad loc.) ἐπικάρσιαι does not mean oblique, but headlong before the wind: compare ἐπίκαρ, Iliad, xviii. 392. So in the position of the ships as described by Herodotus, if the wind blew from the Euxine, it would be right abaft of them.

The circumstance stated by Herodotus,—that in the bridge higher up the stream or nearest to the Euxine, there were in all 360 vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than 314,—has perplexed the commentators and induced them to resort to inconvenient explanations—as that of saying, that in the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given of ἐπικαρσίας (*slanting, schräg*): while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented *their broadside* to the current, is still more inadmissible. But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge compared with the other, seems to admit of an easier explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain dis-

tance from each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the two places chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of the upper bridge—which moreover might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory manner.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity: they run thus—ἐξεύγνυσαν δὲ ὧδε Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριήρεας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (these words are misprinted in Bähr's edition) πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν τέσσερες καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπικαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου κατὰ ῥόον), ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τῶν τόνων τῶν δπλων συνθέντες δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατήκαν περιμήκεας, &c.

There is a difficulty respecting the words ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν δπλων—what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr says in his note, *sc. ὁ ῥόος*, and he construes τῶν δπλων to mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if we read farther on, we shall see that τὰ δπλα mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from shore to shore to form the bridge: the very same words τῶν δπλων τοῦ τόνου, applied to these latter cables, occur a few lines afterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging to ἀνακωχεύῃ is ἡ γεφύρα (not ὁ ῥόος), and that the words from τοῦ μὲν Πόντου down to ῥόον are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above: the express object for which the ships were moored was, “that the bridge might hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore to shore.” I admit that we should naturally expect ἀνακωχεύωσι, and not ἀνακωχεύῃ, since the proposition would be true of both bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear out this charge.

sixty; the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over each of the two lines of ships, across from shore to shore,

Herodotus (iv. 85), Strabo (xiii. p. 591), and Pliny (H. N. iv. 12; vi. 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth: Tournefort allows about a mile (vol. ii. lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give the distance as something considerably greater—1130 or 1150 toises (see Miot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusa states it at 700 toises (Voyage en Turquie, vol. ii. p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be one mile or 5280 feet, 360 vessels at an average breadth of 14½ feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says, "Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of the smallest coasting craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge." (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127.)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the whole breadth, without leaving any gaps between: we only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through, except in three specified places.

I avail myself of a second edition to notice some comments of Professor Dunbar upon this note, inserted in the critical remarks appended to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon, voc. *ἑπικάρσιος*, Herodotus.

Mr. Dunbar differs from me, as well as from Liddell and Scott, in the meaning of the word *ἑπικάρσιος*, but I do not perceive that he brings any convincing arguments. He says, that this adjective signifies "in a cross direction, and is opposed by Herodotus to *ὀρθίος*, in a straight direction, and to *ἰθείας* (Herodot. iv. 101; i. 180)."

I have made reference in my note to both these passages, and they seem to me to bear out my meaning. In the latter of the two, it is not exact to say that *ἑπικάρσιος* is opposed to *ἰθείας*: on the contrary, the two epithets are applied to the very same streets: "All the streets of Babylon (says Herodotus) are cut straight; those streets which run directly down to the river, as well as the rest."

It is true that in iv. 101, Herodotus contrasts, in a certain sense, *ἑπικάρσιος* with *ὀρθίος*. Speaking of the figure of Scythia, he says that it is a parallelogram, of which two sides forming an angle with each other, are lines of coast; while the other two sides run straight up into the interior (*ὀρθιοὶ εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιαν*) to a certain point of junction. To go from the coast into the interior is always conceived by a Greek as going upward—*ἄνω*; to come from inland to the coast, as coming downward, *κάτω*. Hence Herodotus says that these two sides go straight up into the interior. The other two sides of the parallelogram, which run along the coast, Herodotus calls *ἑπικάρσιος*, falling in a straight line, or directly, upon the other two which run *ὀρθίαι εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιαν*. It is plain that if the two sides, which ran up into the interior and there joined each other, were straight, the other two sides of the parallelogram would be straight also: so that *ἑπικάρσιος* in this passage does not bear any sense inconsistent with straightness.

In construing the passage—*Ἐξέγυνυσαν δὲ ὧδε Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριηρέας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐτέρην τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα καὶ τριηκοσίας, (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἑπικάρσιος, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλλησπόντου, κατὰ ῥόον) ἵνα ἀνακωχεύῃ τὸν τόπον τῶν ὀπλων*, Mr. Dunbar says, "Mr. Grote and the editors of Herodotus supply *γεφύραν* with *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν*, and *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐτέρην*. But I cannot conceive what rational meaning can be extracted from *ἐξέγυνυσαν—ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (γεφύραν)*, when the pentekonters and the triremes formed the *γεφύραν*. There can (I imagine) be no doubt that *γῆν* or *χώραν* must be understood (which they very often are with the Greek writers); the land, namely, on each side of the strait: *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν (γῆν)*, on the Asian side; *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐτέρην*, on the European side."

To deal first with Mr. Dunbar's objection to my meaning, which is the same as that of Bähr and others, I cannot admit his assertion, that "the pentekonters and the triremes formed the *γεφύραν*." They formed the support of the bridge; standing in the same relation to it, as the piles of Waterloo Bridge stand to the bridge itself. Speak-

were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to

ing largely, or for common purposes, indeed, the bridge is understood to mean the whole construction, support and all: but the essential portion of the bridge is, the continuous way across from bank to bank, which, in the case of a narrow stream, may exist without any supports at all. Now the pentekonters and triremes did not of themselves form any continuous way across: this was formed by the row of tight parallel cables laid over them, resting upon them, and stretching across from bank to bank. And Herodotus uses the preposition *ὑπὸ* which expresses this relation: the pentekonters and triremes were put together side by side *under the bridge*; or rather, they were first put, and then the bridge of tightened cables was laid over or upon them.

Mr. Dunbar's supposition that the substantive belonging to *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν*, &c. is *γῆν*—meaning the two opposite coasts, Asiatic and European—seems to me inadmissible. The words *τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου*, if you apply them to one of the two bridges, designate naturally enough the one which is highest up in the stream: but they cannot be employed to signify the Asiatic coast as distinguished from the European, for they have just as much reference to one as to the other. Nor can I think that the preposition *ὑπὸ* can be used to signify what Mr. Dunbar means. Assuming even that it could properly be used to mean those ships which were moored near or close to the land, we must recollect that what Herodotus is here describing, is a series of ships lying near each other across the whole breadth of the stream. Of the larger portion of these ships it could never be said with any propriety, that they lay *ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν*—either *under the Asiatic or European coast*. Besides, on Mr. Dunbar's construction, Herodotus would be only describing *one* bridge, whereas there were undeniably *two*.

Mr. Dunbar's conception of the structure of the bridge differs essentially from mine, but I should lengthen this note too much by commenting upon it.

He contests my supposition that the two bridges may have been at some distance from each other, on the ground that both of them terminated in an *ἀκτὴ τραχέα ἐς θάλασσαν κατήκουσα*, on the

European side; and he translates *ἀκτὴ* *promontory* or *headland*. But *ἀκτὴ*, just as often, if not oftener—means a line of coast, stretching along for a considerable distance (see Herodot. iv. 38).

Again, he differs from me, and agrees with Bähr, in regard to the nominative case which is to be understood to the verb *ἀνακωχεύη*. He thinks that *ὁ ῥόος* is understood, not *ἡ γεφύρα*—observing:—

“How the bridge should keep the cables in a state of tension, I cannot comprehend. *ἵνα* must be referred to a cause immediately preceding and well-ascertained; and this can only be the term *ῥόος*. From the statement which the historian gives of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions, it would appear that it was necessary for the triremes to be moored in the direction of the current, in order that it might by its force *keep the cables taut*, and not allow them to swing.” I confess that I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Mr. Dunbar, in translating the words *ἵνα ἀνακωχεύη τὸν τόνον τῶν δπλων*, in the way that I have proposed in an earlier part of this note. And I have already remarked that by the words *τὸν τόνον τῶν δπλων*, Herodotus does not mean the anchor-cables, but the vast cables stretched across: as he himself again uses the phrase a few lines farther on—*κόσμφ ἐπετίθεσαν κατύπερθε τῶν δπλων τοῦ τόνου*, where Bähr and Schweighaeuser justly remark that it is equivalent to *κατύπερθε τῶν δπλων ἐντεταμένων*. It might be possible to suppose *ἡ σύνθεσις* or *τὰ συντιθέμενα* (extracted out of the preceding participle *συνθέντες*) the understood nominative case to *ἀνακωχεύη*, which would get rid of the awkward construction of *γεφύρα* in the singular number—*Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριηρέας συνθέντες ἵνα ἀνακωχεύη* (*ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν τριηρέων*) *τὸν τόνον τῶν δπλων, ἀγκύρας κατήκαν περιμήκεας*, &c. For cases in which an unexpressed nominative case is extracted out of the verb preceding, compare Matthiae, Gr. Gr. s. 295; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. s. 414.

Mr. Dunbar speaks “of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions:” and Bähr holds the same opinion. But as I understand Herodotus, he speaks of no such difference: all the ships, in both bridges, were anchored both ahead and astern, with their heads down the

be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phœnicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.¹ Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade

stream. Συνθέντες δὲ ἀγκύρας κατήκαν περιμήκειας, τὰς μὲν πρὸς τοῦ Πόντου τῆς ἐτέρης, τῶν ἀνέμων εἵνεκεν τῶν ἔσωθεν ἐκπνεόντων, τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης, τῆς πρὸς ἐσπέρης τε καὶ τοῦ Αἰγαίου, εὐρου τε καὶ νότου εἵνεκα. Bähr construes τῆς ἐτέρης—τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης—as if they agreed with γεφύρας, and as if the anchors of the ships belonging to one bridge had been let down at the extremity towards the Euxine—the anchors of those belonging to the other bridge at the extremity towards the Ægean. Surely this explanation cannot be received. If a ship held by only one anchor, that anchor always must be at the extremity towards the Euxine; for the current of the Hellespont, which runs *from* the Euxine, would not permit it to be otherwise. Even if the anchor were originally let down at the head, when pointing to the Ægean, the force of the current would alter the position of the ship until the anchor came to be between the ship and the Euxine. Besides, it surely cannot be doubted, that the same mode of anchorage which was suitable for the ships of one bridge would also be suitable for those of the other. Moreover, the historian tells us that some anchors were intended to guard against the winds blowing out of the Euxine—others, to guard against those blowing out of the Ægean. Surely, each ship of each bridge would need to be made fast against *both*. Compare Pindar, Olymp. vi. 101, δὴ ἀγκυραι.

I construe the words τῆς ἐτέρης—τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης—differently from Bähr. It seems to me that they do not agree with γεφύρας, but with μέριδος, τε-

λευτῆς, or some word indicating direction, or relative bearing; on the one side, on the other side, equivalent to ἔνθεν μὲν, ἔνθεν δέ. Sufficient vindication may be found of the use of the genitive case ἐτέρης in Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. § 377; Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 523. And in this case it coincides with the fundamental conception which these authors give us of a Greek Genitive—as designing the *whence*, or source *from* which an action arises. The anchors are conceived as *pulling* from one side and from the other side, against the dangerous winds when they blow.

¹ For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archimælus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the time of Hiero II. of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v. 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτῆς καὶ καλλονῇ) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus; but that in weight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an Æginæan talent; nor, if he means an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the Athenian dockyard are distinguished as σχολία ὀκτωδάκτυλα, ἑξαδάκτυλα—in which expressions, however, M. Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameter be meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book, Das Seewesen der Athener, ch. x. p. 165.

on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland.¹ That isthmus near the point where it joins the mainland was about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phœnicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighbouring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,² were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighbouring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phœnicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now labouring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks

¹ For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii. 41.
² Herodot. vii. 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi. 2.

that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: "for it would have cost no trouble at all" (he observes¹) to drag all the ships in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them: such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the

¹ Herodot. vii. 24: ὡς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλεόμενον εὐρίσκειν, μεγαλοφροσύνης εἵνεκα αὐτὸ Πέρξης ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε, ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι, καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι· παρεὼν γὰρ, μὴ δένα πόνον λαβόντας, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας διειρύσαι, ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε διώρυχα τῇ θαλάσῃ, εὖρος ὡς δύο τριήρεας πλέειν ὁμοῦ ἐλαστρευμένας.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up by man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the whole performed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, which Grecian report ascribed to Croesus on the advice of Thalês, was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i. 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x.) and by moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence: but in my judgment, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides (iv. 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it *had* existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated: "The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed, and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the Ægean: for such is the

fear entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending how the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of canals." (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 24. p. 145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those of Major Rennell (Geogr. of Herodot. p. 116). I may remark that Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied three years,—he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminary arrangements included—*προετοιμάζετο ἐκ τριῶν ἐτῶν κου μάλιστα ἐς τὸν Ἄθων* (vii. 22).

lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed; of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians¹—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481–480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare “dinner” for himself and his vast suite as he passed on

¹ Herodot. vii. 22: ὥρυsson ὑπὸ μαστίγων παντοδαποὶ τῆς στρατιῆς διάδοχοι δ' ἐφοίτων.—vii. 56: Ξέρξης δὲ, ἐπεὶ τε διέβη ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ἐθήειτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστίγων διαβαίνοντα:—compare vii. 103, and Xenophon, Anabasis, iii. 4–25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful

use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks. See the Mémoires du Baron de Tott, vol. i. p. 256 *seqq.*, and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification¹—while another was misinterpreted into a favourable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests.

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all² came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1000 Persian cavalry with 1000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Patiramphês, being seated in it by the side of the monarch—who was often accustomed to alight

March of
Xerxes from
Sardis—dis-
position of
his army.

¹ Herodot. vii. 57. Τέρας σφί ἐφάνη μέγα, τὸ Ξέρξης ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἐποίησατο, καίπερ εὐσύμβλητον ἔδν. Ἴππος γὰρ ἔτεκε λαγόν. Εὐσύμβλητον ὦν τῇδε ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἔμελλε μὲν ἑλᾶν στρατιὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα, ὁπίσω δὲ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τρέχων ἦξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χώρον.

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strength and splendour, but that he would come back in timid and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact—next, in the certainty of his interpretation—deserves notice, as illustrating his canon of belief and that of his age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause of the story interpreted: an ingenious

man, after the expedition has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (*Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*), and the simile is recounted, either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (τὸ εὐσύμβλητον of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs and warnings.

² Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, as given in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, viii. 2, 1–20.

from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 9000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.¹ Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 2000 talents of silver and 3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favour, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining

Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius—son put to death by order of Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 41. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππον διελέλειπτο καὶ δύο σταδίου, καὶ ἔπειτα ὁ λοιπὸς δμίλος ἦτε ἀναμίξ.

years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaïkus—then through Atarneus,

¹ The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii. 27, 28, 38, 39. I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

Karinê, and the plain of Thêbê. They passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left-hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.¹ From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Athênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhoeteium, Ophryneium and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at

¹ Herodot. vii. 42.

² Herodot. vii. 43. *θησαύμενος δὲ, καὶ πυθόμενος κείνων ἕκαστα, &c.*

the sight of his superhuman power. "Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators¹), why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado." Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,² the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar—"I do not exactly know³ (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burthen. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.⁴

Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine bridges.

¹ Herodot. vii. 45, 53, 56. ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ, καὶ οὐνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Ξέρξεα θέμενος, ἀνάστατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐθέλεις ποιῆσαι, ἄγων πάντας ἀνθρώπους; καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἐξῆν τοι ποιεῖν ταῦτα.

² Tacitus, Histor. iii. 24. "Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Syria mos est, consalutavere"—in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of

the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii. 3, 8. p. 41, ed. Mutzel).

³ Herodot. vii. 54. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως διακρίναι, οὔτε εἰ τῷ Ἥλῳ ἀνατιθεὶς κατήκε ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὔτε εἰ μετεμέλησέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον μαστιγώσαντι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων τὴν θάλασσαν ἐδωρέετο.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 55, 56. Διέβη δὲ δ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἑπτὰ ἡμέρῃσι καὶ ἐν ἑπτὰ εὐφρόνῃσι, ἐλινύσας οὐδένα χρόνον.

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left-hand and the tomb of Hellê on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbour called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled¹ the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

March to
Doriskus in
Thrace near
the mouth of
the Hebrus
—his fleet
joins him
here.

Review and
muster on
the plain
of Doriskus
—immense
variety of
the nations
brought to-
ther.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. “What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,² whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?” Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes,

¹ Herodot. vii. 58–59; Pliny, H. N. iv. 11. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighbourhood of the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa, ch. vi. vol. i. p. 157–159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the Gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

² Herodot. vii. 20–21.

even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,¹ each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force. Eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines. The real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabêlians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phœnicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17): in all 1207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i. e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,²—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight). The other nations

¹ See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii. 61–96. In chapter 76, one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling and Schweighæuser), which, in addition to those specified under the head of the land force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of the Athenians (ix. 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which they pretend to have vanquished forty-six nations — *ἐνίκησαμεν ἔθνηα ἑξ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα*: though there is no reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria (B.C. 192) about his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece,

as well as the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy, xxxv. 48–49). “*Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inauditarum, Dahæ, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymæos—Syros omnes esse: haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia, quam militum genus:*” and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also has some rhetorical turns about the number of nations, whose names even were hardly known, tributary to the Persian empire (iii. 4, 29; iv. 45, 9) “*ignota etiam ipsi Dario gentium nomina,*” &c.

² Herodot. vii. 89–93.

were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.¹ A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 8000 horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,² and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men.³ Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1207 triremes⁴ or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying

¹ Herodot. vii. 61–81.

² The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of 10,000 each, but the process is not described in detail (Herodot. iv. 87).

³ Herodot. vii. 60, 87, 184. This

same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus. (Quintus Curtius, iii. 2, 3, p. 24, Mutzel.)

⁴ Herodot. vii. 89–97.

vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burthen, &c., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,¹ who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp-followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess; together with cattle, beasts of burthen, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.² He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the 'Persæ' gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis,

and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus.

Comments upon the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge.

¹ Herodot. vii. 185–186. *ἰσχυρὸν πάντα τὸν ἡπὶον στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης*. (vii. 157.) "Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

² Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus, hardly does him justice (Herodot, Aus seinem Buche sein Leben, ch. xxxiv. p. 176).

Herodotus¹ has himself enumerated 647 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 276,000 as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.² And while

¹ Only 120 ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 185) as having joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But 400 were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii. 190); and the squadron of 200 sail, detached by the Persians round Eubœa, were also all lost (viii. 7); besides forty-five taken or destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii. 194; viii. 11). Other losses are also indicated (viii. 14–16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well entitled to credit, we must suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoort, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoria, p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

² See on this point Volney, *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 70, 71; ch. xxxii. p. 367; and ch. xxxix. p. 435 (Engl. transl.).

Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, p. 22–23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at 300,000, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says, "You are no doubt at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of

we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded,—and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea,¹ we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever

the Indians." (Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, translated by Brock, vol. ii. App. p. 118.)

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan, "Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accoutument de toutes sortes d'aliments."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at 700,000 men. (*Histoire de Genghis*, liv. ii. ch. vi. p. 193.)

¹ Thucyd. v. 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes *innumerable*—ἀναρίθμητον στρατὸν (*Anabasis*, iii. 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister to know the number of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was encamped at Babadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us, "Le Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l'armée Ottomane étoit nombreuse. C'est à vous que je m'adresserois, lui

dis-je, si j'étais curieux de le savoir. Je l'ignore, me répondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrois-je en être instruit? En lisant la Gazette de Vienne, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his *Voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, &c.*), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes, "On a dit et répété, que leur nombre s'étoit élevé à huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about 500). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre côté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur." (vol. ii. p. 37.)

afterwards increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise; and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men: Diodorus¹ appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us in his 'Persæ' a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands and brothers—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.² The terror-striking

¹ Ktesias, *Persica*, c. 22, 23; Ælian, *V. H.* xiii. 3; Diodorus, xi. 2–11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, p. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Choerilus, a few years younger than Herodotus, and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sakæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See Fragments, iii. and iv. in Næke's edition of Choerilus, p. 121–134. Josephus cont. Apion. p. 454, ed. Haverkamp.

² Æschylus, *Pers.* 14–124, 722–737. Heeren (in his learned work on the commerce of the ancient world, *Über den Verkehr der alten Welt*, part 1. sect. 1. pp. 162, 558, 3rd edition) conceives that

Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The Persian royal scribes or secretaries accompanied the king, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen to strike his attention (*Herodot.* vii. 100; viii. 90), or to exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to the person of the king as ministers to his curiosity and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgement; nor is he correct in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (p. 557–559).

effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers. He then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme (which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent), and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.¹ Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honourable contrast to the

Xerxes passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus—his conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus.

¹ When Herodotus specifies his informants (it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them oftener) they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Bœotia, Archias of Sparta, &c. (iii. 55; viii. 65; ix. 16). He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest: it is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolic coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. Hellenica, iii. 1, 6), and he may thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxes. Nevertheless the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the speeches ascribed to Demaratus, by Herodotus, are well-deserving of attention (Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos, p. 118).

“Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings some man or other through whom he gives utterance to his own lessons of wisdom. To Croesus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon: Croesus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the

same part towards Cyrus and Kambyzes: Darius, as a prudent and honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel to Polykratês, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behaviour and character of the various monarchs—criticisms which are nothing more than general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon, Croesus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose as those of Tacitus—to make the reader more intimately acquainted with the existing posture of affairs or with the character of the agents—but a different purpose quite foreign to history: they embody in the narrative his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divine government.”

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rather too absolutely delivered.

treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.¹

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,² Maroneia, and Abdêra—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the

March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward along Thrace.—Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace—particularly Thasus and Abdêra.

¹ Herodot. vii. 101–104. How inferior is the scene between Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii. 2, 9–19, p. 20, ed. Mutzel).

Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and the same antithesis as that which runs through the Persæ of Æschylus; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from

his sons; for the extreme specialty with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi. 63 *seq.*), and his view of the death of Kleomenês as an atonement to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family information (vi. 84).

² Herodot. vii. 109, 111, 118.

brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents¹ (=92,800*l.*): while at Abdêra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.² A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.³

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honours by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot:⁴ he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ⁵ refused

Xerxes crosses the Strymon—marches to Akanthus—zeal of the Akanthians in regard to the canal of Athos.

¹ This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, &c. (Herodot. iii. 90.)

² Herodot. vii. 118–120. He gives (vii. 187) the computation of the quantity of corn which would have been required for daily consumption, assuming the immense numbers as he conjectures them, and reckoning one chœnix of

wheat for each man's daily consumption (= $\frac{1}{4}$ th of a medimnus). It is unnecessary to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

³ Herodot. vii. 108, 109.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her own life by burying alive fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

⁵ Herodot. viii. 116.

submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation: Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas

March of
Xerxes to
Therma—
his fleet join
him in the
Thermaic
Gulf.

of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krusis or Kros-sæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axios, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Iliakmôn.¹

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both

Favourable
prospects of
of the inva-
sion—zeal
of the Ma-
cedonian
prince to as-
sist Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 122–127.

from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.¹ The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.

¹ Herodot. vii. 116.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON
TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Violent proceedings and death of Kleomenês, king of Sparta. Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneïd, the latter to the younger or the Prokleïd, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleïd king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation: yet which, among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess.¹ But the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognised the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it.

¹ Herodot. vi. 74, 75.

Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phænomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.¹

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,² yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Complaint of the Æginetans at Sparta against Kleomenês and Leotychidês, on the subject of the hostages which those two kings had taken from Ægina.

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidês should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit.³ They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably recol-

The Spartans deliver Leotychidês to the Æginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens, to get back the hostages.

¹ Herodot. vi. 84.

² Herodot. vi. 61. Κλεομένεα, δόντα
ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ

προσεργαζόμενον, &c.

³ Herodot. vi. 85; compare vi. 49-73, and chap. xxxvi. of this History.

lected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychidês having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,¹ beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.² But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell

¹ Herodot. vi. 87, 88.

Instead of *ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι πεντήρης ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ* (vi. 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boeckh—*πεντετηρίς*. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars (*πεντήρης*): moreover, apart from this objection, the word *πεντήρης* makes considerable embarrassment in the sentence: see Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen*, chap. vii. p. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greek who

constructed *πεντήρεις* or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv. 40, 41).

There were many distinct pentaëterides, or solemnities celebrated every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens: see Aristoteles—*Πολιτ. Fragm. xxvii.* ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii. 187.

² See Thucyd. i. 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited, bore the name of *The City* even in the time of Thucydidês (ii. 15), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so large a region around and near it.

into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of *Dêmêtêr Thesmophorus*, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping¹ the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or ^{Treatment of the defeated conspirators—sacrilege.} censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess *Dêmêtêr* never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgement upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.²

The Athenians who were to have assisted *Nikodromus* arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy ^{The Athenians land a force in Ægina—war which ensues.} sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the

¹ Herodot. vi. 91. *χειρες δὲ κείναι ἐμπεφυκυῖαι ἦσαν τοῖσι ἐπισπαστῆρσι.* The word *κείναι* for *ἐκείναι*, “those hands,” appears so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine the real reading to have been *κειναί* (the Ionic dialect for *κεναί*), “the hands with nothing attached to them:” compare a phrase not very unlike, Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 376, *κεινὴ δὲ τρυφάλεια δμ’ ἔσπετο*, &c.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king *Pausanias*, and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at the temple of *Athênê Chalkiœkos* (*Thucyd.* i. 134).

² Herodot. vi. 91. *Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος σφι ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οὐχ οἱοί τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἐφθῆσαν ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἣ σφι ἴλεων γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν.*

Compare *Thucyd.* ii. 27 about the

final expulsion from Ægina. The Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in the territory of *Thyrea*, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians, in the eighth year of the war (*Thucyd.* iv. 57). Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly have failed to notice it, as a farther consummation of the divine judgement. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the opinion thrown out in a preceding chapter (c. xxxiii.) respecting the date of composition of his history—in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenês, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybatês, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybatês, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sôphanês of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.¹ At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;² the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiadês, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty

Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force.

Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the chief men at Athens—intense rivalry between them.—Banishment of the latter by ostracism.

¹ Herodot. ix. 75.

² Herodot. vi. 90, 91, 92, 93. Thucyd. i. 41. About Sôphanês, compare ix. 75.

How much damage was done by such

a privateering war, between countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Xenophon, Hellenic. v. 1).

esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into coöperation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklês.¹ On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidês would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeidês seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence.² The land-

Conversion of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and urged by Themistoklês.

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

² See Mr. Galt's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, *Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean*, p. 376–378 (London, 1802).

"The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerable number, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the Hydriots acquired the reputation of greater integrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators in the Archipelago; and they

were of course regularly preferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institutions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock, from which the charges of victualling the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts: one is allotted to the crew and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed

service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:¹ though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,² than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklēs, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklēs displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidēs, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbour—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklēs knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;³ against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and

conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence among us. By their voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditionary historians, and possess much of that kind of knowledge to which the term *learning* is usually applied. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

¹ Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 19. Isokratēs, Panathenaic. c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 14. Πλὴν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν μὲν ἔνιοι λέγουσιν ὀκνοῦντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοῦς πολίτας, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῦται γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἄπρακτον ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκούσιως: compare vii. p. 301.

² See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5, 19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons first in rank in the city, were also the most disobedient on military service.

³ Thucyd. i. 93. ἰδὼν (Themistoklēs) τῆς βασιλείως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklês, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.¹ Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklês was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalêrum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports,² admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus—that the Æginetan “war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.”³ The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organisation of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Fleet of Athens—the salvation of Greece as well as of herself.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium⁴ in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not

Valuable fund now first available to Athens from the silver mines of Laurium in Attica.

¹ Thucyd. i. 14. Herodot. vii. 144.

² Thucyd. i. 93.

³ Herodot. vii. 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα,

ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i. 18. ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

⁴ Æschylus, Persæ, 235.

very far from the promontory of Sunium,¹ amidst a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common centre at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklês made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum² arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines

Themistoklês prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in building an increased number of ships.

¹ The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greek government. See his *Reisen durch Griechenland*, vol. i. pp. 39, 73. The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especially notices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbour at that place—both circum-

stances of great value at the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in ancient times—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 76.

² Herodot. vii. 144. Ὅτε Ἀθηναίοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῇ κοινῇ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σφι προσήλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυρείου, ἐμελλον λάξεσθαι ὀρηγὸν ἕκαστος δέκα δραχμάς.

must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government: otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklēs availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.¹ One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive

¹ All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable Dissertation of M. Boeckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his *Public Economy of Athens*. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation: but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of 20,000 Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of 33½ talents, he goes on—"That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not therefore to suppose that the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community" (p. 632).

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that *all* the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed. The treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made—but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are to take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it: but he talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing purposes—not about a regu-

lar distribution ("Nam cum pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratum quotannis periret." Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2). A story is told by Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it—of a sum of 100 talents in the treasury, which Themistoklēs persuaded the people to hand over to 100 rich men, for the purpose of being expended as the latter might direct, with an obligation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people (Polyæn. i. 30). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of 33 talents, or 50 talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklēs persuaded the people to employ the *whole* sum in ship-building, which of course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years, as M. Boeckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence. M. Boeckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact (which he himself states just before) that there were two sources of receipt into the treasury—original purchase-money paid down, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the small reserved rent probably went among the annual items of the state-budget.

as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The

Preparations
of Xerxes—
known be-
forehand in
Greece.

orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance.² Other Grecian cities

Heralds from
Persia to
demand earth
and water
from the
Grecian cities
—many of
them com-
ply and
submit.

might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organising resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of

Pan-hellenic
congress con-
vened jointly
by Athens
and Sparta
at the Isth-
mus of
Corinth.—
Important
effect on
Grecian
mind.

¹ Herodot. vii. 239.

² Herodot. vii. 8–138.

Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose¹—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of coöperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralising tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising*² (*i. e.* embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.³ In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklês took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.⁴ The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit coöperation from such cities as

Effects of the congress in healing feuds among the different Greeks—especially between Athens and Ægina.

¹ Herodot. vii. 145. Φρονήσαντες εἴ πως ἐν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν, καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τῷ τὸ πρῆσσοιεν πάντες, ὥς δεινῶν ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι.

² Herodot. viii. 92.

³ Herodot. vii. 145.

⁴ Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot. ix. 9.

were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human.¹ Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed—"Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and fore-shadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."²

¹ Herodot. vii. 203. οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον, &c.: compare also vii. 56.

² Herodot. vii. 140.

Ἄλλ' ἵτον ἐξ ἀδύτοιο, κακοῖς δ' ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desola-

tion and sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser with other commentators try to infuse into it something of encouragement by construing θυμόν, fortitude. The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle is plain (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: “O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here, until death.” Upon which the priestess replied—“Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus.¹ But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest.”²

Terror conveyed in the reply of the Delphian oracle to the Athenian envoys.

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark and unintelligible: and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by “the wooden wall”? Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica for ever. The last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women,

Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity and success of Themistoklēs.

¹ Herodot. vii. 141.

Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δί' Ὀλύμπιον ἐφιλάσασθαι
Λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Cræsus of Lydia (i. 91).

² Τείχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοὶ εὐρύο-
πα Ζεὺς

Μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα γ' ὀνήσει.

.....
.....
*Ὁ θεῖη Σαλαμῖς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν, &c.—(Herodot. vii. 141.)

appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklês, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to ensure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as “wretched Salamis:” but the fact that it was termed “divine Salamis,” indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.¹ Great indeed were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:² nay, he even steps out of his

Great and genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism of the Athenians—strongly attested by Herodotus, as his own judgement.

¹ Herodot. vii. 143. Ταύτη Θεμιστοκλέους ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναῖοι ταυτὰ σφι ἔγνωσαν αἰρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων, οἳ οὐκ εἶων ναυμαχίην ἀρτέεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἄλλην τινὰ οἰκίζειν.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may have conversed with persons who had heard the discussion.

Respecting the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the Spartans—intimating that either Sparta must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish—we may reasonably doubt whether it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylæ (Herodot. vii. 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii. 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Polyænus (i. 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistoklês, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

² Herodot. vii. 139. οὐδὲ σφέας χρησ-

way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.¹ Not only did the Athenians dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,² as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confe-

τήρια φοβερά, ἐλθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δεῖμα βαλόντα, ἔπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, &c.

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many different sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 8).

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων· ὁμῶς δὲ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχέσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι, καταβρωδήσαντες τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον, ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, &c. . . . Νῦν δὲ, Ἀθηναίους ἂν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, &c.

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed, and the

mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admiration for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honour of having beaten back the Persians; and to maintain, that even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could have defended, and would have defended, the Isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

² Herodot. vii. 139. ἐλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ᾗσαν οἱ ἐπεγείραντες, καὶ βασιλέα μετὰ γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι.

derate force at this moment of peril would be compromised.¹ To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance —prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment²—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plataeans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.³

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting coöperation. The result is certain, that no coöperation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exactng only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honours of headship with

¹ Herodot. viii. 2, 3: compare vii. 161.

² Herodot. vii. 144.

³ Thucyd. iii. 56. ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπένδιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Πέρσου δυνάμει ἀντιτάσσασθαι.

This view of the case is much more conformable to history than the boasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in these times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii. 37, p. 120.

Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset; preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.¹

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.² It is

Different stories current in Greece about Argos—opinion of Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. vii. 147–150.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say: Τούτων ὧν τῶν ἑπτὰ ἔθνέων αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις, πᾶρες τῶν κατέλεξα, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐκατέυτο· εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμήδιζον (viii. 73). This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

When he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical: compare vii. 152—he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation; but without guaranteeing their accuracy—he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to complain of the

conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them—“And thus the conduct of Argos has not been *so much worse than that of others*”—οὕτω δὲ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι αἰσχίστα πεποίηται.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favourable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are of little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (ἄνθρωποι ἴσασιν), which it evidently was not.

certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medising*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. Refusal or equivocation of the Kretans and Korkyræans. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;¹ the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.² Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.³

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no

Mission to Gelon at Syracuse—his reply.

¹ Herodot. vii. 169.

² Herodot. vii. 168.

³ Thucyd. i. 32–37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys in Thucydidēs do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the

strong invective which they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly. (Thucydid. i. 37–42.) The conduct of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.¹

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadae were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadae were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidae;² while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,³ intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklês, were despatched by sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.⁴ Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

Grecian army
sent into
Thessaly, to
defend the
defile of
Tempê
against
Xerxes.
B.C. 480.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most

On arriving,
they find
that it can-
not be suc-
cessfully held
against him,
—and retire.

¹ Herodot. vii. 158–167. Diodor. xi. | p. 138.

22. ² See Schol. ad Aristeid., Panathenaic. | ³ Herodot. vii. 172: compare c. 130.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 173.

numerous host.¹ But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.² He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.³ On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the

¹ Herodot. vii. 172. τὴν ἐσβολὴν τὴν Ὀλυμπικὴν. See the description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. ix. p. 280; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe. Frankfort, 1834).

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliii. 18; xlv. 6) seems more accurate than that of Pliny (H. N. iv. 8). We may remark that both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation and organisation of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexander the

Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time of Xerxes these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere—the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, p. 21–33).

² Herodot. vii. 173.

³ Herodot. viii. 140–143.

Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.¹

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.² When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Plataea. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.³

Consequences of this retreat—the Thessalians, and nearly all Hellas north of Kithæron, either submit to Xerxes, or waver.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organised; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.⁴

¹ Herodot. vii. 173, 174.

² Diodor. xi. 3. ἔτι παρούσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, &c.

³ Herodot. vii. 131, 132, 174.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 177.

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment; to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.¹ Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænians, Malians, &c., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knêmis and Cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiaea. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate with

¹ Herodot. vii. 132; Diodor. xi. 3.



the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space¹ was supposed favourable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which between Chalkis and Bœotia becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence: but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north and Mount Ceta to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Ceta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Ceta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.² On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phoenix and the Asôpus, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Ceta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ.

¹ Herodot. viii. 15–60. Compare Isokratês, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

² The word *Pass* commonly conveys the idea of a path enclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavoured so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,¹ whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount Œta, Trachis, Cape Kenæum, the Lichades islands, the river Dyrras. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian Maidens.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit: while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Œta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories south-east of Œta, only through the straight gate;² save and except an unfrequented as

¹ According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact, Hêraklês was supposed to have been an engineer or water-finder in very early times—δεινὸς περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγῇν. See Plutarch, Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum, c. i. p. 776.

² About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii. 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δ' αὖ διὰ Τρηχίνος ἔσοδος ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστὶ, τῇ στεινότητι, ἡμίπλεθρον· οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ στεινότατον τῆς χώρας τῆς Ἑλλης, ἀλλ' ἐμπροσθὲ τε Θερμοπυλέων καὶ ὕπισθε· κατὰ τε Ἀλπηνοῦς, ὕπισθε ἐόντας, εἰούσα ἀμαξιτὸς μούνη· καὶ ἐμπροσθε

well as circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phokians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan com-

Leonidas, king of Sparta, conducts the force thither—the combined fleet under Eurybiadês occupy the Eubœan strait.

κατὰ Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἀμαξίτιδες ἄλλη μούνη.

Compare Pausanias, vii. 15, 2. τὸ στενὸν τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ καὶ Θερμοπυλίων: also Strabo ix. p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi. 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—στενωτέρη γὰρ ἐφαίνετο εἰσοῦσα τῆς εἰς Θεσσαλίην, i.e. than the defile of Tempê.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local phænomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac Gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the Gulf itself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has materially altered its course: instead of flowing into the sea in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to reach the sea much south of the pass, while the rivers Dyrras, Melas, and Asôpus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the sea

separately between the mouth of Spercheius and Thermopylæ, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheius. Moreover the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the appellation Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Ceta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the valuable observations of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii. ch. x. p. 7-40; Gell, *Itinerary of Greece*, p. 239; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. iii. ch. x. p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes, "The hot springs issue principally from two mouths at the foot of the limestone precipices of Ceta, upon the left of the causeway, which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were very near being buried with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved road." (*Clarke's Travels*, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 247.)

mander Eurybiadês, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.¹ Along with them were 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Phlius, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiadês. It appears indeed that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medised*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men,² chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban

¹ Herodot. vii. 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς κατεστρωτάς τριηκοσίους, καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἔδόντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families: if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

² Herodot. vii. 205; Thucyd. iii. 62; Diodor. xi. 4; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydidês is very important here, as confirming to a great degree the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named Aristophanês, who tried to make out a more honourable case for his countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus—Θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας μέρους ὡς τετρακόσιοι—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyræan government (Thucyd. iii. 75) when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal. vii. 5).

people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Plataea, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those ^{Phokians and Lokrians.} who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious:¹ while the Phokians, if originally disposed to *medise*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxes and influential in guiding his movements.² The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover there was no cause for fear, since the invader was after all not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition."³ Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind. Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.⁴

Olympian and Karneian festivals—the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these, even under such imminent danger.

¹ Diodor. xi. 4.

² Herodot. viii. 30.

³ Herodot. vii. 203. λέγοντες δι' ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἤκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδόκιμοι πᾶσαν εἰσι ἡμέρην. . . . καὶ σφι εἶη δεινὸν οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπίοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπον· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἔσεσθαι, τῷ κακὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένῳ οὐ συνεμίχθη, τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοισι αὐτέων,

μέγιστα· ὀφείλειν ᾧ καὶ τὸν ἐπελαύοντα, ὡς ἐόντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσέειν ᾧ.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, &c.) which were under obligations of abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantinea, &c., and of course Athens, were not

Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenês, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them too postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force.² They engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

Path over
Mount (Eta
by which
Thermopylæ
might be
evaded—
Leonidas first
informed of
it on reach-
ing the spot
—the Pho-
kians en-
gaged to de-
fend it.

narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Eta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This path—then hardly

under similar restraint (Thucyd. v. 54, 75).

I do not here mean to assert that these two festivals (the Karneia and the Olympia) took place so exactly at the same time, that persons could not attend both. It would seem that the Karneia came latest of the two. But the Grecian festivals depended on the lunar months, and varied more or less in reference to the solar year. The Karneia were annual; the Olympia

quadrennial.

¹ Josephus, Bell. Judaic. i. 7, 3; ii. 16, 4; *ibid.* Antiqq. Judaic. xiv. 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. ad Dion. Cass. lxvi. 7.

² Herodot. vii. 206; viii. 40.

used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it.¹ But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phokians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.² So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows:—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plataea, in spite of their total want of practice on ship-board, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Trœzenian, 2 from Styrys in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes; together with 9 pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimanthus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.³ Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan,

Numbers and composition of the Greek fleet at Artemisium.

¹ Herodot. vii. 212, 216, 218.

² Herodot. vii. 207.

³ Herodot. viii. 1, 2, 3. Diodorus

(xi. 12) makes the Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate.¹ The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by fire-signals² from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.³ They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by

¹ Herodot. vii. 180. *τάχα δ' ἂν τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύροιο.*

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix. 91; and Tacit. Hist. iv. 53.

² For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii. 5; and the opening of the Agamemnôn of Æschylus and the same play, v. 270, 300; also Thucydides, iii. 22–80.

³ Herodot. vii. 181, 182, 183.

the panic of their troops, similar to that which King Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.¹ Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succour was at hand.² On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.³

Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence—they are rescued by a terrific storm.

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the

Movements of Xerxes from Therma.

¹ Herodot. vii. 184. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τοῦτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν Θερμοπυλέων, ἀπαθὴς τε κακῶν ἦεν ὁ στρατὸς, καὶ πλῆθος ἦεν τηνικαῦτα ἔτι τόσον, &c.—viii. 13. ἐποιέετο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥς ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικόν, μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη. Compare viii. 109; and Diodor. xi. 13.

² Herodot. vii. 178. Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξιόμενοι τὸ μαντήιον, πρῶτα μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι καὶ σφιδεινῶς καταβρώδεουσιν τὸν βάρβαρον ἔξαγ-

γείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

³ Herodot. vii. 189. The language of the historian in this chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together with some other miracles of Æakus, Aristæus, Empedoklês, &c., reproves his Pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting the miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi. pp. 629, 630).

defile of Tempê.¹ Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.² His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days:³ the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family. He respected and protected these

He arrives
with his
army in the
Malian ter-
ritory, close
upon the
pass of
Thermopylæ.

sacred places: an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, &c., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect

¹ The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and Oloosson — “saltum ad Petram” — “Perrhæbiæ saltum” (Livy, xlv. 21; xlv. 27). Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria or Lower Macedonia into Upper Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighbouring country, Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xviii. p. 337–343, and ch. xxx. p. 430; also Boué, *La Turquie en Europe*, vol. i. p. 198–202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 98).

² Herodot. vii. 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the

juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to suppose that *he* could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount of manual labour, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which *might have been said* into that which *was said*, and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.

³ The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxes and his land force (Herodot. vii. 183): it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê or south-eastern coast of Magnesia (ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetæ (vii. 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxes himself had been *three days* in the Malian territory (vii. 196).

for Grecian religious feeling.¹ Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance,² now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guardships) that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,³ his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.⁴ The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the

Advance of the Persian fleet—it is overtaken by a destructive storm and hurricane on the coast of Magnesia.

¹ This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*. Easen, 1832, sect. 19. p. 93.

² Herodot. vii. 196, 197, 201.

³ Diodor. xi. 12.

⁴ Diodorus (xi. 12), Plutarch (*Themistoklês*, 8) and Mannert (*Geogr. der Gr. und Römer*, vol. vii. p. 596), seem

to treat Sêpias as a cape, the southeastern corner of Magnesia: this is different from Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some extent (*ἄρασσα ἡ ἀκτὴ ἡ Σηπιάς*, vii. 191), and notices separately *τὴν ἀκρὴν τῆς Μαγνησίης*, vii. 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i. 560–580) seems sadly inaccurate.

country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land-army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the

¹ Herodot. vii. 189–191.

² Herodot. vii. 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indication of scepticism to escape him: *ἡμέρας γὰρ*

δὴ ἐλείμαζε τρεῖς· τέλος δὲ, ἔντομά τε ποιεῦντες καὶ καταείδοντες γόοισι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μάγοι, πρὸς τε τούτοις καὶ Θέτι καὶ τῇσι Νηρηΐσι θύοντες, ἔπαυσαν τετάρτη ἡμέρῃ· ἣ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων ἐκόπασε.

Isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness: upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number, and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes—Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.²

Delay of
Xerxes with
his land force
near Trachis.

Impressions
of Xerxes
about the
defenders at
Thermopylæ
—conversa-
tion with
Demaratus,
whom he
will not
believe.

¹ Herodot. vii. 194.

² Herodot. vii. 208, 210. πέμπει ἐς αὐτοὺς Μήδους καὶ Κισσίους θυμωθεὶς, | ἐντειλάμενός σφας ζωγρήσαντας ἄγειν ἐς ὄψιν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Croesus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus¹ that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,² together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

Doubts
about the
motives
ascribed by
Herodotus
to Xerxes.

First attack
upon Ther-
mopylæ—
made by the
Median
troops—re-
pulsed.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,³ manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armour. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading

¹ Diodor. xi. 4.

² Herodot. vii. 174; viii. 29–32.

³ Diodor. xi. 6.

shields, steady ranks,¹ and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."²

Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter.

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtês revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honoured as a patriot.³ There were however other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favour of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnês with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asôpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Cêtæans and those possessed by the Trachi-

Embarrassment of Xerxes—he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the mountain.

¹ Herodot. vii. 211; ix. 62, 63; Diodor. xi. 7: compare Æschyl. Pers. 244.

² Herodot. vii. 212. *Ἐν ταύτησι τῇσι προσόδοισι τῆς μάχης λέγεται βασιλέα, θηεύμενον, τρίς ἀναδραμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, δείσαντα περὶ τῇ στρατῇ.* See Homer,

Iliad, xx. 62; Æschyl. Pers. 472.

³ Herodot. vii. 213, 214; Diodor. xi. 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadês and Timaphernês, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain path (Persica, c. 24).

nians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of 1000 men. In the stillness of day-break, the noise of his army trampling through the wood¹ aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnês in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.² But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan³ named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended. There was however ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment

A Persian detachment under Hydarnês march over the mountain-path, driving away the Phokian guard.

They arrive in the rear of Leonidas.

Debate among the defenders of Thermopylæ when it became known that the Persians were approaching their rear.

of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the

¹ Herodot. vii. 217, 218. ἡὼς τε δὴ διέφαινε—ἦν μὲν δὴ νηνεμία, ψόφου δὲ γενομένου πολλοῦ, &c.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake: "The stillness of the dawn, which saved the Phokians from being surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when the occurrence took

place, and like many other trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of the historian." (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii. c. x. p. 55.)

² Herodot. vii. 216, 217.

³ Diodor. xi. 9.

idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honour, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,¹ forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy:² moreover we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

Resolution of
Leonidas to
stay and die
in the pass.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension.³ The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and staid, though he sent away his only son.⁴ None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere pre-

The three
hundred
Spartans,
together
with the
Thespians,
remain with
Leonidas:
the rest of
the detach-
ment retire.

¹ Herodot. vii. 219. ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφῶν ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνώμαι.

² Herodot. vii. 104.

³ Herodot. vii. 220. Ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλεῖστός εἰμι, Λεωνίδην, ἐπεὶ τε ἤσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἔοντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεῦσαί σφῶας ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι· αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν· μένοντι δὲ αὐτῷ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίῃ οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

Compare a similar act of honourable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratēs in

the territory of Abydus (Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 8, 38). He and twelve Lacedæmonian harmosts all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἐνθαδε ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν ξυμμίξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 221. According to Plutarch, there were also two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and staid to perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

servation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders;¹ while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having staid along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.² All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavoured to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present, they must have retired

Last exploits
and death of
Leonidas and
his band.

¹ The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platæa in the following year, they had no heavy armour (Herodot. ix. 30). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii. 75).

² Herodot. vii. 222. *Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμενον, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατεῖχε γὰρ σφῆας Λεωνίδης, ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ ποιούμενος.* How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 865) severely criticises this statement of Herodotus, and on

very plausible grounds: among the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi. 9; and Pausan. x. 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes *before* the battle of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal; not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the Isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chances of defence.

with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtês, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.²

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodotus mentions the Spartan Diênêkês, Alpheus and Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as standing pre-eminent. The reply

Individuals among them distinguished—scorn exhibited towards Aristodêmus who did not fight.

¹ The story of Diodorus (xi. 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated to the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at length overpowered and slain—is irreconcilable with Herodotus and de-

cidedly to be rejected. Justin however (ii. 11), and Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866) follow it. The rhetoric of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favour. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. *ibid.*): but it is not preserved.

² Herodot. vii. 225.

ascribed to the first became renowned.¹ “The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun.” “So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade.” Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.² One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpêni suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armour, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.³ He was denounced as “the coward Aristodêmus;” no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.⁴ After a year

¹ Herodot. vii. 226.

² Herodot. vii. 224. ἐπυθόμην δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν τριακοσίων. Pausanias, iii. 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyric oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honour of Leonidas, jointly with the regent Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Plataea. It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honours.

³ Herodot. vii. 229. Ἀριστόδημον—λειποψυχέοντα λειφθῆναι—ἀλγήσαντα ἀπονοστήσαι ἐς Σπάρτην. The commentators are hard upon Aristodêmus when they translate these epithets “animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum,” considering that ἐλειποψύχῃσιν is predicated by Thucydides (iv. 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different stories about the cause which had kept Aristodêmus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier named Pantitês, who having been sent on a

message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that he hanged himself—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover the disgrace of Aristodêmus is particularly explained by Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of his comrade Eurytus: whereas Pantitês stood alone.

⁴ See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v. 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August 1444), where 1500 Swiss crossed the river and attacked 40,000 French and Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders—all of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valour and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men

of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honour at the battle of Plataea, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valour.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylae against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiades was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Boeotian author,¹ who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiades, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylae. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the farther resistance which remained behind. “Demaratus (said he to the

Fate of the
Theban con-
tingent.

Impressions
of Xerxes
after the
combat—
advice given
to him by
Demaratus
—he rejects
it.

who receded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise desperate. These sixteen men on their return were treated with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, *Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft*, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 393).

¹ Herodot. vii. 233; Plutarch, He-

rodot. Malign. p. 867. The Boeotian history of Aristophanes, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals — ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἄρχοντας ὑπομνημάτων ἱστορήσε.

exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.¹

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed), like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and coöperating mass.²

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.³

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis,

¹ Herodot. vii. 235.

² Herodot. vii. 236.

³ Herodot. vii. 237. "The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, and if asked for counsel will keep back what

he has best in his mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympathises heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm ; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy Pelagon to Themistoklês with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.¹

Proceedings of the two fleets, at Artemisium and Aphetæ—alarm among the Grecian fleet—Themistoklês determines them to stay and fight, at the urgent instance of the Eubœans.

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistoklês doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet ; and the Greeks could not expect any more favourable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistoklês, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary cor-

Important service thus rendered by Themistoklês.

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 7 ; Herodot. viii. 5, 6.

ruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.¹ It was finally determined therefore to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles (says Herodotus²) they would have packed up and removed long before; for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.³ Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks; postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Syllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.⁴

¹ The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable: Οὔτοί τε δὴ πληγέντες δώροισι (Eurybiadês, Adeimantus, &c.) ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέεσι ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτός τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλέης ἐκέρδηνε, ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων.

² Herodot. viii. 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραχρησάμενοι τὸν Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὥς οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὔτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν, οὔτε προεσάξαντο, ὥς παρесоμένου σφι πολέμου· περιπετέα δὲ ἐποίησαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκιδι γὰρ

ᾧδε ἔχει περὶ τούτων ὁ χρησμὸς·

Φράζεο βαρβαρόφωνον ὅταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλλῃ Βύβλινον, Εὐβοίῃς ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἰγας.

Τούτοις δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπεσι χρησαμένοις ἐν τοῖσι τότε παρσοῦσί τε καὶ προσδοκίμοις κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφι συμφορῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα.

³ Herodot. viii. 6. καὶ ἔμελλον δῆθεν ἐκφεύξεσθαι (οἱ Ἕλληνες)· ἔδει δὲ μηδὲ πυρφόρον, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ, περιγενέσθαι.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 7, 8. Wonderful

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.¹ Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.² Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front, at all points of the circumference.³ In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them : but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them : in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station ; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.⁴

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more.

stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skyllias, as a diver.

¹ Diodorus, xi. 12.

² Herodot. viii. 9. δειλὴν ὀψίην γινόμενην τῆς ἡμέρης φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐπ' ἀνέπλων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεκπλόου.

³ Compare the description in Thucyd.

ii. 84, of the naval battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 11. πολλὰν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισάμενοι—ἑτεραλκίως ἀγωνιζομένους, &c.

Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Second storm —increased damage to the Persian fleet, and ruin to the detachment sent round Eubœa. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.¹

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion

Renewed sea-fight off Artemisium —indecisive—but the Greek fleet resolves to retreat.

¹ Herodot. viii. 12, 13, 14; Diodor. xi. 12.

with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it.¹ The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistoklēs, as it seems, among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece:² though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklēs to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organising their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ—they go to Salamis. The Athenian Abrônychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklēs, conducting the latter, staid long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighbouring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklēs hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency.³ With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaea to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across

¹ Herodot. viii. 17, 18.

² Herodot. viii. 18. *δρησµὸν δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

³ Herodot. viii. 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9.

to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaæa and the neighbouring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1000 whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.¹ According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armour, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about 7000:² but the epigram composed shortly afterwards and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4000 warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies."³ Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4000 warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of

¹ Herodot. viii. 24, 25. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐλάνθανε τοὺς διαβεβηκότας Ξέρξης ταῦτα πρήξας περὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς ἐωῦτοῦ καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, &c.

² About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare Herodot. vii. 202; Diodorus, xi. 4; Pausanias, x. 20, 1; and Manso's Sparta, vol. ii. p. 308;

Beylage 24th.

Isokratês talks about 1000 Spartans, with a few allies, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war at Artemisium; in fact his numerical statements deserve little attention.

³ Herodot. vii. 228.

merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas; decorated ^{Impressive epigram of Simonidēs.} apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonidēs. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Plataea, now joined him.² Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attagînus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,³ as well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thespians on the other hand abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Plataeans, who had

¹ Herodot. viii. 40, 71, 73.

² Herodot. viii. 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kadmeian* victory for Xerxes, which is true only in the letter, but not in the spirit; he doubtless lost a greater number of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the

advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi. 12); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi. 13–15).

³ Plutarch, *De Herodot. Malignit.* p. 864; Herodot. viii. 34.

been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,¹ were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.²

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him : a reproach true almost to the letter.³ It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers ; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day.⁴ As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position : they considered it as their last chance,⁵ abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,⁶ while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ : no other position could be

No ulterior plan of defence formed—no new position to be found capable of defending Attica—the Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth.

¹ Herodot. viii. 44, 50.

² Herodot. viii. 66.

³ Thucyd. i. 69. τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ πάρ'

ὁμῶν ἀξίως προαπαντῆσαι.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 71. συνδραυόντες ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν.

⁵ Herodot. viii. 74.

⁶ Herodot. vii. 139.

found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.¹ The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbour of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.²

Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,³ and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9. *ἄμα μὲν ὀργή τῆς προδοσίας εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἄμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατήφεια μεμονωμένους.*

Herodot. viii. 40. *δοκέοντες γὰρ εὐρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὖρον οὐδὲν ἔδν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάγοντο τὸν Ἴσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησόν, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιουμένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.*

Thucyd. i. 74. *ὅτε γοῦν ἡμεν (we Athenians) ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε (Spartans).*

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratês take pride in the fact that

the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, never thought of making separate terms for themselves with Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratês has confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

² Herodot. viii. 40–42.

³ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 699.

family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.¹ The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens)—but in part also to Ægina: there were however many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.² Some few individuals, too poor to hope for main-

Unavoidable
hurry and
sufferings of
the emi-
grants.

¹ Herodot. viii. 66, 67. There was therefore but little time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydidês, i. 18—*διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι*, &c.

² Herodot. viii. 41: Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a man-

ner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his visit to Greece (London, 1825), Letters vi. vii. x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain side by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too from exposure to an intemperate climate; many from diseases contracted through

tenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding moreover in their own interpretation¹ of the wooden-wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.² When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,³ we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistoklēs proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristeidēs, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadēs, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the

Energy of the Athenians, and unanimity of the leaders.—Themistoklēs proposes the restoration of Aristeidēs from exile.

the loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first re-occupation of Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also, in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "Les troupes Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l'Attique, mettant tout à feu et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d'Athènes racontent que

ses malheureux habitants furent obligés de se réfugier à Salamine, à Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu'après trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs. Beaucoup de villages de l'Attique sont encore habités par les descendants de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière révolution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise; mais leur physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque." (Buchon, *la Grèce Continentale et la Morée*. Paris, 1843, ch. ii. p. 82.)

¹ Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistoklēs — Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμόν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς εἰδέναι νομίζοντας (i. 18, 2).

² Herodot. viii. 50.

³ Thucyd. ii. 16, 17.

acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on ship-board, instead of on horseback.¹ It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areiopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,² and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service.³ By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.⁴ Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginctan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small

Numbers and composition of the combined Greek fleet at Salamis.

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

² Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (Politic. v. 3, 5) had in his

mind, we cannot determine.

³ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 99.

squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonteres, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.¹ The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (358 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt however whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.²

¹ Herodot. viii. 43–48.

² Æschylus, Persæ, 347; Herodot. viii. 48; vi. 9; Pausanias, i. 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is 378; but the items which he gives amount, when summed up, only to 366. There seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above 1000, those of the Greeks 700 (Persica, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i. 74) calls the total of the Grecian fleet at Salamis “nearly 400 ships, and the Athenian contingent somewhat less than *two parts* of this total (ναῦς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν).”

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably *two parts out of three*: and if this be the sense, I should agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Gölner (though Dr. Arnold pronounces it “a most undoubted error”) appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοῖραι does not of necessity mean *two parts out of three*: in Thucyd. i. 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας νέμονται, where the words mean *two parts out of five*. Now in the passage before

us, we have ναῦς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Gölner contend, that in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the whole number—*four hundreds or hundredth parts*: so that the whole meaning would be—“To the aggregate *four hundreds* of ships we contributed something less than *two*.” The word τετρακοσίας, equivalent to τέσσαρες ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the general idea of τέσσαρες μοῖραι: and this would bring the passage into exact analogy with the one cited above—τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας. With every respect to the judgement of Dr. Arnold on an author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot and Gölner to be “an undoubted error.” It has the advantage of bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished 180 ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two different constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in order that Thucy-

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the coast adjoining. His land force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!"¹ Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Xerxes occupies Athens and Attica—the Persian fleet enters the road of Phalêrum.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favourable terms.² Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to ensure lenient treatment to the territory of Phokis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.³ The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephissus, among the towns of the inflexible Phokians. All of them were found deserted; the in-

The Persian army ravage the Phokian townships in their march from Thermopylæ to Attica—pillage of the temple at Abæ.

didês may be in harmony with Æschylus and other authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Göller would alter *τριακοσίων* into *τετρακοσίων* in Demosthenês de Coronâ (c. 70), in order that Demosthenês may be in harmony with Thucydidês. Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle; we are not to force different

witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.

¹ Herodot. viii. 26. Παπαί, Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ' ἄνδρας ἡγάγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

² Herodot. viii. 30.

³ Herodot. viii. 28, 29.

habitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea; or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataea; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.¹

Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Cræsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the Gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronæa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The trium-

Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment.

¹ Herodot. viii. 32–34.

phant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the Heroes Phylakus and Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.¹ Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until 130 years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phokian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Plataea.

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance.

He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.² The Athenian acropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150 feet with a flat summit of about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side:³ moreover

Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens—the acropolis holds out—is taken and sacked.

¹ Herodot. viii. 38, 39; Diodor. xi. 14; Pausan. x. 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus; there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, ch. iv. p. 46; ch. x. p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy

to reconcile with the words of Mar-donius, Herodot. ix. 42; still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

² Herodot. viii. 52.

³ Pausanias, i. 22, 4: Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 76. Ernst Curtius (*Die Akropolis von Athens*, p. 5. Berlin, 1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less than 400 feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it to be 178 fathoms or 1068 feet above the level of the sea (*Reise durch das Königreich Griechenland*, i. p. 2); he gives the length and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's valuable *Topography of Athens*, I do not find any distinct statement about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement (if he and Curtius are both correct) to refer only to the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the north-west, called Areopagus:¹ from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time, the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:² moreover the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its

¹ Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post on the Areopagus and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis — ἀντεπύρωσαν (Æschyl. Eumenid. 638).

² Herodot. viii. 52, 53. . . . ἐμπροσθε ὦν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος, ὅπισθε δὲ τῶν πύλεων καὶ τῆς ἀνόδου, τῇ δὲ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε, οὔτ' ἂν ἤλπισε μὴ κοτέ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαίη ἀνθρώπων, ταύτην ἀνέβησάν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἶδον τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς, Ἀγλαύρου, καίτοι περ ἀποκρήμνου ἐόντος τοῦ χώρου.

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appears clearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch. v. p. 261; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 119; Forchhammer, Topographie Athens, p. 365, 366; in

Kieler Philologischen Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the plan of Athens prefixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i. 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions ἐμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος appear to refer to the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northern and western fronts of the acropolis; since they reached Athens from the north—and the western side furnished the only regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.¹ The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.²

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Atoning visit of the Peisistratids to the ruined acropolis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.³ On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,⁴ as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. Yet whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships

¹ Herodot. viii. 52, 53.

² Herodot. i. 84.

³ Herodot. v. 102; viii. 53-99; ix. 65. ἔδεε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ θεοπρόπιον πᾶσαν

τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 55-65.

from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê; an estimate certainly not admissible.¹

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,² and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain

Xerxes reviews his fleet at Phalêrum—debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle at Salamis—prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia.

¹ Herodot. viii. 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii. p. 250), "About 1000 ships is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, 200 in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake ap-

pears somewhat lower than the probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note shortly following.

² The picture drawn in the Cyropædia of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (*ἀνδρακίδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι*), and even designedly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii. 1, 45).

the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day,¹ and for the land force to move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Resolution
taken by
Xerxes to
fight at
Salamis.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalœrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis; among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in the land service—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.² In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.³

Dissensions
among the
Greeks in
the fleet at
Salamis.
Resolution
taken to
remove the
fleet to the
Isthmus.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can

¹ Herodot. viii. 68, 69, 70.

² Herodot. viii. 70.

³ Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favourable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence: and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus

Ruinous consequences if that resolution had been executed.

Themistoklês opposes the resolution, persuades Eurybiadês, and prevails upon him to reopen the debate.

philus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote in favour of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—"Themistoklês, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."²

¹ Herodot. viii. 57. Οὔτοι ἔρα ἦν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμῆς ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχῆσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλιν ἕκαστοι τρέψονται, &c. Compare vii. 139, and Thucyd. i. 73.

² Herodot. viii. 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in the main distinct, instructive and consistent. It is more probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi. 15, 16), who states that Themistoklês succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we

contrast it with the loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. As Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene, Eurybiadês was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themistoklês, and with that view, first made to him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which Themistoklês followed up by the same answer—next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistoklês, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known observation—"Strike, but hear me" (Πάταξον μὲν, ἀκουσον δέ). Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus should have suppressed so impressive an anecdote as this latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative that he

Synod of Grecian chiefs again convened—Themistoklês tries to get the former resolution rescinded—the Peloponnesians adhere to it—angry words.

Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to count the vote of Themistoklês until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than

cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus, Themistoklês gives no offence to *Eurybiadês*, nor is the latter at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadês is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistoklês, and disposed to fall in with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistoklês are, the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too (let it be added), not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief of the minority who persuades Eurybiadês to reopen the whole debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover it is *Adeimantus*, not *Eurybiadês*, who addresses to Themistoklês the remark that “persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged:” and he makes the remark because Themistoklês goes on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs, *before* the business of the assembly has been formally opened.

Themistoklês draws upon himself the censure by sinning against the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadês, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness. His narrative represents Eurybiadês as the person who was anxious both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistoklês from offering any opposition to it; though such an attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad *Æschyl. Pers.* 728) imagines that the story about Eurybiadês threatening Themistoklês with his stick grew out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that historian: it does not consist with his conception of the relations between Eurybiadês and Themistoklês.

half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês, and addressing him personally, he said—“If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.¹ For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying.”

Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling.² The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklês, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messen-

Menace of Themistoklês to retire with the Athenian squadron, unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis—Eurybiadês takes upon him to adopt this measure.

¹ Herodot. viii. 61, 62. *Σὺ εἰ μὲν εἶς αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσσαι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.*

Σαλαμῖνα, ἔπεσι ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεὶ τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρσκευάζοντο ὡς ναυμαχήσοντες.

² Herodot. viii. 64. *Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ*

gers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.¹ Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,² and Megarians, were equally urgent in favour of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek³ who understood Persian and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any

The Peloponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third synod convened—renewed disputes; the majority opposed to Themistoklês and determined on retreating to the Isthmus.

Desperate stratagem of Themistoklês—he sends a private message across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, and thus render retirement impossible.

¹ Herodot. viii. 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο, θῶμα ποιούμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδew ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξερβράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, &c. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

² Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis during the night, and were

only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of Themistoklês. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at Salamis.

³ Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a *Persian by birth*, which cannot be true.



common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first to enclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.¹

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklēs across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighbouring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistoklēs lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,² as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape.³ The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—its head quarters were in the bay of Phalērum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and

Impatient
haste of
Xerxes to
prevent any
of the
Greeks from
escaping—
his fleet en-
closes the
Greeks dur-
ing the night.

¹ Herodot. viii. 75.

² Thucyd. i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, Persæ, 351 seq. See also Herodot. viii. 109, 110.

Isokratēs might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by the Persians to Themistoklēs—Θεμιστοκλῆς δ', ὅς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοῦς κατεναυμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρέων ἡξίωσαν (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 74)—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagem by which Themistoklēs compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.

³ Æschylus, Persæ, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos in Attica. During the night,¹ a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner.² These measures were all taken during the

¹ Diodorus (xi. 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the south-western corner of the island to the north-western strait, where the north-western corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evidently implies that the Greek fleet was enclosed to the north of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii. 100).

² Herodot. viii. 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγένετο τὰ ἀγγελλθέντα, τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξύ Σαλαμῖνός τε κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἐσπέρης κέρας κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνῆγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν τῇσι νηυσί.

He had previously stated Phalêrum as the main station of the Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimates what the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbour of Salamis: and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western (more properly north-western) wing,

presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not know how far the western wing extended before the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to the harbour of Peiræus, and began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that "those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia." What places are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only known places of those names, are, the island of Keos, not far south of Cape Sunium in Attica—and the promontory Kynosura, on the north-eastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory, too distant to render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy, Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and the south-easternmost) of the island of Salamis; and Kiepert has realised their idea in his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the island, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that *before this night-movement commenced*, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part off *the island of Salamis*; which appears to me highly improbable.

night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbour, the next morning.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible. Such prolongation was nowise difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side, and that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favourable to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracised Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistoklês himself—he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favour of night. He caused Themistoklês to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs; and after a generous exordium wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered farther debate useless. Themistoklês expressed his joy at the intelligence; communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that

Aristeidês comes in the night to the Greek fleet from Ægina—informs the chiefs that they are enclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become impossible.

Whatever station that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy: it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in Attica, not in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove

the objections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii. 77).

the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidês to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistoklês, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidês: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea²—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valour: moreover his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians³—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the

¹ Herodot. viii. 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidês, immediately after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch represents him as present and as taking part in it (Aristeidês, c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklês desires Aristeidês to assist him in persuading Eurybiadês: according to Herodotus, Eurybiadês was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later writers.

² Æschylus, Pers. 473: Herodot. viii. 90. The throne with silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long pre-

served in the acropolis of Athens—having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους δίφρος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodôrus—affirmed that the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under Mount Ægaleos, but much farther to the north-west, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistoklês, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognises the Ἡρακλεῖον (Persica, c. 26).

³ Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16.

Persian fleet, however, had been on ship-board all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position; while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês and the other leaders. Just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the trireme which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus with the other Æakid heroes. Honoured with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.¹

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pæan or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—“Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?” The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.² The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the

Battle of
Salamis—
confusion and
complete de-
feat of the
Persians.

¹ Herodot. viii. 83; Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 13; Aristeidês, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phantias, respecting an incident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting. Themistoklês, with the prophet Euphrantidês, was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral's galley, when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly, and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined Themistoklês to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory offering to Dionysus Ô:nêstês; which the clamour of the bystanders compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch states in his life of Themistoklês; in his life of Aristeidês, he affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia, when Aristeidês attacked it at the beginning of the action. Now Aristeidês did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so

that no prisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

² Herodot. viii. 84. φανεῖσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἅπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον τὰδε· ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμναν ἀνακρούεσθε;

Æschylus (Pers. 396–415) describes finely the war-shout of the Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormion especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd. ii. 89).

former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardour; though, according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honourable example.¹ The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse²—the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phœnicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:³ the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct

¹ Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi. 17), it was the Persian admiral's ship which was first charged and captured: if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified it.

² Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16. Æschylus in the Persæ, though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, does not

make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of explanation.

³ Herodot. viii. 86; Diodor. xi. 17. The testimony of the former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalêrum:¹ Demokritus the Naxian captain was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was very great;² the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent the feelings.³

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by

¹ Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.

² The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as having been slain, are probably for the most part

inventions of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield, *Præfat.* ad Æschyl. *Pers.* p. xii.

³ Herodot. viii. 90.

Distinguished
gallantry
of Queen
Artemisia.

the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city.¹ But knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships; among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.²

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of

¹ Compare the indignant language of Demosthenes a century and a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia queen of Karia, as the enemy of Athens—*ὕμεις δ' ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε* (Demosthenes, *De Rhodior. Libertat.* c. x. p. 197).

² Herodot. viii. 87, 88, 93. The story here given by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be compliment; for he himself insinuates a doubt, "I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it."

Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, *De Malign.* Herodot. p. 873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless *heard* more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidês carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.¹

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement.² But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity³ of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phœnicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, &c., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well-suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects.⁴ He fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.⁵

Expectations of the Greeks that the conflict would be renewed—fears of Xerxes for his own personal safety—he sends his fleet away to Asia.

¹ Herodot. viii. 95; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9; Æschyl. Pers. 454–470; Diodor. xi. 19.

² Herodot. viii. 96.

³ The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii. 11, 6; iii. 14, 3).

⁴ See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (Herodot. viii. 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii. 68), which indicates the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the various information which reached him.

⁵ Herodot. vii. 10.

Against the Phœnicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.¹ Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.² They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.³

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was farther embittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him⁴ in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance

Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia—advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind as general to finish the conquest of Greece.

¹ This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, xi. 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phœnissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behaviour of the Phœnician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklēs as choregus, four years earlier than the *Persæ* of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaucus to have been (*παρὰ πειρομένησθαι*) altered from it. The Chorus in the *Phœnissæ* consisted of Phœnician women, possibly the widows of those Phœnicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, *Præf. ad Æsch. Pers.* p. ix.), or only of Phœnicians absent on the expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which

gained the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme or details (see Welcker, *Griechische Tragœd.* vol. i. p. 26; and Droysen, *Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie*, p. 4–6).

² Herodot. ix. 32.

³ Herodot. viii. 97–107. Such was the terror of these retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstēr (about half-way between Peiræus and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them—a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktesias, *Pers.* c. xxvi.; Strabo, ix. p. 395; the two latter talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it had been conceived before the battle.

⁴ Compare Herodot. vii. 10.

not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to re-assure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phœnicians, Egyptians, &c., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. “If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously¹), by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens.” Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen by entrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistoklês) had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without

The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros — second stratagem of Themistoklês by secret message to Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. viii. 101, 102.

delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.¹ Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty manœuvres, and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklês knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man tainted with such constant guilt might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cycladês, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness.² In these gods the Andrians put their

¹ Herodot. viii. 109, 110; Thucyd. i. 137. The words *ἦν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο* may probably be understood in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact—not only was it false, that Themistoklês was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont—but it was also false, that the Greeks had ever any serious intention of

going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos, Themistokl. c. 5.

² Herodot. viii. 111. *ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπείνας ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ φιλοχωρεῖν . . . Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.*

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii. 172.

trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability." While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklēs sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,¹ but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.²

The intimation sent by Themistoklēs perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Boeotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.³

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated⁴—inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even

Xerxes
evacuates
Attica and
returns home
by land,
with the
larger por-
tion of his
army.

¹ Herodot. viii. 112; Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 21—who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

² Herodot. viii. 112–121.

³ Herodot. viii. 114–126.

⁴ The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (Persæ, 482–513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction—1. That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also with another large division was in military

operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus even as to the sufferings by famine must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an undoubted fact (Hist. of Greece, ch. xv. p. 351, 2nd ed.). "The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters"—so Dr. Thirlwall states, after Æschylus—adding in a note, "It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the nar-

Retreating
march of
Xerxes to
the Helles-
pont—suf-
ferings of
his troops.
He finds
the bridge
broken, and
crosses the
strait on
shipboard
into Asia.

incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,¹ delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow; magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the super-human pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded licence of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain

rative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus. There can however be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers," &c.

That a large river such as the Strymon near its mouth (180 yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50'), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak—before the sun became warm—is a statement which surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a "frost out of season" (*χειμῶν ἄωρον*) brought about by a special interposition of the gods. If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them only a short time for escape; whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contend with—nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Stry-

mon: nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting; Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon, remained as an important stronghold of the Persians some years after this event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ would not criticise nicely the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494). But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus—as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

¹ Juvenal, Satir. x. 178.

Ille tamen qualls rediit, Salamine relictâ,
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire fla-
gellis, &c.

and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.¹ But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who re-entered Sardis with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.²

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden case and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.³ At the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded

¹ Herodot. viii. 130.

² See the account of the retreat of Xerxes in Herodotus, viii. 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to reject. The description given in the *Persæ* of Æschylus (v. 486, 515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin (ii. 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. "Ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tem-

pestatibus offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna, et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant."

³ Herodot. viii. 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὐρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμέας αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.

to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Amêinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.¹ Respecting the behaviour of Adêimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavourable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus son of Adêimantus was among the most efficient enemies of the former.²

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklês had a large majority of votes for the second.³ The result of such

Honours rendered to Themistoklês.

¹ Herodot. viii. 93-122; Diodor. xi. 27.

² Herodot. viii. 94; Thucyd. i. 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii. 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry words in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom (Or. xxxvii. p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of

Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi.) insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

³ Herodot. viii. 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17): compare De Herodot. Ma.

voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklês was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadês as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklês as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 300 select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontiers of Tegea.¹ Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immoveable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklês should be offended by being deprived of the general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated.² Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklês.

lign. p. 871) states that *each individual* chief gave his second vote to Themistoklês. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exagge-

rating spirit.

¹ Herodot. viii. 124; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.

² Diodor. xi. 27: compare Herodot. viii. 125, and Thucyd. i. 74.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÆ.—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.¹ Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phoenicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.²

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hêraklês:³ not less venturesome

¹ Herodot. viii. 85.

² Herodot. viii. 130; Diodor. xi. 27.

³ Herodot. viii. 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii. 29–32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian en-

voys had great difficulty in inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos—τὸ γὰρ προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινὸν ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι, οὔτε τῶν χώρων ἐοῦσι ἐμπεύροις, στρατιῇς τε πάντα πλεῖα ἐδόκει

than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterwards, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadaë,¹ and the Boeotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, as well as the neighbouring towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighbouring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.²

General adherence of the medising Greeks to Mardonius—revolt of Potidæa—which is besieged in vain by Artabazus.

είναι τὴν δὲ Σάμον ἐπιστάτο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously interpreted by some of the commentators as if it were a measure of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he is describing. In my judgment, no inferences of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an enemy's country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate the risk before-

hand—rather than any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea, we might say—"A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies,"—by which we should merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their geographical knowledge.

¹ Herodot. ix. 1, 2, 67; viii. 136.

² Herodot. viii. 128, 129.

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phœkis. He sent a Karian named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônus at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus and the Ismienian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptôon near Akraëphia, and Apollo at the Phokian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard, was, that the priest of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.¹ It appears however that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.² The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens—Alexander king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.³ The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a sincere friend to embrace propositions so

Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring in Bœotia. He consults the Bœotian oracles.

Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to Athens, to offer the most honourable terms of peace.

¹ Herodot. viii. 134, 135; Pausanias, ix. 24, 3.

² Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, . . . ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λόγιων, ὥς σφας χρεόν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ δολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναῖοι, &c.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the *medising* party in Greece at this particular moment: there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted—no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamt

of. The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here “to call to mind the prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless himself believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed by “calling these prophecies to mind.”

³ Herodot. ix. 7.

advantageous as well as so honourable : especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its Isthmus.¹

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas : and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game : while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character ; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer together with the seed of the past autumn.² The prudential view of the case being thus favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succour during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said : “ Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours : we too know *that*, as well as thou : but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into

Temptation to Athens to accept this offer—fear of the Lacedæmonians that she would accept it—Lacedæmonian envoys sent to Athens to prevent it.

¹ Herodot. viii. 142.

² Herodot. viii. 142. Πιεζευμένοισι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα (say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν ἐστερήθητε διξῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must

include the seed of the preceding autumn : and the advice of Themistoklēs to his countrymen—καὶ τις οἰκίην τε ἀναπλάσασθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii. 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."¹

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor; protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.² The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,³ and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.⁴ But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from

Resolute
reply of the
Athenians,
and determi-
nation to
carry on the
war, in spite
of great
present suf-
fering.

Selfish in-
difference
displayed by
Sparta and
the Pelopon-
nesians to-
wards
Athens.

¹ Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "on the point of stoning Alexander"—*μικροῦ δεῖν κατέλευσαν* (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 186)—one among many specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with past history.

² Herodot. viii. 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidês who proposed and prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavourably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

³ Herodot. ix. 7. *συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν*

Πέρσῃν ἀντιώσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην, &c.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some erroneous motives (xi. 28).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 7. *ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμεῖν, &c.*

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratês, Or. iv. Panegyric. c. 27, p. 61.

danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was however still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Boeotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.¹ Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavourable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian)² to fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavourable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries,

¹ Herodot. ix. 10.

² Herodot. ix. 7. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δρταζόν τε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστου δ' ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχος σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη ἐπάλξεις ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 5, 11).

and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavoured to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head quarters in Athens (May or June—479 B.C.).¹

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.² The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people

¹ Diodor. xi. 28; Herodot. ix. 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες παρείχον στρα-
τιήν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι

περ ἐμήδιζον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτη οἰκη-
μένων, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 4.

both combined to stone him to death ; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor ; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.¹ Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica ; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the

Remonstrance sent by the Athenians to Sparta—ungenerous slackness of the Spartans.

¹ Herodot. ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kyrtilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demosthen. de Corona, p. 296. c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis, iii. 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians is noway probable: and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrtilus might have been among them, if he had

chosen. Moreover Xerxes held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation: while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

Isokratês (Or. iv. Panegyric. s. 184. c. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *medism* (in allusion doubtless to Themistoklês as one), but he adds—"even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians"—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἴ τις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν. This must have been an ancient custom, continued after it had ceased to be pertinent or appropriate.

Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.¹ Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helot as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: 5000 Lacedæmonian Pericœki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the

Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus.

¹ Herodot. ix. 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. Plutarch had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidês, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and Myrônidês, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi. p. 366) suspects the correctness of the

narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five Ephors: there was no public discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these Ephors is consistent and intelligible—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the manner of communication ultimately adopted is of the nature of a jest.

alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia—a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,² he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, after a route longer but easier, in Bœotia on the plain of the Asôpus; along which river he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Plataea.³ He then took up a position not far off, in the plain

Mardonius
after rava-
ging Attica,
retires into
Bœotia.

¹ Herodot. ix. 12.

² There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40, 2).

³ Herodot. ix. 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendale or Sphendaleis seems not certainly known (Ross, *Über die Deme von Attika*, p. 138); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think

that it stood "near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading from Dekelia through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, *Athens and the Demi of Attica*, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (*Oropus and Diskria*, p. 38) says that "Malakasa is the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry could conveniently halt." It

on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiaë, and his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp¹ of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favourable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes² in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:³ even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attagînus invited Mardonius along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in Greek by his Persian neighbour, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,⁴ continued thus: “Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these, thou shalt behold but few surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighbourhood of the Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to take place most frequently in this south-eastern region of Bœotia,—Tanagra, Cœnophyta, Delium, &c.

¹ Herodot. ix. 15.

² The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd. i. 90).

³ Herodot. ix. 40, 45, 67; Plutarch,

Aristeidês, c. 18.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as a Theban—*Πέρσῃν τε καὶ Θηβαίων ἐν κλινῇ ἐκάστη*—a proof of the intimate connexion between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, which is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i. 51 (compare the Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the Theban family of Herodotus and Asôpodôrus. The ancient mythical feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—"Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result."¹—"This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Plataea." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior.² Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained behind

¹ Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic—*ἐχθίστη δὲ ὁδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὐτῇ, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατεῖν*. It will have to be more carefully considered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks, and upon the philosophy of happiness

and duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics as to the superior happiness of the *βίος θεωρητικὸς* or life of scientific observation and reflection.

² Herodot. ix. 66.

in the neighbourhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Phê mê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.¹ The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behaviour should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.²

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus.

Numbers of
the Greeks
collected
under Pau-
sanias.

¹ Herodot. ix. 17. διεξήλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας. Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies — περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισε (Thucyd. viii. 108.)

² Οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ ἦλθον μὲν ἀπολέοντες τοὺς Φωκέας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, &c. (Herodot. ix. 18).

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not without importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.

After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows : from Tegea, 1500 ; from Corinth, 5000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa ; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600 ; from Sikyon, 3000 ; from Epidaurus, 800 ; from Trœzen, 1000 ; from Lepreon, 200 ; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, 400 ; from Phlius, 1000 ; from Hermionê, 300 ; from Eretria and Styra, 600 ; from Chalkis, 400 ; from Ambrakia, 500 ; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800 ; from Palê in Kephallenia, 200 ; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3000 Megarian hoplites ; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Plataean, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.¹ The total force of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. ✓ There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. ✓ Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites ; together with 1800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.²

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some

¹ Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Plataea (Pausan. v. 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus, except the Palês of Kephallenia ; and he found in addition the Eleians, Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians and Mælians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean : their contingents sent to Plataea must at all events have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Brøndstedt is

plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read FAÆIOI when it was really written ΠΑÆΙΞ, in an inscription at that time about 600 years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians strengthens this suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palês. The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and curators at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).


² Herodot. ix. 19, 28, 29.

little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions¹ continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.² So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the

¹ Herodot. ix. 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες Ἕλληνων.

² About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i. 136; Xenophon, Anab. iii. 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 26; i. 9, 5: compare Cyropæd. i. 2, 4).



ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate¹ however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.²

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded it round the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.³

The Greeks quit the protection of the mountain-grounds and take up a position nearer to Platæa, along the Asôpus.

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiaë, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,⁴

¹ See Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 15; and the note of Mützel.

² Herodot. ix. 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.

³ Herodot. ix. 24, 25. οἰμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἀπλέτῳ· ἀπασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεῖχε ἡ χῶ, &c.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners of Orientals of that day.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 25–30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῶν ἐγγὺς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ συσκίων δένδρων περιεχόμενον.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pausanias, Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀσωπῇ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, παρήσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ρέοντα—show plainly that the Grecian troops were

and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Plataean hero Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the ✓ Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post, which as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little further to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Eryp-

encamped along the Asôpus on the Plataean side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite or Theban side of the river. Whichever army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c. 36–59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 9 *seq.*, and ch. viii. p. 592 *seq.*; and the still more copious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 324–360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that the fountain of Gargaphia was *near* the river towards the right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of

Androkratês also *near* the river towards the left of that position, where the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii. 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right-hand of the first mile of road from Plataea to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer recognisable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to me suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Plataea which accompanies the *Voyage d'Anacharsis*, are now well understood.

¹ Herodot. ix. 26–29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.C. 396) and Mantinea (B.C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph. *Hellen.* iv. 2, 19).

tians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 50,000 :¹ nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Elis—the latter invited one from Leukas.² All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favourable for resistance if attacked—unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Plataea³ had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed⁴ by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

Unwillingness of both armies to begin the attack—the prophets on both sides discourage first aggression.

¹ Herodot. ix. 31, 32.

² Herodot. ix. 36, 38. *μεμισθωμένους οὐκ ὀλίγους*.

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be seen by the details which Herodotus gives

respecting their adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix. 93.

³ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi.; Thucyd. ii. 74.

⁴ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,¹ near the Lacedæmonian hoplites.

Mardonius annoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the rear.

Moreover the Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks.² Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this manœuvre; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.³ In vain did Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned: so as to allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which

¹ Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 50. τὴν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἧς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γὰρ σφί οὐκ ἐξῆν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τοξευμάτων.

Diodorus (xi. 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evident from the ac-

count of Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once diffuse and uninformative, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi. 30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

² Herodot. ix. 38, 39.

³ Herodot. ix. 40, 41.

Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.¹

Impatience of Mardonius — In spite of the reluctance of Artabazus and other officers he determines on a general attack: he tries to show that the prophecies are favourable to him.

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavourable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground therefore we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.²

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgements. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,³ that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though

¹ Herodot. ix. 42.

² Herodot. ix. 42.

³ Herodot. ix. 43. Τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυρίους τε καὶ τὸν Ἑγ-

χελέων στρατὸν οἶδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, &c.

they did not dare to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

✓ The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit—he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. “Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved.”¹

✓ The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. “We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar.” The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite completed, when day broke and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.²

¹ Herodot. ix. 44–45. The language about the sacrifices is remarkable—λέγω δὲ ὦν ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ δύναται τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, &c.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacrifices: it could not be done.

² Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on many other

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well-calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognised by Herodotus, and well-sustained at least by their personal bravery.¹ Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,² casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a “single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians.” This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.³

Mardonius
again attacks
them with
his cavalry.

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of

occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative of Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. ix. 71.

² Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdes (Iliad, viii. 161).

³ Herodot. ix. 49, 50. Pausanias men-

tions that the Plataeans restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (*τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνεσώσαντο*); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself seen it (ix. 4, 2).

the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroë;¹ both of which flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called Island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.² It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the Island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;³ insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, &c., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete

¹ See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 358.

² Herodot. ix. 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χώρον ἐβουλεύσαντο μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἔχῃσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόγῃ, καὶ οἱ ἱππεὲς σφέας μὴ σινοῖατο, ὥσπερ κατ' ἰθὺ ἐόντων.

The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

³ Herodot. ix. 52. κείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης τῆς ἱπποῦ, εἶχον πόνον ἄτρωτον.

shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the Island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Plataea, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i. e.*, between the course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroê), there appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.¹ Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the Island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,² obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."³ Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.⁴

Refusal of
the Spartan
lochage
Amompha-
retus to obey
the order for
the night-
march.

¹ Herodot. ix. 56. Πausanίας—σημή-
νας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς
πάντας· εἶποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. Ἀθη-
ναῖοι δὲ ταχθέντες ἦσαν τὰ ἔμπαλιν ἢ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὄχθων
ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρείης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶ-
νος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς
τὸ πεδῖον.

With which we must combine another
passage, c. 59, intimating that the track
of the Athenians led them to turn and
get behind the hills, which prevented
Mardonius from seeing them, though
they were marching along the plain:—
Μαρδόνιος—ἐπεῖχε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους

καὶ Τεγεῆτας μόνους. Ἀθηναίους γὰρ
τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πεδῖον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων
οὐ κατέώρα.

² There is on this point a difference
between Thucydides and Herodotus:
the former affirms that there never was
any Spartan lochus so called (Thucyd.
i. 21).

We have no means of reconciling the
difference, nor can we be certain that
Thucydides is right in his negative com-
prehending all past time—ὅς οὐδ' ἐγέ-
νετο πώποτε.

³ Herodot. ix. 53, 54.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 52, 53.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding;¹ yet it proved fortunate in its results—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—“This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers.” Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame

Mistrust of
Pausanias
and the
Spartans ex-
hibited by the
Athenians.

Pausanias
moves with-
out Amom-
pharetus, who
speedily fol-
lows him.

¹ Herodot. ix. 54. Ἀθηναῖοι—εἶχον ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα, ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἐτάχθωσαν, ὥς ἄλλα φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων.

his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.¹ The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the Island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadae—"These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

Astonishment of Mardonius on discovering that the Greeks had retreated during the night—he pursues and attacks them with disorderly impatience.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:² but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighbourhood of the Demetrium or temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athe-

Battle of Plataea.

¹ Herodot. ix. 56, 57.

² Herodot. ix. 59. *ἐδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμῳ οὔδενι κοσμηθέντες, οὔτε τάξι. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν βοῇ τε καὶ ὁμίλῳ ἐπήϊσαν, ὥς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.*

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius—*ἔχων*

συντεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπέφερετο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, &c. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17).

Plutarch also says that Pausanias *ἤγε τὴν ἁλλήν δύναμιν πρὸς τὰς Πλαταιὰς, &c.*, which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the Island, not to Plataea: he did not reach either the one or the other.

nians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.¹ Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:² their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavourable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,³ among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Plataeans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favourable:⁴ but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armour, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.⁵ They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians,

¹ Herodot. ix. 60, 61.

² About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anabasis, iii. 4, 17.

³ Herodot. ix. 72.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Πausanίῳ ἐγένετο θυομένοισι τὰ σφάγια χρηστά. Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristot. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix. 61).

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favourable sacrifices, see Xenophon, Anabasis, vi. 4, 10–25; Hellenic. iii. 2, 17.

⁵ Herodot. ix. 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: λήματι μὲν νυν καὶ ῥώμῃ οὐκ ἔσσονες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἄνοπλοι δὲ ἔόντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοις σοφίην . . . πλεῖστον γὰρ σφεας ἐδηλέετο ἢ ἐσθῆς ἐρῆμος ἐοῦσα δπλων, πρὸς γὰρ δπλίτας

seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.¹ Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnêstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.²

Great personal bravery of the Persians—they are totally defeated, and Mardonius slain.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.³ With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medising* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or

The Athenians on the left wing defeat the Thebans.

ἰόντες γυμνήτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii. 17), a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,—and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which 1400 half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelin, Geschichte der

Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, ch. vi. p. 240, or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

¹ For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii. 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (θώρηκας): probably this may have been after the battle of Plataea. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on horseback had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the case of Masistius above narrated: by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 6; Brissot, De Regno Persarum, lib. iii. p. 361), for the cavalry at least.

² Herodot. ix. 64, 65.

³ Herodot. ix. 67, 68.

reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.¹

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat.

Artabazus with a large Persian corps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece—the rest of the Persian army take up their position in the fortified camp.

A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to ensure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.²

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Plataea instead of to the Island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was,

Small proportion of the armies on each side which really fought.

¹ Herodot. ix. 67, 68. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέος ἐθελοκακέοντων . . . καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ πᾶς

ὁμιλος οὔτε διαμαχεσάμενος οὔδενι οὔτε τι ἀποδεξάμενος ἔφυγεν.

² Herodot. ix. 66.

that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honour, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men.¹ But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed throne, and scimitar,² were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only 3000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.³

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of

¹ Herodot. ix. 69.

² Herodot. ix. 70; Demosthenes cont. Timokrat. p. 741. c. 33. Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the scimitar of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

³ Herodot. ix. 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805–824. He singles out “the Dorian spear” as the great weapon of destruction to the Persians at Platæa—

very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they deserved at Platæa. Pindar distributes the honour between Sparta and Athens in like manner (Pyth. i. 76).

computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein however is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all doubtless hoplites – for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.¹ Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,² while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medising* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.³ It will be seen that Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribe *Æantis*, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that *no* citizens belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

² Diodorus indeed states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give quarter or take any prisoners (xi. 32); but this is hardly to be

believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost 10,000 men is still less admissible.

³ Herodot. ix. 89. The allusions of Demosthenês to Perdikkas king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flight from Platæa, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too loose to deserve attention; more especially as Perdikkas was *not then* king of Macedonia (Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 687. c. 51; and *περί Συντάξεως*, p. 173. c. 9).

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians and the Phliasians each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians¹—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighbourhood of Platæa by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honour, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans.² The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.³ On the morrow the body was stolen

Funeral obsequies by the Greeks—monuments—dead body of Mardonius—distribution of booty.

¹ Herodot. ix. 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-place only to the other *Spartans*, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that 5000 of them were included in the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to the word *ίρέας*, or *είρενας*, or *ίππέας* (the two last being both conjectural readings), it seems impossible to arrive at any certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

² Herodot. ix. 85. *Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὅσοι καὶ φαίνονται ἐν Πλαταιῇσι ἔδοντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, ἐπαισχυνομένους τῇ ἀπεστοῖ τῆς μάχης, ἐκάστους χώματα χώσαι κεινὰ, τῶν ἐπιγινομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων· ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινήτων ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δέκα ἔτεσι ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεηθέντων τῶν Αἰγινήτων, χώσαι Κλεάδην τὸν Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιέα, πρόξεινον ἔδοντα αὐτῶν.*

This is a curious statement, derived

by Herodotus doubtless from personal inquiries made at Platæa.

³ Herodot. ix. 78, 79. This suggestion, so abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans: there is moreover a third (ix. 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Platæa: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathised in the hatred of the Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius—which has more the air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honourable sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories.

away and buried; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.¹

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, &c., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.² By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.³ The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridês of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatês; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.⁴ Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Plataean inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Plataea were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognised, in inscriptions

Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 1; iii. 1, 17).

¹ Herodot. ix. 84; Pausanias, ix. 2, 2.

² Herodot. ix. 80, 81: compare vii. 41–83.

³ Diodorus (xi. 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says — ἐλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἀξιοι ἦσαν (ix. 81).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa: see Diodor. xvii. 35; Quintus Curtius, iii. xi. 21; Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 2.

and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.¹ It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.²

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medising* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timêgenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory; giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who found means to

Pausanias summons Thebes, requiring the surrender of the leaders—these men give themselves up, and are put to death.

¹ Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873; compare Plut. Aristeid. c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the orator Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funebr. c. 9). If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognise the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle was fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of

position: moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, &c., he would naturally enquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Platæans.

² Herodot. ix. 77.

escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,¹ that they were nowise implicated in the *mediæm* of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.² It is remarkable that Pausanias himself only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.³ In this hope indeed he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognised untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the battle of Platæa may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.⁴ But it seems that the general opinion recognised the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest

¹ See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix. 5). Compare also Herodot. iii. 116; ix. 120.

² Herodot. ix. 87, 88.

³ Thucyd. i. 131. καὶ πιστεύων χρημασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Compare Thucyd. viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet (all except

Hermokratês of Syracuse) received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyochus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leotychidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi. 72; Thucyd. ii. 21).

⁴ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan however who had surpassed them all—Aristodêmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valour and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honours as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent valour might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodêmus to a level with the most honoured citizens.¹

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Plataeans received by general vote the prize of valour, it is certain that they were largely honoured and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The marketplace and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.² The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at

Reverential
tribute to
Platæa, as
the scene of
the victory,
and to the
Plataeans:
solemnities
decreed to be
periodically
celebrated by
the latter, in
honour of the
slain.

¹ Herodot. ix. 71, 72.

² Thucyd. ii. 71, 72. So the Roman Emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bebraicum where his troops had re-

cently been victorious, "instaurabat sacrum Diis loci" (Tacitus, Histor. ii. 70).

a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê—the symbol probably of renewed connexion with Athens. They undertook to render religious honours every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.¹ In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Plataea, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Plataea, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover the town of Plataea was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.²

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable;³ nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medising*, either in reality or in appearance, and

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19–21; Strabo, ix. p. 412; Pausanias, ix. 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Boëdromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honour of the deceased, took

place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann (Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

³ Thucyd. i. 90.

new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Plataea, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Plataea, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.¹

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Plataea, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychidês was

Proceedings of the Grecian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Persians.

¹ It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Plataea after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medised*—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x. 35, 2), in his time. Periklês, forty years after the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic

assembly at Athens, for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, *as they give it*, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix. 29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix. 33; Isokratês, Or. iv.; Panegyr. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. Δεκατέλειον, Cicero de Republicâ, iii. 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this History.

long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus, *i. e.* army-leader." "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychidês, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favourable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Deïphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.¹

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,² and had prepared themselves for a naval engagment, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighbouring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus.³ Here they were under the protection

The Persian
fleet aban-
dons Samos
and retires
to Mykalê
in Ionia.

¹ Herodot. ix. 91, 92, 95; viii. 132, 133. The prophet of Mardonius at Plataea bore the name—Hegesistratus: and was probably the more highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix. 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising 250 triremes (xi. 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Deïphonus, will be found curious and interesting (Herodot. ix. 93, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new prophetic family was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 96. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμῆς πρὸς Καλάμοισι, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὀρμιστάμενοι κατὰ τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταύτην, παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς ναυμαχίην.*

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated

temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii. 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

³ Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us—Gæson, Skolopoeis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by Philistus one of the primitive colonists of Miletus, &c. (ix. 96): from the language of Herodotus, we may suppose that Gæson was the name of a town as well as of a river (Ephorus ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 311).

The eastern promontory (Cape Poseidion) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv. p. 637), near to the place where Glaukê was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79)—modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 465).

of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranês—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.¹

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manœuvre, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.²

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day—the fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September) 479 B.C. By a remark-

Mistrust of the fidelity of the Ionians entertained by the Persian generals.

The Greeks land to attack the Persians ashore—revelation of the victory of Plataea, gained by their countrymen on the same morning, is communicated to them before the battle.

¹ Herodot. ix. 96, 97.

² Herodot. ix. 98, 99, 104.

able coincidence, the victory of Plataea in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine Phê mê or message flew into the camp. Whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,¹

¹ Herodot. ix. 100, 101. *ἰοῦσι δὲ σφί (Ἑλλησι) φήμη τε ἐσέπτατο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν, καὶ κηρυκῆϊον ἐφάνη ἐπὶ τῆς κυματωγῆς κείμενον. ἡ δὲ φήμη διήλθε σφί ὧδε, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατιὴν νικῶεν ἐν Βοιωτίῃ μαχόμενοι. Δῆλα δὲ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοις ἐστὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων· εἰ καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπίπτουσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῇσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκάλῃ μέλλοντος ἐσεσθαι τρώματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἑλλησι τοῖσι ταύτη ἐσαπικέτο, ὥστε θαρσῆσαι τε τὴν στρατιὴν πολλῷ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν . . . γεγονέναι δὲ νίκην τῶν μετὰ Πausανίῳ Ἑλλήνων ὁρθῶς σφί ἡ φήμη συνέβαινε ἐλθοῦσα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῇσι πρῶτ' ἐτι τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγένετο· τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκάλῃ, περὶ δέλην . . . ἦν δὲ ἀβρῶδ' ἡ σφί πρὶν τὴν φήμην ἐσαπικέσθαι, οὔτι περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν οὕτω, ὡς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ ἡ Ἑλλάς. ὡς μέντοι ἡ κληδὼν αὕτη σφί ἐσέπτατο, μᾶλλον τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσοδον ἐποιοῦντο: compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna.—The φήμη which circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia, respecting his intention to kill the Phokians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix. 17).*

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum, c. 27, p. 57, and De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the ancient idea of φήμη—a divine voice or vocal goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous feeling—the Vox Dei passing into the Vox Populi. There was an altar to φήμη at Athens (Pausan. i. 17, 1); compare Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761, and the Ὅσσα of Homer, which is essentially

the same idea as φήμη: Iliad, ii. 93. μετὰ δὲ σφίσιν Ὅσσα δεδήκει Ὀτρύνουσι λέναι, Διὸς ἄγγελος; also Odyssey, i. 282—opposed to the idea of a distinct human speaker or informant—*ἦν τις τοι εἴπῃσι βροτῶν, ἡ Ὅσσαν ἀκούσης Ἐκ Διὸς, ἥτε μάλιστα φέρει κλέος ἀνθρώποισι;* and Odys. xxiv. 412. Ὅσσα δ' ἄρ' ἄγγελος ὦκα κατὰ πτόλιν ὄχετο πάντη, Μνηστήρων στυγερὸν θάνατον καὶ κῆρ' ἐνέκουσα. The word κληδὼν is used in the same meaning by Sophoklēs, Philoktet. 255: Κληδὼν at Smyrna had altars as a goddess, Aristeidēs, Orat. xl. p. 507. ed. Dindorf, p. 754 (see Andokidēs de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64): Herodotus in the passage now before us considers the two as identical—compare also Herodot. v. 72. Both words are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in that particular case is considered as determined by the special intervention of the gods, for the information of some person who hears it: see Homer, Odyssey. xx. 100: compare also Aristophan. Aves, 719; Sophoklēs, Œdip. Tyr. 43–472; Xenophon, Symposium, c. 14. s. 48.

The descriptions of *Fama* by Virgil, Æneid. iv. 176 seq., and Ovid, Metamorph. xii. 40 seq., are more diffuse and overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended, those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent and contagious impressions of every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x. 28. "Victorem equi-

and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykalê were alive to tell their own story. He moreover mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity : there was a chapel of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalê, as well as at Plataea. Diodorus and other later writers,¹ who wrote when

tatum velut *lymphaticus* pavor dissipat." ix. 27. "Milites, incertum ob quam causam, *lymphatis* similes ad arma discurrunt"—in Greek *νυμφόληπτοι*: compare Polyæn. iv. 3, 26, and an instructive note of Mützel, ad Quint. Curt. iv. 46, 1 (iv. 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea which the Greeks invested with divinity under the name of *Φήμη* than by transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution Française*. The illustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is predominant,—and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an explanation pre-eminently satisfactory—has passed away in the historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs ; the common susceptibilities, common inspiration, and common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event—the capture of the Bastille, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii. vol. i. p. 105).

"Versailles, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des ministres, un général, une armée, n'étoit qu'hésitation, doute, incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

"Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plus profond, l'unanimité des esprits.

"Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu'à se défendre. Le 14, il attaqua.

"Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus le matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur désordonnée. Le matin fut lumineux et d'une sérénité terrible.

"Une idée se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une voix : Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!

"Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire; . . . Et tous le crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

"La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n'en étoit pas moins imprenable, à moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie. Le peuple n'avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les moyens de faire un siège régulier. L'eût-il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses munitions de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds d'épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et quarante à la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets : et ses batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeait sur Paris, auroient pu en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

"L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce fut un acte de foi.

"Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent. Le long des rues, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule criait à la foule—À la Bastille—à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous entendoient : À la Bastille.

"Personne, je le répète, ne donna l'impulsion. Les parleurs du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, la Polignac, Artois, le prévôt Flesselles, d'autres encore. Les noms des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n'est pas non plus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs ramènèrent les dépouilles et les prisonniers.

"Encore moins les électeurs qui siégeaient à l'Hotel de Ville eurent-ils l'idée de l'attaque. Loin de là, pour l'empêcher, pour prévenir le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aisément, ils allèrent jusqu'à promettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, on ne l'attaqueroit pas. Les électeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés ; mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

"Qui l'eut ? Celui qui eut aussi le devouement, la force, pour accomplir sa foi. Qui ? Le peuple, tout le monde."

¹ Diodor. xi. 35 ; Polyæn. i. 33. Justin (ii. 14) is astonished in relating "tantam famæ velocitatem."

the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataea, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardour of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,¹ with disadvantages of armour such as had been felt severely at Plataea, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians—next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means

¹ Herodot. ix. 102, 103. Οὗτοι δὲ | χοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος ἐσπίπτουσι (Πέρσαι), κατ' ὀλίγους γινόμενοι, ἐμά- | Ἑλλήνων.

bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.¹ The honours of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Træzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.²

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his scimitar and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,³ who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês. The consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.⁴ But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.⁵ But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the

¹ Herodot. ix. 104, 105. Diodorus (xi. 36) seems to follow different authorities from Herodotus: his statement varies in many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the Greeks; but the latter says that 40,000 Persians and allies were slain.

² Herodot. ix. 105.

³ Herodot. ix. 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 108-113. He gives the story at considerable length: it illustrates forcibly and painfully the interior of the Persian regal palace.

⁵ Herodot. viii. 132.

same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medising* Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.¹ The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honourable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute²—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November 480 B.C.).³ Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for

The Grecian fleet sails to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remain to attack the Chersonese.

¹ Herodot. ix. 106; Diodor. xi. 37. The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

² Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the Per-

sians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to a conjunction of free states like the Greeks they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, vol. i. book vi. p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A.D. 1390–1400).

³ Herodot. viii. 115, 117; ix. 106, 114.

the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês¹ down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493–480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendancy of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiadês had in after days, with private forts of his own.² To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.³ Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the coöperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Œobazus and Artayktês.⁴

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,⁵ was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighbouring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched

Siege of Sestus—antipathy of the Chersonesites against Artayktês.

¹ See the preceding volume of this History, ch. xxx., ch. xxxiv., ch. xxxv.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 17. τὰ ἐαυτοῦ τείχῃ.

³ Herodot. vii. 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the Hel-

lespont, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 59.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 114, 115. Σηστὸν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλληνισ-
πόντου — Thucyd. viii. 62: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. ii. 1, 25.

⁵ Thucyd. viii. 102.

with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—"Master, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory, met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land"—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.¹ Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where however he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and

Capture of
Sestus—
crucifixion
of Artayktês.

¹ Herodot. ix. 116: compare i. 4. | Ἀθήνας ἐξηπάτησε, τὰ Πρωτεσίλειω τοῦ Ἀρταύκτους, ἀνὴρ Πέρσης, δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ἰφίκλου χρήματα ἐξ Ἑλαιούντος ὑφέ-
ἀτάσθαλος· ὃς καὶ βασιλέα ἐλαύνοντα ἐπ' | λόμενος. Compare Herodot. ii. 64.

made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed.¹ There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.²

¹ Herodot. ix. 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἑλαιοῦσιοι τιμωρόντες τῷ Πρωτεσίλεω ἐδέοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταύτην ὁ νόος ἔφερε.

² Herodot. ix. 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must intend his celebrated story respecting the proposition advanced by Themistoklês and condemned by Aristeidês, to apply (Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 20; Aristeidês, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the Thessalian harbour of Pagasæ, when Themistoklês formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian, in order that no city except Athens might have a naval force. Themistoklês (he tells us) intimated to the people, that he had a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate; but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidês. Themistoklês did so; and Aristeidês told the people, that the project was at once eminently advantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon which the people re-

nounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasæ was Thessalian, and as such, hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never been there: moreover we may add, that taking matters as they then stood, when the fear from Persia was not at all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistoklês was not very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidês to describe it in the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency and Aristeidês with Themistoklês—as well as to bestow at the same time panegyric upon Athens in the days of her glory.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELO-
NIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR
GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian æra, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighbourhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. . This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself

Agrigentum
and Gela
superior to
Syracuse be-
fore 500 B.C.
—Phalaris
despot of
Agrigentum.

the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether Telemachus, became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêro established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusians reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.² With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês.

Syracuse in 500 B.C.—oligarchical government under the Gamori or privileged descendants of the original proprietary colonists—the Demos—the Kyllyrîi or Serfa.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonising chiefs), possessing large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrîi, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual

¹ Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, p. 57-61, who however treats the pretended letters of Phalaris with more consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he took Carthage. See Aristot.

Polit. v. 8, 4; Pindar, Pyth. i. 185; Polyb. xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 90; Cicero in Verr. iv. 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been *then* at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B.C. See a note of Boëckh on the Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. i. 185.

² Thucyd. vi. 5; Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. v. 19: compare Wesseling ad Diodor. xi. 76.

labour and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the

Early governments of the Greek cities in Sicily—original oligarchies subverted in many places by despots—attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus.

oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece.

The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,¹ is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.² It was about the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia³—a colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew

¹ At Gela, Herodot. vii. 153; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic. v. 3, 1.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 8, 4; v. 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων· ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναιτίου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως.

³ Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus: this seems not consistent with the account of Hero-

dotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv. 23).

A funereal monument in honour of Athenæus, one of the settlers who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias, iii. 16, 4).

Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.¹

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian æra, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.²

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,³ did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê: “from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say;” but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to

About B.C.
505.
Kleander
despot of
Gela.—B.C.
about 500
—First rise
of Gelo and
Ænesidêmus
in his service.
Têlinês, the
first marked
ancestor of
Gelo.

¹ Herodot. v. 43, 46.

² Herodot. vii. 158. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing, as

we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

³ Polyænus, v. 6.

march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—detering the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phylê-Athênê in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses¹—a function certainly honourable, and probably

¹ See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii. 153. *τούτους δὲ τῆς Τηλίνης κατήγαγε εἰς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἰρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἡ αὐτὸς ἐκτίησάτο, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. τούτοις δὲ δὲ πῖσυνος ἐὼν, κατήγαγε, ἐπ' ᾧ τε οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱεροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσονται*: compare a previous passage of this History, vol. i. chap. i. p.

It appears from Pindar that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (Olymp. vi. 160 (95), with the Scholia ad loc. and Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 27).

About the story of Phylê personifying Athênê at Athens, see above, ch. xxx. of this History.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vague sense of the Greek and Latin neuter, *ιερά* or *sacra*, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language: but the verbs connected with it, *ἔχειν*, *κεκτῆσθαι*, *κομίζειν*, *φαίνειν*, *ιερά*—*ιεροφάντης*, &c., relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the general public, but accessible only to those who went through certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honour of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece. The *λεγόμενα*, or things said on these occasions, were of less importance than the *δεικνύμενα* and *δρώμενα*, or matters shown and things done (see Pausanias, ii. 37, 3). Herodotus says about the lake of Sais in Egypt, 'Εν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ τὰ δεικνύμενα τῶν παθῶν αὐτοῦ (of Osiris) νυκτὸς ποιεῖσι, τὰ καλέουσι μυστήρια Αἰγύπτιοι: he proceeds to state

that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honour of Dêmêtêr in Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476): compare Pausan. ii. 14, 2.

Δεῖξεν Τριπτολέμῳ τε, Διόκλει τε πληξίππῳ
Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν· καὶ ἐπέφραδεν
ὄργια παισὶ

Πρεσβυτέρῃς Κελέοιο.....

Ὀλβιος, ὃς τὰ δ' ὅπως ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Compare Eurip. Hippolyt. 25; Pindar, Fragm. xcvi.; Sophokl. Frag. lviii. ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81: De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. *ὥς γὰρ οἱ τελούμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠθούμενοι συνίασι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν, προσέχουσιν ἤδη μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς*: and Isokratês, Panegyric, c. 6, about Eleusis, *τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ νῦν δεικνυμεν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν*. These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—*Δηῶ καὶ Κόρη δράμα ἐγενέσθαι μυστικόν, καὶ τὴν πλάνην καὶ τὴν ἀρπαγὴν καὶ τὸ πένθος ἡ Ἐλευσίς δαδουχεῖ*. The word *ὄργια* is originally nothing more than a consecrated expression for *ἔργα*—*ιερά ἔργα* (see Pausanias, iv. 1, 4, 5), though it comes afterwards to designate the whole ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done—*τὰ ὄργια κομίζων—ὄργίων παντοίων συνθέτης*, &c.: compare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22–34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were moveable were brought out—*τελετῆς ἐγκύμονα μυστίδα κίστην* (Nonnus, ix. 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations per-

lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokratês, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.¹

Gelo—in high command among the mercenaries of Hippokratês despot of Gela.

The fate of Zanklê—seemingly held by its despot Skythês in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians

formed by his mother, was bearer of the chest—*κιστόφορος καὶ λικνόφορος* (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79, p. 313). Clemens Alexandrinus (Cohort. ad Gent. p. 14) describes the objects which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian mysteries—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt, ferules, ivy, &c. The communicant was permitted, as a part of the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into a basket, afterwards putting them back again—"Jejunavi et ebibi cyceonem: ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi: accepi rursus, in cistulam transtuli" (Arnobius ad Gent. v. p. 175, ed. Elmenhorst), while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking at it "even from the house-top."

Τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ θασεῖσθε βέβαλοι
Μήδ' ἀπὸ τῷ τέγεος.

(Kallimachus, Hymn. in Cererem, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, *Aglaophamus* (i. p. 51), says, "Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani, præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram suppellectilem dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinât, ut putem Hierophantas ejusmodi *ἱερὰ* in conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliave priscae religionis monumenta; qualia in sacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare

possumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem. Namque non solum in templis ferè omnibus cimelia venerandæ antiquitatis condita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicere quidem liceret . . . Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipse fuisse *ἄγρια φάσματα* sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant *δειξαι τὰ ἱερὰ* vel *παρέχειν* vel *φαίνειν* dici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniarum sacerdotum principem nomen accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum."

Compare also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part ii. ch. ii. sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de *Haruspicum Responsis* (c. 11), which is transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius adv. Gentes, iv. p. 148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance of the festival of the Megalesia: the smallest omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves in 1845, shows what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be produced, even in the nineteenth century, by *ἱερὰ δεικνύμενα*.

¹ Herodot. vii. 154.

(B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode; and the Zanklæans, especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê. His enemy the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,¹ at Inykus, in the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves:

¹ Herodot. vi. 22, 23. Σκύθην μὲν τὸν μούναρχον τῶν Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἱπποκράτης πεδήσας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθογένεα, εἰς Ἴνυκον πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words ὡς ἀποβαλόντα seem to

imply the relation pre-existing between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

excepting however from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.¹ The Samians however did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messênê—a name which it ever afterwards bore;² and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.³

Hippokratês
is victorious
over the
Syracusans
—takes Ka-
marina—dies
—Gelo be-
comes in his
place despot
of Gela.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy

¹ Herodot. vi. 23, 24. Aristotle (Polit. v. 2, 11) represents the Samians as having been first actually received into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

² Thucyd. vi. 4; Schol. ad Pindar.

Pyth. ii. 84; Diodor. xi. 48.

³ Herodot. vii. 155; Thucyd. vi. 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v. 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became
B.C. 491. the most powerful man in the island; but an incident

Greatness of
Gelo—he
gets posses-
sion of Syra-
cuse—and
transfers the
seat of his
power from
Gela to Sy-
racuse.

which occurred a few years afterwards (B.C. 485), while it aggrandised him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the Kyllirii, and the smaller freemen

called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.¹ But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela; which

¹ Herodot. vii. 155. 'Ο γὰρ δῆμος δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων ἐπιόντι Γέλωνι παραδίδοι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐωυτόν.

Aristotle (Politic. v. 2, 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamori were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless indeed we might venture

to suspect that the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which indeed democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. vii. 1. p. 1314): the latter however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, since he describes Hippokratês as *brother* of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of *Syracuse*, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of *Gela* (see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 491 B.C.)

was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns of Megara and Eubœa.

Both these towns, Megara and Eubœa, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a Demos or Body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments: both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behaviour disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus¹) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognised class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome yoke-fellows"—a

Conquest of various Sicilian towns by Gelo—he transports the oligarchy to Syracuse, and sells the Demos for slaves.

¹ Herodot. vii. 156. Μεγαρέας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ, ὡς πολιορκεόμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν παχέας, ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῷ καὶ προσδοκέοντας ἀπολέσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἄγων ἐς Συρακούσας πολιήτας ἐποίησε· τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἔόντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου, οὐδὲ προσδεκόμενον

κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσεσθαι, ἀγαγὼν καὶ τοὺς ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀπέδοτο ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τῶντ' οὖν δὲ τούτου καὶ Εὐβοέας τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίησε δὲ ταῦτα τούτους ἀμφοτέρους, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριτώτατον.

sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹ A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonised Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis² the Mænaliam, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia—and Agêsias the Iamid prophet from Stymphâlus³—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia. For the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiership; while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes.⁴ Moreover, during the

¹ Diodor. xi. 21.

² Pausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, &c.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 106, 107).

³ See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Syracusan Agêsias. The Scholiast on v. 5 of that ode—who says that not Agêsias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stymphâlus to Syracuse—is contradicted

not only by the Scholiast on v. 167, where Agêsias is rightly termed both Ἀρκὰς and Συρακόσιος; but also by the better evidence of Pindar's own expressions—συνοικιστὴρ τε τᾶν κλεινᾶν Συρακοσσᾶν—οἴκοθεν οἴκαδε, with reference to Stymphâlus and Syracuse—δύ' ἀγκύραι (v. 6, 99, 101 = 166–174).

Ergotelês, an exile from Knôsus in Krete, must have migrated somewhere about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympic Ode of Pindar.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 26.

ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 slingers, 2000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.¹

Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid —B.C. 481.

If this numerical statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:² and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to coöperate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.³ We have nothing but a brief and

Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests in the islands.

¹ Herodot. vii. 157. σὺ δὲ δυνάμιός τε ἡκεις μεγάλης, καὶ μοῖρά τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μέτα, ἄρχοντί γε Σικελίης: and even still stronger, c. 163. ἔων Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἄρχων corresponds with ἀρχή, such as that of the Athenians, and is less strong than τύραννος. The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

² Herodot. vii. 145. τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι· οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω.

³ Herodot. vii. 158. Gelo says to the

envoys from Peloponnesus—Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην, ἐτολήμασθε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέοντες ἔλθεῖν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάσασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο, ἐπισκῆπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδew πρὸς Ἑγεσταίων φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλαι ὠφελίαι τε καὶ ἐπαυρέσιες γεγόνασι· ὅτε ἐμεῦ εἵνεκα ἤλθετε βοηθῆσοντες, οὔτε τὸν Δωριέος φόνον ἐκπρηξόμενοι τὸ δὲ κατ' ὑμεῶς, τάδε ἅπαντα ὑπὸ βαρβάροισι νέμεται. Ἀλλὰ εἴ γὰρ ἡμῖν

vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklês. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognised by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Spartan and Athenian envoys apply to Gelo—his answer. Athens, Corinth, &c., reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—“We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—*we* will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan.”

“Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring.”¹

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη· νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπικται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνηστὶς γέγρονε.

It is much to be regretted that we have no farther information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate that the Carthaginians and Egestæans had made some encroachments and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it strange however that he should be made to say—“You (the Pelopon-

nesians) have derived great and signal advantages from these sea-ports”—the profit derived from the latter by *the Peloponnesians* can never have been so great as to be singled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected—ἀπ’ ὧν ἡμῶν (and not ἀπ’ ὧν ὑμῶν)—which must have been true in point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the general purport of Gelo’s speech.

¹ Herodot. vii. 161, 162. Polybius (xii. 26) does not seem to have read

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed : but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece ; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatised. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated) and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organised for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them : and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes¹—probably by the Phœnicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro ; while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seem to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks ; at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity

480 B.C.
Carthaginian
invasion of
Sicily, simul-
taneous with
the invasion
of Greece by
Xerxes.

this embassy as related by Herodotus—or at least he must have preferred some other account of it. He gives a different account of the answer which they made to Gelo : an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and evasive—*πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα*, &c. See Timæus, *Fragm.* 87, ed. Didot.

¹ Ephorus, *Fragment* 111, ed. Didot ; Diodor. xi. 1, 20. Mitford and Dahlmann (*Forschungen, Herodotus, &c.*, sect. 35, p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between Xerxes and the Carthaginians ; but on no sufficient grounds, in my judgement.

and correspondence with Carthage.¹ It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Thêro, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage; backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilcar the Carthaginian Suffes or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favourably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.² These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof

The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar besiege Himera—battle of Himera—complete victory gained over them by Gelo.

that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.³ This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,⁴ in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Himerians, reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sun-rise until late in the afternoon; and its

¹ Herodot. vii. 165; Diodor. xi. 23: compare also xiii. 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv. 44).

² Herodotus (vii. 165) and Diodorus (xi. 20) both give the number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

³ Herodot. vii. 165. The Ligyes came

from the southern junction of Italy and France; the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified: Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci*: an ingenious conjecture.

⁴ Polyb. i. 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the Sikanian mountains where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.¹ Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast²) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies:³ on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to

¹ Diodor. xi. 21–24.

² Herodotus, vii. 167. σώματα δλα καταγίζων. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Mövers on the Phœnician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phœnicians (Porphyr. de Abstin. iv. 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phœnicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Mövers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, p. 71–118).

³ Herodot. vii. 166, 167. Hamilkar

was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of *connubium* between Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B.C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius gave licence to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor. xiv. 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 3000 Grecian prisoners.¹

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.² Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damarêtê wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.³ If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship.⁴ But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.⁵ Indeed we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:⁶ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

Supremacy
of Gelo in
Sicily—he
grants peace
to the Car-
thaginians.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot

venture to trust the details given by the latter.

² I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi. 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other "great benefit" Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

³ Diodor. xi. 26.

⁴ Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 3; Plutarch, *De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ*, p. 552, c. 6.

⁵ Diodor. xx. 14.

⁶ Pindar, *Nem.* ix. 67 (= 28 B.) with the Scholia.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simonidês,¹ composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.² When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperilled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

Conduct of Gelo towards the confederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property,

Number of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and distributed among the Carthaginian cities—their prosperity, especially that of Agrigentum.

¹ Simonidês, Epigr. 141, ed. Bergk.

² Herodot. vii. 163–165: compare

Diodor. xi. 26; Ephorus, Fragg. 111, ed. Didot.

who were kept in chains to work,¹ and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.²

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterwards died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklês.³ And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

¹ Diodor. xi. 25. αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατέστησαν τοὺς διαιρεθέντας αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων ἐπεσκεύαζον.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and labouring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot. i. 66; iii. 39.

² Diodor. xi. 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, capp. 3 and 4.

³ Diodor. xi. 38, 67: Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 29; Aristotle, *Γελῶν Πολίτεια*; *Fragm.* p. 106, ed. Neumann.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,¹ that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia²—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers: but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Number of
new citizens
whom Gelo
had intro-
duced at
Syracuse.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero; a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidês, Bacchylidês, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel, and rapacious in his government³—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Thêro; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but

B.C. 478.

Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Syracuse—jealous of his brother Polyzêlus—harsh as a ruler—quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and Thêro of Agrigentum—appeased by the poet Simonidês.

¹ Diodor. xi. 49. ² Diodor. xi. 72, 73.

³ Diodor. xi. 67; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (*πραδὲς ἀστροῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοισι δὲ*

θαυμαστὸς πατήρ, Pyth. iii. 71 = 125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar. Pyth. i. and ii. p. 161–182).

no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonidês the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.¹

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera:² his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.³

Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thêro.

Power and exploits of Hiero—against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians—against Anaxilaus—he founds the city of Ætna—new wholesale transplantation of inhabitants—compliments of Pindar.

his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:⁴ he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighbouring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered,

¹ Diodor. xi. 48; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii. 29.

² Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii. 173. For the few facts which can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thêro, see Göller, *De Situ et Origine Syracusarum*, ch. vii. p. 19–22. The Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally

useful in explaining the brief historical allusions of the poet; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

³ Diodor. xi. 48, 49.

⁴ The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ in-

his neighbours the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.¹ Those heroic honours, which in Greece belonged to the Œkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna,² on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna; 5000 of them from Syracuse and Gela—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighbouring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model.³ Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar,⁴ that Hiero was vain of his new title of founder. But we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of

scribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boëckh, *Corp. Inscriptt. Græc.* No. 16, part i. p. 34.

¹ Diodor. xi. 51; Pindar, i. 74 (=140); ii. 17 (=35) with the Scholia; Epicharmus, *Fragment*, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 98; Strabo, v. p. 247.

² Ἱέρων οἰκιστὴς ἀντὶ τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι, Κατάνην ἐξελὼν Αἴτνην μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, ἑαυτὸν οἰκιστὴν προσαγρεύσας (Schol. ad Pindar. Nem. i. 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of Thurii, among the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in

determining who should be recognised as Œkist of the place. On referring to the oracle, Apollo directed them to commemorate *himself* as Œkist (Diodor. xii. 35).

³ Chromius ἐπίτροπος τῆς Αἴτνης (Schol. Pind. Nem. ix. 1). About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, &c., Pindar, Pyth. i. 60–71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic victories of the latter by costly offerings at Olympia (Pausan. vi. 12, 1).

⁴ Pindar. Pyth. i. 60 (=117); iii. 69 (=121). Pindar. ap. Strabo. vi. p. 269. Compare Nemea, ix. 1–30, addressed to Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan: but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined together: see Nemea, i. *init.*

offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.¹ But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureat strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.² But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.³ The Agrigentines, thus happily

¹ Justin. iv. 2.

² So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood — πλείστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλλήνας ἔπεσον (Diodor. xi. 53).

³ Diodor. xi. 53. ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν. This is a re-

markable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive τύραννος. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as Selinus.

released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela,¹ nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,² the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.³

Great power of Hiero, after the defeat of Thrasydæus—his death.

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.⁴ This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities⁵—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now

B.C. 467. Thrasybulus, brother and successor of Hiero—disputes among the members of the Gelonian family.—Cruelties and unpopularity of Thrasybulus—mutiny against him at Syracuse.

¹ Diodor. xi. 76. Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρωνος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπτωκότες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων—τούτων δ' ἦσαν Γελῶοι καὶ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ Ἱμεραῖοι.

² Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to have had two other wives—the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklês: this last was the mother of his son Deinomenês (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 112).

We read of Kleophrôn son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during his

father's life-time: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii. 34).

³ Diodor. xi. 66.

⁴ Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, App. chap. 10, p. 264 seq.) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

⁵ Xenophon, Hiero, iii. 8. Εἰ τοίνυν εἰέλεις κατανοεῖν, εὐρήσεις μὲν τοὺς

seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus; who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbour. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its later name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials.¹

ιδιώτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φιλουμένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκτονηκότας, πολλοὺς δ' ὑπὸ παιδῶν αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίσιν ἀλληλοφόνους γεγεννημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν τυράννους διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἐταίρων γε τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratēs, De Pace, Orat. viii. p. 182, § 138.

So also Tacitus (Hist. v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty—"Sibi ipsi reges imposuere: qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium everSIONES, —*fratrum, conjugum, parentum, neces—aliaque solita regibus ausi,*" &c.

¹ Respecting the topography of Syracuse at the time of these disturbances, immediately preceding and following the fall of the Gelonian dynasty—my statements in the present edition will be found somewhat modified as compared with the first. In describing the siege of the city by the Athenian army under Nikias, I found it necessary to study the local details of Thucydides with great minuteness, besides consulting fuller modern authorities. The conclusions which I have formed will be found stated, — partly in the early part of chapter lix. — but chiefly in a separate dissertation annexed as an Ap-

pendix to that chapter, and illustrated by two plans. To the latter Dissertation with its Plans, I request the reader to refer.

Diodorus here states (xi. 67, 68) that Thrasybulus was master both of the Island (Ortygia) and Achradina, while the revolted Syracusans held the rest of the city, of which Itykê or Tychê was a part. He evidently conceives Syracuse as having comprised, in 463 B.C., substantially the same great space and the same number of four quarters or portions, as it afterwards came to contain from the time of the despot Dionysius down to the Roman empire, and as it is set forth in the description of Cicero (Orat. in Verr. iv. 53. 118-120) enumerating the four quarters Ortygia, Achradina, Tychê, and Neapolis. I believe this to be a mistake. I take the general conception of the topography of Syracuse given by Thucydides in 415 B.C., as representing in the main what it had been fifty years before. Thucydides (vi. 3) mentions only the Inner City, which was in the Islet of Ortygia (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντὸς)—and the Outer City (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἔξω). This latter was afterwards known by the name of Achradina, though that name does not occur in Thucydides. Diodorus expressly mentions that both Ortygia and Achradina had each separate fortifications (xi. 73).

Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thêro to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, first in a naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.¹ The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus (son of Thêro) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.² Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.³ The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,⁴ and began their æra of freedom.

B.C. 465.
Expulsion
of Thrasy-
bulus, and
extinction
of the Ge-
lonian dy-
nasty.

In these disputes connected with the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, I conceive Thrasybulus to have held possession of Ortygia, which was at all times the inner stronghold and the most valuable portion of Syracuse; insomuch that under the Roman dominion, Marcellus prohibited any native Syracusan from dwelling in it. (Cicero cont. Verr. v. 32-84. 38. 98.) The enemies of Thrasybulus, on the contrary, I conceive to have occupied Achradina.

There is no doubt that this bisection of Syracuse into two separate fortifica-

tions must have afforded great additional facility for civil dispute, if there were any causes abroad tending to foment it; conformably to a remark of Aristotle (Polit. v. 2. 12.), which the philosopher illustrates by reference to Kolophôn and Notium, as well as to the insular and continental portions of Klazomenæ.

¹ Diodor. ix. 67. 68.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 23.

³ Diodor. xi. 68.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 76.

Popular governments established in all the Sicilian cities—confusion and disputes arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonian princes.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed a first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, &c., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse¹—

¹ Aristotle (Politic. v. 2, 11) mentions, | chief of receiving new citizens, that the as one of his illustrations of the mis- | Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty,

Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position.¹ But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to have a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a reward of one mina per head.²

Internal
dissensions
and combats
in Syracuse.

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.³

Defeat of
the Gelo-
nians—Sy-
racuse made
into one
popular go-
vernment.

admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honours. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel: but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklēs from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honour (Diodor. xxi. Fragm. p. 282).

¹ Diodor. xi. 73. Οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι πάλιν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς παραχῇν, τὸ λοιπὸν

τῆς πόλεως κάτεσχον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ἐπετείχισαν, καὶ πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν ἑαυτοῖς κατεσκεύασαν· εὐθὺ γὰρ τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξόδου τοὺς ἀφεστηκότας εὐχερῶς εἰργον καὶ ταχὺ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐποίησαν ἀπορεῖν.

Diodorus here repeats the same misconception as I have noticed in a previous note. He supposes that the Gelonians were in possession both of Ortygia and of Achradina, whereas they were only in possession of the former, as Thrasybulus had been in the former contest.

The opposing party were in possession of the outer city or Achradina: and it would be easy for them, by throwing out a fortification between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, to straiten the communication of Ortygia with the country around; as may be seen by referring to the Plans of Syracuse annexed to chap. lix. of this History.

² Diodor. xi. 72, 73, 76.

³ Diodorus, xiv. 7.

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigento, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,¹ with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-admit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it.

The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing the city of Kamarina,² which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês despot of Gelo, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among

¹ Diodorus, xi. 76; Strabo, vi. 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the edifices erected in the market-place of Amphipolis, in honour of the Athenian Agnon the Œkist, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v. 11).

² Diodor. xi. 76. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κα-

μαρίναν μὲν Γελῶσι κατοικίσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκληρούχησαν.

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little doubt that in Thucydidês (vi. 5) the correction of κατὰκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῶν (in place of ὑπὸ Γέλωνος) is correct.

the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.¹ For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.²

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,³ probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all the confusion however with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus

¹ Herodot. vii. 155.

² See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 82, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had re-established Ka-

marina. Τὰν νέοικον ἔδραν (Olymp. v. 9); ἀπ' ἀμαχανίας ἄγων ἐς φάος τόνδε δᾶμον ἀστῶν (Olymp. v. 14).

³ Diodor. xi. 86. πολλῶν εἰκῇ καὶ ὥς ἔτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.

Reactionary feelings against the previous despotism, and in favour of popular government, at Syracuse and in the other cities.

and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.¹ Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.²

¹ Herodot. vii. 170; Diodor. xi. 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered (he says) along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of Mikythus—we may remark that Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the

geography of southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight *from Iapygia to Rhegium*.

² Aristotel. Polit. v. 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi. 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum: and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutional changes which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think this juxtaposition of the two passages unauthorized: there is nothing at all to connect them together. See History of the Dorians, iii. 9, 14.

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